T

he US embargo constitutes a multi-layered pressure mechanism that is deepening Cuba’s energy crisis. Whilst companies transporting oil and insurance firms are reluctant to take risks due to sanctions on fuel supplies, the decline in subsidized oil flows from Venezuela is also exacerbating the crisis. At the same time, thermal power stations frequently go offline due to restricted access to US-origin technology and spare parts. Financial sanctions and Cuba’s inclusion on the list of ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ prevent international banks from facilitating payment transactions and hinder energy investments.

This situation is disrupting both fuel supply and infrastructure renewal, leading to widespread power cuts and economic disruptions across the country. The electricity crisis in Cuba is not merely a technical failure; it is a multi-layered “national security” issue that directly affects the country’s economic, diplomatic and social fabric.

Cuba’s electricity grid (SEN – Sistema Eléctrico Nacional) relies heavily on thermal power stations dating from the Soviet era, with ages ranging from 35 to 45 years. Due to a shortage of foreign currency, regular maintenance cannot be carried out on these stations, and spare parts cannot be procured. This situation leads to the power stations frequently being taken offline due to breakdowns. I would like to emphasize a crucial point here: the Antonio Guiteras power station in Matanzas and the Lidio Ramon Perez power station in Felton are the backbone of the system. Even the slightest technical fault at these sites plunges the entire island into darkness.

US intervention in Venezuela has ‘deeply’ shaken Cuba

Cuba relies heavily on heavy crude oil and diesel for its electricity generation. Whilst Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro met 40 per cent of the island’s oil needs, this support has come to a virtual standstill in recent times due to the pressure of US sanctions. As Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel has emphasized, with the exception of limited shipments from Mexico, virtually no fuel has been imported into the country since the start of the year. The US’s threat of sanctions against shipping companies transporting fuel to Cuba and the countries involved is causing deep social and economic fractures on the island.

Power cuts, known among the public as ‘Apagones’ and a major source of stress in daily life, virtually paralyzed the country in the second half of March. Between 16 and 23 March, as Cuba was plunged into total darkness, transport ground to a halt, life at petrol stations came to a standstill, and food supplies began to spoil rapidly due to the failure of refrigeration systems.

During this period, when the internet and communications were down, healthcare services were also severely disrupted. People are forced to cook their meals over wood fires because their stoves are not working. A tourist in Cuba describes the fuel shortage as follows: “If you want to order a pizza from outside, the delivery cost is twice the price of the pizza itself.” Consequently, bicycles are currently serving as the primary means of transport. The Cuban government, which has taken drastic measures such as changing working hours in public institutions and banning the use of air conditioning to tackle the energy crisis, is attempting to reduce consumption to a minimum.

However, the effects of the crisis have also spilled over into tourism; the suspension of flights by international airlines and the closure of hotels have plunged the tourism sector—the lifeblood of the economy—into a major crisis. Consequently, a population of 10 million faces collective punishment; this ‘energy embargo’ imposed by the US is forcing the island into scarcity and the regime into change.

Although Cuba’s population is officially reported to be approximately 11 million, it is estimated that the actual population has fallen to around 10 million due to the wave of emigration that has gained momentum in recent years. In particular, it is reported that in 2022 and 2023, hundreds of thousands of Cubans—equivalent to around 4–5 per cent of the population—left the country due to economic hardships and chronic power cuts. Whilst the migration of predominantly young and educated segments of the population is notable, the aging of the remaining population creates a more vulnerable situation, particularly for those requiring care during periods when the effects of the energy crisis are most acutely felt.

It is quite difficult to quantify the scale of the energy crisis in Cuba with a single ‘percentage’, as the situation changes by the hour. However, current technical data clearly reveals the critical level the crisis has reached. According to daily reports from the Cuban Electricity Union (UNE), approximately 30 to 45 per cent of the country’s total electricity demand cannot be met; this means that, particularly in the evenings, nearly half the country is left in the dark. As power cuts are implemented on a rotating basis, the entire population is left without electricity at certain times of the day.

The current situation is described as a ‘chronic shortage’ rather than the nationwide blackouts seen in the past. Whilst the capital, Havana, experiences relatively fewer outages due to its status as a tourism and administrative hub, people in regions such as Matanzas, Holguín and Santiago de Cuba can spend between 12 and 18 hours a day without electricity.

The lobby led by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s family background paints a different picture from what is widely known in the public eye. Rubio’s parents, Mario and Oriales Rubio, left Cuba not after the 1959 revolution, but in 1956—that is, before Fidel Castro came to power—and emigrated to the US for economic reasons. However, Rubio’s description of himself as a “child of exile” during the early stages of his political career led to the perception that his family had fled the country to escape the Castro regime.

