The PKK leader calling his terrorist organization twice to leave Turkey or leave armed engagement did not find a response by the KCK and Turkey witnessed thousands of terrorists attacks during the cease-fire period that began in 2013. The HDP’s pre-election campaign to disarm the PKK has also not panned out as Demirtş said HDP is not in the position to do so.

The cease-fire and PKK’s disarmament process beginning in March 2013 with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s announcement has come to a halt several times and even almost ended owing to attacks on infrastructure, armed forces and civilians following calls on the Kurdish community by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) for street protests. In addition, the contradiction between Öcalan and the PKK leadership in northern Iraq’s Qandil Mountains has been there to be seen, carrying out bloody attacks while Öcalan called for PKK disarmament.

Over the course of the cease-fire and the PKK’s disarmament process, the government remained composed and did not take any military action even though the PKK terrorist organization carried out attacks resulting in dozens of deaths.

Having been determined to bring the three-decade unrest in the country to an end, the government has taken many steps toward improving relations through reforms. The reward for the efforts, however, has so far been contradicting remarks by the political wing of the process as well as the PKK leadership, justifying bloody attacks and threatening the government from time to time.The chronology of statements from Öcalan and top PKK leaders in the Qandil Mountains explicitly show contradictions on the organization disarming with inconsistent statements at once disclaims the declaration and encouraging an armed fight against the Turkish state.

The period starting from July 11 with the unilateral declaration of the end of cease-fire by the PKK terrorist organization has witnessed the killing of more than 40 security forces personnel. The state has exercised its right to defense and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has said it will resolutely fight until the terror across the country has ended.

Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have repeatedly indicated that Ankara has always been and continues to be in favor of carrying out the reconciliation process with the Kurdish people. For this, however, all armed factions need to leave the country for good and support along with justification for terrorist attacks needs to end.

Chronology of the period since Öcalan’s call for PKK to leave Turkey

March 21, 2013: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s Nevruz message

“A door has been opened from armed struggle to democratic struggle… We have come to a point today where guns will be silenced and thoughts and ideas shall speak. Now it is time for our armed elements to move outside [Turkey’s] borders… This is not giving up the struggle, but the launching of a different struggle…”

April 25, 2013

The PKK officially announced that it would withdraw all its armed forces to northern Iraq. Speaking at a press meeting held in Qandil, which was relayed on TV channels, Murat Karayılan announced that the PKK would recess without precondition from May 8.

May 7, 2013

Selahattin Demirtaş’s announcement on the pullout: “The pullout will officially start tomorrow. We are estimating that it will last three or four months.”

July 2, 2013

Some protests were kicked off in Diyarbakır province’s Lice district on the pretext of road works and outpost constructions. One protester died.

Sept. 9, 2013

Cemil Bayık was assigned to chair the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). The announcement issued by the KCK read, “The nine-month period without any clashes has been spent conducting some military works that cannot be performed in a state of war…”

Sept. 30, 2013

The government introduced the Democratization Package. In reply to that, the PKK organized the Patriotic Revolutionist Youth Movement (YDG-H), which acted as the PKK’s urban youth armed group. It also founded courts in cities, collected taxes and abducted people.

March 15, 2014

The KCK announced that the government was “no longer the addressee of the democratization move.”

March 21, 2014

The letter penned by Öcalan for the Nevruz celebrations: The letter was recited both in Kurdish and Turkish in Diyarbakır, by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Deputy Chair Pervin Buldan and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Istanbul Deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder respectively. Öcalan wrote, “History showed us that if we don’t lead for peace with strong will, historical problems will go their own way and most probably will produce their own answers with very big losses. There is a burning question awaiting an answer: Will we continue with replicated coups or will we prefer absolute and radical democracy?”

June 1, 2014

A delegation from the HDP met the imprisoned Öcalan on İmralı Island. In the statement issued after the meeting, it was stated that Öcalan remarked, “the most important reality is the fact that the process has come to a new phase,” adding that hopes should be kept alive to make a serious start for the resolution.

June 8, 2014

In the province of Bitlis, terrorists blocking a road opened fire on security forces with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons. A bomb attack took place in the district of Lice.

June 9, 2014

A national flag in the garden of Diyarbakır’s Second Air Force Command was taken down by a terrorist.

July 10, 2014

The “Draft Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social Integration,” which regulates the procedures and principles of the reconciliation process, passed into law after being approved at the Parliamentary Counsel.

Aug. 5, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan said, “The 30-year-old war is about to end with a great democratic negotiation. The democratic negotiation process has a profound meaning in a historical and societal sense…”

Aug. 19, 2014

A statue of PKK member Mahsuni Korkmaz was erected in Lice. The court issued a decision to demolish the statue. Clashes broke out, one was killed.

Aug. 20, 2014

In Diyarbakır, a group of terrorists organized an attack on an outpost.

Aug. 24, 2014

Terrorists attacked a thermal plant located in Silopi district’s Görümlü neighborhood with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons.

Sept. 18, 2014

The HDP issued a call to boycott schools on the pretext of education in their mother tongue. Dozens of schools were set ablaze in many provinces.

