Building a Strategic Alliance in Türkiye-Gulf Relations
Through its recent diplomatic contacts and initiatives with Qatar, Türkiye aims to establish similar relationships with Kuwait and Oman.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Sultan Haitham bin Tariq of Oman attend a signing ceremony following delegation-level talks at Al Alam Palace, where Turkish Presidency of Communications Director Burhanettin Duran signs bilateral agreements, in Muscat, Oman, on October 23, 2025. Photo by Anadolu Images.
T
he Gulf region is one of the areas with which Türkiye has had the most intense foreign policy interactions in recent years. Since 2020, this rapprochement has intensified, and Türkiye’s partnerships with the region’s leading foreign policy actors have grown. Notably, its long-standing close relations with Qatar have evolved into a strategic partnership. Meanwhile, relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which were once defined by competition, have transformed into cooperative engagements.
Meanwhile, Ankara has also maintained contact with other countries in the region, including Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. These interactions have brought potential cooperation opportunities in various sectors, including the defense industry, trade, energy, and manufacturing, to the forefront. In line with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s approach of establishing direct contact with Gulf countries, reciprocal visits have increased.
From October 21 to 23, 2025, President Erdoğan undertook a Gulf tour covering three countries. Accompanied by numerous ministers, bureaucrats, and journalists, he visited Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. There, he engaged in activities aimed at strengthening Türkiye’s relations with Gulf countries, particularly in areas such as the defense industry and energy. The signing of 24 cooperation and partnership agreements during the visit suggests that the relationship is evolving into a stronger partnership.
What makes Qatar, Oman and Kuwait different?
There are certain points that distinguish Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman—the three countries visited by President Erdoğan on his recent tour of the Gulf region—from other Gulf countries. First, these three countries differ from others in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain, particularly in terms of their foreign policy approaches and orientations. Notably, Qatar’s relations with Türkiye, its North African policies, and its moderate stance on the Muslim Brotherhood distinguish it from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Conversely, unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Oman and Kuwait tend to adopt a neutral and conciliatory stance in their foreign relations.
Another aspect that sets Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman apart from other Gulf countries is how they handle the Palestinian issue. Notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain normalized relations with Israel by signing the Abraham Accords in 2020. Recently, there has been discussion about the possibility of Saudi Arabia taking a similar step. In contrast, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman have opposed Israel’s occupation policies in Palestine on many regional and international platforms.
These countries also use their diplomatic influence on the global stage to advocate for Palestinian rights. For example, Qatar has hosted Hamas members for many years and uses the Aljazeera channel to create international public pressure against Israel. Since October 7, Oman has strongly criticized Israel’s massacres in Gaza in official statements. This reaction is also evident at the societal level. In Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait, Friday sermons, television broadcasts, and civil society organizations have condemned Israel while expressing solidarity with Gaza and the Palestinians.
Qatar and Oman: Diverting from Saudi Arabia and the UAE
On the other hand, one could argue that Qatar and Oman have diverged from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in their policies toward Iran. In fact, Qatar is closely aligned with Tehran due to its cooperation with Iran in the Persian Gulf and their similar policies on other regional issues. During the 2017 blockade, Iran and Türkiye provided Qatar with significant support, particularly by supplying food products.
Oman, on the other hand, is said to have the strongest historical and cultural ties to Iran of any country in the Gulf region. Recently, these two countries conducted military exercises involving land and naval forces. In contrast, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama have adopted policies closer to those of the U.S. and Israel regarding Iran. Thus, they differ from Doha and Muscat in this respect.
Finally, it is known that all three countries closely cooperate with the United Kingdom in the defense industry. In this context, Türkiye has been planning to purchase Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets for some time. Due to growing regional risks and security concerns, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman have added 22, 15, and 12 Eurofighter jets, respectively, to their air forces in recent years.
Despite their security partnerships with the U.S. and the U.K., these countries have been striving to develop their own capabilities. According to reports, Qatar ordered 36 Eurofighters, Kuwait ordered 28, and Oman ordered 12. Considering that Türkiye has put the purchase of used Eurofighters on its agenda, President Erdogan’s choice of these three countries for his Gulf visit becomes more meaningful. Indeed, statements made after the visit indicated that the purchase of Eurofighter jets was specifically negotiated with Oman and Qatar.
From cooperation to strategic partnership
President Erdoğan’s Gulf tour from October 21 to 23 is significant because it elevates Türkiye’s relations with regional countries beyond traditional cooperation into strategic partnerships. Considering the nature of relations and partnerships in recent years, this has already been achieved with Qatar. Türkiye provided critical support to Qatar when it became the target of a political blockade initiated by its neighbors on June 5, 2017. As a result, relations between the two countries strengthened. Following the blockade, Türkiye established a military base in Qatar, becoming one of the Doha administration’s most reliable global partners.
Over the following years, Türkiye and Qatar continued to strengthen their relationship, particularly with regard to regional policies. They pursued common policies in regions such as the Horn of Africa and North Africa. Most recently, during Israel’s attacks on Gaza, Ankara and Doha pursued overlapping policies, calling for Tel Aviv and the Benjamin Netanyahu government to be held accountable under international law. Disturbed by Qatar’s stance, Israel bombed the offices of Aljazeera and the Qatar Red Crescent in Gaza.
Then, in September, Israel directly targeted Doha, the capital of Qatar, carrying out an attack against Hamas members there. Despite Israel’s aggression, Turkey continued to support Qatar. After the attack, President Erdoğan attended the Doha summit and expressed his support for Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. As part of his Gulf tour, Erdoğan also made his second visit to Qatar within two months.
