With the help of Kemalist civil society elements, in February 1997, the Turkish army toppled the government that was formed by the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) and the right-wing liberal True Path Party (DYP). The coup was called a “postmodern” coup, owing to the indirect role of the army. The army did not take control of the rule in the country as it had done twice after the 1960 and 1980 coups. It threatened the government that if it did not step down, then the army would intervene and take control of the country’s rule.

Indeed, the army was restless from the beginning of the RP-DYP coalition government. It was deemed as another nail in the coffin after the landslide victory of the RP in the 1994 local elections. In 1994, the RP won many of the municipalities in the country, including Istanbul and Ankara. The army was very well aware that losing Istanbul and Ankara was a sign of a coming political revolution that might carry away the Kemalist regime. They are the most crowded cities and in the meantime, the election results in these cities carry a symbolic meaning for the general elections and the power relations in the country. Whoever rules Istanbul, rules the country.

On its 22nd anniversary, the February 28 coup was still able to stir a heated debate in Turkey. The opponents of the coup take a liberal-democratic stance and portray it as great political violence. They argue that the coup was a suppression of the basic rights of the conservative-religious sections of society by an authoritarian state.

According to the defenders of the Ferbruary 28 coup, it was a “process,” which implies the eternity of Kemalist rule in Turkey, that was interrupted after the Kemalist state bureaucracy lost its political struggle against the AK Party in the 2000s.

The proponents of the coup on the other hand take a national security stance and defend it on the basis of the struggle against the infiltration of religious reactionary groups such as the Gulenists into state structures. They argue that had the February 28 coup been successful, the July 15, 2016, by the Gulenist cadres in the state bureaucracy, including the army, would have not taken place. According to the defenders of the Ferbruary 28 coup, the February 28 “process,” which implies the eternity of Kemalist rule in Turkey, was interrupted after the Kemalist state bureaucracy lost its political struggle against the AK Party in the 2000s.

These two alternative narratives fail to understand the political meaning of this critical event. February 28 is a way more important event for Turkish politics than what these narratives tell us. It can be reduced neither to authoritarianism nor to a national security matter. According to the standing 1982 Constitution, Turkey in essence, was not a democracy at that time. Due to the lack of a better world, the regime was said to be democratic, which means that the political rule rests on the national well, yet major decisions were taken by the National Security Council (MGK). The army-dominated MGK was the governing body of the country, and the elected government was only playing a minor role in it. The regime was therefore an oligarchy, based on the rule of the coalition of bureaucracy and big business. Thus, the coup cannot be viewed as an attempt to transgress democracy. How can a non-existing thing be violated?

Nor can the coup be called a national security measure. It was against the majority of society; it was an encroachment of the national will. How can a policy that violates the national will be viewed as a national security measure?

Then, what was the February 28 coup? It was a special moment in Turkish politics. It was a moment of the political. The political moment showed that the Kemalist regime is neither eternal nor natural. It is rather contingent, like all other political regimes. This was a huge blow to the regime, since its political legitimacy and strength was based on the perception of its naturalness and everlastingness. The coup and the events that opened the way for it opened up an un-repairable crack in the Kemalist political totality.

What was the February 28 coup? It was a special moment in Turkish politics. It was a moment of the political. The political moment showed that the Kemalist regime is neither eternal nor natural. It is rather contingent, like all other political regimes.

Thus, the coup was a futile attempt to hide the groundlessness of the existing Kemalist political order. It was a hopeless attempt to over-turn the dislocation of the regime at the face of sociological developments. That’s why the Kemalists were claiming that February 28 was a “process,” not a onetime strike at the national will, and would “continue for a millennium.” And that’s why it was handled in such a ruthless manner.

This political dimension of the coup explains why the Kemalist regime was easily toppled within the period during the early 2000s. If the liberal-democratic critique of the coup was correct, that is that the Kemalist regime was notoriously powerful to crush the national will and encroached on democracy, it would not have been possible for the AK Party to dislocate it from such power in a short period of time. And Turkey would not have evolved into a democracy in the following years.

Since Turkey’s transition to a multi-party political system as from the election held on 14 May, 1950, the country had to experience numerous interregnum periods mainly due to military coups. One of these military coups was the February 28 coup in 1997. Although 22 years has passed, the societal problems and traumas caused by the coup have not be fully recovered yet. On the other hand, the regulations marked by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan abolished the oppressive and prohibitive practices remaining from February 28.

The memories of the latest military coup attempt Turkey experienced are still fresh in the country’s collective memory while its traces are still visible in bureaucracy and society. During the atrocious coup attempt organized by a group of Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) operatives who infiltrated the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), 251 citizens were killed and 2194 were injured. The atrocity was answered by an unprecedented resistance that marked its name in Turkey’s political history. Political will and society united and repelled the coup attempters. The nation defended the political will in the streets and paid heavy prices to protect democracy, which has been a turning point in Turkey’s democracy. Upon President Erdogan’s call, people took to the streets and reclaimed the public offices and media organizations occupied by the pro-coup forces, which was a first in the country’s history of coups that goes back to 26 May, 1960. The awareness spurred and shaped by this demeanor will certainly play a crucial role in building Turkey’s future.

Turkey and military coups

As of the election on 14 May, 1950, that marked Turkey’s transition to democracy, the country has experienced a slew of overt or covert military coups. The military coup staged on 27 May, 1960, was the first one and resulted in the capital punishment of then Prime Minister and Democrat Party leader Adnan Menderes and two ministers. A junta of military officers ended the 10-year ruling power of the Democrat Party, which came to power in every election by enjoying popular support. Only 11 years later, on 12 March, 1971, the military gave a memorandum to civilian politics and forced the government, ruled by the Justice Party leader and then Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, to resign. So, between the years 1970 and 1980, Turkey suffered a long-standing conflict between the right-wing and left-wing and had to deal with unstable coalition governments, which ended with another coup attempt staged on 12 September, 1980.