Sept. 22 2014

HDP deputy Aysel Tuğluk threw stones at military officers when police and military officers blocked the crowd heading to Kobani.

Oct. 3, 2014

In Tunceli province’s Pülümür district, some PKK militants attacked an outpost.

Oct. 8-9-10, 2014

Demirtaş’s Kobani call: After the call issued by Demirtaş, the Kobani incidents broke out. More than 50 people died. Clashes erupted in over 35 cities. Damage costing millions of Turkish lira was done. Öcalan said, “The reconciliation process will end if Kobani falls.”

Oct. 13, 2014

Some PKK militants were identified in Tunceli while leaking into a launch base area. A clash took place.

Oct. 21, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan announced that a new phase started on Oct. 15 and tangible steps would be taken.

Oct. 25, 2014

Three undercover military officers were killed in Yüksekova.

Oct. 29, 2014

The HDP called on people to take to the streets again.

Oct. 30, 2014: In Diyarbakır, Necdet Aydoğdu, 24, a military officer, was killed by two masked assailants while he was off-duty, shopping with his wife downtown.

Nov. 24, 2014

Speaking to Fırat News Agency, Sabri Ok, a senior KCK member, remarked that there were no developments in their agenda regarding disarmament.

Dec. 20, 2014

Cemil Bayık said, “Laying down arms would mean death…”

Dec. 27, 2014

Major clashes broke out in Cizre. The bodies of four People’s Protection Units (YPG) members, who were killed in the clashes in Syria’s Kobani and Iraq’s Shingal regions, were transferred from Habur to Cizre. A confrontation between the YDG-H members, who were on duty at the tent for condolences in Nur, and some proponents of the Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR), turned into an armed conflict.

Jan. 23, 2015

A HDP delegation negotiated with Qandil. It was stated that the KCK thought the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) did not display the responsible approach required for the negotiation process.

Feb. 9, 2015

Parliamentary negotiations regarding the package known as the “domestic security package” in public, which comprises the law on police duties and authorities, the law on the gendarme institution, duties and authorities, the law on the civil registry services and the draft on altering some laws and statutory decrees, was postponed for the second time.

Feb. 15, 2015

Meeting the KCK administration in Qandil, the HDP delegation announced in a written statement that the KCK was disturbed by the Domestic Security Package and this would undermine the negotiation process.

Feb. 17, 2015

Demirtaş: “Öcalan issued a conditioned disarmament call.”

Feb. 28, 2015

Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down its arms.

March 21, 2015

Öcalan called to hold a congress to leave the armed fight: He called for the PKK to gather a congress with the aim of ending the armed conflict against Turkey in the Nevruz celebrations held in Diyarbakır on the condition of founding a truth and reconciliation commission comprising of deputies and a monitoring board.

April 11, 2015

In Ağrı, PKK members attacked military officers. Four officers were injured.

5 May 2015

Bese Hozat said, “Convening the congress is not on our agenda at the moment because the process has not worked and no step has been taken. Let alone negotiations, the dialogue process was removed. Negotiations have not been held with our leadership for a month, the delegation did not pay a visit to our leadership.”

June 7, 2015

The HDP imposed pressure on ballots in the eastern regions. Block votes were cast in hundreds of ballot boxes in villages.

June 12, 2015

After Demirtaş’s call that the PKK could lay down its arms with Öcalan’s call, the KCK announced, “We own the will of disarmament. Demirtaş or Öcalan cannot urge us to lay down our arms.”

The KCK: “We must clearly emphasize that the PKK’s will to end the armed fight against Turkey belongs completely to us. Everyone should know that the HDP is not the official party of the PKK. Consequently, the HDP does not have a right to issue such a call. Besides, it is not possible for Öcalan to issue a call in his present conditions in İmralı. Expecting the HDP and Öcalan to call for disarmament and putting pressure on that frame means the insistence on insolubility and it is not possible for our movement to recognize that. This attitude aims at neither listening to Öcalan nor blocking the HDP’s policy-making.”

June 29, 2015

Karayılan: “Let me put this clearly. If they intervene in Rojava, we will also intervene in them. Then the whole of Turkey will turn into a battlefield. The Turkish authorities should not forget the uprising of our people on Oct. 6, Oct. 7 and Oct. 8. It is well known that Öcalan, who did not approve of the great uprising of our people, was barely able to stop it. It is obvious that the people would not allow such an intervention. In brief, such a decision would be a strategic one for Turkey, and a new period would start for the Kurdish people. We will not beg to anyone on that matter. They can do whatever they want. If they attempt it, of course, we would reply to that as Kurdish people.”

July 11, 2015

KCK’s announcement on ending the cease-fire: “The cease-fire is over. The meticulous attitude of our liberation movement was exploited. The dams and vehicles used for dam constructions will be targeted by our guerilla forces. Every detainment from now on will be a reason for the reprisal of our guerillas. Our liberation movement will not accept the exploitation of the cease-fire conditions, and stands against the policies that leave the Kurdish question unresolved.”

July 12, 2015

The PKK opened fire on a minibus.

July 14 2015

KCK Co-Chair Bese Hozat wrote an article entitled “The new process: a revolutionary people’s war,” calling the conflict a revolutionary people’s war.

