As one may remember, in early 2017, German authorities took a decision to expand the ban on PKK-related symbols and flags – a ban in place since 1993. This expansion did not achieve the expected effect due to the ambivalent efforts of the authorities and the continuing tolerance of PKK/YPG/Ocalan flags. Nevertheless, this symbolic step of the federal authorities is still welcomed.

In a similar effort, last week, German federal authorities banned two “media” organizations in Germany, which had links to the PKK terrorist organization. The accusation of the interior ministry was that money earned through these organizations was sent exclusively to the PKK abroad, which also strengthened the group’s capabilities on German soil. The names of these organizations are Mesopotamia Publishing House and MIR Multimedia and they are located in the western states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony.

With regard to the recent ban, the former leader of the ultra-conservative Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) and the current Minister of the Interior, Horst Seehofer stated that “as the PKK is still active despite being banned in Germany, it is necessary to rein in the PKK and uphold our legal system.” On the other hand, the PKK-friendly Leftist Party opposed this step while in particular Turkish politicians both from and outside Germany, and even some German politicians openly welcomed the government’s stance against the PKK.

According to the official statement of the ministry, there are around 14.500 PKK supporters in Germany that can be counted as the biggest group among foreign terror groups.

According to the statement by the ministry, there are around 14.500 PKK supporters in Germany that can be counted as the biggest group among foreign terror groups. Moreover, the ministry stressed that the PKK-affiliated organizations had been banned since 1993 while more than 90 people have been sentenced by the German judiciary for their links to the PKK.

Under these circumstances, though, the question arises as to why German authorities nowadays have intensified their steps against the PKK and other affiliated groups in Germany. The question is very crucial due to Germany’s known ambivalent stance against the overall PKK danger. For instance, it seems that while on the one hand Germany initiates a harder handling against PKK supporters or PKK-affiliated groups, on the other hand it also supports the PKK’s Syrian branch, the YPG, just like the U.S. does. Thus, why is Germany taking such a step under these continuing facts?

Germany initiates a harder handling against PKK supporters and PKK-affiliated groups internally, but externally it supports the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK.

First of all, one has to address some current developments in Germany that shape the general mood in the country. Besides the unfortunately increasing antisemitism among Germans –in particular among Germans without a migration background– Germany is disregarding and not facing the country’s problem with the far-right, xenophobia and increasing anti-Muslim, anti-Turkish actions.

Recently, three young Syrian girls were targeted in apparent xenophobic attacks in Berlin, while there has not been any outrage by mainstream media platforms or even politicians. Thus, it seems likely that under these circumstances federal authorities are willing to take some superficial steps against a Marxist-Leninist based terrorist group, the PKK, in order to distract attentions. For this, some symbolic steps might cause a good image in the eyes of particularly Turkish people in Germany. It does not seem very honest that an officially recognized foreign terror group in Germany, which although has not been around for over 30 years has continued its bloody terror campaigns since 1984 against a NATO ally Turkey, is only nowadays becoming a focused problem. This does not seem very sincere.

Of course, the second likely reason as to why German has intensified its position rather than starting an actual struggle against the PKK might have something to do with the recovery of bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany. In such a positive mood, Germany might initiate some harder steps against an organization, which has been recognized as a terrorist organization since 1993. However, on the other hand, despite Turkey’s continuing heavy pressures, Germany still does not accept the fact that FETO (Fetullah Terrorist Organization) poses a security threat.

PKK is a security threat for Germany. There are German citizens who are ethnic Kurds, and who are unfortunately seen as a source of recruitment for the PKK’s terrorist campaigns.

The third point though might have a direct relation with the ambiguities of the current U.S. administration, which nowadays elaborates to cancel its support for the PKK’s Syrian branch. Of course, despite Donald Trump’s proposal to withdraw American troops from Syria and simultaneously stop supporting the YPG, U.S. security institutions are continuously making efforts to change this ambition. It is likely that German policy makers and advisors, or even think-tanks, have begun to re-consider and update their position with regard to the PKK/YPG.

Finally, one must not ignore that the PKK terrorist organization is a security threat for Germany. There are German citizens with ethnically Kurdish background, who are unfortunately seen as a source of recruitment for the PKK’s terrorist campaigns. It’s also undeniable that the PKK receives immense financial support from its supporters in Germany. From this point of view, it would not be wrong to state that Germany needs to start an actual struggle against all potential PKK components flourished in Germany once and for all.

In a joint conference held in Germany on Friday, President Erdoğan and German Chancellor Angela Merkel discussed bilateral relations. Both leaders announced that they have reached a consensus to revive bilateral cooperation mechanisms.