Following the 1980 coup staged under the tutelage of then Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren, Turkey confronted a long period of oppression marked by arrests, tortures, and prohibitions. The volatile democratic climate, which was established perfunctorily after the period when the military controlled political life, started to decompose again with the election victory of politicians who were not considered acceptable by the system.

The military oppression period that started in the early 1990s culminated in yet another military coup staged on 28 February, 1997. The February 28 coup is one of the most far-reaching coups in Turkey’s history since the military officers that organized the coup and their co-conspirators in bureaucracy did not only aim their political opponents but also plotted an extensive intervention that affected all segments of society. The scope of the prohibitions that were put into practice after the February 28 manifests this intent.

The February 28 coup is one of the most far-reaching coups in Turkey’s history since the military officers that organized the coup and their co-conspirators in bureaucracy did not only aim their political opponents but also plotted an extensive intervention that affected all segments of society.

The climate of February 28

Some contextualization on the process leading up to the coup is required to comprehend the political and social background of the February 28 coup. During the 1990s, Turkey could not achieve political or economic stability since it was ruled by coalition governments throughout these years. In an atmosphere where political power was in decline, other power mechanisms such as military, media, capital, bureaucracy and global forces enjoyed increasing influence on the country.

In the local election held in 1994 amid all these, the Welfare Party chaired by Prof. Necmettin Erbakan had a victory since the local candidates of the party won both in Istanbul and Ankara, the two most populous provinces of Turkey. Becoming the Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor after the election, Erdogan practiced “project municipalism,” “administration skills” and “face-to-face communication policy,” all of which added up to the formation of a role model and spread to the rest of the country.

The first reflection of the Welfare Party’s success in municipalities was seen in the 1995 general election, in which the party had a notable success by receiving 22 percent of the vote share and becoming the first party. Of course, it was hard for political engineers to accept this success. As a result, the power to form the government was not granted to the first party but to the second and third parties, namely the Homeland Party (ANAP) chaired by Mesut Yılmaz and the True Path Party (DYP) led by Tansu Ciller. However, since the ANAYOL coalition government formed by these two parties had a short lifespan, then President Suleyman Demirel assigned Erbakan to form a government, after which Erbakan and DYP formed the REFAHYOL coalition government on 28 June, 1996.

Some groups within the army and Jacobin Kemalists in the bureaucracy were disturbed in the face of this development, and their discomfort started to reflect in the media from the very beginning of the coalition. In fact, the military never wanted to recognize Erbakan as Prime Minister despite the sensitive and soothing remarks of Erbakan as well as a large part of the media outlets who defined themselves as secular, universities, judiciary, and large organizations of business world. Eventually, a series of operations to shape opinions and open intervention attempts were ignited to undermine the 54th government led by Erbakan.  

Tanks of February 28

The process that has gone down in history as the “post-modern coup of February 28” was led by a certain group of military personnel within the TSK and conducted against the civilian government of the period. While this process is referred to as such due to the 9 hour long meeting of the National Security Council held on February 28, 1997, where anti-democratic decisions were taken, it in fact refers to the well-planned coup process that had military, civilian, financial, bureaucratic and media dimensions, and which were simultaneously put into action.

One of the more symbolically important events of the February 28 process is the deployment of tanks to the streets of Sincan, Ankara by the General Staff. As a reaction to the Al-Quds night event organized by the Sincan municipality, which at the time belonged to the Welfare Party, tanks were moved to the streets of Sincan on February 4, 1997, 5 days after the event. Choosing Sincan for such a display was a direct message. While tanks were in the streets of Sincan, news about the rise of reactionism that did not reflect reality were being pushed by the media.

News of this kind were intentionally pushed by the media to legitimize the coming interference in civilian politics. Another important symbolic indicator of the era is that both de facto bans against religious people in public spaces were put into effect and anything projecting an image of religiousness was demonized and portrayed as deserving ridicule. The February 28 coup, which happened after such an atmosphere was successfully created, forced the government of Erbakan to resign on June 18, 1997, and subsequently the Welfare Party was closed on January 16, 1998, by the Constitutional Court.

Several names, including Prime Minister Erbakan, were barred from politics. In accordance with their agendas, the perpetrators of the February 28 coup implemented many bans during the process. But these bans were removed one by one in the 17 years following the electoral victory of the AK Party, founded on 14 August, 2001, under the leadership of Erdogan, in the elections held on November 3, 2002.

Gradual dismantling of the anti-democratic inheritance

The bans and rights abuses put into place with the claim that “February 28 will last a thousand years” were in effect for a long time. The reason behind the fact that these policies could continue during the AK Party era is the power held by the bureaucratic oligarchy in Turkey, which should never be neglected as an actor in Turkish politics. Along with this, despite all obstructions and interference attempts of various kinds, governments under the leadership of Erdogan removed the bans implemented as part of the February 28 process, contributing greatly to the democratization of society and politics in Turkey.

It might be hard to talk about all of them, but it is important with respect to remembering and understanding the oppression of the period that some of the important bans that were implemented by the perpetrators of the February 28 process and were removed by Erdogan are discussed here. Here, the first topic that must be mentioned are the headscarf bans. The headscarf ban was first forced on students studying in universities, and then was made more extensive, coming to include all public spaces.

Among such bans, the ban on headscarf in universities was the first to be removed in the AK Party era in 2011. In 2013, by making a change in the “Regulations Regarding the Dress and Appearance of Public Institutions Personnel,” the ban on the headscarf for female public personnel was removed. Again in 2013, four female parliament members of the AK Party attended the general assembly with headscarves, signaling that the February 28 process was over. Another regulation introduced in 2014 removed the headscarf ban for students in middle schools and high schools. Another change in the Turkish Armed Forces Dress and Appearance Regulations in 2017 made it possible for female military personnel to wear headscarves. After the removal of this ban, it was seen that some female officers in the military preferred to wear the headscarf at work.

