Even though this was a small-scale operation compared to the others, the structure of the Gülenist Organization in Turkey was first revealed through the said operation in the following years. Targeted by Gülen himself and accused of being an Al-Qaeda member, 66-year-old Mehmet Doğan was a retired imam. He had a small congregation gathered around him in Muş, a city in the southeast part of Turkey. His congregation consisted of followers of Said-i Nursi, one of the most influential religious figures of the 20th century in Turkey. This group, which also had a publishing company named Tahşiye (Annotate), had been criticizing certain Islamic statements by Fetullah Gülen. The group’s criticism wasn’t known by anyone in Turkey, except for the members of the group and Gülen.In a speech made online on April 6 2009, Gülen talked about a subject only his followers could understand: an organization, which was named Tahşiye. Listening to the speech, you may think that the Tahşiye members are terrorists, or you may think that there is a group named Tahşiye, which consists of innocent members who are to be framed! As Gülen’s followers understood his ciphered messages, the operations commenced immediately. The investigation conducted after the revelation of this scheme uncovered some interesting details: two days after Gülen’s speech, his media outlets, even series being aired on his TV channels, started to cover Tahşiye.First, the Zaman daily covered the group, which was followed by Tek Türkiye (“One” or “United” Turkey) three days later, a TV series being aired on the Gülen-affiliated Samanyolu TV channel. In the series, the gathered “Dark Council” had mentioned a group named Tahşiye. Moreover, on Gülen’s TV channels, the segments from the said TV series were used on news bulletins while covering Tahşiye, as if it was actual footage. While the subject was being covered by the Zaman daily every 3-5 days, another Gülen-affiliated newspaper, Bugün, was publishing news pieces stating that Tahşiye was an armed terrorist organization which had links with Al-Qaeda. Ultimately, 7-8 months later Mehmet Doğan and more than a 100 of his disciples were put into prison by Gülenist loyalists in the judiciary and security forces on charges of being Al-Qaeda supporters.

Even Daesh, which is known to be skillful in employing media and technology, is almost nothing when compared to the Gülenist Organization. While the Gülenist media conducted the usual media business on one side, they were working for the elimination of figures or organizations, which are critical of them or may disrupt their short-term, midterm or long-term targets. A short time after the news on the media, the Gülenists within the security forces and the judiciary were starting to operate and make comments on the issue which enforced the ideas been propagated by their own media outlets.

Thousands of Gülenists were able to fill posts in the judiciary, security forces and bureaucracy; sometimes they openly said they were Gülenists, sometimes they just assumed other identities, concealing their own identities: leftist, extreme leftist, right-wing, agnostic, deist, laic or Islamist, etc. This is also true for their members within the ranks of the media and the academia. To camouflage their identities like a chameleon until the time is right is the characteristic of this organization, which differentiates it from the other terrorist organizations.

It was recently revealed that they were also stealing the answers to various exams, including the military, civil service and university entrance exams. It should be expressed that these people, Gülenists, weren’t just waiting for the answers to the exams; they were also hard-working and diligent. In politics, they infiltrated not only the ruling party, but they have infiltrated almost all existing political, social and religious movements, including many NGOs.

Not all of the Gülenists have been found and put to trial yet, as it is an organization, which has been active for 40 years. The majority of the people of Turkey had at least an acquaintance, neighbor, colleague or even family member which was linked with this organization. This is another characteristic of the organization; none of the members of other secret organizations could have such day-to-day interaction with the people. Moreover, none of the other organizations’ members could look so ordinary to the surprise of the people.

The leadership of this terrorist organization, which resembles modern Western sects like the Moon or Scientology is also different from the leaders of all existing terrorist organizations. You can’t see any PKK or Daesh leaders speaking from different points of view on a singular subject, as if they have numerous different personalities. Gülen, on the other hand, can act as if he is a great humanitarian, the leader of a violent terrorist organization, a slanderer or just an ordinary person. He doesn’t even speak to his followers in a singular voice. It isn’t possible to cover each and every example; however, there was a speech of his to his followers that was uncovered recently:

“If I am to bring harm to Hizmet [“Service” – what the organization calls itself] and my annihilation is a way to protect my institutions, I’m ready to sacrifice my life. Even if it is a cardinal sin, I’m ready to face it. Considering this, you may think about what I’m further willing to do. (…) God willing, we’re ready to face every challenge for the Service. If such sacrifice is necessary, we will let the flames consume us. If we are talking about this issue extensively, all of our friends out there should also do so.”

In short, Gülen is saying commit suicide instead of endangering the organization, even if it means going to hell. Expressing this idea in longer sentences is not a coincidence; it is a method, of course. Looking at these speeches as a whole, it is easy to realize that he is trying to show that everything he says is consistent, while, in fact, it is contradictory.

It took a long time for Turkey to recognize and understand the threat of this organization,  which was thought to be comprised of friendly and charitable people. Even after the realization of the threat they pose, if the state could have made a propaganda film out of the events transpired on the night of July 15, get on to a time machine and show it on the night of July 14, one still would have had a hard time believing that the Gülenist Organization could be that brutal or bloodthirsty.

Moreover, if one had seen putschists firing on the elderly, who begged the putschists to give up their guns and stop this madness, in this hypothetical movie, one would have still said that the Gülenists were being demonized. However, all of this was not in a film; there never was a film. It was the cold harsh reality. The Parliament was bombed, the Chief of Staff was held hostage, and National Intelligence Organization was strafed by helicopter gunships. More than 2,000 people were wounded. All of the people in Turkey felt that this was more of an invasion than a coup. Even today, this harsh reality seems as unreal as a science-fiction film. As it was covered by foreign media outlets, not only do the supporters of the government believe that the coup was perpetrated by this organization; even the government’s fiercest critics are of the same mind with the government in this matter.

Who killed Karlov, the Russian Federation’s ambassador to Ankara? According to the initial findings, there are many signs, ranging from the schools the shooter went to, to his contacts, which suggest that he is a Gülenist. On the other hand, it isn’t a secret that Gülen had established his game with external parameters through his schools all around the world. His ambition and attempts to shape Turkish foreign policy aren’t also a secret anymore. Two years ago, the organization commenced an operation with its infiltrators within the security forces and the judiciary, accusing the government of being corrupt, which actually targeted Turkey’s relations with Iran and the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. While the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials targeting the military allowed the organization to open space for their own members, it also eliminated military personnel, which argued that Turkey should prioritize the Russia-China axis. The “demonic Iran” propaganda, which was being propagated by the organization’s supporters, has also been deciphered, as the relations between the US and Iran entered a new phase. Now that the US is opening up to Iran, Gülenists aren’t even mentioning Iran anymore, even while talking about Syria.