Türkiye eyes a relationship with Oman and Kuwait similar to that with Qatar
Through its recent diplomatic contacts and initiatives with Qatar, Türkiye aims to establish similar relationships with Kuwait and Oman. While relations between Kuwait and Türkiye have primarily focused on economic and social cooperation, this dynamic has begun to evolve in recent years. In 2024, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Meshal Al-Sabah visited Türkiye and signed an agreement with President Erdoğan regarding defense industry imports and increased military cooperation.
After taking office on December 16, 2023, Al-Sabah made his first visit outside the Arab world to Türkiye, where he expressed his desire to further strengthen relations between the two countries. Kuwait sends the highest percentage of tourists to Türkiye relative to its population, and it ranks among the top ten foreign countries purchasing real estate in Türkiye. These facts demonstrate positive perceptions of Türkiye within Kuwaiti society and highlight the potential for further strengthening relations.
The final stop on the visit was Oman, with which Türkiye has sought to strengthen relations recently. Oman, which has the second largest native-born population in the Gulf Cooperation Council, has strengthened its relations with Türkiye in areas such as energy, the defense industry, and tourism, particularly in recent years. As part of this cooperation, Oman began exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Türkiye in 2025. In February of that year, Aselsan, a leading Turkish defense industry company, opened its fourth office in the Gulf region in Muscat, the capital of Oman.
The most significant development in the relationship between the two countries was Sultan Haitham bin Tariq of Oman’s visit to Türkiye last year. During this historic visit, the two countries signed agreements to strengthen their relationship. As part of his tour of the Gulf region, President Erdoğan visited Oman to maintain the momentum gained in relations. Signing four agreements with Qatar and Kuwait and sixteen with Oman highlights Ankara’s emphasis on relations with Muscat. The agreements between Oman and Türkiye cover areas such as military cooperation, the defense industry, and critical minerals, indicating that the relationship may evolve into strategic cooperation.
Limitations and opportunities
At this point, it may be useful to note why relations with Oman have progressed more slowly, considering that Türkiye has much closer ties with other Gulf countries. First, Oman’s reserved stance on external relations has played a significant role. Although Oman has a history of ruling over distant lands, it was an extremely inward-looking country during the reign of Sultan Said bin Teymur, the father of the previous sultan, Qaboos. After Qaboos ascended to the throne in 1970, Oman reopened to the outside world and began modernizing and developing.
Oman’s transformation differed from those of other Gulf countries. Oman embraced a strategy of remaining faithful to its traditions and preserving its culture. The country maintained neutrality in foreign relations and proceeded cautiously in opening up to the outside world. As part of this strategy, Oman has emerged as a mediator in regional crises. Therefore, it can be said that Oman’s development of relations with external actors was gradual, which is why its rapprochement with Türkiye took time.
Oman’s close ties with the United Kingdom prompted the country to exercise caution in its foreign relations. Oman worked closely with the UK, particularly during Sultan Qaboos’s rise to power. This continued throughout the years that followed. Throughout Sultan Qaboos’s 50-year reign, from 1970 to 2020, relations between the two countries remained strong. However, this also affected Oman’s ability to establish close relations with other regional and global actors.
In the context of economic relations, it is important to mention the Indian diaspora, which has historically held a strong position in Oman. This diaspora has played a significant role in Oman’s economy, both historically and in the present day, and is considered a key player in directing the country’s economic activities. The dominance of businesspeople of Indian origin in many sectors makes it difficult for new economic actors to enter the country’s finance and trade ecosystem.
On the other hand, the accelerated pace of relations between Oman and Türkiye also presents opportunities. Compared to the past, Oman has adopted a more open and innovative administration. Sultan Haitham has also shown a willingness to collaborate with new regional and global partners. Additionally, Oman stands out with its substantial military spending. Oman shares borders with Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE due to its vast geography. To protect its territory and develop its capacity in the face of possible crises, Oman is striving to acquire new military technologies and modernize its army.
Currently, Türkiye could become an important supplier for Oman, which is seeking to diversify its military supply sources. Oman also prioritizes strengthening its naval capabilities because it has the longest coastline in the Middle East. With a longer coastline than Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and India—the largest military powers bordering the Middle East and the Indian Ocean—Oman could increase its cooperation with these countries, particularly regarding coastal and maritime security.
Finally, Oman’s demographics differ from those of other Gulf countries, presenting another opportunity for rapprochement with Türkiye. Unlike the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, where most of the population is non-local, Oman, like Saudi Arabia, has a population that is largely comprised of its own citizens. With over three million citizens, Oman has the second-largest national population in the Gulf region after Saudi Arabia. This allows social and cultural factors to take center stage in relations with Oman. Türkiye is one of the most popular tourist destinations for Omanis, with thousands of Omani citizens purchasing property there every year. Given Omani society’s positive perception of Türkiye, it seems likely that social relations will grow closer.
In conclusion, President Erdoğan’s tour of three Gulf countries underscores the importance that Türkiye places on this region, which plays a critical role in regional and global politics. Through these engagements, Ankara intends to fortify existing partnerships in the Gulf region and demonstrate its dedication to reviving the agenda of delayed cooperation in certain areas. Ultimately, these initiatives seek to transform Türkiye’s presence in the Gulf into strategic alliances and establish long-term, institutional, unshakable partnerships with regional countries.
(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)