Another ban implemented as part of the February 28 process was regarding Imam Hatip schools. In 2009, the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) made the decision to end the policy of using a different multiplier in the university admission evaluations of Imam Hatip graduates. Following this, in 2012, Imam Hatip schools in middle school were re-opened with a legislative regulation. Similarly, bans on Quran courses were removed. Following the executive order number 653 accepted in 2011, the regulation introduced as part of the February 28 process limiting the minimum age of attendants in Quran courses was removed, creating a space for families to freely make their decisions.

Another well-known attribute of the perpetrators and sympathizers of the February 28 process is their eagerness to shut down political parties. The Welfare Party and subsequently the Virtue Party were shut down by the Constitutional Court. In 2008, a case to shut down the AK Party was opened and the AK Party was saved from being shut down with a single vote. Within this context, as part of the constitutional amendments in 2010, the AK Party implemented changes in the 149th article of the Constitution, making it harder to shut down political parties. Today, the decision to shut down a political party can only be taken if the Constitutional Court reaches a two-thirds majority.

In addition to these, extremely important steps were taken to secure democracy and remove anti-democratic influences in the judiciary by the restructuring of the High Council of the Judges and Prosecutors as well as the Constitutional Court. In the fight against anti-democratic influences in the military, unprecedented regulations were introduced in the era of AK Party governments. Some of these are the re-structuring of the Supreme Military Council and the removal of military justice and martial law.

Also, due to the oppression in the February 28 process, many public personnel were blacklisted, referred to disciplinary committees and forced to resign. The numbers show this clearly as between 1997 and 2001 roughly 11 thousand teachers were forced to resign, and 3 thousand 527 teachers were dismissed. This corresponds to 11 percent of the teacher shortage experienced in the period. In this period, 33 thousand 271 teachers underwent disciplinary inspections due to certain reasons, 11 thousand 890 received disciplinary punishments and 4 thousand 625 Ministry of National Education personnel were blacklisted. National Intelligence Agency (MİT) also flagged 2 thousand 639 public personnel, 418 academics and 949 teachers as “related to reactionism” within this period.

The psychological and physical oppression of the perpetrators of the February 28 coup on generally the conservative groups of the public in Turkey, which is observable in the above stated numbers, ended in the Erdogan era. The necessary efforts were made to ensure that the Directorate of Religious Affairs, Imam Hatip Schools, Quran courses and Religious Studies Faculties had the required personnel, preventing efforts to discredit these institutions. Discriminatory policies employed on public personnel solely due to their religious identities such as blacklisting, mobbing and disciplinary action were stopped.

April 27 military memorandum, violent Taksim Gezi Park protests, judiciary attack in December 2013,  various economic attacks and finally the bloody military coup attempt of July 2016… All these failed due to the strong support of the national will towards the civilian government.

Institutionalization of the democratic atmosphere

With the military coups that had been happening almost each decade, juntas within the military imposed their decisions on politics and society. The time span in which this state of affairs changed is the 17-year-long period of AK Party governance, which was founded in 2001 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Certainly, the length of the period in which civilian politics under the leadership of Erdogan governed Turkey does not mean that military juntas have given up on coups. On the contrary, many coup attempts took place and these coup attempts were not limited to the military dimension, instead being conducted by employing different centers of power.

From the April 27 military memorandum to the violent Taksim Gezi Park protests, from the attempt in December 2013 by law enforcement and the judiciary to the economic attacks from abroad, and finally the bloody military coup attempt of July 2016, many coup attempts took place. But all these attempts failed due to the strong support of the national will towards the civilian government. Thus, as opposed to the other periods in which military coups took place, in the AK Party era, civilian politics resisted coup attempts with the authority it has taken from the nation, leading to the continued rule of democracy.On the 22nd anniversary of the February 28 coup, Turkey is at an important stage on the road of democratization. The most important thing that must be done following this stage is the creation of an atmosphere that will institutionalize these achievements. 

The trial for the February 28, 1997, coup, heard by the Ankara 5^th High Penal Court, is about to be finalized. A total of 103 defendants are being tried as part of the case, including Gen. Ismail Hakki Karadayi, the Chief of General Staff during the coup, and his deputy retired Gen. Cevik Bir, former Land Forces Commander retired Gen. Erdal Ceylanoglu, who was responsible for the symbolic release of tanks through the Sincan district in Ankara, Teoman Koman and Cetin Dogan as well as a number of civilians such as Kemal Guruz, former head of the Higher Education Board (YOK). On November 23, 2011, the Ankara Prosecutor’s Office announced that an investigation had began on the 1997 coup as part of Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, which reads: “Any person attempting, by the use of force and violence, to overthrow the government of the Republic of Turkey, or to prevent it, in part or in full, from fulfilling its duties, shall be sentenced to a penalty of aggravated life imprisonment.” The indictment was submitted to the court on May 22, 2013. Following the hearings that lasted for over four years, the trial was concluded on December 21, 2017, and the prosecutor asked for aggravated life sentences for the 60 defendants who were within the chain of command at the time of the coup. The defendants posted their final pleas in response to the prosecutor’s opinion between January 8 and 10, 2018 whereas the hearings had been postponed to February 12. By this time, the court is expected to give a final verdict after all the final pleas are presented. Thus, recent developments over the past couple of months brought the forgotten trial back onto the agenda.

