The Ceuta Crisis: Europe’s Low Crisis Resilience and the Geopolitical Test for Schengen

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t the end of July, an extraordinary mass influx from Morocco toward Spain’s autonomous city of Ceuta in North Africa brought the migration debate back to center stage in Europe. The arrival of approximately 72,000 people in Ceuta within a short period on July 29–30 not only strained local border capacity but also simultaneously tested Spain–Morocco relations, the logic of mutual trust under the Schengen Agreement, and the crisis resilience of the EU Migration and Asylum Pact, which is set to take effect in June 2026. According to Spanish authorities, although approximately 70,000 people had returned to Morocco by August 4, it was reported that 5,000–8,000 people were still in Ceuta as of mid-August. A protest organized by hundreds of migrants seeking asylum on August 16, followed by concerns raised on August 18—particularly by women—regarding unsafe living conditions and the risk of harassment, demonstrated that the sudden surge of activity at the border had evolved from a temporary security incident into a humanitarian and political crisis.

As a Spanish city on the North African coast—and one of the European Union’s two land borders with the African continent—Ceuta’s significance extends far beyond its geographical size. It is also subject to special regulations that differ from those of mainland Spain under the Schengen regime. Precisely for this reason, the events that have unfolded represent less a crisis signaling the direct collapse of the Schengen Agreement in legal terms and more a test that has shaken the political psychology of Schengen. Immediately following the crisis, Italy initiated temporary controls at its air and sea borders with Spain from August 1 to September 1. Spain, in turn, implemented controls on travelers arriving from Italy between August 8 and September 7. European Commission records show that both countries justified these measures on grounds of public order, internal security, and potential secondary movements. However, EU officials stated on August 4 that there had been no significant secondary movements from Ceuta to mainland Spain or other member states.

This situation demonstrates that the fundamental problem with Schengen is not the absence of legal rules, but the rapid erosion of mutual trust during a crisis. The most recent example of this erosion manifested itself in the form of border closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. Schengen is not merely the abolition of passport controls at border crossings; it is based on the assumption that when one member state manages its external border, it acts on behalf of the others as well. If, when a crisis arises at an external border, the first reflex of other member states is to reinforce their own borders rather than mobilize shared capacity, the system’s political logic weakens even if it remains legally intact. The mutual control decision between Italy and Spain following the Ceuta incident is therefore symbolically significant: a shared external border problem transformed, within a matter of days, into an internal border problem triggered by national security reflexes.

Causes of the crisis

There is no single cause for the crisis. The Spanish Supreme Court’s July 8 ruling determined that irregular migrants arriving by sea in Ceuta and Melilla could not be subject to the same “immediate return” procedure as those who physically cross the border barrier. The ruling did not make returns impossible; however, it required a separate and more formal procedure for those arriving by sea. The misrepresentation of the ruling on social media—suggesting that the borders had effectively been opened—spread rapidly, particularly among young Moroccans. Economic hardship in Morocco, dwindling future prospects for young people, and idealized images of life in Europe circulating on social media have all played a role in this. Therefore, viewing Ceuta solely as an operation organized by human trafficking networks would overlook the social roots of the crisis.

However, questions regarding Morocco’s role have not been entirely dispelled. The Rabat administration has denied allegations that it deliberately relaxed border controls during the 2026 crisis, and Madrid has emphasized that bilateral relations remain in good standing. Nevertheless, the experience of 2021 has left a strong historical imprint on Europe. During the diplomatic crisis that followed Spain’s decision to admit Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali for medical treatment, Morocco’s relaxation of border controls led to approximately 10,000 people crossing into Ceuta, clearly demonstrating that migration flows can become a tool of pressure in interstate relations.

Relations have improved significantly since Spain recognized Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara as the “most serious, realistic, and credible” basis for a solution in March 2022.

Therefore, while there may not be sufficient evidence to directly characterize the 2026 crisis as “Morocco weaponizing migration,” Ceuta has once again highlighted how the migration control that Europe has delegated to neighboring countries can create geopolitical dependency. The state on the other side of the border is not merely a source of irregular crossings or a transit country; it is also becoming an actor that Europe cannot do without in terms of its own border security. The externalization of migration thus reduces the EU’s border burden in the short term while potentially increasing third countries’ bargaining power vis-à-vis Europe in the long term.