Suspecting that the assassin was a Gülenist right from the beginning isn’t without reason. No one would be surprised if he were a Gülenist masquerading as an Al-Nusra militant. Turkey knows very well that Gülenists are like chameleons, always masquerading. This was experienced by everyone ranging from highest-ranking bureaucrats to the ordinary people, in every part of life, from ordinary events to foreign policy.

Two main frameworks can be used to evaluate the purpose of the assassination. First, terror organizations such as FETO, PKK, and DAESH have been trying to create a state of chaos in Turkey after increasing their terror activities post-July 15. With this chaos, what is intended is to create a confidence crisis among citizens of Turkey and to damage the country’s image in terms of security and stability on the international level. It is possible to read Ambassador Karlov’s assassination as part of the chaos plan of the terrorist organizations.The second way of looking at the attack is to directly connect it with the rapprochement that has begun in the last few days between Turkey and Russia. Through this attack, there was an attempt to disrupt the steps taken in the aftermath of the plane crisis for the normalization of relations and for the efforts that have been expended for bilateral (Turkey-Russia) and trilateral (Turkey-Russia-Iran) steps to be taken on Syria. By causing a crisis similar to that of the plane one, there was an attempt to interrupt the two countries’ endeavours for normalization and their negotiations on Syria.

At this point, two important processes in Syria can be mentioned. The first is the mutual understanding on the evacuation of civilians from Aleppo between Turkey and Russia. Despite Iran’s and the regime’s interventions, Turkey and Russia are both putting forward a will to ensure that the understanding on evacuation continues. In fact, these evacuations are a point where the [Syrian] regime and Iran and Russia diverge politically. The guarantor of the mutual understanding being applied are Turkey and Russia, and the tension in relations between these two countries can bring an end to this understanding on evacuation. The second process is the talks that are to be held in Astana on Syria. Both the Turkey-Russia-Iran meeting and the new period that is being attempted to begin at Astana carry great importance in terms of the political solution of the Syrian crisis. This process also signifies a limitation of the American initiative on the Syria crisis. For this reason, this assassination, carried out at such a critical juncture, also has the aim of disrupting the meetings on Syria.

2. What can be said about the perpetrator?

The murderer is Mevlut Mert Altintas, employed in the Ankara Riot Police as a police officer. Altintas snuck into the building pretending to be among the ambassador’s personal guard and took place directly behind the ambassador while the latter was giving his speech. After shooting the ambassador, the murderer shouted slogans in Arabic and Turkish and made references to Aleppo. It is observed that the Arabic slogans were memorized in order to give the attack the appearance of being carried out by al-Qaeda or DAESH. It is not possible for these groups to have infiltrated and burrowed into the police department, let alone the fact that neither group would accept a position such as being a police officer per their own doctrines. It is also not possible for such an organized and well-planned attack to be done by a lone wolf.

There are strong traces of FETO in the murderer’s past. One of these is his employment in the Police, which was among the central institutes within the FETO structure. Even after the dismissals from duty and layoffs after July 15th, it was assumed that there remained FETO members within law enforcement. Holding on to the key, important positions in the Police for many years, FETO placed its members through certain promotions within the ranks of the agency. One of these is also the school from which the murderer graduated, the Izmir Rüştü Ünsal Police School. There are also allegations that the murderer was laid off due to the case about the school examination’s questions being stolen, that he took time off during July 15th, and that he lives in the house of one of FETO’s key people. Ultimately, there is no other organization within the police establishment who can conduct an operation of international scope with the structure and the belief to carry out what might well be called a suicide mission other than FETO. Among the Russian public, the allegations about the attacker’s FETO past were debated and the FETO-US connection was established.

3. How should reactions to the assassination be regarded?

It is understood that one of the most important targets of the attack on Russian Ambassador Andrey Karlov was to end the period of rapprochement that had been going on for the past few months between Turkey and Russia. As is known, relations between Russia and Turkey experienced several serious crises following the shooting down of a Russian plane that had violated Turkish airspace by the Turkish air force on November 24, 2015, but following intense diplomatic efforts on both sides, the diplomatic crisis between Ankara and Moscow was finished.

Compared to the plane incident, the crisis management that was enacted in the aftermath of the assassination of the Russian Ambassador was done much better. The initial reactions coming from both capitals and leaders prevented the assassination from turning into a crisis. First, Erdogan immediately calling Russian president Putin and directly informing him rendered speculations that would have abounded after the assassination ineffective. At the same time, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s travel to Moscow in order to participate in the trilateral summit on Syria and his informing of Russian authorities there also played an easing role in the management of the crisis.

Secondly, both Erdogan and Putin have qualified the attack as a provocation and expressed that the attack’s main aim had been Turkish-Russian relations. This unity in discourse has also made the management of the crisis easier. Moreover, Turkey’s announcement that Russian security officials would be allowed to participate in the investigation of the assassination also made the process easier.

Among the underlying reasons for carrying out this crisis management in such a careful and delicate manner can be shown the experiences from the previous crisis lived shortly before and the continued diplomatic efforts to overcome the past crisis. Also, the fact that the diplomatic process among Russia, Turkey and Iran continues on a very delicate base can be shown as among the justifications for the joint reaction of the two sides.

4. What might the consequences of the assassination be?

The purpose of the assassination was to sabotage the rapprochement efforts between Turkey and Russia. In fact, the West created a discourse likening this assassination to that carried out by Gavrilo Princip against Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand which set off the First World War, and stated that this could be the beginning of the Third World War. Moreover, many analyses were written stating that this could deepen the crisis between the two countries. However, both countries’ carrying out mutual high-level meetings which kept the issue from ballooning invalidated expectations of a crisis. Therefore, contrary to assumptions, Turkish-Russian relations will not enter a period of conflict.

In the forthcoming period, the assassination’s consequences could appear on a few different levels. First, there could be a period where bilateral relations become stronger. Both countries’ tensions in their relations with the West brings them closer together. Despite the presence of many political problems on which Moscow-Ankara cannot come to an agreement, the sides are putting into play a certain model of strategic rationality. Accordingly, while areas of disagreement are handled through diplomatic channels, relations in the economic realm are protected from the fall-out in the area of political irreconcilability.

Secondly, a new solution-making period can result where Tehran is also involved in the political solution that Moscow-Ankara work out on Syria. The US compartmentalizing the Syria crisis by focusing solely on fighting DAESH and leaving that up to the PYD-YPG might mean that it will be left out of the aforementioned solution process. When considered as a whole, it is possible to say that this assassination will develop Turkish-Russian relations.