Prior to the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, the judiciary in Turkey sided with previous putschists and tutelage regimes. It was only until recently that the country’s judiciary stood with and supported the national will and legitimate government for the first time. As a matter of fact, this change in the judicial system began with the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) elections held in 2014 and presented significant possibilities for the fight against the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO). The judiciary has been the leading institution running an effective and determined fight against FETO during the December 17-25, 2013, judicial coup attempts and before and after the July 15, 2016, coup attempt. Despite some problems stemming from FETO-linked members of the judiciary during the early stages of the investigation, the 1997 trial constitutes a considerable phase of the fight against putschist conventions and tutelage regimes.

The  “postmodern” character of February 28 and the trial process

Some groups assert that the actions leading to the Feb. 28 process cannot be regarded as a coup attempt and do not constitute an offense in terms of penal responsibility since the military did not virtually seize power. We have also witnessed defendants presenting their pleas within this scope. The pleas of defendants within the 1997 coup trial stressed that former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan resigned from office voluntarily, that politics in the country underwent a transformation in its own right, the military did not intervene virtually, all actions were in accordance with the duties and authorities vested by the Constitution and law, and that laws were not breached.

While the Turkish Armed Forces did not virtually seize power on February 28, 1997, it exercised a tremendous control over politics, state and society with all means. In doing so, the military utilized instruments of the bureaucratic tutelage system that was established with the 1961 Constitution and consolidated with the 1982 Constitution, whereas the National Security Council turned into a shadow government. Although the MGK, according to the Constitution, is only an “advisory body,” it gave instructions to the government and followed these instructions in all the state institutions by means of the MGK’s Secretary-General’s Office. A separate control mechanism named West Working Group (BCG) was also established unlawfully outside of the constitutional state organization. With the briefings given, the judiciary was prompted and hundreds of investigations and lawsuits were filed mostly on political grounds. The opposition parties sided with the military instead of protecting the domain of politics whereas the media became the leading actor of the process. Media outlets went to any length in order to spread fear in society and to legitimize the military intervention. As a result of this, the legitimate government that came to power with free and democratic elections was overthrown, the Welfare Party was closed, political bans were introduced, the True Path Party was dissolved and hundreds of thousands of people suffered from unjust treatment as an outcome of the implementations of the MGK decisions. As opposed to the arguments brought forward in the pleas of the 1997 coup trial defendants, an exceptional period was experienced before the eyes of the public at the time.

In a statement made, Erol Ozkasnak – Secretary General at the office of the Chief of General Staff during the 1997 coup and for whom the prosecution asked for an aggravated life sentence – openly admitted that they “staged a postmodern coup on February 28.” He explained the “postmodern” character of the coup as follows:

“It was a successful process that did not resemble previous coups. There was no bloodshed and nobody was upset. It was through democratic means and with the assistance of nongovernmental organizations.”

FETO and its shadow on the 28 February trial

February 28 was a process that occurred before the eyes of the Turkish people and which was greatly condemned by a majority in their hearts. This is why the February 28, 1997, coup trial provides a good opportunity for Turkey to face with its history of coups. However, the trials planned and conducted by FETO, for example, Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and the military spying trial, and the injustices that occurred during these trials make it harder for the 1997 coup trial to be conducted fairly and competently in the public eye.

We can see that the perpetrators of the 1997 coup are trying to hide behind the image of a mistreated and falsely accused Turkish soldier generated by these trials. In fact, this strategy can also be observed in the 2016 coup attempt trial. These conspiracies of FETO are now being used to shelter and excuse the real perpetrators of military coups.

When the 1997 trial process first started, it was actively sabotaged by FETO-linked elements active in the judiciary at the time, especially among specially authorized prosecutors and courts. The prosecutor who prepared the indictment of this trial and an important number of judges that presided over it have been expelled from office due to being members of FETO. We can now see that the defendants are using this point as the foundation of their legal defenses. FETO must have considered this trial unimportant and useless for its own interests as the organization did not exert as much effort on this trial as it did on trials regarding coup plans such as the Sledgehammer case. A reason for this is that while the 1997 coup greatly impacted the religious masses, it opened new doors for FETO members.

Despite the attempts of FETO to sabotage the case, the 1997 coup trial process is near to an end. However, this alone is not enough to address the injustices and crimes that occurred within the February 28, 1997, process. A significant number of people involved in this process were left outside of the trial. For example, no steps have been taken against the media, which was the most important and effective element during the process. Obviously, it is not possible to try all media workers involved in court. Legal accusations in the context of punishment law may not be applicable to some people involved. However, it is neither tolerable nor understandable that some media members, despite all their involvement in the 1997 process, are still using various platforms to accuse others of infringing democracy and human rights.

Another issue along with punishing the perpetrators of the 1997 coup is addressing the injustices that happened during the process. With this idea in mind, some measures have already been taken. Public workers who were forced out of their positions due to wearing headscarves were allowed to return to their jobs. People who had no choice but to leave their schools during the February 28 period were given the right to return. However, no solid measures have been taken in regards to the people convicted by the military in trials held during the coup process. It is difficult to make blanket statements regarding legal matters and a case-by-case examination is required to assess the validity of these trials and the sentences dealt. Yet it is noted that around 600 people received heavy sentences during trials in 1997 and some of them are still in prison. Some also put forward that these sentences were generally based on a series of abstract accusations rather than any solid evidence of offenses. The re-evaluation of these cases and consideration of other injustices that may have occurred due to February 28 would be an important step in facing the history of the 1997 coup.

The room for maneuver created by the strong reaction to the 2016 coup attempt by the Turkish public and politicians must be well employed. The required actions in this context are that the 1997 coup trial must be concluded, other participants must face the consequences of their actions and all effects of the process must be negated.

