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man has been one of the most notable countries in the war waged by the US and Israel against Iran, both in terms of the stance it has adopted and the policies it has pursued. As the country in the Gulf region with the closest historical and cultural ties to Iran, Oman made intensive efforts in the pre-conflict period to prevent a potential war. In this context, the negotiations led by Oman’s foreign minister between the US and Iran were largely successful; however, Washington’s unilateral decision to go to war could not be prevented. Whilst many attribute this decision to the influence of pro-Israeli actors within US decision-making mechanisms, the Trump administration’s miscalculations in this regard were evident in its statements during the war.

Oman’s forecasts and policies

Indeed, it was Oman that attempted to dissuade the Trump administration from this decision right up to the last minute. Oman’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi, in a statement to the CBS channel just a few hours before the US attacks began, said, “We are very close to peace between the US and Iran,” thereby making a final attempt to ensure that all the efforts they had undertaken as a neutral mediator in this process were not in vain. Despite this, the Trump administration decided to go to war, launching attacks against Iran and thereby initiating a process that has disrupted all political fault lines in the Middle East and the Gulf region, paving the way for a redesign of the region’s security architecture.

In an interview with the CBC, Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi’s warning that “no option other than diplomacy will bring peace” is noteworthy; indeed, it could also be interpreted as a veiled warning against the US entering this war, the motivations for which remain unclear. Oman, as an actor representing reconciliation, diplomacy and neutrality in the region, had argued that regardless of its own reasons, a potential war would benefit no regional country, including the US.

As seen a month after the war began, Oman’s predictions have largely come to pass. The US and Israeli attacks on Iran have brought serious destruction, primarily to these three countries directly involved in the conflict, whilst regional nations have also been heavily affected by the process. The Gulf states, which failed to provide sufficient support for Oman’s pre-war mediation efforts and did not exert pressure on the US regarding the potential negative consequences of an attack on Iran, have emerged as the actors most severely affected by the process. Iran, having issued warnings on numerous previous occasions, has struck military bases in the Gulf states, the US targets closest to it, in response to the attacks.

During this process, Tehran has begun to pursue a strategy of spreading the conflict to the region by targeting certain locations in Gulf states that have close ties with the US and have been under Washington’s security protection for years. Whilst this may have been one of the unexpected developments of the process, the fact that countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which had long been the centre of peace and stability in the region, suddenly found themselves in the midst of the conflict has been a major source of concern for them. As the perception of a ‘safe haven’ built up over many years was suddenly shattered, the resulting severe crisis of confidence, coupled with a massive capital outflow, has exposed economic vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the fact that these countries’ economies, which rely heavily on food security and energy exports, have been affected by the war has highlighted that the Gulf states could face far more severe structural crises.

Historical ties between Oman and Iran

When assessed as of the first month of the war, it became apparent that Oman was the exception to this pattern. Whilst Gulf countries such as Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, which host US bases and military units, became targets of Iran during the conflict, Oman remained largely outside this equation. The attacks carried out by Iran against Oman did not target Oman’s oil and gas companies, OQ or PDO; rather, they were directed at the Port of Duqm, where the US maintains a military presence under agreements concluded with Oman in previous years. In a statement, the Iranian Ministry of Defense announced that the attack on the port of Salalah had not been carried out by Iran and suggested that a third country might be behind it.

Oman views its status as the country least affected by the conflict in the Gulf in security terms as a result of the neutral policy it has pursued from the past to the present. Indeed, Oman, which acted as a mediator in Iran’s negotiations with the West during its most difficult periods, is not being targeted by this country with which it has historically maintained strong ties. Oman, once one of the region’s most significant empires, has relations with Iran rooted in ties dating back centuries. In the modern era, it is known that Iran provided substantial military aid to the Sultanate of Oman during the Dhofar uprising. Throughout this conflict, which lasted from 1960 to 1976, the support provided by Iran, then under the Shah’s rule, played a critical role in Oman’s suppression of the uprising and its return to stability.