5. How might the assassination reflect on the Syria crisis?

The two sides will not want to lose the momentum they have gained in the resolution of the Syria crisis. In fact, the trilateral summit that was nevertheless carried out and the decision to act in a joint manner point to this. In the forthcoming period, Turkey will expend efforts for involving the opposition in the process and for the establishment of a ceasefire by maintaining open channels of communication with Russia. For their part, Russia and Iran will be engaged in overtaking Aleppo and will work to turn political negotiations to the advantage of the regime following the assassination. In this period, the three actors finding the least common denominator will increase the potential for a political solution. There are not just differences between Turkey and Iran-Russia about the future of Syria, but between Russia and Iran as well. It can be expected for these differences to become more apparent as negotiations continue. For this reason, the negotiations aim to bring together the regime and opposition with the international actors who support the regime and the opposition on some common ground.

Faruk Yaslıçimen interviewed Belkıs Kılıçkaya, a distinguished Turkish journalist, about DAESH, on which she made a three-part documentary for a TV channel in Turkey. Since its initial broadcast, the documentary was repeatedly shown on TV and has reached thousands of people via internet. Kılıçkaya’s critical perspective, multi-dimensional approach, use of different source material, and in-depth analyses clarify and illuminate many points about DAESH and the ambivalent international politics against this terror group that have so far remained in the dark.

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I would like to begin with asking when and how this work began.

Habertürk asked me to make a documentary on foreign fighters in August 2015. While studying foreign fighters’ portraits, I found myself focusing on Afghanistan: from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to the Taliban and to the US invasion in the aftermath of 9/11. The invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq are recent history, but we forget them quickly. I can tell that the bad experience of invasions continues to shape these countries and the region today.

At the beginning, I remember that I was depressed while researching the daily lives of people during the invasions. I was struck by a visual. It was a holiday. I was watching a French-made documentary, showing Afghan people living in denlike houses and villages. Like a hole in the wall … The interview was about the US soldiers’ Taliban hunting methods. A man in his fifties was telling his story. He said that the US troops came at night. His father was elderly and wasn’t able wake up right away. When his father barely got up and started to ask a question, the soldiers fired at him. The man, with tears in his eyes, said that his son, who was 12 to 13 years old, yelled at the soldiers, saying “you’ll pay for what you’ve done,” and they shot him too. Then the soldiers left, saying “sorry,” this was the wrong house. After watching this, I stood silent for a long time, not being able to utter a word.

How did you feel?

Numbness … I was still for some time, as if paralyzed. And this was just one of several examples of cruelty during the years of invasion.

After my research on Afghanistan, I started working on the portraits of foreign fighters originating from Europe. These are also depressing, reflecting their sorrowful lives. Take the Kouachi brothers, for instance; they didn’t have a father. Their mother was a prostitute, who committed suicide while bearing her sixth child. The brothers, who were only children then, came to their home and saw their hanged mother. It’s not a surprise that they joined DAESH later.

Joining DAESH grants them a comfortable, safe environment. They feel they’ve become somebody from being just nothing. Even their dead bodies would become precious; they were told that they would become martyrs. While nobody acknowledged their presence before, by joining DAESH, they became like brothers to people from numerous countries. I observed this while watching an interview, which was conducted by the French with hidden cameras. A boy was passionately saying “I have brothers from countries all across the world, can you believe it?” These portraits sadden you; this gets worse when you start researching Iraq.

You believe that these people are joining DAESH due to individual or social sufferings?

Yes, sure. There are individual and social traumas at play. Invasions have severely disrupted the traditional and social fabrics of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, where different segments of society have clashed with each other. Such organizations are nurtured by chaos and instability. Additionally, violence has a market in today’s world and it’s possible that there are also nihilist tendencies in some of those who joined DAESH, as Olivier Roy has argued. And finally prisons … We know from the PKK example that this terror organization emerged from Diyarbakır Prison. The politicians of the movement, academic studies, even Abdullah Öcalan himself have stated this. What else could emerge from prisons in Afghanistan where hundreds and thousands of people were imprisoned? Or from Abu Ghraib Prison and others in Iraq? Speaking from a sociological viewpoint, DAESH is not a surprise.

What kind of sources did you use while making the documentary?

I read many books. For instance, I read books on the Salafi-Wahhabi movements, along with the books by the founders of Al-Qaeda. I watched numerous documentaries, mostly French. I have also watched some US-made documentaries, as well. Slowly, I began to reach some conclusions and my further research, particularly my interviews conducted with various academicians and people who conducted field research, have all confirmed my foresight.

What did you foresee?

Looking at the patterns, academic works on the subject and the information gathered from the field, they were all leading to the same conclusion. I had foreseen that there would be DAESH attacks not only in the Middle East but also in Europe. I had forecast more precisely that there would be terror attacks in France, where I lived for 17 years. People coming from French colonies, jobless for three generations, and bearing neither Muslim nor French identity had formed a potential human resource for DAESH. Some had already revolted in 2004 by burning cars in the streets. It was no surprise that the largest participation in DAESH in Europe was from France.

A similar coincidence happened when I was meeting with academics from Turkey, Europe, and the US. For instance, what Prof. Burhanettin Duran said about the US invasion of Afghanistan was unknowingly confirmed by Alberto Munoz, who was one of the high-ranking administrators of the CIA during the invasion. Similarly, an Australian security expert’s observations in Iraq and Syria during the invasion coincided with Cole Bunzel’s findings, who is an academic at Princeton working on DAESH. Listening to all of them, I understood that none of these events were unexpected. On the other hand, Michael Nagata of US Special Operations said to the New York Times in 2014, “We do not understand the movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it”. This can only be an irony! Shane Bell, a former Australian soldier and a senior security consultant for Iraq, Syria, and Libya, notes that “people from military-origin, like me, and intelligence agencies were aware of DAESH for a long time. Recently, a picture [was] released showing that a US commander posing for the camera with a black DAESH flag in his hand. This picture belongs to 2008 and if you look at the souvenirs that soldiers brought along having served there in this period of time, you can undoubtedly find traces of DAESH.” Although Turkish media, along with the whole world, was surprised when DAESH first emerged in 2014, the emergence of DAESH was hardly a surprise for people working in the field.

Could you say briefly who or what caused the emergence of DAESH? Was it international interventions or regional dynamics? What does your documentary tell us about this?