Angela Merkel emphasized the crucial role lead by Turkey in confining the refugee influx, especially from Syria, to Europe which has been a focal issue for Germany and for which Merkel has been criticized severely. She announced that the Leaders’ summit on Syria is planned for October.

Merkel also highlighted the distinctive connection between the two countries on account of over 3.5 million people of Turkish roots in Germany. Acknowledging the rise of Islamophobia in Germany, Merkel said that the attacks on mosques were ‘unacceptable’.

Both leaders stressed the mutual economic significance of the two countries and their need for increased cooperation. Merkel stated that “Germany wants a stabilized Turkey with an economy that is permanently growing”

In a bid to improve bilateral relations, President Erdoğan said that “Turkey plans to fulfill remaining 6 criteria on visa liberalization as soon as possible”. President also stressed that Turkey has been effective in fighting terror and has also assisted Germany and addressed Germany’s expectations on this matter.

President Erdogan underscored that he expects the same sensitivity from his German counterpart and said that “thousands of PKK terrorists and hundreds of FETO terrorist organization members are living across Germany”. He stressed the threat of terrorism that these malignant groups have for both countries and said “Extradition of criminals is highly significant for the safety & peace of both Turkey and Germany”

Merkel answered this call ambivalently and said that “more information was needed on Gulen movement (FETO) in order to classify it as a terrorist group, like PKK” despite the fact that countless evidence and solid documents have been submitted to German authorities by Turkey clearly indicating the ties between FETO terrorist organization and the July 15^th coup attempt of 2016.

According to a recent survey conducted for the German public channel ARD, Germans don’t trust Turkey, while France is the most trustworthy partner. Even though the feeling of trust against Turkey, as a partner, increased in contrast to July 2017 by 2 points, only 5 percent of people in Germany hold the opinion that Turkey is a trustworthy partner for Germany. 90 percent of the answers suggest that Turkey is not a trustworthy partner. Turkey’s trustworthiness, according to the regularly conducted survey, was about 17 percent in April 2016. On the other hand, 92 percent of Germans think that France can be trusted as a real partner for their country, while 28 percent trust the U.S. (67 percent mistrust) and 26 percent Russia (67 mistrust).

Normally, the puzzle would be why Germans don’t trust Turkey, or more interestingly, whether Turks trust Germany. However, in this case, it’s better to point out something that became more apparent in recent years.

With no doubt, the fact that Germans don’t trust a country to which 3 million German-Turks have important ties – be it family, emotional, economic, etc – is an interesting phenomenon. Hence, it’s strange that the presence of 3 million Turks or “people with a Turkish background” in Germany is not considered as a positive factor by the interviewees.

But what’s behind the phenomenon that left out positive things in assessing Turkey? It would be too unlikely to assume that people differentiate between Turks living in Germany and the country with which strong ties do exist. The potential argument according to which interviewees just limited Turkey’s trustworthiness to current bilateral or global politics and Turkey’s new political system would also be a false assumption. This is because Turks in Germany are always included into these kind of negative discourses – both led by German media and politicians – whenever a problem occurs in bilateral relations. For instance, it’s striking that the “German-ness of Turks in Germany” is occasionally casted doubt if there is some disagreement between the two countries’ political standpoints. It also seems not very sincere to permanently criticize one country’s political preferences while trusting another country with 92 percent but being collectively silent with respect to its quite controversial political system which is described as a ‘republican monarchy’ (additional 1>; 2).

Thus, the actual explanation why Turkey is not perceived as a trustworthy partner in the eyes of Germans may firstly have something to do with prejudices, and secondly, with rejection.

By prejudices, I mean, the general political bias in German politics and society. Due to a general and deliberate current trend in the Western world, people in Germany also increasingly prefer marginal-extreme right-wing political parties, discourses and their anti-Islamic positions. It’s not a legitimate argument to advocate radicalized positions by stressing so-called “fears” of citizens supporting populist racists. In one of the wealthiest and most “enlightened” countries in the world, it’s quite absurd to hide the seriousness of the issue behind these kinds of downplaying statements. In addition, even though the huge majority of 4,5 million Muslims and 3 million Turks living peacefully in Germany, an increasing number of politicians and (including state-funded) media outlets permanently tense the societal mood by supporting inadequate “experts” who don’t represent an average Turk. Consequently, this broadcasting preference and political atmosphere supports already existing prejudices.

The second problem is the rejection of people as they are. By this, I mean challenging the preferences of Turks and Muslims living in Germany and their strong ties to Turkey. Unfortunately, it seems that conservative circles and right-wing parties expect Turks to totally break ties with Turkey while calling it, e.g., integration. Even though the German constitution does not request assimilative actions, extreme positions increasingly become pushed into the political center.

