Is War at the Door? Iran and the Azerbaijan-Armenia Tensions
Iran is not in a position to engage in a large-scale conflict with Azerbaijan. It only wants to sow instability in order to strengthen its negotiating position.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev greets as he attends the opening of the commando brigade with his wife Mihriban Aliyeva and son Haydar Aliyev at Hadrut district of Shusha, Azerbaijan on December24, 2021. Photo by Anadolu Images
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ince 2020, following the liberation of Karabakh from nearly three decades of Armenian occupation, the region has yet to establish a stable governance structure. This issue is undoubtedly complex, involving a multitude of actors beyond the primary parties involved. In addition to the ongoing Baku-Yerevan crisis, tensions have arisen between Moscow and Yerevan, on the one hand, and Baku and Tehran, and Ankara and Tehran, on the other, contributing to regional instability.
In response to this intricate situation, Presidents Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Erdoğan of Turkey, towards the end of 2020, introduced a proposal for a platform that would bring together the key stakeholders in the region, with the aim of resolving the conflict and forging a lasting peace. This proposal, known as the “6-party platform,” did not receive a positive reception from Iran and Armenia. Meanwhile, despite various proposals, progress remained stagnant, with Iran basing its South Caucasus policy on preventing the geopolitical losses that could result from disrupting the 30-year status quo.
To this end, Iran tested the responsiveness of the Baku administration by taking provocative measures, such as conducting military exercises along the border and issuing provocative statements through official channels. Simultaneously, Iran continued to caution Azerbaijan and Turkey, asserting “red lines” and emphasizing its stance of not permitting any alterations to the existing borders.
Armenia’s foreign policy shift
When Armenia’s efforts to seek support for its foreign policy, aimed at maintaining the illegal occupation of Karabakh, failed to elicit a response, especially from Russia, it turned its attention to the United States. In this context, Armenia explored options such as withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Simultaneously, U.S. and Armenian soldiers commenced a joint military exercise known as “Eagle Partner.”
Eagle Partner was deliberately timed to coincide with the so-called presidential elections conducted in a region controlled by Armenian forces within Karabakh, serving as a clear political message to Baku. These illegitimate elections, strongly condemned by Turkey and unrecognized by the U.S. and the EU, unquestionably undermine the prospects for establishing stability and peace in the region.
Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan noted during an interview with an Italian media outlet that “our dependence on Russia for security has been a strategic mistake,” as his wife, Anna Hakobyan, visited Kyiv to express support for Ukraine. These developments have undoubtedly irked Russia. While this diplomatic shift by the Pashinyan administration appears to be driven by Russia’s perceived vulnerabilities, stemming from events such as the Ukrainian conflict and the Prigozhin mutiny, it is unlikely to yield the desired outcomes for Armenia.
Despite possible reactions from Azerbaijan, Turkey, Russia, and Israel, expecting substantial support from the United States in a situation where Armenia’s actions flagrantly violate international law is a futile endeavor. Nonetheless, to garner the support of the Armenian lobby ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in the U.S., some figures may offer symbolic gestures of support to Armenia, albeit with limited impact.
Meanwhile, Russia’s stance cannot be interpreted as outright support for Azerbaijan against Armenia, but rather as a decision to refrain from direct military involvement on Armenia’s behalf. Within this framework, Turkey-Russia relations have played a significant role. Armenia’s recent overtures towards the United States have deeply unsettled the Kremlin. Amid the growing distance between Armenia and Russia, President Putin made a noteworthy statement underscoring Armenia’s concession regarding Karabakh by asserting that “Armenia itself recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan; there is nothing more to say.”
Iran is the primary source of support for Armenia. Armenia’s neighbor, Iran, has enjoyed a long history of positive relations with Armenia and has subtly conveyed its backing for Armenia on the Karabakh issue. Various factors, however, prevent Iran from openly and directly endorsing Armenia; notably, the significant presence of Turkish population within Iran presents a challenging factor for Iran. Nevertheless, the reasons necessitating Iran’s support for Armenia are equally compelling.
Foremost among these reasons is the potential geopolitical loss stemming from the opening of the Zangezur Corridor, which would sever Iran’s land connection with Armenia. This would place Iran in a precarious situation, hemmed in by two formidable Turkic states. Given the historical significance of the South Caucasus to Iran, such a loss is simply untenable and Iran has repeatedly asserted its opposition to the corridor. While officially acknowledging Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory, Iran leaves the issue unresolved due to its concerns over its regional interests.
How realistic is the prospect of war?
Could this tension escalate into an outright war? Are we teetering on the brink of a major regional conflict, as some claim? I would emphatically say we are not. A meticulous examination of the parties’ responses to the unfolding events makes it abundantly clear that the prospect of armed conflict involving Iran and Turkey is exceedingly narrow.
Keeping Iran’s motivations for safeguarding its national interests in the South Caucasus in mind, a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal and external political equilibrium, along with its diplomatic acumen, leaves no room for the possibility of the outbreak of such a war. Notably, senior Iranian military officials have unequivocally refuted allegations of military buildup along the Turkey-Iran border. Furthermore, military authorities from both nations have solidified their commitment to enhancing Iran-Azerbaijan military collaboration through an official agreement.
Seyed Abbas Mousavi, the Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, has chosen to characterize these developments and discussions as akin to “a storm in a teacup.” In essence, he has interpreted them as a tempestuous but ultimately inconsequential commotion. Moreover, it has become evident that there is no verifiable statement attributed to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan suggesting that Turkey would intervene if Azerbaijan were to come under attack.
Hence, the prospects of war are virtually non-existent, and diplomatic prudence prevails at the highest echelons of officialdom, guided by a keen sense of statecraft. However, this does not imply that tensions have completely dissipated. In simple terms, where there is smoke, there is fire. Several focal points continue to fuel this tension.
Social media accounts associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) persist in issuing threats directed at Azerbaijan. In addition to that, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Iran Ali Alizada, said via X, fomerly known as Twitter, that Armenian troops were engaging in military activities along the Nakhchivan border, characterizing it as a provocative move. These acts of provocation underscore Armenia and Iran’s reluctance to acknowledge the realities on the ground.
Iran’s efforts to stop the Zangezur Corridor or accept only similar plans tailored to their preferences are noteworthy. Nevertheless, given Iran’s inability to engage in a large-scale conflict, its primary recourse is to perpetuate instability in a bid to enhance its bargaining position. However, even if this tactic temporarily hinders progress, it remains dubious whether it can deter Azerbaijan from realizing its objectives in the medium and long terms.