This situation sparked controversy in 2011 when the Washington Post revealed that the family had emigrated before the revolution. Rubio responded to the criticism by stating that his family had returned to Cuba briefly after the revolution and had severed all ties with the country after witnessing the Castro regime. Rubio’s hardline stance towards Cuba is shaped not only by his family history but also by his ideological stance and domestic political dynamics.

In Florida politics, the Cuban immigrant voter base—particularly centered in Miami and possessing a strong anti-communist base—has effectively made a hardline stance against the Cuban regime a political necessity. It was reported in the press that this lobby donated 200 million dollars to help Donald Trump win the election. Rubio, however, defines the Cuban regime not merely as a political rival, but as an authoritarian structure posing a threat to democracy in the Western Hemisphere and to US security, and views the alliance forged with Venezuela and Nicaragua as a regional risk.

In line with this approach, Rubio—one of the most vocal opponents of the normalization process during the Obama era—played a key role in tightening sanctions against Cuba in the subsequent period. He also argues that, under the Helms-Burton Act—which forms the cornerstone of US policy—sanctions can only be lifted if there is political change in Cuba. Rubio maintains that lasting improvement is impossible without ‘new leadership’ and political reform in Cuba.

However, this strategy is sparking serious debate on the ground: the worsening fuel crisis, power cuts and difficulties accessing basic necessities are increasing the pressure on the population, whilst experts note that this could deepen the humanitarian crisis rather than the political one, and trigger new waves of migration.

The “deepest crisis” since the 1959 Revolution

Cuba is experiencing its most fragile period since the revolution due to the structural collapse of its food, medicine and energy systems. The current situation, historically compared to the 1990s “Special Period” (Periodo Especial), is being exacerbated by limited support from traditional allies such as Russia and China, and aid from left-wing governments in Latin America that has fallen short of expectations.

In the international community, the question of whether the solution lies in the lifting of US sanctions or in Havana undertaking radical political and economic reforms constitutes the greatest uncertainty regarding the island’s future. The Havana administration is preparing a “negotiation package” aimed at ending the chronic tension with the US that has persisted since the 1959 Revolution; this package involves radical changes whilst refusing to compromise on sovereignty.

Cuba’s strategic approach is built on four pillars: the lifting of the US embargo in exchange for opening the way for political reforms based on internal dynamics; the rejection of Washington’s “backyard” policy and the establishment of the principle of “diplomacy between equals”; and the cessation of support for left-wing groups to address regional security concerns.

Presented under the “win-win” principle, this diplomatic move is positioned not as a “surrender” but as a search for a solution based on mutual respect; meanwhile, the Cuban government is clearly drawing its red lines by sending a message that the spirit of historical resistance against attempts to force submission through economic or military pressure remains alive.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

U

.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday threatened to impose new tariffs on countries that supply oil to Cuba, escalating Washington’s pressure campaign against the Communist-run island amid its worsening economic crisis.

The move, authorized through an executive order declaring a national emergency, allows the United States to levy tariffs on imports from nations that “directly or indirectly” provide oil to Cuba. The order does not specify tariff rates or name countries that could be targeted.

The White House said the measure was necessary to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, citing Cuba’s alleged ties to hostile states and armed groups. Trump has increasingly relied on tariff threats as a tool of foreign policy during his second term.

Cuban state media swiftly condemned the decision, warning it could cripple electricity generation, agriculture, water supply, and health services. In a televised statement, the Cuban government accused Washington of seeking to “suffocate all spheres of life” on the island, which is already facing severe fuel shortages and widespread blackouts.

“Cuba will be failing pretty soon”

Trump’s latest move follows the U.S. military’s seizure earlier this month of ousted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, after which Washington blocked Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba. Venezuela had long been the island’s main energy supplier.

Mexico has since emerged as Cuba’s largest remaining oil provider, though Reuters reported last week that Mexican officials are reviewing whether to continue shipments amid concerns over possible U.S. retaliation.

Trump said earlier this week that “Cuba will be failing pretty soon,” adding that it was no longer receiving oil or financial support from Venezuela. He has also urged Havana to strike a deal with Washington.

Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel rejected the suggestion, saying the United States had no moral authority to impose terms on the island.

(Source: Reuters)

Cuba’s gradual easing of restrictions following the coronavirus pandemic has been discussed in terms of its economy. An article published recently highlights the pandemic predicament as the main reason in Cuba’s dwindling tourism statistics.

COVID19, however, was not the only reason for Cuba’s contracting economy. On the 59^th anniversary since Kennedy signed the executive order for the blockade against the island, Cuban President Miguel Diaz Canel noted that the island incurred losses of over $144 million since 1962. The largest deficit, however, was reached between 2019 and 2020, when the reversal of the Obama Administration’s policies towards Cuba, which included normalization of relations, caused a loss of over $5 billion dollars.