July 20 2015

ISIS attack in Suruç: An explosion took place in Kobani simultaneously with an explosion in Suruç. Thirty-two people were killed in the Suruç explosion.

20 July 2015

Military officer Müsellim Ünal was killed in a clash between the PKK and officers in Adıyamanç

KCK Co-Chair Cemil Bayık called on people to take up arms, dig trenches and create tunnels in their homes.

22 July 2015

Police officers Feyyaz Yumuşak and Okan Acar were shot dead in their houses in Şanlıurfa’s Ceylanpınar district.

In Adana, Kalem-Der member Ethem Türkben was killed by the PKK in front of his pregnant wife and three children.

23 July 2015

In Diyarbakır, a police squad heading to a traffic accident scene was ambushed. Polis officer Tansu Aydın was killed and one officer was injured.

24 July 2015

Turkey launched operations in northern Syria and northern Iraq.

Immediately after the independence referendum held in northern Iraq, the PYD conveyed a congress on September 27-28, 2017. This event, known as the 7^th General Congress, was held in Rmelan. As was the case in previous PYD congresses, once again the name of the PKK/KCK leader Abdullah Öcalan was on the front line. It is known that the repressive-propagating methods of the PYD, including its establishment in northern Syria, is being directly coordinated and directed by Öcalan and the leadership in the Qandil mountains. During this two-day congress, co-chairs Salih Muslim and Asya Abdullah were replaced by Shahoz Hasan and Aisha Heso. As it can be observed from the organizational structure of the PYD and the mechanisms within this structure, the elections are determined solely by the representatives and the nominees who are appointed by the upper leadership bodies.

To briefly explain how tasks are distributed within structures of the PYD and how new task distributions occur, the following information will be useful. According to their own by-law that was published by the PYD, there are five main organs in the organization. While according to an established hierarchy the chairman is in third place of authority, above the party chairmanship, congress is declared as the supreme decision-making body. When the by-law is examined, it can be understood that the congress also dominates all levels of the organization. While according to the by-law, congress should be convened every three years, this rule has been infringed according to individual needs and interests. The most important tasks of the Congress are the determination of party chairpersons, the formation of parliament and the determination of those who will enter this parliament and the prescription of their duties. Looking at the establishment of the PYD organization, it does not hesitate to move directly in line with the directives of the KCK main leadership structures. As a matter of fact, the most recent congress has shown this in terms of its content and purpose.

As is the case with all other leading members of the PYD, the two newly appointed co-chairs appear to have been previously occupying various posts under the KCK structure. Although the 7th congress has not attracted much attention except from the people working in this area, the two selected leaders presented themselves on the international and regional level by attending the funeral ceremony of former Iraqi Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani. The ideological approaches of the new co-chairs, who also met Masoud Barzani during Talabani’s funeral, can be evaluated by both the congress and the activities they were enduring previously when serving in the ranks of the KCK.

The following information about the two newly appointed co-chairpersons could be identified: Shahoz Ahmad Hasan, who filled Salih Muslim’s seat, was originally born in Hasakah. Hasan, who was known to have taken part in military activities in the Qandil Mountains until 2011, was assigned to continue his activities in northern Syria the same year. One of the first public works after his Qandil years was published on the PKK’s website. Shahoz Hasan wrote an article called “The Spring of the Peoples,” in which, praising the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan, he argued that the post-Cold War capitalist and imperialist system is going to collapse and that the imperialists are continuously going to lose in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, there is no doubt that Hasan accepts Öcalan’s thoughts and ideas as the most important source of inspiration for the region’s future. Abdullah Öcalan, who is described as “the natural leader of all the Kurdish peoples,” also appears to be identified as a “source for the victories of the people of the whole region.”

After being sent to northern Syria by the Qandil leadership, Hasan began actively working in the PYD from 2013. While firstly being appointed to the leadership board of the city of Ayn al-Arab, which was under PYD control, he was then appointed as media officer of the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), which was later imposed by the PYD as an administrative element to govern northern Syria in the early periods of the crisis. Later, he became a member of the Syrian Democratic Council, which is the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces and established at the end of 2015 to help PYD’s military wing YPG through gaining support from Western countries, especially the U.S. Meanwhile, Hasan also received membership at the “Founding Assembly of Democratic Federalism of North Syria” whose co-chairperson is Hediya Yousef. From his listed experiences, it can be assessed that Shahoz Hasan has focused particularly on media issues throughout his experience in Syria. Within these various processes, Hasan, who as stated earlier, has publications praising PKK leader Öcalan, was no doubt a prominent figure in carrying out activities in order to disseminate the PKK/KCK ideology.