The positive relations between the two countries continued even after the 1979 revolution in Iran and have persisted to the present day. Indeed, in October 2024, the Iranian and Omani Armed Forces conducted their first-ever joint military exercise in Oman’s Jebel Akhdar region. Even during years when Iran was embroiled in intense crises with the US and Israel, senior military officials from Oman and Iran have exchanged visits, whilst there remains significant political and economic interaction between Tehran and Muscat. In this context, whilst there is a significant Iranian diaspora in Oman, particularly in the capital Muscat, a new ferry route was launched in 2024 connecting Oman’s Shinas port with Iran’s Bandar Abbas port as a result of these interactions.

Iran’s perspective

From Iran’s perspective, there is no rational justification for posing any security threat to Oman. The primary reason for this is the long-standing relationship of trust between the two countries. Another factor is that Iran still views Oman as a key channel of communication, particularly in its dealings with the West. Although various actors such as Pakistan, Türkiye and Egypt have become involved in the mediation process, Oman’s potential role in this regard may once again come to the fore. Consequently, Iran’s positioning of Oman in a different stance from the Gulf states during this process could be viewed as a rational policy choice.

In conclusion, Oman’s stance in this process constitutes a continuation of its traditional policy. Through its strategy of neutrality, Oman seeks to minimize potential risks arising from regional crises, whilst simultaneously aiming to ensure that its development programs—which are progressing at a relatively slower pace compared to those of its neighbours—are not derailed. Furthermore, Oman aims to utilize its geostrategic position to mitigate the effects of a prolonged crisis in the Strait of Hormuz on the region and to ensure the continuity of global and regional trade activities.

The investments made in the port of Duqm over many years, along with the enhanced functionality of the port of Sohar, one of the Gulf region’s gateways to the Indian Ocean, will significantly strengthen Oman’s geopolitical position. As the second-most populous country in the Gulf in terms of its native population, Oman continues to act as the region’s ‘wise man’ through policies shaped by its imperial heritage.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ver the centuries, the Sultanate of Oman has navigated geopolitical shifts through a foreign policy characterized by calmness, deliberation, and positive neutrality. This approach stems from the profound understanding of current events held by its decision-makers, and is rooted in the country’s long history of adapting to its regional and global environment. It has strengthened Oman’s regional standing, ensured the stability of its political system and contributed to its continued existence as an independent state.

It has also given Oman a unique position in managing developments within the Arab Gulf region, with Muscat often playing the role of a conduit between conflicting parties without becoming embroiled in polarization or alliances. Oman’s role as a mediator or facilitator stems from the confidence that regional states and non-state actors have in its ability to resolve differences and find solutions to crises. Muscat is renowned for its constructive dialogue and diplomatic approach, avoiding confrontations that would otherwise harm the region.

This has led some political analysts to describe Oman as the ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’. However, the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran on 28 February 2026, following a round of indirect negotiations between the US and Iran, took Oman and other regional actors by surprise. His Excellency Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, the Omani Foreign Minister, stated that an agreement was imminent following a round of negotiations held in Muscat and later in Geneva, he stated that progress was being made towards de-escalation in order to maintain the necessary calm in the region. This is vital as it is an important energy artery that cannot withstand military confrontation and its repercussions for long without seriously disrupting the global supply of oil and gas. This raises questions about Oman’s ability to fulfil its traditional role in the region, given its limited capacity to leverage its soft power, which is crucial for defusing tensions between conflicting parties.

In contrast to its previous calm and covert rhetoric, Muscat has openly voiced its opinion on the ongoing conflict, adopting a clear stance against joint US-Israeli aggression towards Iran. In an article published in The Economist, the Omani foreign minister emphasized that a war on Iran would be illegitimate and would not serve the interests of the region. It would also have serious repercussions for the security and economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as well as for the global economy and energy markets more broadly. He urged Washington and its allies to de-escalate and resume diplomatic efforts.

