Power Projection in the “Backyard”: The Venezuela Operation, Oil, and Critical Minerals

February 18, 2026

U.S. interventions in Latin America have often targeted democratically elected governments.
Members of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) take part in a march in support of Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro. Photo by Anadolu Images.

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ince the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has intervened numerous times in Latin American countries, which it considers its “backyard,” to protect its own interests, often using arguments of “democracy” and “the fight against communism” to legitimize these interventions. Within this historical context, the US operation on the night of January 3, 2026, in Venezuela, capturing and abducting President Nicolas Maduro, has once again brought to the forefront criticisms that Washington can disregard international norms for the sake of its hegemonic interests.

Indeed, Trump’s rhetoric about governing Venezuela until a safe transition is ensured, and the clear messages from US oil companies regarding the resumption of production in Venezuela, demonstrate that geo-economic objectives were decisive in this intervention. Therefore, the Maduro operation can be read not as a new behavior in the long practice of US intervention in Latin America, but rather as a more visible manifestation of the same intervention logic.

Disregard for International Legitimacy

U.S. interventions in Latin America have often targeted democratically elected governments. In Guatemala, the 1954 elected president Arbenz was targeted for land reform, and a CIA-backed coup led to a long civil war. One of the most striking examples of U.S. interventions in Latin America is the debate surrounding Washington’s role in the 1973 coup that overthrew Chilean President Salvador Allende by General Augusto Pinochet. Three years later, following the 1976 coup in Argentina, it has been argued that the U.S. adopted a stance of accepting and supporting regime change. The U.S.’s direct military intervention in Panama in 1989 to overthrow Manuel Noriega demonstrated Washington’s ability to employ hard power when necessary.

These examples in Latin America indicate that the U.S. has long held an approach to intervention that prioritizes its security and geo-economic interests. Washington, citing various reasons, primarily the fight against communism, has instigated government changes in many countries while channeling military and economic resources to authoritarian regimes aligned with US interests.

The kidnapping of Maduro has made it even more apparent that the “Rules-Based International Order” rhetoric, which the Washington administration has consistently promoted, especially since the end of the Cold War, is in practice selectively applied. Indeed, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s statement in Davos—” We knew that international law was applied with different rigor depending on the identity of the accused and the victim. This construct was useful because it offered certain benefits of American hegemony. So we put the sign on display “—clearly confirms this. Within this framework, the US move regarding Venezuela also emerges as one of the factors weakening the legitimacy of liberal hegemony.

U.S. Energy Management Plan

Looking at the historical role of energy, while the United Kingdom built its industrial power on coal in the 19th century, the US consolidated its global power through oil in the 20th century. Therefore, in US interventions concerning energy, the main issue has often been who controls the oil, where it is sold, who controls the revenue, and how prices are determined. The US organization and support of the 1953 coup in Iran after Mossadegh nationalized oil is a classic example demonstrating Washington’s ability to directly intervene in the internal politics of countries when energy interests are at stake.

In 1980, the Carter Doctrine considered the flow of oil in the Persian Gulf a vital US interest and declared that any means, including military force, could be used against any attempt to threaten this flow. Indeed, the Gulf Crisis of 1990 demonstrated how this logic worked in practice; the possibility of oil supply disruption and price shocks became one of the main justifications legitimizing US-led military intervention. This historical context demonstrates that the US has been able to resort to a variety of tools, including hard power, when it comes to oil flow.

In this context, while the capture and extradition of Maduro to the US is being justified by the rhetoric of “fighting drugs-narcoterrorism,” it also demonstrates the continuation of the US’s energy-geopolitical reflexes in the background. Indeed, Trump stated that they had taken the oil found on the Venezuelan tankers seized by the US, that it would be processed in US refineries, and that 30-50 million barrels of oil would be shared. Furthermore, Trump’s statement that the US would decide which major oil companies would enter Venezuela clearly shows that the intervention was not solely for security reasons, but also aimed at establishing de facto control over oil flow and revenue.

Furthermore, the US’s oil-centric energy system is facing significant competitive pressure today due to the rapid spread of renewable energy technologies. In particular, China’s production share exceeding 80% in the solar energy supply chain and its role in accounting for more than three-quarters of global battery sales provides it not only with technological superiority but also the opportunity to establish an alternative energy-economy network to the US-centric system by exporting panels, batteries, and electric vehicles to many parts of the world. Indeed, one of the most critical fronts of the global competition with China is the critical minerals and supply chains dependent on these minerals, which are essential for renewable energy technologies and digitalization.

Venezuela possesses rich resources of critical minerals vital to the technology industry, including coltan, known as blue gold. For the US, which seeks to break China’s monopoly in battery and high-tech production, controlling Venezuelan resources also means cutting off Beijing’s access to these strategic raw materials. Therefore, the January 3rd operation should also be considered a concrete manifestation in Latin America of the US strategy to contain China through its supply chains.

Controlling the oil industry

Finally, the pursuit of control over the oil industry in Venezuela, the country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves, can be interpreted not only as a response to today’s supply needs but also as a goal to “buy time.” Assessments indicating that the pace of transition to renewable energy and investment appetite can weaken during periods of low fossil fuel prices suggest that the strategy of increasing oil supply and suppressing prices could have a “slowing down the transition” effect. Indeed, Trump’s mention of aiming to lower prices by releasing more Venezuelan oil onto the market shows that this approach can also be interpreted as an intention to “make the transition more controlled.”

Furthermore, the goal of lowering oil prices coincides with the aim of reducing inflationary pressure in the US by lowering energy costs and mitigating economic discontent in domestic politics. Washington’s past calls for OPEC to increase energy production and Trump’s pressure on OPEC to increase energy supply at different times support this idea. In this respect, the Venezuela move can also be read as a complementary part of the strategy of increasing oil supply to lower prices.

From an environmental and climate perspective, moves to lower oil prices have the potential to counteract the goals of accelerating the renewable energy transition and reducing emissions. Given the Trump administration’s approach of prioritizing fossil fuel production over the climate agenda, the oil strategy implemented through Venezuela can be seen as a step that supports and strengthens this trend.

In conclusion, the events in Venezuela exemplify the hegemonic politics of the United States, which complements its energy and precious metal resources with military force in order to maintain its global leadership. Washington’s move sends a clear message, primarily to rising powers such as China, that Latin America is within the US sphere of influence and that the regional geo-economic order will be shaped in accordance with Washington’s priorities.

Serkan Yavuz received his PhD in International Political Economy from Marmara University. He currently serves in the Department of International Relations at Sakarya University.