Invasions, dictatorial regimes, and finally terror regimes… Firstly, there is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When the Soviets left the country 10 years later, it had become a completely different Afghanistan. It is a country where 20 different dialects are spoken; a country with a population of 30 million, consisting of diverse ethnic groups. Although the Soviets have left the country, the communistic ideology remains, as many bureaucrats and civil servants were raised by the Soviets. During the Soviet invasion, new sectarian dynamics entered Afghanistan that had not existed before. For instance, with the support of the US, Pakistani jihadists entered the fray. Similarly, a Salafi-Wahhabi understanding of Islam also started to appear in Afghanistan, where the Sunni-Sufi understanding of Islam had actually been predominant throughout history. Suddenly, there was a new movement, which forbid music, girls’ education, or even flying a kite. And the Taliban emerged.

The social fabric of the region started to unravel and it became unpredictable. Then, the US invasion ensued after 9/11. Something really surprised me about this invasion. As you know, the Afghan Northern Alliance supported the international forces against the Taliban. There was a tradition between the clans of Afghanistan; the Northern Alliance, being victorious, demanded that the Taliban, the defeated side in the war, should submit, and the Taliban agreed. However, Donald Rumsfeld disagreed with the decision. As a result, prisons were built and more than 100,000 people were imprisoned. Moreover, many people were sent to the notorious “black sites”, secret prisons run by CIA and constructed generally outside of the US territory, and these are places, where human rights do not matter.

So, now we can expect that some of these inmates were probably tortured to become radicals.

Of course; people imprisoned during the Iraqi invasion turned from typical insurgents into militants with a clear agenda when they got out. The first pictures of the ruling cadre of DAESH released to the world media were all taken in the Iraqi prisons. The conditions there apparently paved the way for radicalization.

But the invasion of Afghanistan is not the whole story. After Afghanistan, Iraq was invaded. Before the Iraqi invasion, there was the Iran-Iraq War between 1980-88 that caused the deaths of almost a million people. We had Saddam Hussein, who was backed by the West. We also had the Iranian Revolution in 1979, with serious regional effects when Humeyni tried to spread it. We are basically talking about a turbulent region. Moreover, as Iraq invaded Kuwait, there was a 13-year-long embargo on Iraq by the international community, which left the country in a shambles. To top all of this, Iraq was invaded after 9/11 and it became a failed state with no authority! Prisoners who committed either felonies or petty offences were all released. Looking at the dispositions of the groups in Iraq, you can see Sunnis and Shiites who were in favor of the invasion and who were against it. Some of these groups had enmity against each other. While some elements formed an alliance between themselves in the first year, they became enemies in the second and allies once again in the third year. There were many different organizations emerging during these turbulent times.

The war in Iraq also had a psychological component. The US forces were playing Metallica on the streets of Fallujah. A whole administration was overthrown, from its fire department to basic state institutions. It became a country without any authority after the 13-year-long embargo; a country that suffered too much violence as a consequence of Saddam and the Iran-Iraq War. On the other hand, the country had the potential for wealth, as it has bountiful oil and mineral reserves. It could have become as wealthy as France, but the country is continuously ravaged by invasion.

You said that it was a transformation from dictatorial regimes to terror regimes: a title that you gave to the second part of your documentary.

DAESH emerged in Iraq and flourished in Syria. If you notice, these two countries were ruled by the Ba’ath regimes, which were actually the remnants of the Soviet ideology, while also having components of the Nazi Stasi. Moreover, both of the regimes represented the minorities in their respective countries: one represented the Nusayri minority, while the other the Sunni. It is not simply that DAESH emerged due to existing catastrophic conditions, but I want to underline that DAESH means Ba’ath. It’s not coincidental that, among all of the organizations in the region, only DAESH emerged and established a state. They got their know-how from Saddam’s men. Looking at the important figures of DAESH reveals this. Izzat al-Douri, for instance, was the right-hand man of Saddam. Abu Bakr Naji’s notes were published by Der Spiegel. Examining his networks within prisons led to the same conclusion. Olivier Roy defined it perfectly: “Secular men with mustaches grew Islamic beard[s] within a couple of months.” They also transferred their military skills to DAESH.

You’re speaking about DAESH’s organizational structure now …

After he was killed, Abu Bakr Naji’s notes were published by Der Spiegel. In those notes, it said that they were forming religious schools named Da’wah and were selecting the most talented participants. Then, they cooperated with these people from whom they received intelligence about the people in their villages or towns. They learned who had a weakness for what, who was wealthy, who would resist etc. By this method, they were able to establish a small but effective intelligence network. Abu Bakr Naji was known to be responsible for the air force and intelligence during Saddam’s reign. All of the names were somehow related to Saddam.

Do you believe that each and every member of DAESH was related to Saddam’s regime?

No, there are still many questions about the nature of this issue. Zarqawi, for instance, is still a mystery for me, even after all of the reading. You know everything about him, but you cannot make any sense of him. Cole Bunzel studied his portrait very well and read all of his works. I should state that I’m commenting on existing works. He is from Jordan and he was an alcoholic and a drug addict. Zarqawi met with Maqdisi, his Salafi teacher, in a prison; however, their relations turned sour. It is said that he is charismatic and is able to mesmerize people.

Zarqawi left the prison with a seemingly inimical attitude towards the countries in the Middle East and the Shiites. Let’s assume that he met with Salafist imams and started to hate Shiites to the extent that he came to believe that every Shiite has to be annihilated. He doesn’t even care about the invasion forces. Moreover, the American academics who examined the notes of Zarqawi state that he isn’t inimical to Jewish people.

That’s peculiar. How can we explain it?

Depending on the information provided by our interviewees and on the news appearing in the world media, Zarqawi first went to Afghanistan to meet Osama bin Laden; however, they had a disagreement. Later, someone acted as an intermediary between them and, ultimately, bin Laden funded him. Anyway, Zarqawi was wounded during the US siege of Herat and left Afghanistan. Do you know where he went? Tehran! We know that Zarqawi saw Shiites as his enemies during that time. So, how was he able to go to Tehran and conduct his business there? This is an important question. We asked this to Cole Bunzel and he said “this is a very hypocritical behavior; he didn’t attack Shiites during his stay. Moreover, the Shiite administration offered him support and he accepted it.”

Let’s stay there for a minute. A man who is inimical towards Shiites goes to Tehran, conducts certain businesses, and receives support from Iran. What does this mean?

I leave this to our readers. I’m just providing the information.

When I talked to the people of the region, they were telling me that the probability of DAESH being an instrument of Iran was high.

We know that Iran wouldn’t miss any chances. Petraeus says that Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian senior military officer, is “a wonderful spy and he established a contact with the Iraqi al-Qaeda.” The interesting thing is that Iraqi al-Qaeda is against Shiites.  According to German intelligence reports, Zarqawi started to travel frequently to Syria from Jordan. Syria isn’t an ordinary country in which to travel. It is hardly believable that someone like Zarqawi would travel to Syria frequently without any knowledge of the Assad regime. Then, in 2005, Zarqawi’s men were captured in Iraq. One of the captured men was from Syrian Intelligence, while the other was a colonel in the Syrian Army. I watched the record of this news broadcast on Iraqi TV at that time.

