W

ith the advancement of the digital age, international relations and power struggles have shifted from the physical realm to the virtual world, taking on a new and complex dimension. The conventional intelligence gathering methods of the past have now been replaced by far more complex, difficult to detect and wide-ranging cyber espionage activities. One of the most critical fronts in this new arena of conflict is the chips, hardware, and software at the heart of the technological devices that are indispensable parts of our daily lives.

States’ desire for technological superiority and information dominance drives them to embed hidden backdoors even in the most innocent devices we use, fundamentally shaking the global technology landscape and the international security paradigm. This practice is evolving beyond a niche intelligence tactic and moving towards the centre of geopolitical competition. This process, spanning from the physical hardware manipulations of the Cold War to the systemic compromise of today’s software and supply chains, presents a dilemma for states.

The impact of the quest for information dominance on national security

A backdoor, in its most basic definition, is a method designed to provide covert access to a system by bypassing normal security controls. These deliberately placed mechanisms aim to provide persistent and privileged access, even after the initial security vulnerabilities have been patched. In state-sponsored espionage activities, backdoors can be divided into three main categories: software, hardware, and cryptographic. While software-based backdoors (such as Trojan horses) are more common and relatively easier to detect, the real major threat is posed by hardware and cryptographic backdoors.

A hardware backdoor embedded in a device’s microchip or factory firmware operates below the operating system level, making it nearly impossible to detect with software-based security measures. Installing such a backdoor is highly costly and difficult, as it requires intervention in the supply chain during the design or manufacturing phase. However, it offers the highest level of persistence and stealth.

At this point, the argument that the pursuit of absolute information dominance through backdoors creates a paradoxical scenario that makes nations using these methods more vulnerable gains significance. A state that installs backdoors in technological infrastructures to monitor its rivals also renders its own infrastructure more vulnerable to similar attacks. For the backdoor created inevitably becomes an entry point for criminals, terrorists and hostile states as well, dragging everyone into greater insecurity. This situation erodes global security while ushering in a new and more dangerous era of technological conflict.

From the Cold War to the digital age

The roots of modern digital espionage activities lie in intelligence operations during the Cold War. The physical hardware manipulations of that era served as a model for today’s complex cyber-attacks and supply chain interventions. One of the most striking examples from this period is Operation Rubicon, in which the CIA and the West German BND secretly took control of the Swiss encryption machine manufacturer Crypto AG.

Thanks to this operation, which lasted for decades, the secure communications of more than 120 countries were illicitly intercepted and read. While secure machines were sold to NATO allies, weakened and easily breakable versions were sold to neutral or hostile countries. The Crypto AG operation established the playbook for covertly taking over a trusted global supplier, weakening most of its products, and using the intelligence gained for diplomatic and military advantage. Another significant case from the Cold War era is the crypto wars of the 1990s and the famous Clipper Chip initiative.

In 1993, the U.S. government proposed a hardware chip that would be mandatory for secure voice communication and would contain a backdoor known as a key escrow. Under this system, each chip’s unique key would be stored in two separate government agencies, and law enforcement could access these keys with a court order to decrypt communications. However, this proposal failed due to significant backlash from civil liberties advocates and the technology industry. The failure of the Clipper Chip’s overt, legally mandated control mechanism prompted intelligence agencies to pursue more covert and deniable methods to undermine encryption. The public crypto wars of the 1990s did not end; they merely went underground.

Actors and strategies in global cyber espionage

Today, cyber espionage and the use of backdoors have become a global phenomenon. All major intelligence services have concluded that the most effective method is to be invited in through a compromised trusted product or update, rather than infiltrating a target’s network from the outside. This tactical convergence is creating a universally fragile and unreliable technological ecosystem. In the United States, Edward Snowden’s revelations documented how the NSA systematically built backdoors into the global digital ecosystem through programmes such as PRISM and BULLRUN.

