8 years after the Arab Uprising, which sought radical institutional reform, the primary obstacle to the just rule of law in Egypt is ‘political.’ The entrenched military elite have remained reluctant to any alternative judiciary system that attempts to create a center of authority beyond their control. The political transition, indeed, created a possibility of institutional reform, where the state and society would be equally accountable to the rule of law. However, Egypt’s judiciary erected barriers to any practice that fiddled with the traditional impunity and supremacy enjoyed by the authoritarian institutions.

Since the overthrow of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, on July 3, 2013, the Egyptian judiciary has operated under severe authoritarian strain. While the judiciary exercised limited checks over the executive bias, the executive interference has undermined all other state institutions. This helped to contain, at least marginally, the authoritarian coercion during the Mubarak regime and during the Muslim Brotherhood’s brief government.

A day after the coup against the elected MB government, Military General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi appointed the Chief of Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansoor, as interim president. On July 5, 2013, Mansoor dissolved the Shura council, allowing the executive to manipulate the rule of law. This was the first judicial misconduct after the overthrow of Morsi. Morsi, no doubt, attempted to consolidate power – at least, misuse the people’s mandate. But Egypt enjoyed considerable space for dissent. On September 23, barely two months after the coup, the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood and ordered for the confiscation of its assets. A month later, on November 24, the interim government issued the Demonstration Law, essentially criminalizing any organized form of dissent “at the slightest indication of disorder.” Such unlawful action axed whatever pluralism was left in the political chaos of Egypt.

After Sisi assumed power on June 8, 2014, the Egyptian judiciary became complacent to cumulative degrees of injustice and oppression. The judges that remained in service either voluntarily abided to authoritarian dictates or didn’t dare to raise their voice for judicial impartiality. Take for example the case of Judges for Egypt – a group of judges who challenged the authority of Sisi in overthrowing the elected president. In March 2016, the Supreme Disciplinary Board forcefully removed 47 judges who were part of a group being charged of being “pro-Islamist.” However, adherence to any political idea is the right of a citizen devoid of the professional position one holds. The explicit muzzling of this right and the conspicuous silence of the judiciary shows the extent of compromise Egypt’s judicial system has fallen for. It also explains Sisi’s authoritarian insecurity towards religio-political dissent.

But in the case of Egypt, religio-political discourse is essential – not only because it serves as a counterbalance to state structures, but also because it propagates the idea of equality and accountability, a notion that the ruler is not above the law. These are the basic premises that uphold human dignity. Thus, the intent of central actors of transition considerably determines how religion is allowed to shape the political discourse thereof. Egypt failed to strike a balance, partially given to the miscalculation given to the miscalculation of the street and partially because of ‘external factors,’ whose interests lie in authoritarian Egypt. Sisi and his regional allies understood that the Muslim Brotherhood is the only force capable of re-emerging and taking an independent decision or challenging the existing norm. Hence, the decision to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood was to eliminate any possibility of opposition and to legitimize the authoritarian brutality against any form of dissent.

The Egpytian Criminal Court sentenced Muslim Brotherhood supporters to death in masses in “unfair trials.” Such “grotesque parody of justice” further strengthened the institutionalized authoritarian coercion.

An explicit judicial disparity reigns the court proceedings. The Criminal Court sentenced Muslim Brotherhood supporters to death in mass in “unfair trials.” Such “grotesque parody of justice” further strengthened the institutionalized authoritarian coercion. Not all these death sentences were to be carried out, but the message went out very clear – no institution is above the authoritarian norm, not even the judiciary. These mass convictions and the uncensored enthusiasm of the Egyptian executive to crackdown upon any form of opposition shows the level of irrelevance the Egyptian judiciary enjoys.

The activists detained for opposing the government have been “unnecessarily” held for lengthy periods before their court proceedings. In October 2014, Sisi expanded the jurisdiction of military courts to “public and vital” facilities. This further manipulated the ambit of judicial impartiality; thousands of civilians were referred to military trials based on media reports; hundreds of “suspected” MB supporters were tried in mass and “unfair” judicial proceedings. On the other hand, members of the security forces, those affiliated to Hosni Mubarak, and the supporters of the Sisi regime were freed on bail.

The renewed Anti-Terrorism Law in August 2015 drew curtains over whatever miniscule space for dissent and the rule of law remained in Egypt. The law bestows the security forces with unrestricted impunity from persecution and penalizes the press for negating the official version of military attacks.

The renewed Anti-Terrorism Law in August 2015 drew curtains over whatever miniscule space for dissent and the rule of law remained in Egypt. The law bestows the security forces with unrestricted impunity from persecution and penalizes the press for negating the official version of military attacks. It sets a fine of up to $64000 for journalists who publish or spread news reports contradicting that of the state’s version. Such expansion of surveillance established the consolidation of an absolute authority within the executive. It also illustrated that legal reform is pursed in order to protect the regime rather than the citizens of Egypt.