Exceptional for being a “post-modern coup” in Turkey’s history of coups and triggering one of the largest devastations of the political system in contemporary history, February 28 differs from other coups for being a process rather than a one-off intiative. Unlike conventional military coups that occurred during the multiparty system era, the coup was realized in coordination with actors from the judiciary, mass-media, academia, finance and the business worlds while the material and psychological damage it caused is still observable in various institutions and segments of society. The said damage is a result of the immense socio-psychological traumas triggered by the implementation of the headscarf ban, discriminatory quotients and national security pressure over pious segments of society with the pretense of a so-called “Sharia threat.” While there are ongoing February 28 trials today, the disappointments, tragedies and wasted years of thousands of people who were barred from employment and education are still fresh. On the other hand, it is obvious that the coup caused political and economic devastation due to banned politicians, parties that were closed down, siphoned banks and ransacked public finances. Having multidimensional societal and institutional devastations similar to all other military coups, analyzing the economic and financial damage caused by the February 28, 1997 coup is crucial.

Turkey’s first liberalization experience

Remembering the issues and systemic malfunctions of Turkey’s post-1980 liberalization experience is important in terms of better understanding the economic dimensions of the February 28 process. Turgut Özal led Turkey’s first wave of liberalization and implemented it according to the “Washington Consensus,” which limits state interference and enforces deregulation. During this era, the overlapping visions of the Motherland Party and foreign institutions led by the IMF and World Bank accelerated the process towards an open economy. However, even though a free market economy was advocated, failing to amend regulations and establish control mechanisms necessary for the institutional infrastructure rendered the country’s economy prone to crisis. Meanwhile, the era of fragile coalitions which began in 1991, triggered a ten-year long period of instability as political uncertainties and financial crises aggravated each other. High inflation, burden of uncontrolled public debt and the need for international loans condemned the economy to a vicious cycle in which debts were paid off with new loans. With the 1994 financial crisis, Turkey suffered its first systemic shock after the decision of financial liberalization in 1989.

The divided political structure and vulnerabilities in the management of the economy in the mid-1990s consolidated the spoils system. Public finance deteriorated due to paying high interest to the financial sector over aggravating internal debt. Systemically making losses under the pretense of “duty losses,” state economic enterprises (KITs) were being covered by high interest loans taken from private banks, making it a lucrative business for individuals with immense capital. By loaning the credits taken abroad to public institutions with high interest rates and exploiting the internal debt spiral, a superficial bourgeoisie that had the political power to form and destroy political coalitions was shaped. Along with banks, large-scale industrial enterprises in and around the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSIAD) amassed a huge capital through internal debt incomes, which were shown as non-operating income. The terms such as industry, investment and production became obsolete in the country.

The Welfare Party’s ‘pool system’ in the Treasury

Winning the elections in 1994 through the discourse of clean politics and crowning this victory by coming first in the 1995 parliamentary elections, the Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan formed a coalition with the True Path Party and was determined to implement a “pool system” that would overhaul the management of macroeconomics. Implemented in 1996, this system created a resource pool among state enterprises and allowed those showing relatively better financial performance to loan with low interest rates. Rather innovative for its time, the pool system limited the vulnerabilities of public finance that was caused by state enterprises and the total public debt started to decline. However, as has been the case throughout Turkey’s political history, the large-scale bourgeoisie objected to this innovation in order to protect their interests, resorting to anti-democratic tactics. The new public finance order caused a great loss to those who were loaning funds to the state institutions with high interest rates. Rejecting to lose their source of easy income, this financial bourgeoisie initiated its plan to either persuade the coalition to give up the pool system or to depose the coalition. A consensus was formed between the military-civilian bureaucracy and large business groups along with their media affiliates who were all ideologically opposed to the Welfare Party’s Islamic discourses. A psychological war was launched during which the economic concerns and calculations were kept hidden as a part of the strategy and some careless statements made by certain members of the Welfare Party were provocatively used to indicate a so-called “Sharia threat.”

Financial operations hidden behind the regression discourse

What happened next is history. Using the expression “readjusting democracy”, February 28 process created a new type of post-modern coup aiming to change the government through the discourse “secularism is being abolished” rather than just seizing the control of the state through armed forces. Assumed to “last for a thousand years,” this process was expected to shift the economic and social balance along with the political, to obstruct political movements that emphasize Islamic identity and to constrain the conservative representatives of the business world like Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD) and Anatolian Tigers Business Association (ASKON).

While injecting the paranoia of regression into the subconsciousness of society with marginalized figures and images, the coup perpetrators were attempting to cover up the substantial economic and financial operation. Indeed, during the 4-year time period between February 28, 1997, and the 2001 financial crisis, Turkey lost its public finance discipline and experienced the most intense subsequent crises of the country’s political economy. Coming to power in June 1997, the coalition formed between the Motherland Party, Democratic Left Party and True Path Party, also known as the AnaSol-D coalition, removed the pool system and opened the way to the internal debt exploitation cycle. This caused the interest expenditure to national dividend ratio to increase from 5% to 17% within four years. Allowing the financial bourgeoisie to exploit internal debt, this system crashed with the twin crises of 2000 and 2001 – all tax revenue of the state was being used for paying interest and it was not enough.

The financial cost of February 28 process: over $50 billion

Along with having a detrimental effect on public finance, the February 28, 1997 coup also damaged financial supervision and regulation systems. Undermining the financial supervision system, weak coalition governments issued multiple banking licenses together with their allies including the military-civilian bureaucracy and financial bourgeoisie. Transferring public banks to private enterprises without any supervision, issuing banking permits easily, siphoning banks the high volume of international loans taken to be given to public institutions with high interest rates and the fragility of supervisory institutions triggered a banking crisis. During the process, 20 private banks announced bankruptcy and were transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (TMSF). Considering the burden of seized banks, their interests and the burden of public banks, which were at a duty loss, the February 28 process cost over $50 billion to Turkey.