The other co-chair, Aisha Heso, draws a more unfamiliar portrait than Shahoz Hasan. Heso, a close associate with the Qandil cadre, was born in Afrin. It is believed that a relative with the same name as herself was killed during a clash with the Turkish Armed Forces in the Zap region of Iraq while fighting in the PKK ranks at the beginning of the 1990s. Prior to her role as co-chair of the PYD, Aisha Heso was a member of TEV-DEM’s high leading board, and head of its women’s structure. More, she had also previously served under the directives of the KCK and worked for “Yekitiya Star” (Star Women’s Union), which was established within Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological framework “gineology.” Yekitiya Star changed its name to “Star Congress” (shortly Star, Star Women Congress) with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Heso, who was appointed as the coordinator of this structure, is known to have protested against the lack of PYD representation in the Astana negotiations. Heso made some statements concerning the arrests of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) deputies in Turkey. When making these statements, she was interestingly interviewed as a normal citizen, with her real identity and role kept in secrecy. Lastly, in July 2017, she made multiple comments about Turkey’s possible military actions in Afrin.

Thus, the two names that have been determined by Qandil for the leadership of the PYD – Shahoz Hasan and Aisha Heso – are merely puppet leaders. As the steps taken by the PYD clearly illustrate, the terrorist organization has never stepped out of KCK directives and it will never do so. While currently there are only rumors about the new duties of the out-going chairs Salih Muslim and Asya Abdullah, who have transferred their duties to Shahoz Hasan and Aisha Heso, it is considered highly likely that both figures will be appointed to future roles on an international level.

Western critiques and objections from certain domestic circles are doomed to be ineffective against the current hardening security policy and widespread domestic support for such policies. In order to trace this situation, one needs to go back to the PKK’s turn to violence in the Summer of 2015.This most recent round of the terrorism-counterterrorism cycle started as the PKK announced the end of its 16 month-long ceasefire on 11 July 2015, citing the construction of new dams and military outposts in southeast Turkey as its reason. A few days after the announcement, Bese Hozat, co-chair of the KCK (which is the umbrella term that PKK calls itself now) declared “a people’s revolutionary war” on July 15th, and was soon joined by his co-chair Cemil Bayık. On July 19th, Bayık ordered the PKK mass base in southeastern Turkey to arm themselves, erect barricades, and dig tunnels and ditches for the revolutionary war.

The battle started as the PKK murdered two policemen while they were sleeping in their homes in Ceylanpınar, Şanlıurfa on July 22nd. What followed was the Turkish state’s restarting of military and police operations against the PKK. As the PKK put its urban warfare in action in towns under the rule of HDP mayors, municipal vehicles were used by the PKK to dig trenches in roads and plant bombs. As a reaction to the PKK’s urban warfare (which was a real war by the way, as the PKK started it with mines, bombs, and RPGs, and Turkey responded first with police teams and then with military operations including the use of tanks), Turkish security forces declared curfews in combat zones and detained HDP mayors in those towns. This marked the starting point of the HDP detentions.

What followed was the replacement of those mayors with centrally appointed trustees (kayyum) and the spread of these replacements to many other HDP municipalities. As a reaction to the trustee appointments, the PKK declared that they will target trustees as well as the AK Party’s local politicians in the region. And it did. The PKK murdered Naci Adıyaman, the youth branch district chairman of the AK Party in Şırnak, and Ahmet Budak, the AK Party’s Hakkari candidate in the November 2015 parliamentary elections. The PKK continued its attacks against the AK Party politicians in October 2016 with three murders: Aydın Muştu, AK Party’s Van, Özalp district deputy vice chairman, Deryan Aktert, AK Party’s Diyarbakır, Dicle district chairman, and Mehmet Şefik Doğu, the assembly member appointed by the trustee at Erciş Municipality. Besides those murders, the PKK has also detonated bombs in AK Party headquarters and trustee appointed municipal buildings in the region.

Along with the ongoing military operations against the PKK, the HDP co-leaders Selahattin Demirtaş, Figen Yüksekdağ and nine other parliamentary deputies were arrested as another stage of Turkey’s war on terror.

Once we see this flow of events starting from last summer in one piece, then what comes next is to analyze the reasoning of the related actors: Why did the PKK murder AK Party politicians, and why were the HDP mayors and MPs arrested?

The PKK’s reasoning is simple as usual. They started a “revolutionary urban warfare” that was supposed to defeat Turkey, “liberate” those towns from Turkey and establish its de facto autonomy in the region. As the PKK failed to take HDP-ruled municipalities directly under its sole control, it even lost its indirect rule in those towns after the detentions of HDP mayors and trustee appointments. The only way for the PKK to claim that it is still controlling the region was to kill unarmed AK Party politicians, which it did. The message was, “if my politicians cannot rule, yours cannot either!” Nevertheless, what the PKK fails to see is the AK Party government has new priorities now. The PKK’s decision to return to its terror attacks after the so-called Reconciliation Process (Çözüm Süreci) closed the negotiation door for an unforeseeable time. And there is now no domestic or international factor that can change the AK Party’s decision to restart a security-first oriented approach to the problem.