Through the PRISM program, the NSA collected user data directly from the servers of major US internet companies, while the BULLRUN program attempted to undermine encryption standards. One of the most notorious examples is the NSA imposing Dual_EC_DRBG, a flawed random number generator, as a standard and being able to break the encryption of countless products thanks to the cryptographic backdoor in this algorithm. It has also been revealed that the NSA’s Special Access Operations unit physically interfered with network equipment destined for export to install backdoors.

Chinese telecommunications giants Huawei and ZTE have been viewed as a national security risk due to allegations that their equipment may contain backdoors accessible to the Chinese government. China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which compels all organisations to cooperate with state intelligence, has heightened these concerns. Although no definitive evidence has been made public, these allegations have led many countries to ban Huawei equipment from their 5G networks.

On the other hand, it is known that Russian state-sponsored groups, particularly in the SolarWinds case, infiltrated software supply chains, putting thousands of government and corporate networks at risk. Furthermore, allegations that Russian-made Kaspersky antivirus software has the potential to be used as a spy tool demonstrate deep mistrust of software originating from strategic rivals. Finally, the Pegasus spyware developed by the Israeli NSO Group is one of the most dangerous examples of the ‘spyware as a service’ model. Sold to governments, this tool has been widely used to target journalists, activists and political opponents, highlighting the risks of the privatization and proliferation of state-level surveillance capabilities.

Singapore’s cybersecurity authorities reported a sharp rise in cyber threats in 2024, with ransomware, outdated infrastructure vulnerabilities, and state-linked cyberattacks dominating the digital landscape. The findings were published on September 3 in the Singapore Cyber Landscape (SCL) 2024/2025, an annual report that not only reviews the previous year’s cybersecurity situation but also commemorates a decade of progress since the establishment of the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) in 2015.

The report paints a picture of a small but digitally advanced nation grappling with the challenges of rapid digitalization while seeking to build a safer, more resilient cyberspace. Over the past ten years, Singapore has positioned itself as a regional leader in cybersecurity policy, innovation, and capacity building — but 2024 served as a reminder of the evolving and persistent threats that continue to test its defenses.

“The cyber threat landscape is becoming increasingly complex. Threat actors are not only more numerous but also more sophisticated, often state-linked and well-funded,” said a CSA spokesperson. “Singapore cannot afford complacency. Our focus must remain on building resilience, fostering public-private collaboration, and staying one step ahead of malicious actors.”

Rise of ransomware and legacy malware exploitation

One of the most concerning findings in the 2024 report was the marked increase in ransomware incidents and the exploitation of unpatched, legacy systems. Many attacks in 2024 were carried out using older malware strains, some of which had been identified and patched years ago.

This suggests a continuing challenge in promoting basic cyber hygiene practices among individuals, businesses, and even certain critical sectors. Despite heightened awareness campaigns, many organizations failed to update their software or implement layered security measures, leaving themselves open to ransomware schemes that encrypted data and demanded payments, often in cryptocurrency.

“Ransomware remains a lucrative business model for cybercriminals because it exploits the weakest links — outdated systems and poor patching practices,” the report noted.

Advanced persistent threats targeting strategic sectors

Beyond ransomware, Singapore faced continued targeting by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups, which conduct stealthy, prolonged operations to compromise high-value networks. One such group highlighted in the report, UNC3886, has been actively focusing on strategic sectors, including Critical Information Infrastructure (CII), which encompasses energy, transport, and financial services.

APT activity in 2024 demonstrated increasing scale, sophistication, and persistence, aligning with global trends of cyber operations linked to geopolitical tensions. Singapore’s position as a major financial hub and technology innovator makes it an attractive target for cyber espionage and disruption campaigns.

CSA’s 10-year milestone

This edition of the SCL is particularly significant as it marks the 10th anniversary of the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore. Since its inception in 2015, CSA has overseen major national initiatives, from setting up sector-specific resilience frameworks to building a talent pipeline in cybersecurity.