Let’s assume that Al-Assad was afraid of a US invasion and sent his men to infiltrate the insurgents. However, Zarqawi worked together with these men and, if the news was accurate, Iraqi Al-Qaeda started to attack Shiite mosques. It’s not improbable that they coordinated and carried out these attacks together. We also know that they appeared anti-Shiite, but they killed thousands of Sunnis too.

According to the writings of Zarqawi found by the US military, the chief purpose of Zarqawi was to sparkle a civil war with sectarian conflicts at its core. For this reason, Zarqawi called the people to protest the elections. As a result, the Sunni population protested the elections; the Shiites gained more power, while this clever act by Zarqawi pushed the Sunnis out of politics and led them to become increasingly marginalized.

At the same period of time, a book named The Management of Savagery was published. Its author was Abu Bakr Naji. The book employs a complex academic discourse. A year after its publication, it was translated by a think-tank in the US. For instance, the book interestingly distinguishes between Jihad and Islam and suggests employing violence and savagery to manage perceptions. It states “One who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening (others), and massacring—I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam and one should not confuse them. (Moreover, he knows) that he cannot continue to fight and move from one stage to another unless the beginning stage contains a stage of massacring the enemy and making him homeless (or ‘frightened’).”*

The claim for a state appeared first with Zarqawi and it was before DEASH, right?

Yes, Zarqawi first established the Mujahideen Shura Council. Then, they found two men, one from Baghdad (Abu Omar al-Baghdadi) and one from Egypt (Abu Hamza). They established a so-called state and announced it on the internet. But none cared about the claim. After Zarqawi was killed, Omar al-Baghdadi became the leader. The actual ruler of the organization was Abu Hamza; however, al-Baghdadi was preferred as he was a local man. The US put a $5-million bounty on these two men. Two years later, this amount decreased to $100,000, as they had suspicions about these two men’s existence. After they were killed, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the new leader. We did not hear his name between the years 2006 and 2011. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began to emerge as a powerful figure when Maliki took the government in Iraq, the Sunnis came under pressure, and the Sahwa forces comprised of Sunni fighters were destroyed by Petreaus. Some of these fighters joined the Iraqi al-Qaeda later.

You have said that there were many documentaries on this subject; how does your documentary compare with those?

I’m a journalist who loves to deal with the human element. I prefer to examine subjects with a sociological perspective. This is also true for the DAESH documentary. There are very good books and documentaries on Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, and DAESH. But there are also documentaries that can turn their viewers into Islamophobics. Unfortunately, the second is widespread in Europe and the US, portraying Muslims as a savage horde targeting Western civilization; however, this is not the case. DAESH is actually targeting us rather than the rest of the world. Look at, for instance, the number of people they killed in the Middle East and the cultural heritage they destroyed. Olivier Roy rightly defines the Salafi-Wahhabi movement as “Holy Ignorance” in one of his books. In my view, DAESH is an attempt to de-Islamize Islam, targeting not only Muslims but also Islamic civilization as a whole.

Do you think that modernism and DAESH are in contradiction with each other?

I think DAESH is a very modern organization, as they effectively employ every privilege granted by modern life. Their propaganda videos don’t only consist of violence. For instance, a journalist at the BBC examined their tweets posted during a three months period. The visuals are exceptionally well done. The foreign fighters originating from Europe are especially good at this. The saying of Andy Warhol, “In the future, everyone will be world-famous for 15 minutes,” applies to DAESH as well. DAESH militants become famous with their YouTube videos on the internet.

How about DAESH’s periodicals?

If you examine their periodicals, you can see that they’re all well prepared. They refer to events from the historical and sociological memory of their respective countries. For instance, their first periodical in Turkey referred to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The British and French made a secret agreement and divided the territories among themselves. We understand that the Ottoman Caliphate was no more, right? The peculiar part is that DAESH regards neither the Ottomans nor Turkish as Muslims. That’s why they talk about conquering Istanbul, and it is no coincidence that on the cover page you see the picture of the Maiden’s Tower, not the Sultanahmet (Blue) Mosque.

So, DAESH’s media tools follow certain tactics for winning people over.

Let me tell you something more interesting. As I was exposed too much to their materials, I wasn’t able to distinguish interesting or peculiar parts of their publications. So, I gave one of their periodicals to my brother, so that he could examine it. He said, “They’re [DAESH] calling people to not vote.” I knew that they were doing this, but I thought it was only in Europe. If the Muslims in Europe don’t vote, they will become marginalized, as was the case in Iraq. Think of people in Turkey who identify themselves as Muslim not casting their vote; the people who they want to exclude from the system will become excluded, marginalized, and will form a human resource for DAESH-like organizations to be recruited.

And the image of the sword … You examine it in your documentary as well. DAESH is not killing people with the sword. But they use weapons of modern technology that were left behind by the Americans and captured by DAESH in Iraq.

These are pornographic visuals. They terrify people, while becoming a center of attraction. On the other hand, I know from France that mainstream Islamophobic periodicals sometimes used the image of the sword. Can you imagine, there was a weekly periodical published in France that had such a cover, named “Prophet of the Sword”? DAESH serves this perception and markets this image deliberately.

Interestingly, ten months after the formation of their so-called state, one of al-Baghdadi’s statements was revealed. He said “Islam is a religion of war, not peace.” This wasn’t said by Trump, Sarkozy, or any Islamophobic academics, but by al-Baghdadi himself. They first categorize the world as Muslims and non-Muslims. Then, they distinguish Muslims on the basis of their pledge of allegiance to them and they excommunicate whoever does not obey them. This excommunicative behavior is such that, if two people were left, one would excommunicate the other.

Then, what purpose does excommunication serve? Which strategy is it a part of? A rational person would expect the organization to negotiate more in order to recruit more people, especially if they are claiming to found a state. Am I wrong?

Palestine is a fundamental issue for Muslims all over the world, right? You can even find a Palestine motive, being a symbol of resistance, in very secular and leftist movements. In theory, you expect DAESH to have such a motive too. But DAESH attacked the Yarmouk Camp where Palestinians were residing. Why? I think there are some peculiarities waiting to be answered. We should try to understand DAESH by following not what they are saying but what they are doing.

There are Eurofighters in DAESH as well. What do their profiles tell us?