One of the most tragic features of the era in terms of the relationship between politics and economics was that retired generals were being made members of many private companies and the executive boards of various holdings. Under military tutelage, these large-scale enterprises did not shy away from protecting themselves with senior military officers and using their influences for commercial purposes. As the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök objected to this practice on ethical grounds, this tradition, which only exists in third world countries, came to an end. However, the mysterious relationship between military actors and the financial bourgeoisie is among the main dimensions of February 28, which we are yet to shed light upon. Meanwhile, it should be remembered that the TUSIAD administration – which tries to boast on being pro-democracy and pro-modernization – while reaping the economic benefits of this hefty crime period, was silent to injustices committed against conservative political movements, conservative segments of society and entrepreneurs.

Despite all institutional and democratic gains, as the July 15 coup attempt reminds us that the threat of military coups in Turkey is still alive. For this reason, democratic consolidation, social solidarity and economic institutionalization which render such coup attempts unsuccessful, shall be achieved swiftly and the anti-coup spirit should be kept alive at all times.

The claim that the process started by the 1997 Turkish military memorandum will “last a thousand years” was founded on a wrong answer to the question as to why military coups occur. According to this view, coups are the result of a clash between a state with immense powers or a “progressive” bureaucratic elite and public elements with “reactionary” beliefs. Historically, the coups in Turkey happened due to political and public actors that were unable to internalize the republican regime and Ataturk’s reforms crossed the red lines of the state. Thus, military coups would only end after the entire public internalized reforms through a radical political and cultural shift. The sociological extinction of “reactionary” views and the decreasing number of people subscribing to those views led to the end of coups.

Those who sought alternative answers to this question were also similarly mistaken. For example, people evaluating the issue from the point of political culture reasoned that coups happen due to a statist mindset with authoritarian and patriarchal inclinations. Such mental constructs, present since the Ottoman era, were the real reason for coups. The prevention of new coups required a radical shift in public mentality, which would subsequently lead to a dominance of democratic beliefs in politics. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary for the perpetrators of the coups, namely the state, the military or the bureaucratic elite, to gradually lose its importance and control in politics to a civil society with liberal beliefs.

Another opinion was that coups in Turkey occur as a result of the interference of international powers. This was especially for the cause of the U.S. due to its global influence and self-interest in Turkish politics. According to this belief, any government that adopted internal or foreign policies against the interests of the U.S. would inevitably face a military coup. Therefore, in order to prevent coups, it was necessary to stop toeing the line of the west and end their influence in Turkey.

These three views all disregard the sociological structural factors of the Turkish public. The changes in the balance of power between political and public actors in the country were not being accounted for. Coups could possibly be triggered by an authoritarian and patriarchal mindset endemic in the state, resistance of the public to internalize Kemalist reforms and bureaucracy or international forces seeking to shape Turkish politics according to their own interests. However, none of these factors explain why coups are actively being used as a tool in political power relations. The reason for this is because only the perpetrators of the coup, whether the military, bureaucratic elite or the west were being focused on. The political and sociological forces subject to the coup were being objectified and not being viewed as political agents. The reason why coups were being actively used as a tool in political power relations and succeeding in their intentions was due to the fact that the public subject to such military interventions were weak.

Changing balances of power

To give a substantial answer to the question regarding why coups occur, one must examine and account for the historical developments in political and social balances of power in Turkey. The main power struggles in Turkish politics between the 1840s and the 1920s happened between the Ottoman Sultan and the westernized bureaucratic elite, combined with inner conflicts of the bureaucratic elite itself. During this period, popular democratic forces were not even perceived as actors in politics. Since the 1950s, political power struggles have occurred between the military and the bureaucratic elite, around which gathered the capital-owning class, organic intellectuals, artists, politicians and small portions of the public in line with these elements either due to ideological or financial benefits, versus popular domestic forces of the public. We can identify two main structural breaking points within this period that deeply affected public power balances.

The first is the partial dismantling of state power and its division among democratic forces according to the principles of democratic politics. This turned the long-standing hierarchical structure of political power in the country into an anarchical one (as in power did not belong to anyone). State power that was solely wielded by the Sultan for a long time prior to the 19^th century was being shared among bureaucratic oligarchic powers and the Sultan until 1919. Following the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, political power transferred entirely to the bureaucratic oligarchy. In both cases, government power was not open to the public and had absolute owners.

The opening of political power to the public with a multi-party parliamentary system was introduced and its subsequent adoption by certain political actors in the 1950s caused a radical change in the situation; it opened the political stage for large masses in search of a democratic regime. Likewise, democracy is a system of government where segments of the population that hold a majority are the principal actors in the government of the state. From this point onwards, political power was being shared between the bureaucracy and large public masses – in other words, between the appointed and the elected. After the 1950s, the struggle for power was the main driver of Turkish politics. The 1960, 1980 and 1997 coups are critical moments in Turkish history where oligarchic powers, along with their bureaucratic and civil counterparts, acted together to keep their hold on political power and to banish the representatives of the people from the power domain via accusations of being “reactionary” and “separatist.” These sudden coups were always followed by periods where via the introduction of new regulatory agencies, power was restored to the bureaucratic oligarchy and further denied to the general public.

The second structural breaking point was the continuous strengthening of democratic public actors against the oligarchy. This is a situation that must happen in practice if a democratic regime’s ideal of transitioning political power to the public is to be realized. The conservative strata of the public, composed chiefly of people with low socio-economic status from the Turkish countryside, became urbanized and improved their economic and cultural class over the course of a half a century period. The result of this sociological shift is the gradual change of material and moral power balances between the minority oligarchic powers and majority democratic powers in the country. If a small analogy is to be made between this situation and international relations, we can say that the unipolar structure that enabled the hegemony of oligarchy powers and backed coups slowly evolved into a bipolar structure via the strengthening of democratic forces. This bipolar structure enabled the AK Party to assume power in 2002 and allowed it to become even more established and stable in the following periods between 2002 and 2010.