To commemorate this milestone, the report includes Founders’ Stories — first-hand accounts from early CSA leaders detailing the agency’s formative years, the lessons learned from early cyber incidents, and how Singapore’s strategy evolved from reactive measures to a proactive, globally connected approach.

Over the past decade, CSA has also strengthened Singapore’s role in international cyber diplomacy, forming strategic alliances and participating in global threat intelligence sharing initiatives to counter transnational cybercrime.

Australian journalist Antony Loewenstein’s groundbreaking book, The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation Around the World, offers a chilling exposé of Israel’s military-industrial complex and its sinister role in perfecting and exporting oppressive technologies developed through the prolonged occupation of Palestinian territories. For over half a century, the West Bank and Gaza have served as a testing ground for weaponry, surveillance tools, and control mechanisms, solidifying Israel’s position as a global leader in the military-techno complex.

Loewenstein takes readers on a riveting journey through a clandestine world, backed by secret documents, revealing interviews, and on-the-ground reporting. The book unveils, for the first time, the meticulous architecture of control that Israel has honed through surveillance, home demolitions, and brutality, evolving from the occupation of Palestinian lands. 

From the notorious Pegasus software implicated in high-profile hacks to the weapons supplied to oppressive regimes like Myanmar, Israel’s technological prowess is exposed as a driving force behind some of the world’s most brutal conflicts. A striking example is the use of Israeli drones by the EU and Frontex, battle-tested in Palestine, for surveillance and border control, particularly in response to the refugee crisis after 2015. 

The author skillfully connects the dots, illustrating how Israel’s ethno-nationalistic approach has become a global model, influencing governments such as Modi’s in India where admiration for Israel’s actions in the West Bank influences their approach in regions like Kashmir. Loewenstein highlights the alarming rise of Israel as a major player in spying technology and defense hardware, revealing the dark underbelly of its contributions to the violation of human rights on a global scale.

The book further unmasks the ruthlessness with which Israel leverages the experiences gained from an illegal occupation. It argues that Israel has successfully exported its tested technologies and methods to over 130 countries worldwide. This includes the sale of spyware, smart walls, facial recognition tools, and other tools of occupation and repression. The book serves as a stark reminder of how Israel’s oppression of Palestinians has become the cornerstone of its military and security industries.

Moreover, The Palestine Laboratory sheds light on Israel’s questionable alliances, exposing its support for despots worldwide. Over the past 50 years, the U.S. and Israel have formed close partnerships, with Israel serving as an invaluable partner in arming and training nations that the U.S. officially couldn’t support due to various restraints.

The world is in an era of permanent low-level conflict. Traditional conflict has largely left its place to grey-zone warfare and hybrid war. States have always used unconventional and non-military ways to acquire leverage or attain victory; however, the increasingly complex and interconnected current nature of the world has made interdependence the battleground.

From sanctions to competing for and buying influence abroad, warfare has taken a more subtle, sly, undeclared, unending, and, most importantly, unrestricted, form. Nowadays, this has blurred the line between war and peace.

While traditional war is very expensive, unpopular, and often too difficult to manage, this new way of war is groundbreaking and does not shy away from any tool available. War is all around us, in everyday life, culture, economics, law, and information. Even something as innocuous as cute cat pictures online can become a ploy.

Mark Galeotti takes us through the weaponization of everything, from disinformation, cyberattacks, and espionage to subversion and crime, in order to understand the changing landscape of war and what it might bring.

Gone are the days of “stable” warfare! The subtle components of martial and everyday civilian life are blending, leading to instability within countries and a legitimacy crisis across the globe. However, this development does not need to be a solely negative one. As Galeotti points out, conflict is democratized, meaning the people are not just bystanders and can take positive action to avoid zero-sum situations. The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War equips the reader with ways of surviving, adapting, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by this new reality.

When everything is weaponizable, why would the distinction hold any meaning? Where do we begin to look? How can civilians be mindful of this development? Many of the weapons used are often abstract but their effects are very much tangible and jolting. As it turns out, some things are more weaponizable than others.