There is an identity crisis in Europe. Looking at the lives of those who joined DAESH, you will see intriguing facts. For instance, Salim Benghalem, one of the ten most wanted DAESH militants in the US. He has a criminal record for being a gang member, being connected with the mafia, drug dealing, and thievery. His lawyer is Léon-Lef Forster, who caught my attention when I was a journalist in France, for also being the lawyer of Alaattin Çakıcı. Forster is an expert in gang lawsuits. He said that he was very surprised when he heard about Benghalem joining DAESH. “Putting religion aside, I haven’t even seen this man being either a part of a civilization or the enemy of it,” he said. Benghalem became a DAESH member in a very short period of time.

Another example was a family in which the mother was Algerian and the father a Charlie Hebdo subscriber. The family defined itself as laical believers. Their child was against any religion. The child had two names: Yunes and Sebastian. He sometimes used one and then the other. It can be seen that he was in an identity crisis. Then, his parents joined DAESH. Interestingly, they wrote and sent a letter to their son. The mother said “don’t think that we affected the decision of each other, we made this decision by ourselves.” This indicates a hybrid form of culture. They stressed the equality between men and women. In the statements of such people, there are many indicators of a hybrid culture. For instance, some of them talk about “the right to behead people.” They say “I haven’t beheaded anyone until now, but I can. This is how I employ my freedom of expression.” Another one says, “You carry the flag of gay pride. It is my preference to carry the DAESH flag.” These kinds of rhetoric on freedoms and rights don’t appear in the profiles of fighters originating from the Middle East.

For instance, there is a family in France that produces flags. The woman there made an interesting statement. She said that she made a white DAESH flag as “many pacifists come and prefer the white DAESH flag.” This was an interesting detail.

In another instance, there was a man named Abdelhamid Abaaoud who was a Belgian of Moroccan descent. It was one of the first profiles I examined while studying DAESH. There was a visual of him, which was one of the most striking. He had attached a number of corpses to a rope and said “I used to ski, but now I’m jihading.” Then, he laughed and started to drag the corpses with the rope. It was one of the most terrifying visuals I have ever seen. A French TV station conducted an interview with this man and broadcast the footage. Abaaoud was somewhat popular in DAESH. If I had ever seen him, I would’ve been able to identify him easily. However, this terrorist entered and left France numerous times, as if there was no screening. Moreover, this man was one of the important figures of the Bataclan attack. Previously, he had prepared an attack on the opera house in Toulouse; however, it was prevented at the last minute. Abaaoud was one of the most important profiles in DAESH.

In addition, there are religious converts, all of whom don’t have any political background. They don’t have any connections with political movements, including extreme ones, in their own countries. There are very interesting portraits among these converts. There was one whose mother was an agnostic and father socialist. Then, the parents got divorced and the father married a Portuguese woman, who was a devoted Catholic. The mother raised both her child and the man’s together. However, both of the children joined DAESH. For example, Denis Cuspert’s mother was German, while his father was from Ghana. His father left the family and Cuspert was subjected to violence by his American step-father. Cuspert is an important recruiter in DAESH.

How much time does it take the new converts to join DAESH?

They join DAESH after almost a year of sharing the news of their conversion to Islam to their close friends and relatives. In his book, Robert Leiken has an important point. He says, “It’s 80 times easier for a German to become a jihadist than a Muslim.” Because, converts have no basic information about Islam at the beginning. There are elements of modernism, violence, and an identity crisis that contribute to this fact. This is also known by Al-Qaeda. In their guides on propaganda, it’s said, “stay away from the ones who know the religion well, focus on people who don’t know much about it.”

There are striking similarities between DAESH’s interpretation of Islam and evangelist’s interpretation of Christianity. I interviewed Esra Özyürek, who is an academic in the UK. Özyürek studied the Salafi mosques in Germany and published a book named Being German, Becoming Muslim. I told her an anecdote I had heard from a peshmerga who fought in Northern Iraq against DAESH. A DAESH militant and the said peshmerga somehow came side by side; the peshmerga asked the militant why he was fighting. The militant said, “Because, I’m going to have lunch together with the prophet.” After listening to this anecdote, Özyürek said that it was interesting and added, “Evangelists talk about having tea with God.”

Does this mean that DAESH is also using expressions borrowed from Christianity in its propaganda mechanisms?

No, they are not borrowing these expressions directly from Christianity. Such similarities demonstrate resembling reflections of modernism both in new Christian currents and DAESH-like organizations. It is also seen in the letters of the European Muslims who join DAESH: “If you become a Muslim, we’ll see each other [in] heaven.” They’re sure that they’ll all become martyrs. And there is also the Salafi-Wahhabi understanding, which is a modern interpretation of Islam representing not really returning to the authentic version of religion. It disregards fourteen centuries of memory of Islamic culture and civilization, severing all ties with tradition and local culture. Not all Salafis have jihadist or excommunicative attitudes, of course. But the Salafi-Wahhabi tradition turns against the Islamic culture. As you know, Salafis always have an issue with tombs. DAESH shouts “Allah-u Akbar” while destroying the tombs with explosives.

Is DAESH still a closed book?

Yes and no. In certain aspects, it’s a deciphered organization. There is a French expert on terrorism named Jean-Charles Brisard, who worked at the anti-terror department. In one of his statements, he said that the 24 banks captured by DAESH are still open for international transactions.

What does it mean if the banks are open to international transactions?

I don’t know. Banks in Greece were closed down in just a day. Then, it means that the international system allows them to stay open for transaction. When we asked this to Munoz, he said, “It is easy to close down the banks. If they are still open, someone wanted to keep them open.” He clearly wasn’t surprised.

It seems as if the international system doesn’t want to finish off DAESH quickly.

According to the 2015 report of the Louvre Museum, which was conveyed to the Élysée Palace, DAESH is smuggling artifacts. So, it is not dynamiting all historical artifacts.

Or, take the oil sales of DAESH.

We knew that the Western oil companies in the region were selling oil during the Iraqi embargo. These companies never asked the source when they found cheap oil. This was also stressed by the European Parliament. There also was a hearing in 2015 in the US. The Chief of General Staff and the Secretary of Defense were present. A senator was asking how the DAESH tankers travelled almost without any resistance. They replied that the drivers were civilians. When the senator emphasized that those drivers were working for DAESH, they said that they didn’t have any man in the field. The senator asked again, “where are these drivers? Have they retired after carrying all the oil and started to plow the fields somewhere?” The Chief of General Staff replied by saying, “I don’t understand your question.” It was just like a comedy show.

Would you like to add anything?

In Europe, one of the most brutal events in world history, the Holocaust happened. This was conducted by an organized large group, which was the product of the transitivity between the state and the people. WWII swept millions of lives away. In summary, 50 million people died and, since then, we haven’t seen a war of this scope. However, we know that in the region we’re living, WWI and WWII still continue.