The AK Party already had some internal dissent in its mass base against negotiating with the PKK during the Reconciliation Process. And now there seems to be no single trace of pressure from the party’s popular base to return to the negotiations after the PKK reinitiated violence. The MHP’s popular base almost entirely, and the CHP’s popular base in a significant degree, seem to embrace the military struggle against the PKK’s terror. With such a composition, the AK Party’s current counter-terrorism struggle has a wide range of support in society according to the leading survey companies in Turkey such as GENAR, ANDY-AR and A&G. The negotiations with the PKK ended with its turn to violence. The PKK took the HDP’s electoral success as direct support for itself and hijacked the HDP votes with its urban warfare in places where HDP rules. The overwhelming idea in society is that the PKK is using the HDP for recruitment, propaganda and logistical support purposes, and it even uses HDP-ruled municipalities as its safe havens. The government’s solution to this problem now seems to be breaking this logistical link between the HDP and PKK by arresting the HDP mayors in those municipalities as well as the HDP’s leadership with no significant domestic objection to that in the AK Party’s, MHP’s, and, to some extent even CHP’s mass bases.

While there is no strong domestic objection to the detainment of the HDP politicians, international pressure seems to be ineffective as well. Especially after Western reactions to the coup attempt on 15 July, 2016 and the American military support for the PKK’s partner organization PYD in Syria, on top of the never-ending accession process with the EU, both the EU and the United States lost their leverage on Turkey. Hence, the American and European critiques will not change the AK Party government’s decision to fight against the PKK on all fronts, including both its military and political wings. There seems to be no reason for AK Party politicians to change their mind.

The loud objections from the US and EU fall on deaf ears in Turkey, as the AK Party no longer considers them credible partners. Turkey’s current security-first orientation and the jailing of HDP politicians may not end the PKK terror for once and for all, but with the given parameters, there seems to be no factor to persuade the government to change its approach towards the PKK and the HDP.

The PKK leader calling his terrorist organization twice to leave Turkey or leave armed engagement did not find a response by the KCK and Turkey witnessed thousands of terrorists attacks during the cease-fire period that began in 2013. The HDP’s pre-election campaign to disarm the PKK has also not panned out as Demirtş said HDP is not in the position to do so.

The cease-fire and PKK’s disarmament process beginning in March 2013 with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s announcement has come to a halt several times and even almost ended owing to attacks on infrastructure, armed forces and civilians following calls on the Kurdish community by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) for street protests. In addition, the contradiction between Öcalan and the PKK leadership in northern Iraq’s Qandil Mountains has been there to be seen, carrying out bloody attacks while Öcalan called for PKK disarmament.

Over the course of the cease-fire and the PKK’s disarmament process, the government remained composed and did not take any military action even though the PKK terrorist organization carried out attacks resulting in dozens of deaths.

Having been determined to bring the three-decade unrest in the country to an end, the government has taken many steps toward improving relations through reforms. The reward for the efforts, however, has so far been contradicting remarks by the political wing of the process as well as the PKK leadership, justifying bloody attacks and threatening the government from time to time.The chronology of statements from Öcalan and top PKK leaders in the Qandil Mountains explicitly show contradictions on the organization disarming with inconsistent statements at once disclaims the declaration and encouraging an armed fight against the Turkish state.

The period starting from July 11 with the unilateral declaration of the end of cease-fire by the PKK terrorist organization has witnessed the killing of more than 40 security forces personnel. The state has exercised its right to defense and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has said it will resolutely fight until the terror across the country has ended.

Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have repeatedly indicated that Ankara has always been and continues to be in favor of carrying out the reconciliation process with the Kurdish people. For this, however, all armed factions need to leave the country for good and support along with justification for terrorist attacks needs to end.

Chronology of the period since Öcalan’s call for PKK to leave Turkey

March 21, 2013: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s Nevruz message

“A door has been opened from armed struggle to democratic struggle… We have come to a point today where guns will be silenced and thoughts and ideas shall speak. Now it is time for our armed elements to move outside [Turkey’s] borders… This is not giving up the struggle, but the launching of a different struggle…”

April 25, 2013

The PKK officially announced that it would withdraw all its armed forces to northern Iraq. Speaking at a press meeting held in Qandil, which was relayed on TV channels, Murat Karayılan announced that the PKK would recess without precondition from May 8.

May 7, 2013

Selahattin Demirtaş’s announcement on the pullout: “The pullout will officially start tomorrow. We are estimating that it will last three or four months.”

July 2, 2013

Some protests were kicked off in Diyarbakır province’s Lice district on the pretext of road works and outpost constructions. One protester died.

Sept. 9, 2013

Cemil Bayık was assigned to chair the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). The announcement issued by the KCK read, “The nine-month period without any clashes has been spent conducting some military works that cannot be performed in a state of war…”

Sept. 30, 2013

The government introduced the Democratization Package. In reply to that, the PKK organized the Patriotic Revolutionist Youth Movement (YDG-H), which acted as the PKK’s urban youth armed group. It also founded courts in cities, collected taxes and abducted people.

March 15, 2014

The KCK announced that the government was “no longer the addressee of the democratization move.”

March 21, 2014

The letter penned by Öcalan for the Nevruz celebrations: The letter was recited both in Kurdish and Turkish in Diyarbakır, by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Deputy Chair Pervin Buldan and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Istanbul Deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder respectively. Öcalan wrote, “History showed us that if we don’t lead for peace with strong will, historical problems will go their own way and most probably will produce their own answers with very big losses. There is a burning question awaiting an answer: Will we continue with replicated coups or will we prefer absolute and radical democracy?”