Then came Law No 13 of 2017, which amended the Judicial Authority Law (Law No. 46 of 1972). This law stipulates that the President of Egypt must directly appoint the Chief Justice for each of the main four judicial bodies of the country. The silence of the Egyptian judiciary over this legislation explained that the judiciary preferred allying itself with the regime at the cost of institutional dignity.

The greatest low of the judiciary came in early December 2018, when a group of Egyptian lawyers filed a petition seeking to amend Article 140 of the constitution in order to grant Sisi a “lifetime” presidency. Though courts are yet to take any substantial decision on this petition, such endeavors explain another judicial misconduct aiding authoritarian sustenance in Egypt.

A just political system cannot be consolidated without a strong and impartial judiciary; thus, in the absence of a judicial system supportive of the principles of democracy, the rule of law will always remain subject to authoritarian manipulation.

Around 6 years after overthrowing the democratically elected government, Sisi managed to establish a brutal authority, but not a secure government. A just political system cannot be consolidated without a strong and impartial judiciary; thus, in the absence of a judicial system supportive of the principles of democracy, the rule of law will always remain subject to authoritarian manipulation.

Egypt’s judicial reform has neither been indigenous, nor comprehensive, nor locally supported. Any successful reform aims to restructure the social and political variables exogenous to the judiciary that promotes judicial independence and the superiority of the “rule of law.” This “decisional” independence requires, essentially, that judicial ranks are not staked in advance through the appointment or promotion of people that approve a particular set of ideas. Since Sisi assumed power, the Egyptian judiciary has served to legitimate and facilitate the authoritarian rule. Other than a feigned opposition against the transfer of two islands – Sanafir and Tiran – to Saudi Arabia in 2016, the Egyptian judiciary has served as a channel through which Sisi presses his oppression.

Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who is behind the 2013 military coup, made headlines in the international media with a new scandal, which was initially planned to be a public diplomacy campaign. When accepting to give an interview to one of the most successful news programs in the U.S. – 60 Minutes – Sisi thought that it might contribute to enhance his global image. However, a series of events in relation to the interview created an opposite reaction.

The interview was conducted when Sisi visited New York last September to attend the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Egyptian regime hoped that the interview would contribute to Sisi’s global image as the 60 Minutes previously held interviews with figures such as Anwar Sadat, Yasser Arafat, Fidel Castro, Ayatollah Khomeini, Barack Obama, Mohammad bin Salman and King Abdullah.

Days before the interview was aired by CBS, presenter Scott Pelley and producer Rachael Morehouse explained how the Egyptian government asked them to not broadcast the interview. The request came right after the completion of the interview, as the Egyptian government discovered that the comments made by Sisi would damage the image of the regime at home. The staff at the Egyptian Embassy in Washington contacted Morehouse and formally requested for the interview not to be aired. The program had never received such a request and unlike its anticipated objectives, Sisi’s statements caused a negative reaction even before the broadcast.

The Sisi regime requested for the 60 Minutes interview with Sisi not to be aired as they feared that his comments would damage the government in Cairo. 

The producers refused the request and made a short video of how the events unfolded. This further angered the Egyptian regime, but Cairo was not successful in preventing the program from being aired. CBS aired the interview on scheduled time – January 6, 2019. Apart from the topics covered during the interview, the initiative to prevent its broadcast caused further embarrassment to the Sisi regime, which has been struggling with political, economic, and security problems at home.

The program was critical of the Sisi regime and its policies in Egypt, so the questions directed at him were in this manner. The main issues in the program were the state of political prisoners in Egypt, Sisi’s responsibility in the Rabaa massacre and the cooperation between Egypt and Israel. The correspondent Pelley asked Sisi what his reaction to Human Rights Watch report, which claims that there are around 60,000 political prisoners in Egypt, was. Sisi’s answer was on the lines that he “does not know where this organization got that figure.” He even went further and claimed that “there are no political prisoners in the country.”

In July 2013, acting as the Defence Minister, Sisi ordered the military to remove the democratically elected President, Mohammed Morsi, and put him in prison. In the aftermath of the coup, a serious campaign of arrest was launched against the largest civil society in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Morsi was also a member. The main reason for this campaign was that the movement did not accept the military takeover and requested democratic and civilian institutions to be reinstated. In a nationwide campaign, tens of thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested and taken into high-security prisons all around the country. Despite calls from international human rights organizations, the Sisi regime continues to hold more than 60 thousand civilians in prison, including the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood – just because they did not support the military coup.

Despite calls from international human rights organizations, the Sisi regime continues to hold more than 60 thousand civilians in prison, including the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood – just because they did not support the military coup.

Sisi was also questioned about his role during the Rabaa massacre, which took place on August 14, 2013, and claimed the lives of over 1,000 civilians. When Sisi was asked whether he gave the orders of the massacre, he replied, “there were armed men in the square, we peacefully tried to disperse them for days but were not successful.” Sisi’s response was perceived as a confession of him giving the orders for the most violent massacre in the modern history of Egypt.