A changing regional landscape

The Arab Gulf region has been unique for decades, with its own political, economic, cultural and religious characteristics. Long ago, it became an arena for competition between the great powers, starting with the arrival of the Portuguese in the late 15th century and continuing with the growing influence of the Dutch, British and French between the 17th and 19th centuries. The discovery of oil in the early 20th century further cemented the region’s prominence, even while the great powers were preoccupied with conflicts such as the First and Second World Wars. The discovery of oil coincided with the establishment of the Third Saudi State in 1932. This state is characterized by its vast geographical area, regional influence and prominent role in global energy markets. However, the region has not been immune to geopolitical changes that have disrupted its relative stability.

These include communist maneuvers in southern Oman (1965–1975), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), the impact of the 9/11 attacks, followed by the US invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the subsequent Arab Spring (2011), the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen (2015) and the blockade of Qatar (2017). These events have cast a shadow over the political landscape of the Middle East and the relationship between the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. This raises questions about the future of the GCC, more than four decades after its foundation. This puts Oman’s foreign policy in relation to the region at stake and is exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the stance of the other GCC states.

Despite being relatively isolated from its regional surroundings since the dissolution of the Omani Empire in 1856, anyone familiar with Oman’s foreign policy towards the Arab Gulf region will realize that, since Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970, Oman has been keen to achieve unity and consensus with its neighbors, focusing on collective action for human development rather than conflict. This approach has earned Oman the trust of various parties through its balanced policies, adherence to principles, maintenance of neutrality, avoidance of involvement in ill-conceived conflicts that could prove costly, and pursuit of diplomatic efforts in cooperation with regional partners, especially its ‘brothers’ in the GCC.

This independent and unique approach has continued under the leadership of His Majesty Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, who ascended to the throne on 11 January 2020. His Majesty affirmed that the Sultanate of Oman would continue its noble mission and play a positive role in the region. He emphasized the independence of Omani policy and its sovereign decision-making by stating that Oman would not be swayed by whims and desires and would not enter into blocs and alliances directed towards a specific party. This summarizes the balance and stability of Omani foreign policy over the past five decades.

His Majesty also affirmed Oman’s support for Arab and Muslim causes, foremost among them the Palestinian cause, within a balanced diplomatic framework that focuses on opportunities for peace. This framework affirms the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to establish an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, based on a two-state solution. It also completely rejects Israeli attacks that affect Palestinian lands and rights, as well as repeated violations of the sovereignty and security of other countries.

Oman’s approach to the crisis

While Muscat has achieved a certain level of political maturity and learned to adopt a moderate and non-confrontational approach to conflict, avoiding escalatory rhetoric and utilizing international channels to maintain calm, it has also demonstrated a firm desire to adhere to the principles of moderation and preserve regional balance and stability. However, recent events have challenged Muscat’s approach to the crisis, given the damage to Omani infrastructure caused by drone attacks on coastal investments, such as the ports of Sohar and Salalah and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in Duqm. While the physical damage was limited, the broader economic implications threaten the coastal investment strategy outlined in Oman’s Future Vision 2040, in which coastal investments are a crucial pillar of the economic diversification strategy.

Such attacks on Oman have revealed that traditional neutrality no longer guarantees security, and the breach of sovereignty sent an alarming signal to Muscat that a more explicit stance was necessary. Muscat condemned the attacks, some of which Tehran denied. Muscat then repeatedly criticized US-Israeli aggression against Iran, which brought chaos to the region. This was after the Omani Foreign Minister announced that the US and Iran were on the verge of reaching a genuine agreement on most of the complex issues causing hostility. The minister described the attacks as ‘illegal, shocking, but not surprising’ when military strikes were favored over a peace treaty that was within reach, and only hours after the most crucial round of talks. Furthermore, he described Iran’s immediate retaliation as ‘inevitable, albeit deeply regrettable’, as it led to unacceptable consequences and further escalation.