Luckily, The Weaponisation of Everything lays bare how this warfare takes form all around the world with examples and a future trajectory. While this form of conflict may be vague and confusing, Galeotti makes the topic apprehensible for all readers.

Even though technology advances in leaps and problems seem to be constantly evolving, Galeotti’s approach invites the reader not only to face the emerging reality, but also to learn to adapt to the new permanent, bloodless war. The Weaponisation of Everything, first released in February 15, 2022, is now available in paperback as of February 14, 2023.

Mark Galeotti, The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War (Yale University Press, 2022) ISBN 9780300253443, 256 Pages

I

nterpol has conducted an operation against cyber-enabled financial crimes and money laundering. The operation, called “HAECHI III,” started in June and ended in November 2022.

Operation HAECHI III was planned by Interpol’s National Central Bureaus (NCBs), in particular the Interpol Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Center (IFACC). The operation involved countries from Asia and Europe, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. Hyun Se Lee, the head of NCB in Seoul, stated, “As we look to the future, we recognize the importance for decisive and concerted law enforcement action across borders. This year’s leg of Operation HAECHI III speaks volumes of IFCACC’s dedicated coordination and the strong commitment of participating countries, all of which foretell of new law enforcement victories ahead.”

Operation HAECHI III notably targeted illicit online gambling-related money laundering, investment fraud, sextortion, romance frauds, and voice phishing. Law enforcement agencies, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), asset recovery offices, prosecutors, and private sector financial experts joined forces for Operation HAECHI III in order to locate illicit cash and money mules, uncover money laundering activities, and deactivate related bank accounts.

Additionally, investigators noted an increase in fraudulent investment schemes that involve the use of instant messaging apps where encrypted information is shared and wallets for cryptocurrencies are promoted as a form of payment.

As a result of this long-running operation, 1,600 cases were solved and $130 million worth of virtual assets were seized. The operation also created an intervention tool entitled “Anti-Money Laundering Rapid Response Protocol (ARRP),” which allows countries to recover digital assets.

Anti-Money Laundering Rapid Response Protocol (ARRP)

Interpol has been trying for a long time to develop a new intervention tool to intervene in the flow of illicit funds, which plays an active role in the cybercriminal economy of countries. Finally, after months of pilot testing, it produced a tool called a “rapid intervention tool” in the fight against money laundering. According to Rory Corcoran, the director of the IFCACC, “The ARRP is a game-changer in the battle against global financial crime, where speed and international cooperation are critical to catching illicit monies before they vanish into the coffers of money mules abroad.”

Game-Changer Policies Help

The ARRP was used for the first time in Operation HAECHI III and it allows countries to work together to prevent the proceeds of crime. The seizure of 1.2 million euros obtained through commercial mail fraud in Ireland was strong evidence of the successful use of the ARRP during the operation.

Scenes from the Operation

Two Red Notice fugitives, who were wanted by Korea in an investigation for their alleged participation in a global Ponzi scheme, were apprehended in Greece and Italy after stealing 28 million euros from 2,000 Korean victims.

During the illegal transaction targeted by HAECHI II, victims were threatened by being told that their identity had been stolen or that their names were involved in narcotics crimes. They were then asked to transfer money under these pretexts.

Interpol reported that four bitcoin wallets used by con artists were seized, adding that a total of $159,000 had been transferred by victims of the call center scam. Over the course of the five-month operation, roughly 2,800 bank and virtual asset accounts that were being utilized to launder illegally obtained funds were shut down.

Operation HAECHI III provided strong evidence that the IFCACC will take the lead in Interpol’s efforts to provide operational support against money laundering related to virtual assets. The illicit use of virtual assets, especially cryptocurrencies, has advanced significantly in recent years and is now a common way to facilitate crime.

Cyber security is becoming an increasing issue for peoples as well governments with the rise of cyber-criminal acts across the globe.