Belkıs Kılıçkaya, I thank you for your time and we’re grateful that you allowed me to conduct such an extensive interview with you.

*The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass, translated by William McCants, Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, May 2006.

On June 29, 2014, an armed group declared that they had established the Islamic State and that they were to restore the caliphate. Subsequently, the group changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and to Levant/Syria-ISIL/ISIS.  In a short span of time, the group has taken hold of a number of cities, ammunition stores and has established substantial financial resources.

ISIL is a modern phenomenon and it is in many ways not different from fascism or communism which for a great part defined the bloody history of the twentieth century. For ISIL, the caliphate is a mere declaration of intention – it has never offered any theological explanation of it. Its leadership’s main group of advisors is composed of the remainders of Saddam’s army, especially the Republican Guards; in this manner ISIL features in the dictatorship of the Saddam era. ISIL is a reflection of the situation created by the United States and, later, by Iran in the region. Currently, Western countries are targeting ISIL, which in return, puts up strong resistance and has gained new sites in Iraq and Syria. At this stage, ISIL has gained the sympathy and support of radical organizations such as Al Nusra and the Islamic Front. ISIL’s power is, in a sense, a result of the lure of power. It must be born in mind, however, that neither other jihadi movements –including many warring factions under the banner of ISIL- nor major denominations –including Salafis- have accepted ISIL’s call for the establishment of the caliphate.

ISIL’s ontological base is a reaction against the regional policies of Western countries and Israel alongside the failure of the state institutions in Iraq and Syria. The emergence of fascist organizations everywhere in the world in such overwhelming and long-term instability is frequently encountered. ISIL is an outcome of the latter and to present it as one of the main reasons of the state of affairs in the Middle East is complete demagoguery.

Salafi movements can be seen as products of the reaction against the globalization of modernity in an effort to influence the Islamic world. However, ISIL represents a more radical break than Salafi movements; it is impossible to consider ISIL as part of heretical Islam. It is true that ISIL has derived its human resources from “Muslim” societies but its mode of appearance, ignorance, hastiness and greenness has reduced it to a tool for preparing the ground for regional operations of various outsiders and to legitimize and facilitate their operations.

ISIL is a modern phenomenon and it is in many ways not different from fascism or communism which for a great part defined the bloody history of the twentieth century.

ISIL suggests that all areas of life –and politics, of course- must be carried out as they were in the initial stages of Islam. That stage, at least as far as ISIL defines it, is almost an imagined one. As to the call for the caliphate of Al Baghdadi, certain questions must be answered from the outset: Is the caliphate an issue that can be owned by a group formed in a few years and trying to make a name by terror activities? Can we explain the situation while ignoring its historical-sociological background? As is known, the caliphate has a connotation of higher authority inviting all Muslims to obey. Today, the nation-state, which is formed on the concept of “absolute” positive and negative sovereignty, is the norm in global politics. It will not recognize any higher authority including the caliphate in the traditional meaning of the term. Therefore, a call for the caliphate is nothing but an instrument to carry out immediate objectives.

http://thenewturkey.org/why-daesh-is-so-pleasant-to-israel/

Radical groups or ideologies can be seen in every society and in all periods. What is important is how these groups or ideologies get hold of the community or the international system. At this point, we should ask: would we still be referring to the so-called Al-Qaida organization, had there never occurred a power struggle between the USSR and the U.S. in Afghanistan? Can we understand the emergence of ISIL without Al-Qaida and the U.S. occupation of Iraq? Going back further, without the postcolonial practices of Western countries in the Middle East – i.e. the extraordinary political capacity of the U.S. to remain on friendly terms with Saudi Arabia so as to hold sway over oil flux – would Salafi/Wahhabi ideologies terrorize marginal groups in the Islamic world?

What about the concept of jihad and mujahidin? Were not the mujahidin the “good guys” for the U.S. before 1989? What was the content of the concept prior to the mujahidin of Afghanistan? What about democracy? Do Western countries want to see real democracies in the Islamic world? What is the nature of the rage of the Muslims living in Western countries? Is it only because they are Muslims or because of the frustration caused by racist and exclusionary circumstances in the West? What is the target of this rage? Why do they kill Muslims in Syria and Iraq?

With these questions, we do not want to empty the historical content of the concept of jihad and to suggest that the concept is wholly produced by Orientalist approaches. On the contrary, the term jihad occupies an exceptional place in Islamic history. It has been a main motivation behind the social, economic and political power of Muslim states. From this perspective, we need to ask again: Can people who use the “jihad” rhetoric offer a clear definition of the concept, which is acceptable to everyone, especially to Muslims? Do the “jihadists” emulate historical Muslim figures or modern warriors like Hitler and Saddam Hussein? Current representation of the concept empties its historical content and makes it unattractive in the eyes of the whole world, including Muslims. This sort of empty concept eliminates one of the vital ontological roots of the Islamic world and exterminates its most important vantage point against the West.

It does not seem realistic to say that ISIL will soon be wiped out of the Middle Eastern scene in an environment where state institutions are paralyzed, the state image has collapsed, and political commitments are defined along sectarian lines.

At this point, it is of little significance to detect the presence of Western actors or intelligence agencies in the emergence of ISIL. What is significant is how ISIL is utilized by global actors for the sake of their pragmatic purposes. In order to understand this, we should look at the kinds of results brought about by policies designed and implemented through ISIL. To give a few examples:

• The intervention of countries such as the U.S., the U.K., Russia and Iran in Iraq and Syria is legitimized in the eyes of both their public and the global community.
• These countries have exported radicals from their homelands and in this manner postponed upcoming internal problems, thanks to the ground offered through ISIL.
• The concept of Muslim-Western tension proposed in the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis has been reinforced through ISIL.
• The center-periphery relations between the West and Middle Eastern countries have been reinforced with no visible anticipation of change in the near future.
• This environment has increased the importance of Israel as the sole representative of the West in the region and any possibility of objection to Israeli policies by the international community has been seriously impaired.
• Although Syrian opposition was and still is the most important group struggling against ISIL, its legitimacy has severely been eroded; the Assad regime has been legitimized and its life has been prolonged through ISIL.
• Iran has stiffened its hegemony in Iraq and increased its presence in Syria under the pretext of combating ISIL.
• Kurdish nationalism, PKK and its affiliates in Syria and Iraq have grown stronger.