Muslims and particularly Turks, who feel both a sense of belonging to Turkey and Germany, deny giving up their (constitutionally-protected) positions, practices, beliefs and so on. And it seems that these wrong expectations cause – due to prejudices supported by broadcasts and populist political discourses – a sentiment of doubt and rejection regarding people and to a country with which transnational ties exist.

Of course, surveys should not be generalized and problems have to be examined extensively. However, one must not close their eyes to prejudices or unacceptable requests – like accepting a superior/guiding culture (“Leitkultur”) – becoming a societal normality and consequently fostering even other international related perceptions. Due to the fact that –above all, pious – Turks in Germany are underrepresented in politics and the media, and that there is a lack of sufficient instruments of expressing their actual positions, prejudices are getting underpinned as well. Thus, while there exists an extremely negative language in politics and media with respect to one specific societal group and its transnationally tied country, then one should not be surprised as to why the number of prejudices increases and the call for rejection gets reinforced.

In a speech delivered on December 5, 2017, German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), stated that it would not be beneficial for the U.S. to leave European countries alone regarding rising powers in the Middle East and other Asian countries. He went on to suggest that the European Union and Germany are required to defend their own interests more self-confidently. A few days after Gabriel’s statement, SPD Chair Martin Schulz also made a similar emphasis during the party’s congress. Adopting an unrealistic rhetoric, Schulz called for the establishment of a “United States of Europe” by 2025.

While representatives of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), a center-conservative party, did not brush off this suggestion made by Schulz as an idealistic one, they expressed that such a thing was not possible in the short-run. As can be recalled, CDU leader and German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, emphasized in a speech she made in May 2017 that Germany needed a foreign policy less dependent on the U.S. In this speech, Merkel also stressed that with the inauguration of Donald Trump, the U.S. was no longer a reliable ally, adding that therefore Europe is required to determine its own fate from now on.

During his speech, Gabriel pointed out that the EU has been gradually losing its influence and that Germany in particular needed to take a more active role in foreign policy. Another notable statement made by Gabriel is that new areas of crises have emerged in the east of Europe, which have disrupted stability in the region. Within this framework, the German Foreign Minister claimed that the Syria summit between the presidents of Russia, Turkey and Iran in Sochi must be read as the “old empires rising,” adding that “the major powers gathered in Sochi are not friends, but they have plenty in common. They base their identity both at home and abroad on their historical greatness. And that is the crucial factor that distinguishes them from us: they invest considerable capital in throwing their weight about to show the West from time to time.”

Can Germany defy the U.S.?

Gabriel also underscored that Turkey does not refrain from launching military operations or having dispute with the U.S. in order to protect its own interests against the Syrian offshoots of the outlawed PKK’s quests for an autonomous region, adding that the EU and the U.S. remain passive in the face of such problems. Within this scope, one of the most noteworthy expressions of Gabriel is undoubtedly “We need to realize that we can either try to shape the world ourselves or wait to be shaped by the rest of the world.”

Within the German parliamentary system, in which a new government has failed to be formed for over three months, not only are transatlantic relations being questioned, but a divergence from the conventional foreign policy sustained since the Second World War is also occurring. How can we evaluate these developments? While it must be noted that the choices and statements made by the federal government and foreign ministry who are temporarily in charge must not be read within long-term foreign policy plans, it is evident that Germany has adopted this stance since 2014. Consequently, the latest statements are not directly linked to the Trump administration.

It would also be useful to recall the statements made by the former non-partisan German President Joachim Gauck, former Foreign Minister from the SPD Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Defense Minister Ursula Gertrud von der Leyen from the CDU at the 2014 Munich Security Conference, who called for a more active Germany in world politics before the statements made by Merkel in May 2017 and the SPD politicians in December 2017. Along with the discussions that have been ongoing for a long time in regards to whether Germany would become a more active foreign policy actor with less dependence on the U.S., the positions of the three countries referred to with their historical past, particularly Turkey, have also been considered within this context.

Is Gabriel’s emphasis on Russia, Iran and Turkey a defiance?

As a number of studies indicate, although the German public supports the idea of an institutionally more active EU under the leadership of Germany and France, they do not give as much credit to Germany’s increasing military expenditure, which is vital for realizing this idea. Such conventional and compulsorily passive stance of Germany, which is the fourth largest economy in the world, also reflects the actual and traditional foreign policy approach of the SPD. However, it has been observed that a trend of change (at least on the level of rhetoric for the time being) has been adopted by both the CDU/CSU alliance and the SPD as of 2014. This tendency has discursively become much more explicit due to the foreign policy priorities of Trump.