The period from 2010 onwards was defined by the gradual shift of power towards the pole represented by the AK Party and a transition back to a unipolar power structure. Two indicators representative of this are first, the Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) – a party that traditionally associated itself with a different segment of society – decision to closely follow the AK Party’s line after the November 1, 2015, elections. The second indicator is the fact that the opposition led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) had to plan its policies defensively, with the focus of preventing AK Party’s influence and power from increasing rather than offensively, with the focus of reclaiming the government and political power.

Are new coups possible?

Changing power balances explain why the coups of 1960, 1971, 1980 and February 28, 1997, were successful while the memorandum of 27 April 2007, the attempted judiciary coup of December 2013 and the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, were unsuccessful. As pro-democratic political and public actors change power balances in their favor, coup attempts become unable to achieve desired results. Furthermore, as democratic forces accumulate their share of power in the political system, coups will ultimately stop being an effective tool in power struggles. Thus, as coups fail to succeed, the heavy costs of participating in a failed coup attempt, namely the legal punishments of participating in anti-democratic acts, deter future coup attempts.

The court decision of June 2014 that sentenced the participants of the 1980 coup to life imprisonment, the current point arrived in the trial process concerning the 1997 coup and the fast-moving trial process of the 2016 coup attempt signify that Turkey has reached an important milestone with respect to domestic democratization. Coup trials can neither be reduced to, as some say, attempts of revenge, nor can they be reduced to purely apolitical processes where injustices are addressed and justice is served. Attempts to define this process through apolitical points of views disregard the historical structural breaking point that Turkey has gone through. Since the 1950s, large public masses have become political actors and the power balances in Turkey continue to shift in favor of pro-democratic forces. This historical and on-going structural process renders future coups impossible.

February 28 was a coup. There was nothing post-modern about it. In a clear and direct way, it was a military coup d’état. The government was deposed through threats, blackmails and various other methods. Illegitimate means were used. It was anti-democratic.

While the army led the way, academics supported them, the business world preferred this overthrow and the media announced the whole thing. A legitimately elected government was deposed due to its number of deputies in Parliament. Politicians were threatened at the National Security Council. They were forced to sign various decisions. Tanks paraded on the streets. People were arrested. Discrimination occurred in all spheres, on all levels. Methods of political engineering were applied. Psychological warfare became part of everyday life. If this is not a coup, then what was it?

Those who claim that February 28 was not a coup are only trying to cover up their own crimes. I’m not sure who coined the term “post-modern coup,” but it is being used frequently. What does this mean? Nothing essentially. Are coups modern? Did they not exist before modernity? What does post-modernism, a phenomenon of the social sciences, have to do with February 28? The whole thing is farcical.

Turkey’s conservatives barred from accessing education

The coup’s most prominent aspect was education. With discriminatory policies and double standards, the religious segment of society was barred from accessing education. The headscarf ban was implemented and wasted away a generation. The 28 February coup was not only framed against politicians, but against society.

Looking back, we may assume that this mentality has been defeated. However, the estimates of the damage made are yet to be calculated: How many girls were barred from education due to wearing a headscarf? How many people were barred from education through the implemented quotient to imam-hatip and vocational high schools? How many dreams were shattered?

In the upcoming years, all these estimates may become clear. For instance, it might be easier to calculate how many people were denied the right to an education due to their headscarves. Yet, we may not know how many girls had to remove their headscarves in order to access education. Moreover, we may never know the cost of the trauma the coup had on the psychology of these girls.

Think about it. How many girls had to give up on registering to university because of the headscarf ban? You may have seen such examples around you. It is possible to understand what a prominent tragedy this was by listening to personal experiences. We may assume that it has a higher cost when we think about society as a whole. Despite these events, if some are still claiming that February 28 was not a coup, this means that the arrays of events have not been explained well enough.

Another aspect of this hostility and design was the quotient issue of imam-hatip high school graduates. Through the implementation of a quotient, the coup plotters wanted to bar a generation from accessing education. Those who remember will note that in the summer of that year, regulations involving university entrance had changed. High school seniors learned that entering a university was almost impossible in the autumn. More, they were told that they could not transfer to other high schools as it was also banned. Some transferred to open high schools, where they would complete their education from outside the system. There were a few who entered foundation universities. Some had to go abroad, as if they were exile. They suffered a lot. Yet, these people were the only ones that could have saved themselves as a minority. Most of them were doomed and were forced to apply to open education. While their scores were enough to enter prestigious universities in Istanbul or Ankara, they were forced to register to associate degree programs.

We didn’t forget, we won’t forget

Who could possibly calculate the estimates of this cost? Who is to be held accountable for the people deprived of an education? There is a vile figure left from those times. He was only recently defending all these discriminatory practices on TV. In the eyes of God, everything is forgivable, with the exception of injustice towards a fellow human being. Thousands of people were barred from establishing a good career and helping their children and grandchildren establish a good career. Is this a forgivable crime?

I came across a friend of mine who could have entered the most prestigious universities in Turkey had these unjust practices not been implemented. He told me that he had worked in various villages and towns of Anatolia for many years as a high school graduate. After many years he re-entered the university exam. He said he would be graduating soon. “After 18 years, I barely got everything back on track,” he said. Who is going to answer for all these years wasted? Who can claim that February 28 was not a coup? It was a vile coup that stole the future of people.