This dependency became even more striking on August 12, when Moroccan Justice Minister Abdellatif Ouahbi reiterated Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla. Madrid immediately rejected the statement, declaring that the status of the two cities was not open to negotiation. Subsequently, when calls for new mass crossings on August 15 emerged on social media, Moroccan security forces reinforced the border area to block new attempts and detained a large number of people. Spain responded by increasing the number of security personnel in Ceuta. Morocco has thus emerged as both a potential source of geopolitical pressure from Europe’s perspective and an indispensable security partner for preventing new mass crossings. The strategic dilemma of the EU’s migration policy lies precisely here: the more border control is outsourced to third countries, the more these countries’ bargaining power over Europe increases.

Ceuta has also served as one of the first major stress tests for the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Adopted in May 2024 and set to take effect on June 12, 2026, the Pact aims to harmonize border procedures and provide a mandatory yet flexible solidarity mechanism for member states facing intense migration pressure. A financial reference amount of 420 million euros has been set for the 2026 solidarity pool, comprising 21,000 resettlements or an equivalent solidarity contribution; Spain is among the countries designated as facing migration pressure. At an extraordinary meeting on August 4, EU interior ministers sent a message of solidarity to Spain while emphasizing the fight against smuggling networks, the facilitation of returns, cooperation with third countries, the protection of external borders, and the fight against online disinformation.

Political impact

However, there is a significant paradox here. While the EU’s rhetoric of solidarity has grown stronger, its actual policy response continues to be largely driven by securitization and externalization. While the New Pact aims to institutionalize the sharing of responsibilities among member states, the measures that came to the fore in the early days of the Sebta crisis included internal border controls, accelerated returns, maritime barriers, and support for Morocco’s border capacity. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s statement following the crisis that more support could be provided to Morocco on border management was one of the most concrete indicators of this trend. In other words, while the EU’s institutional learning is progressing at the technical level, its political learning is not keeping pace.

The scale of the crisis’s political impact is even more striking when compared to general migration trends. According to EU Council data, there was a 37 percent decline in irregular entries across the Union during the first six months of 2026. Nevertheless, the surge in Ceuta over the course of just a few days has reignited debates across Europe about the future of the Schengen Area. This situation demonstrates that in migration policy, sudden surges, the circulation of dramatic imagery, and fears of secondary movements can be more decisive factors in shaping political decisions than overall numbers. In this sense, Ceuta has revealed not only Europe’s border capacity but also how quickly the perception of a crisis can alter political behavior. It is precisely at this point that a broader issue—which could be described as “Europe’s low crisis resilience”—becomes apparent. In a well-functioning crisis management system, a shock automatically triggers predefined common mechanisms. In the EU, however, crises often lead not to the consolidation of common rules but to the proliferation of national exceptions. While member states benefit from the mobility, security, and economic advantages provided by the common area in normal times, they renationalize risks in times of crisis. Solidarity thus ceases to be an automatic reflex and becomes a political bargaining chip that is renegotiated after every crisis.

The humanitarian issues in Ceuta that remained unresolved as of mid-August also illustrate the cost of this structural shortfall. The fact that thousands of people are stranded in the city, that reception centers have exceeded their capacity, and that there are issues regarding shelter in open areas and, in particular, the safety of women, serves as a reminder that “border protection” and “crisis management” are not the same thing. The return of a large portion of the migrants to Morocco within a short period may have alleviated the acute pressure; however, this has not eliminated the economic, social, legal, and geopolitical dynamics that gave rise to the Ceuta crisis. Therefore, the Ceuta crisis is not a sign that the Schengen Agreement has come to an end, but rather that the political resilience of European integration in the face of crises remains limited. The real threat is not the temporary passport controls themselves. The more fundamental problem lies in the fragility of member states’ trust in common mechanisms and the EU’s increasing reliance on cooperation with third countries for the security of its external borders. Ceuta has become a testing ground where these two vulnerabilities have emerged simultaneously.

The true success of the new Migration and Asylum Pact will not depend solely on how many people are resettled, how many millions of euros are allocated, or how much the external borders are strengthened. The decisive question is whether, when the next shock hits, Europe will retreat back behind its national borders, or whether it will be able to transform solidarity from an option negotiated after a crisis into an automatic political reflex that kicks in during a crisis. The initial answer provided by Sebte, however, is not very optimistic at this point.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)