June 1, 2014

A delegation from the HDP met the imprisoned Öcalan on İmralı Island. In the statement issued after the meeting, it was stated that Öcalan remarked, “the most important reality is the fact that the process has come to a new phase,” adding that hopes should be kept alive to make a serious start for the resolution.

June 8, 2014

In the province of Bitlis, terrorists blocking a road opened fire on security forces with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons. A bomb attack took place in the district of Lice.

June 9, 2014

A national flag in the garden of Diyarbakır’s Second Air Force Command was taken down by a terrorist.

July 10, 2014

The “Draft Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social Integration,” which regulates the procedures and principles of the reconciliation process, passed into law after being approved at the Parliamentary Counsel.

Aug. 5, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan said, “The 30-year-old war is about to end with a great democratic negotiation. The democratic negotiation process has a profound meaning in a historical and societal sense…”

Aug. 19, 2014

A statue of PKK member Mahsuni Korkmaz was erected in Lice. The court issued a decision to demolish the statue. Clashes broke out, one was killed.

Aug. 20, 2014

In Diyarbakır, a group of terrorists organized an attack on an outpost.

Aug. 24, 2014

Terrorists attacked a thermal plant located in Silopi district’s Görümlü neighborhood with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons.

Sept. 18, 2014

The HDP issued a call to boycott schools on the pretext of education in their mother tongue. Dozens of schools were set ablaze in many provinces.

Sept. 22 2014

HDP deputy Aysel Tuğluk threw stones at military officers when police and military officers blocked the crowd heading to Kobani.

Oct. 3, 2014

In Tunceli province’s Pülümür district, some PKK militants attacked an outpost.

Oct. 8-9-10, 2014

Demirtaş’s Kobani call: After the call issued by Demirtaş, the Kobani incidents broke out. More than 50 people died. Clashes erupted in over 35 cities. Damage costing millions of Turkish lira was done. Öcalan said, “The reconciliation process will end if Kobani falls.”

Oct. 13, 2014

Some PKK militants were identified in Tunceli while leaking into a launch base area. A clash took place.

Oct. 21, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan announced that a new phase started on Oct. 15 and tangible steps would be taken.

Oct. 25, 2014

Three undercover military officers were killed in Yüksekova.

Oct. 29, 2014

The HDP called on people to take to the streets again.

Oct. 30, 2014: In Diyarbakır, Necdet Aydoğdu, 24, a military officer, was killed by two masked assailants while he was off-duty, shopping with his wife downtown.

Nov. 24, 2014

Speaking to Fırat News Agency, Sabri Ok, a senior KCK member, remarked that there were no developments in their agenda regarding disarmament.

Dec. 20, 2014

Cemil Bayık said, “Laying down arms would mean death…”

Dec. 27, 2014

Major clashes broke out in Cizre. The bodies of four People’s Protection Units (YPG) members, who were killed in the clashes in Syria’s Kobani and Iraq’s Shingal regions, were transferred from Habur to Cizre. A confrontation between the YDG-H members, who were on duty at the tent for condolences in Nur, and some proponents of the Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR), turned into an armed conflict.

Jan. 23, 2015

A HDP delegation negotiated with Qandil. It was stated that the KCK thought the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) did not display the responsible approach required for the negotiation process.

Feb. 9, 2015

Parliamentary negotiations regarding the package known as the “domestic security package” in public, which comprises the law on police duties and authorities, the law on the gendarme institution, duties and authorities, the law on the civil registry services and the draft on altering some laws and statutory decrees, was postponed for the second time.

Feb. 15, 2015

Meeting the KCK administration in Qandil, the HDP delegation announced in a written statement that the KCK was disturbed by the Domestic Security Package and this would undermine the negotiation process.

Feb. 17, 2015

Demirtaş: “Öcalan issued a conditioned disarmament call.”

Feb. 28, 2015

Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down its arms.

March 21, 2015

Öcalan called to hold a congress to leave the armed fight: He called for the PKK to gather a congress with the aim of ending the armed conflict against Turkey in the Nevruz celebrations held in Diyarbakır on the condition of founding a truth and reconciliation commission comprising of deputies and a monitoring board.

April 11, 2015

In Ağrı, PKK members attacked military officers. Four officers were injured.

5 May 2015

Bese Hozat said, “Convening the congress is not on our agenda at the moment because the process has not worked and no step has been taken. Let alone negotiations, the dialogue process was removed. Negotiations have not been held with our leadership for a month, the delegation did not pay a visit to our leadership.”

June 7, 2015

The HDP imposed pressure on ballots in the eastern regions. Block votes were cast in hundreds of ballot boxes in villages.

June 12, 2015

After Demirtaş’s call that the PKK could lay down its arms with Öcalan’s call, the KCK announced, “We own the will of disarmament. Demirtaş or Öcalan cannot urge us to lay down our arms.”