Another issue that was widely discussed following the interview was Sisi’s comments on Egypt’s cooperation with Israel. When asked about the nature of the cooperation between Cairo and Tel-Aviv, Sisi confidently said that there is a wide range of cooperation between the two countries. Sisi also emphasized that Israeli forces support the Egyptian army in its operations in the Sinai Peninsula. His comments on Israel received strong criticism from the Arab world, as many social media users criticized the Egyptian leader for betraying the Palestinian cause.

Egyptian media outlet Mada Masr claimed that due to the fear of domestic reactions, the Egyptian government ordered media channels in the country not to cover any news related to the 60 Minutes interview on any TV channel, newspaper, or website.

The 60 Minutes interview was a serious failure of public relations strategy of the Sisi regime. The program was aired on the same day that Sisi attended the opening of a newly built church and mosque, which were constructed at the controversial new capital project in the desert, 45km outside of Cairo. The opening ceremony was also meant to serve the Sisi regime’s PR campaign, but due to the damage caused by the 60 Minutes program, none of the international media outlets showed any interest in publishing stories about the mosque and church projects. Even Donald Trump’s tweet was not enough to attract attention to the opening ceremony in Egypt.   

The 60 Minutes was aired hours after the opening ceremony of the giant mosque and church projects. However, the debate over the program and Sisi’s comments caused a significant impact on his deteriorating perception, let alone contributing to his popularity. Finally, Egyptian media outlet Mada Masr claimed that due to the fear of domestic reactions, the Egyptian government ordered media channels in the country not to cover any news related to the 60 Minutes interview on any TV channel, newspaper, or website.

There is widespread criticism that Turkey’s ruling AK Party has a poor democratic performance. Disrespect for basic rights and liberties of political and social opposition is counted as the main reason for that. This is claimed to testify the fact that the AK Party performs an authoritarian governance and undercuts democracy. Indeed, the AK Party fails to provide an equal treatment of all demands in society. In other words, it is unable to embrace society as a whole. The question is whether failing to represent all of society, or not being able to respond to all demands in society makes a political party authoritarian. More to the point, can we label a political party authoritarian in every instance of failure to carry out the impossible task of democracy?

What is to be democratic?

In order to give a satisfying answer to this question we should carefully differentiate two things: democracy and authoritarianism. Authoritarianism means to violate the basic principle of democratic politics, which is accepting the emptiness of the place of power. Respecting the principle of democracy involves first of all having a multi-party political system, periodically conducting open and fair elections, and allowing the political opposition to be present in the parliament. Secondly, we can also add that the right to oppose and criticize policies of the ruling force through various channels is to be respected. And finally, the ruling power is to admit that its rule is bound by law. Therefore, if the ruling group do not allow for political opposition and assumes its power above the law, then we can declare that there is an authoritarian regime in the country.

If the ruling political party respects the presence of political opposition and allows to be limited by law, then we can say that there is a democratic regime. This posits the different dimensions of democracy. However, democratic regimes also require providing an identity to the social whole. This identity dimension constitutes the second moment of democracy. Indeed, democracy is an ambiguous political regime which encapsulates both moments, that is identity and difference, and requires to hit a handsome balance between these conflicting forces. Harboring these two conflicting forces, democracy is an impossible task and cannot fully be achievable. Even if the ruling political power respects the difference dimension, it usually fails to provide an incontestable identity to society. Generally, it fails in the identity dimension and falls short of embracing all demands in society. This failure can be viewed as a lack of democracy, yet cannot be labelled as authoritarianism.

Is the AK Party authoritarian?

Looking from this perspective, the AK Party is not representative of authoritarian politics. However, it might fail to provide a full-fledged democratic rule. To put differently, its lack of democracy does not amount to authoritarianism. Its failure in democracy stems from not being able to provide an incontestable identity to the social whole. In its early years of rule, the AK Party sought to provide an overarching identity by responding to all social demands. It aimed at trivializing the existing societal differences between Turks and Kurds, Sunnis and Alawites, conservatives and secularists, and Muslims and non-Muslims around the so-called politics of “civilization.” The party believed that society as a whole had to come together around this identity, which was supposed to remedy all societal fault lines.

Yet this politics of civilization faced a strong resistance in society. With the Gezi Park protests (2013) and the PKK stimulated HDP riots (2014-15), it came to a halt. Following this failure, the AK Party began to provide a new identity through the so-called politics of “native and national.” Currently, the AK Party seeks to bring society into unity through this discourse, as it calls society to come around this identity of being “native and national.” Yet the party has faced and continues to face robust resistance by the opposition. The political opposition follows the politics of difference by raising the criticism that the AK Party does not respect rights and liberties in society. This undoubtedly seeks to block the AK Party’s hegemonic moves. However, the opposition does not perform the second moment of democracy – it does not even consider providing a workable unity in society. Therefore, the opposition in Turkey also fails in its democratic performance.

Briefly, the AK Party cannot be blamed of reducing democracy to elections. The governing party embraces both moments of democracy. However, so far, it has yet been unable to bring society around a workable unity.