Blaming the Cuban Revolution suffices for the capitalist narrative. Even when reforms are announced, these are juxtaposed against the central economic model which was implemented in 1959. However, an early assessment in 1961 shows that Cuba was on track with fulfilling its promises to the population, laid down in Fidel Castro’s defense speech, ‘History Will Absolve Me,’ in 1953. On trial for the Moncada Barracks Attack, Fidel Castro not only defended his position but also utilized the moment to communicate the revolution’s political program. Land, industrialization, housing, unemployment, education and health were the six main points highlighted by Fidel Castro.

By 1961, an early assessment indicated that the revolution was fulfilling its promises. The emphasis upon education, health and agrarian reform indicated the will to rebuild Cuba in the face of shortages faced due to its elite workforce abandoning the island for the US. In February 1962, US President J.F. Kennedy authorized a complete blockade over Cuba, even as the US busied itself with the creation of USAID – a governmental agency ostensibly promoting economic development, and used as a veneer for infiltration in Cuba.

The blockade was instrumental in Cuba’s shift towards the Soviet Union and it was during this time that Fidel publicly declared allegiance to Marxism-Leninism.

This is not to say that Cuba was not heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union, particularly in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Such dependence became clear upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989, when Cuba entered into the ‘Special Period’ and found itself isolated. In Fidel’s words, ‘From day one to the next, we found ourselves without fuel, without raw materials, without food, without soap, without everything.’

In 1992, the Cuban Democracy Act  reinforced the blockade until the government complied with US requests for free market economics and constitutional change, among other requirements. The Helms Burton Act of 1996 further intensified the blockade, expanding the embargo to include foreign companies dealing with Cuba, while explicitly outlining the US plans for a transition government replacing Fidel Castro.

Meanwhile, Cuba continued expanding its education and healthcare programs, distinguishing  itself in the region, as even the World Bank acknowledged in 2014. However, the blockade has long been recognized as one of the main impediments of Cuba’s economic growth.

In February, the Cuban government announced it would be lifting restrictions on self-employment to stimulate the local economy in terms of imports and exports. US mainstream media, however, is lamenting the reforms as not capitalist enough, albeit timely enough to meet the possible shift in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the US under the Biden Administration.

Cuba’s self-reliance and its regional cooperation with Latin American countries were both strategies devised to challenge the Western economic development concepts.

What the US expects from Cuba, however, differs from what the Cuban system aims to achieve. The reforms were not aimed at establishing a capitalist model in Cuba, but rather to enable the island to cope under the deprivation caused by the US blockade. While the US equates a possible Cuban departure from socialism with economic prosperity, the Cuban model remembers the US exploitation of the island, and the absence of any sustainable development in Cuba. In 2019, Cuba was ranked top in the global ranking for sustainable development – an achievement with historical roots dating back to 1953.

Recognizing the role the Cuban Revolution played in Cuba’s success also requires thorough consideration of the US role in hindering Cuba’s economic development. Cuba’s self-reliance, and its regional cooperation with Latin American countries, were both strategies devised to challenge the Western economic development concepts that do not go beyond the capitalist model and the desire that Cuba submits to the same. Furthermore, the US placed many hurdles for trade with Cuba to proceed seamlessly, with the threat of sanctions looming overhead as a means of coercion for the island to abandon its revolutionary principles and practice.

The coronavirus pandemic, however, provided an opportunity for the international community to view Cuba through its own lens. In the early days, as footage of health services worldwide collapsed with the influx of hospitalizations and rising death tolls, Cuba burst onto the international scene with its medical contingent – the Henry Reeves Brigade. A testament of Fidel’s words during the Haiti earthquake in 2010  – “We send doctors, not soldiers!” – when Cuba sent its medical teams as the US increased its militarization of humanitarian aid, the Henry Reeves Brigade offered its services to countries worldwide. Italy was one of the first countries welcoming the medical brigade, as images on TV illustrated the inability of the healthcare system to cope with the sudden onslaught.

While Cuba offered its help abroad, Cubans at home benefited from a healthcare system that tended to their needs. Unlike the US, for example, which mismanaged the pandemic from the start, Cuba is now the first Latin American country close to developing its own vaccine.

As the Business Insider plainly stated in its headline, Cuba ‘has a history of fighting disease without help from the West.’ Which begets the question – what would Cuba achieve internationally if the US blockade was lifted, and the island was able to trade freely in the international arena?

With a vaccine on the horizon, a plan to inoculate all Cubans by the end of 2021, the possibility of vaccinating tourists visiting Cuba while also providing additional doses, it cannot be denied that the advances in healthcare are one of the strongest factors in Cuba’s economy, or would be without the embargo.