The KCK: “We must clearly emphasize that the PKK’s will to end the armed fight against Turkey belongs completely to us. Everyone should know that the HDP is not the official party of the PKK. Consequently, the HDP does not have a right to issue such a call. Besides, it is not possible for Öcalan to issue a call in his present conditions in İmralı. Expecting the HDP and Öcalan to call for disarmament and putting pressure on that frame means the insistence on insolubility and it is not possible for our movement to recognize that. This attitude aims at neither listening to Öcalan nor blocking the HDP’s policy-making.”

June 29, 2015

Karayılan: “Let me put this clearly. If they intervene in Rojava, we will also intervene in them. Then the whole of Turkey will turn into a battlefield. The Turkish authorities should not forget the uprising of our people on Oct. 6, Oct. 7 and Oct. 8. It is well known that Öcalan, who did not approve of the great uprising of our people, was barely able to stop it. It is obvious that the people would not allow such an intervention. In brief, such a decision would be a strategic one for Turkey, and a new period would start for the Kurdish people. We will not beg to anyone on that matter. They can do whatever they want. If they attempt it, of course, we would reply to that as Kurdish people.”

July 11, 2015

KCK’s announcement on ending the cease-fire: “The cease-fire is over. The meticulous attitude of our liberation movement was exploited. The dams and vehicles used for dam constructions will be targeted by our guerilla forces. Every detainment from now on will be a reason for the reprisal of our guerillas. Our liberation movement will not accept the exploitation of the cease-fire conditions, and stands against the policies that leave the Kurdish question unresolved.”

July 12, 2015

The PKK opened fire on a minibus.

July 14 2015

KCK Co-Chair Bese Hozat wrote an article entitled “The new process: a revolutionary people’s war,” calling the conflict a revolutionary people’s war.

July 20 2015

ISIS attack in Suruç: An explosion took place in Kobani simultaneously with an explosion in Suruç. Thirty-two people were killed in the Suruç explosion.

20 July 2015

Military officer Müsellim Ünal was killed in a clash between the PKK and officers in Adıyamanç

KCK Co-Chair Cemil Bayık called on people to take up arms, dig trenches and create tunnels in their homes.

22 July 2015

Police officers Feyyaz Yumuşak and Okan Acar were shot dead in their houses in Şanlıurfa’s Ceylanpınar district.

In Adana, Kalem-Der member Ethem Türkben was killed by the PKK in front of his pregnant wife and three children.

23 July 2015

In Diyarbakır, a police squad heading to a traffic accident scene was ambushed. Polis officer Tansu Aydın was killed and one officer was injured.

24 July 2015

Turkey launched operations in northern Syria and northern Iraq.

The PKK leader calling his terrorist organization twice to leave Turkey or leave armed engagement did not find a response by the KCK and Turkey witnessed thousands of terrorists attacks during the cease-fire period that began in 2013. The HDP’s pre-election campaign to disarm the PKK has also not panned out as Demirtş said HDP is not in the position to do so.

The cease-fire and PKK’s disarmament process beginning in March 2013 with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s announcement has come to a halt several times and even almost ended owing to attacks on infrastructure, armed forces and civilians following calls on the Kurdish community by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) for street protests. In addition, the contradiction between Öcalan and the PKK leadership in northern Iraq’s Qandil Mountains has been there to be seen, carrying out bloody attacks while Öcalan called for PKK disarmament.

Over the course of the cease-fire and the PKK’s disarmament process, the government remained composed and did not take any military action even though the PKK terrorist organization carried out attacks resulting in dozens of deaths.

Having been determined to bring the three-decade unrest in the country to an end, the government has taken many steps toward improving relations through reforms. The reward for the efforts, however, has so far been contradicting remarks by the political wing of the process as well as the PKK leadership, justifying bloody attacks and threatening the government from time to time.The chronology of statements from Öcalan and top PKK leaders in the Qandil Mountains explicitly show contradictions on the organization disarming with inconsistent statements at once disclaims the declaration and encouraging an armed fight against the Turkish state.

The period starting from July 11 with the unilateral declaration of the end of cease-fire by the PKK terrorist organization has witnessed the killing of more than 40 security forces personnel. The state has exercised its right to defense and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has said it will resolutely fight until the terror across the country has ended.

Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have repeatedly indicated that Ankara has always been and continues to be in favor of carrying out the reconciliation process with the Kurdish people. For this, however, all armed factions need to leave the country for good and support along with justification for terrorist attacks needs to end.

Chronology of the period since Öcalan’s call for PKK to leave Turkey

March 21, 2013: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s Nevruz message

“A door has been opened from armed struggle to democratic struggle… We have come to a point today where guns will be silenced and thoughts and ideas shall speak. Now it is time for our armed elements to move outside [Turkey’s] borders… This is not giving up the struggle, but the launching of a different struggle…”

April 25, 2013

The PKK officially announced that it would withdraw all its armed forces to northern Iraq. Speaking at a press meeting held in Qandil, which was relayed on TV channels, Murat Karayılan announced that the PKK would recess without precondition from May 8.

May 7, 2013

Selahattin Demirtaş’s announcement on the pullout: “The pullout will officially start tomorrow. We are estimating that it will last three or four months.”

July 2, 2013

Some protests were kicked off in Diyarbakır province’s Lice district on the pretext of road works and outpost constructions. One protester died.