Meanwhile, German public opinion and leading media circles who read the statements of Gabriel as a defiance to transatlantic relations indicate through a more realistic perspective that Germany cannot successfully stand by itself and that therefore there is no alternative other than siding with the U.S. In this case, what can we understand from Germany’s emphasis that countries like Russia, Iran and Turkey are increasing their prominence in regions where the U.S. is claimed to be ceding?

The German political elites’ divergence from the U.S. or the formation of a (military) alternative within the present state of the EU does not seem possible, at least in the short run. It is not certain that a possible concurrence of Germany and France will be agreed upon by all other EU Member States. It must be noted that one of the reasons for Germany’s new quest in defense is Brexit, which will see the EU lose the United Kingdom – a military power who is also a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Therefore, Germany cannot possibly lead a formation that would offer an alternative to the U.S. for the time being. Cognizant of this, the German administration endeavors to mark some provocative maneuvers in order to improve relations with the U.S. to some extent. Undoubtedly, one of the leading maneuvers in this sense has been the gesture towards prominent countries in places where a vacuum of power has been observed within the declining influence of the U.S.

The project of an “active Germany” and Turkey-Germany relations

One of the most noteworthy aspects of Gabriel’s remarks for the Turkish public opinion is his emphasis on “old empires” while referring to Russia, Iran and Turkey. This emphasis may have been made with an aim to highlight that the uni-polar world order lead by the U.S. “Empire” is about to come to an end. Although this statement may not turn out to be correct in all respects, this possibility decreases as the current position of Germany cannot allow the country to consider a notable detachment or embark on new alternatives aside from the U.S. in the short run. For this reason, Gabriel’s statement can be said to underline the fact that the situation is not promising for the U.S. either, and that the U.S. administration is required to support the institutional transformation of the EU and contribute to a stronger and more realistic Western alliance.

Furthermore, although Germany had adopted an irrational approach to Turkey, the country currently signalizes a return to a more realistic foreign policy. This choice can be read as a message against the U.S. and the historic alliance with Germany. Drawing on an “uncontrollable” Turkey, Iran and Russia, which can be interpreted as an element of threat through a conventional transatlantic viewpoint, Gabriel signalizes that better relations can be established with these countries with a perspective of a more active foreign policy that pays particular regard to the economic interests of the EU and Germany, contrary to the old state traditions. Calling for a more reconciliatory approach with Russia with stress on economic cooperation, Gabriel is known to be siding with the Trump administration in regards to Iran and supporting the maintenance of the nuclear agreement deal made with Tehran. As for Turkey, Germany is expected to pursue a realistic perspective while it is estimated that German foreign policy will endeavor to establish a partnership with the Ankara administration on equal terms instead of an asymmetrical relationship.

Stating that Germany cannot act alone in international politics, Gabriel has consistently underlined that Germany is required to act with the EU in order to secure Europe in cooperation with Russia. Parallel to this, Germany is closely observing Turkey’s foreign policy choices that prioritize the country’s own interests as Turkey is a NATO ally which does not act under the control of the U.S.

It is fair to state that Germany will seek to develop close ties with Turkey with a more realistic perspective in the following period. Although German politics and media will probably try to affect Turkish politics due to the upcoming 2019 elections in Turkey, a return to a more realistic ground is inevitable in the long run.

As can be seen from the German Foreign Minister’s approach, Germany’s attitude towards Russia is not in line with the U.S. and the projects implemented with Russia, such as Nord Stream II, indicate that Germany is prioritizing its own interests despite the U.S. Refusing Trump’s Iran policy may also increase the possibility of establishing closer ties between Berlin and Ankara.

The fact that Germany is avoiding a future projection that is dependent on the U.S. will consolidate the need to search for other alternatives both inside and outside of the EU. Since alternatives within the EU are extremely limited in the short-term, establishing more realistic relations with Turkey will probably be considered as one of Berlin’s long-term projections.

While it does not seem possible to implement this approach into practice in the near future, it still needs to be considered by Germany. Over the past four years, the German administration has diverged from a rational approach in its relations with Turkey. However, it is possible for Berlin to pay regard to the realities of Ankara in a more reasonable way, which must not be overlooked due to the presence of the U.S. and the EU. In doing so, following the formation of a new federal government in the near future, rather than radical changes, small yet realistic steps can be taken in German foreign policy in order to re-establish relations between Turkey and Germany as the positive atmosphere and constructive outcome of the most recent Gabriel – Cavusoglu meeting demonstrates.