There is never a “good” coup, as all of them in all forms are detrimental. However, February 28 was different than previous coups as it tried to achieve more. The government deposed with the May 27, 1960, coup and which was replaced with state bureaucracy had an impact on the state, but not directly on society itself. The right to education was not barred. The March 12, 1971, coup was realized among various fractions of the state and was mostly dis-regarded by the people. The September 12, 1980, coup hurt a lot of people. However, it had a limited design towards the people as it aimed to perpetuate the tutelage system. It did not care about left or right wing politics – its focus was the state. Meanwhile however, the February 28, 1997, coup did not only push the largest ideological group in Turkey away from politics, but also attempted to destroy them. In this respect, the February 28 coup is on par with the July 15, 2016, coup attempt. The July 15 coup attempted to have a larger impact than February 28. It tried to control all of society, not just a particular segment. If the July 15 coup attempt had been successful, the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) would have had control of both the state and society. As they failed with this aim, they attempted to push the country into a civil war. Considering these factors, only July 15 could be compared with February 28 in terms of vileness.

There is never a “good” coup. Military overthrows are vile. However, some are trying to whitewash February 28 today. Excuse me, but we have not forgotten, and will never forget the tragedies lived.

Much research has been produced related to the 28 February, 1997 coup, on what happened, what caused it, and the economic and political results. The decisions of the National Security Council forced Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign despite the national will, and the government was suspended and put under the custody of the army, and the judiciary, bureaucracy, and business world put in the hands of politicians supporting the coup. Despite all these unfair actions, the symbol of 28 February came to be the head-scarf ban and the prosecutions undertaken to enforce it.

In particular, the head-scarf ban is an issue which has been mentioned and discussed by all categories of society. After countless panel discussions, demonstrations, and legal cases, the ban was finally completely lifted in October, 2013. That is to say, this ban remained in force from 1997 to 2013, or a total of 16 years. With compulsory education being 12 years long, and undergraduate education being 4 years long, that 16 year period encompassed a whole generation’s basic and undergraduate education, and impacted their prospects for employment as well. Furthermore, new age groups have entered in this system during the 16 years. In other words, because of the 1997 coup, women who sought to wear the headscarf were excluded from an education entirely.

There is no comprehensive qualitative and quantitative data about women who suffered under the head-scarf ban, on how many left their education, or completed education by obeying the ban, only to go on and not be able to find a job because they wanted to don the headscarf. We do not have any idea how the head-scarf ban has affected the participation of women in democracy, especially women with a weak socio-economic status. So when the participation of women in education, employment, and managerial positions is examined, we tend to automatically overlook the impact of the 28 February coup.

The Role of February 28 on Social Gender Equality 

Women’s appearance in education, training and working life became more pronounced in the years since 1990. The main cause of this was families in low and middle income groups supporting girls to put them through school. When taking into consideration the statistics of higher education, we can see the substantial difference between the number of schooled girls between 1980 and 1990, and 1990-2000.

 

The dramatic increase in women’s enrollment in higher education has, however, not been mirrored when it comes to employment in Turkey. The latest Human Development Index Report published by the United Nations Development Program includes a social gender inequality index, determined by the dimensions of women’s reproductive health, women’s recruitment, and economic activities. The dimension of women’s recruitment is measured by the numbers of women in general assembly and continuation of women to secondary school and higher education. In 2014, Turkey was ranked as 71st among 155 countries, with a 0.359 grade. On the other hand, the ratio of women who at least have secondary education is 39%, while the same ratio among men is 60%. Additionally, the number of women parliament members was 80 in 2017, so the ratio of female members in parliament was only 14%.

When we analyze the causes of this situation, generally we can see the situation to be derived from religious sensibilities and traditional practices, which are believed to encourage the exclusion of women from economic and social life. But that is not the only explanation. The preference long given to “modern women” in Turkey, meaning those who do not, for example, wear a headscarf, has also built up a powerful barrier which prevents the participation of religiously observant women in education, employment and management. But, this fact is ignored.

So, on this year’s International Women’s Day, we face the situation, as in previous years, where the image of “modern women” is brought forward and as before, the religious principles or traditional life might be blamed as the main cause of women being treated as second class citizens. Yet, this behavior causes unfair approaches for women, so Turkey’s women find themselves in a vicious cycle of resentment and unequal treatment. In spite of the fact that many women were treated unfairly between 1997 and 2013, the discriminatory attitudes of women towards other women is not discussed. Furthermore, their attitudes have continued to intensify.

According to November 2016 data of Turkish Statistical Institute on Labor Force, it seems that the labor force participation of women in Turkey is only 32.7%; and the overall employment rate is 27.5%. Women’s participation in business life as well as education are among the foundations for a country’s economic and social development. However, in the criticism of the low employment rates for women in Turkey, the effect of the 1997 coup is completely ignored. There are neither qualitative nor quantitative data on women who were forced to leave school after 1997.

Studies on how many women are prevented from studying, whether they entered into business life, or ended their careers very limited. We do not know what kind of impact the ban had on the economic and social participation of women who were already weak in terms of socio-economic status. This must be compared with the situation for women with a strong socio-economic background, many of whom were able to continue studying by going abroad, or establishing their own businesses, after the 1997 headscarf ban. Even now, in criticism of the education and employment rates of women in Turkey, the loss of human capital caused by the February 28th coup is not mentioned. Although, the February 28th ban imposed systematic discrimination against women, this coup’s sin and its sinners are ignored in analysis of social gender inequality.

Therefore, in order for women to overcome inequality in social life and to guarantee justice among the sexes, practices should be encouraged to ensure equality between women and men, not just among men only. Lessons must be taken from the mistakes of the past, and from the impact of the headscarf ban, which resulted in the ‘othering’ of a large segment of Turkey’s women. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the greatest discriminatory practice on February 28th was the legitimizing of a “modern” understanding of women in Turkey, which was in fact, entirely illiberal.