It does not seem realistic to say that ISIL will soon be wiped out of the Middle Eastern scene in an environment where state institutions are paralyzed, the state image has collapsed, and political commitments are defined along sectarian lines. Unless power-sharing struggles between global and regional actors cease, to build successful states in Iraq and Syria will never be possible. The most aggrieved parties from this situation have been the Syrian and Iraqi peoples, of course. Regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and Turkey have been hit the hardest both in their domestic and foreign policies. It cannot be said that Western countries and Russia have clearly benefited from the turmoil in the region. The country that has benefitted the most, however, is Israel, which is now the most relaxed it has ever been in its history as the highest threats to its existence, namely Syria, Iraq and Egypt, have been paralyzed.

Following the coordinated terrorist attacks in which 130 people were killed in Paris on November 13^th, many observers (including politicians) declared that France was going through its own “9/11”.  At first glance, there are indeed many striking similarities between the two terrorist attacks and the way they both traumatized the United States of America in 2001 and France in 2015.  Far more than localized attacks that could be socially and / or geopolitically explained, these tragedies has been unanimously described as a global “act of terror” against either “the American Way of Life” or the “French lifestyle”. In both cases, these “barbaric” and “foreign” attacks targeted peaceful civilians and the only possible response would be the declaration of a “global war on Terror” (Georges Bush) or a “merciless war” against the Islamic State (François Hollande).

As a direct consequence of these terrorist attacks on domestic soil, both George W. Bush and François Hollande benefited from the “rally-round-the-flag effect”: they openly became “War Presidents” and intensified their military intervention in the Middle East while reducing civil liberties at home.

On the international front, The United States of America heavily bombed Afghanistan that was harboring Al-Qaeda and invaded Irak in 2003 (without the authorization of the United Nations) whereas France immediately intensified its bombing of the so-called and self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (I.S.) in Syria. One should not forget that the ensuing chaos in Irak led to the creation of I.S…

On the domestic front, the U.S. government drafted the “Patriot Act”, which drastically limited American civil liberties and opened the door to the infamous Guantanamo prison. With the same parliamentary support, the French Government declared a new “state of Emergency” by extending a law created in 1955 during the bloody postcolonial war of independence in French Algeria.  It also proposed to write the State of Emergency into the French constitution.

However, beyond these apparent similarities between the American and the French immediate reactions to these international acts of terror (intensified military intervention in the Middle East and strict restriction of civil liberties), it is possible to highlight a few factors proving that history will not repeat itself and that “November 13^th” can not become a French version of “9/11”.

http://thenewturkey.org/ex-soviet-state-fighters-in-daesh/

On the international front, it is obvious that France, a newly (re)integrated NATO member, does not have the United States of America’s diplomatic and military capabilities.  As a truly Hobbesian State, America had the military power to invade Irak on its own even if they tried, mostly for diplomatic reasons, to build the largest “coalition of the willing”: At the end, out of the 48 Nations officially supporting the Bush administration in its “war against terror”, only three nations (The United Kingdom, Australia and Poland) offered limited military support on the Iraqi front. It is true that France is still one of the five permanent members of the United Nation Security Council and remains the largest army in continental Europe with a nuclear arsenal.  But as a more Kantian European State focused on peace building since the end of the Cold War, France has neither the diplomatic power nor the military might to follow the United States’ steps in the Middle East. As confirmed by President Hollande’s mixed results in his attempt to build a larger coalition with the support of key regional players such as the United States, Russia or even its closest European ally Germany, it is clear that France will not be able to unilaterally wage the “merciless war” against ISIS on Syrian soil as President Hollande and Prime Minister Valls promised to French citizens.  In addition, the current humanitarian tragedy in Syria where millions of civilians are brutally killed and forced into exile by both ISIS and the terror producing/exporting Assad Regime will force the French government to follow a more diplomatic path. The recent diplomatic agreement reached between the European Union and the Turkish government on the Syrian refugee crisis is a promising step in this more peaceful direction.

The future of civil peace and collective harmony in France depends on it.

If there is no doubt that “November 13^th” cannot have on the international scene the same impact as “9/11”, there are serious reasons to worry about the consequences that a radicalized war against ISIS terror could have on the French domestic front.  Situated thousands miles away from the Middle East with a very small Muslim community, the United States of America can still afford to dangerously instrumentalize Islam(ism) for political gain without having to greatly suffer on the domestic front from such an anti-Muslim rhetoric. Donald Trump’s recent call to block all Muslim Foreigners from entering the United States is a disturbing sign that Islamophobia remains an effective tool to gain support during an election campaign.

However, the situation of France, the country hosting the largest Muslim community in Europe, is radically different. As opposed to what happened in 2001, the French situation is a lot more complex since – despite apparent links to Syria – it was clearly a matter of homegrown terrorism with European connections. Moreover, as proven by the 2005 suburban youth riots and by the 2015 attacks against the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and the kosher hypermarket, France is still struggling to harmoniously balance its multicultural and pluri-confessional identity inherited from its troubled colonial past with its deeply rooted Republican principals inscribed in the first two articles of the Constitution: “liberty”, “equality”, “fraternity” and “secularity” (“Laïcité”).  In a country where Marine Le Pen’s anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim National Front is becoming the main party shaping the whole political landscape, it is urgent that the French Republic rightfully preserves its integrity without however abandoning its core democratic values. It is also important that, in the name of national unity, France protects its Muslim community, which unanimously condemned the barbaric killings on November 13^th. But there are reasons to worry:  In the wake of the Paris attacks, islamophobic hate crimes have skyrocketed not just in France but in the whole Western world.  In recent days, many French associations and non-governmental organizations have denounced the drastic reduction of civil liberties made possible by the new State of Emergency. For example, many climate activists have been abusively placed under house arrest during the COP 21 conference in Paris even if they did not represent a terrorist threat. Many search warrants and house arrests have also targeted innocent Muslim French citizens who, thankfully, have been finally released. There are thus serious reasons to fear that the security measures taken by the French government could put at risk the civil Rights at the heart of French society and more particularly the freedom of its Muslim community. As clearly summarized by former conservative Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (who gained international fame by opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq in his 2003 UN speech), it is the moral and political duty of France to resist “the temptation to slide towards authoritarianism”.

The Paris attacks will certainly go down as one of the most tragic and infamous day in recent French History.  The difficulty to develop a more (self)critical and complex understanding of  “November 13^th” is a normal reaction that can be partially explained by the profoundly traumatic nature of these killings.  And yes, this is still the time to mourn and salute the memories of these 130 innocent victims. But if we want to make sure that History does not repeat itself and that “November 13^th” does not have the same tragic consequences for world peace than “September 11^th” and if France does not want to fall into the “civil war trap” designed by the so-called “Islamic State”, the time will come soon to move beyond grief in order to truly understand the complex social, cultural and (geo)political roots of what happened on November 13^th.  The future of civil peace and collective harmony in France depends on it.