While other GCC capitals took a stronger position, refusing to support or participate in military operations, Muscat urged all sides to stop what it called ‘grave miscalculations’, calling for an immediate return to negotiations through engagement with other GCC states and other regional and international partners. Muscat emphasized its criticism of the war and called for an immediate ceasefire.

During the GCC foreign ministers’ meeting on 30 March, Muscat expressed its position to representatives from Russia and Jordan. At the same time, it continued its role as go-between through indirect talks with Washington and Tehran, stressing that the door for diplomacy remained open. Therefore, Oman is continuing its role as a stabilizing force, prioritizing diplomacy over all other means of resolving conflicts to ensure the stability of the Arab Gulf region and avoid military entanglement. This is in accordance with the fact that Oman’s security and economy are directly affected by the repercussions of the war.

Challenges to Muscat’s active role

One of the most significant challenges facing Muscat in its efforts to play an active role is reaching a consensus with the other GCC capitals on regional issues. These political differences have resulted in the absence of a collective GCC response mechanism to regional issues, whether political or military. Firstly, despite the GCC’s 45-year existence and the Peninsula Shield Force’s (PSF) 44-year history, this modest military force remains largely symbolic and lacks the capability to engage in a large-scale regional conflict due to its lack of air and naval elements. Secondly, Muscat is affected by regional polarization and a changing security landscape, which makes acting as an intermediary between the GCC states and Iran more difficult. Amid a polarized Arab Gulf environment, maintaining cordial ties can be difficult, reducing the chances of Muscat maintaining its neutrality. Therefore, Oman may be pressured into choosing sides, which would contradict its long-held political orientation.

Thirdly, the lack of robust leverage means that Oman’s regional role is being challenged by the emergence of new regional mediators, such as Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. This reduces Oman’s unique diplomatic role, particularly given Muscat’s stance on the current crisis: it has explicitly condemned American and Israeli strikes on Iran, and warned against regional escalation and its repercussions for the region and the world. Fourthly, unlike other wealthier GCC states, Oman has financial constraints in the form of low financial reserves and high public debt. This reduces its ability to finance diplomatic initiatives and consequently reduces its regional footprint. Finally, Oman faces economic constraints, developmental challenges and an increasing unemployment rate, as well as a desperate need for economic diversification. This may reduce its ability to pursue an active foreign policy and instead divert its focus to domestic affairs.

Based on the foregoing and Oman’s traditional foreign policy approach, it is clear that Muscat has taken a firm stance by condemning both the American-Israeli and Iranian strikes. Calling on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid escalation, Muscat has also appealed to Iran to keep trade routes open and not to militarize the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Oman recognizes that neutrality does not always guarantee security, as demonstrated by Iran’s targeting of some of its vital infrastructure. Therefore, Muscat now needs to achieve balance through two main strategies: Firstly, it should maintain its rapprochement with Tehran in order to advance diplomatic solutions, joining the initiative of regional actors such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Turkey to ensure the safety of maritime navigation routes and a regional environment conducive to foreign investment. This is vital to the future economic visions of all GCC states.

Secondly, Muscat should play a leading role in adopting a unified stance among the Gulf capitals regarding any foreign intervention that could lead to crises affecting the GCC states first. This can only be achieved by setting aside differing viewpoints and focusing on the collective benefits of regional stability. There must also be a firm conviction that prolonging the conflict will have serious repercussions for the GCC states themselves before it has regional and global effects. During a high-level briefing at the UN Security Council meeting on 2 April, GCC Secretary-General Jassim Al-Budaiwi stated that ‘The Gulf states do not favor war over peace, security and stability’, emphasizing that ‘dialogue and diplomacy remain the best way to address crises’ and that ‘continued escalation would undermine regional security and lead to serious repercussions for international peace and security’.

This could serve as a basis for a collective GCC perspective on regional politics and security that benefits not only Oman, but the entire region. While it does not necessitate a total transformation of Oman’s foreign policy or its decision-making autonomy, it does mean working in a more balanced manner with regional partners to ensure the security and stability of both the region and the country itself.