Sept. 9, 2013

Cemil Bayık was assigned to chair the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). The announcement issued by the KCK read, “The nine-month period without any clashes has been spent conducting some military works that cannot be performed in a state of war…”

Sept. 30, 2013

The government introduced the Democratization Package. In reply to that, the PKK organized the Patriotic Revolutionist Youth Movement (YDG-H), which acted as the PKK’s urban youth armed group. It also founded courts in cities, collected taxes and abducted people.

March 15, 2014

The KCK announced that the government was “no longer the addressee of the democratization move.”

March 21, 2014

The letter penned by Öcalan for the Nevruz celebrations: The letter was recited both in Kurdish and Turkish in Diyarbakır, by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Deputy Chair Pervin Buldan and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Istanbul Deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder respectively. Öcalan wrote, “History showed us that if we don’t lead for peace with strong will, historical problems will go their own way and most probably will produce their own answers with very big losses. There is a burning question awaiting an answer: Will we continue with replicated coups or will we prefer absolute and radical democracy?”

June 1, 2014

A delegation from the HDP met the imprisoned Öcalan on İmralı Island. In the statement issued after the meeting, it was stated that Öcalan remarked, “the most important reality is the fact that the process has come to a new phase,” adding that hopes should be kept alive to make a serious start for the resolution.

June 8, 2014

In the province of Bitlis, terrorists blocking a road opened fire on security forces with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons. A bomb attack took place in the district of Lice.

June 9, 2014

A national flag in the garden of Diyarbakır’s Second Air Force Command was taken down by a terrorist.

July 10, 2014

The “Draft Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social Integration,” which regulates the procedures and principles of the reconciliation process, passed into law after being approved at the Parliamentary Counsel.

Aug. 5, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan said, “The 30-year-old war is about to end with a great democratic negotiation. The democratic negotiation process has a profound meaning in a historical and societal sense…”

Aug. 19, 2014

A statue of PKK member Mahsuni Korkmaz was erected in Lice. The court issued a decision to demolish the statue. Clashes broke out, one was killed.

Aug. 20, 2014

In Diyarbakır, a group of terrorists organized an attack on an outpost.

Aug. 24, 2014

Terrorists attacked a thermal plant located in Silopi district’s Görümlü neighborhood with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons.

Sept. 18, 2014

The HDP issued a call to boycott schools on the pretext of education in their mother tongue. Dozens of schools were set ablaze in many provinces.

Sept. 22 2014

HDP deputy Aysel Tuğluk threw stones at military officers when police and military officers blocked the crowd heading to Kobani.

Oct. 3, 2014

In Tunceli province’s Pülümür district, some PKK militants attacked an outpost.

Oct. 8-9-10, 2014

Demirtaş’s Kobani call: After the call issued by Demirtaş, the Kobani incidents broke out. More than 50 people died. Clashes erupted in over 35 cities. Damage costing millions of Turkish lira was done. Öcalan said, “The reconciliation process will end if Kobani falls.”

Oct. 13, 2014

Some PKK militants were identified in Tunceli while leaking into a launch base area. A clash took place.

Oct. 21, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan announced that a new phase started on Oct. 15 and tangible steps would be taken.

Oct. 25, 2014

Three undercover military officers were killed in Yüksekova.

Oct. 29, 2014

The HDP called on people to take to the streets again.

Oct. 30, 2014: In Diyarbakır, Necdet Aydoğdu, 24, a military officer, was killed by two masked assailants while he was off-duty, shopping with his wife downtown.

Nov. 24, 2014

Speaking to Fırat News Agency, Sabri Ok, a senior KCK member, remarked that there were no developments in their agenda regarding disarmament.

Dec. 20, 2014

Cemil Bayık said, “Laying down arms would mean death…”

Dec. 27, 2014

Major clashes broke out in Cizre. The bodies of four People’s Protection Units (YPG) members, who were killed in the clashes in Syria’s Kobani and Iraq’s Shingal regions, were transferred from Habur to Cizre. A confrontation between the YDG-H members, who were on duty at the tent for condolences in Nur, and some proponents of the Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR), turned into an armed conflict.

Jan. 23, 2015

A HDP delegation negotiated with Qandil. It was stated that the KCK thought the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) did not display the responsible approach required for the negotiation process.

Feb. 9, 2015

Parliamentary negotiations regarding the package known as the “domestic security package” in public, which comprises the law on police duties and authorities, the law on the gendarme institution, duties and authorities, the law on the civil registry services and the draft on altering some laws and statutory decrees, was postponed for the second time.

Feb. 15, 2015

Meeting the KCK administration in Qandil, the HDP delegation announced in a written statement that the KCK was disturbed by the Domestic Security Package and this would undermine the negotiation process.

Feb. 17, 2015

Demirtaş: “Öcalan issued a conditioned disarmament call.”

Feb. 28, 2015

Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down its arms.

March 21, 2015

Öcalan called to hold a congress to leave the armed fight: He called for the PKK to gather a congress with the aim of ending the armed conflict against Turkey in the Nevruz celebrations held in Diyarbakır on the condition of founding a truth and reconciliation commission comprising of deputies and a monitoring board.

April 11, 2015

In Ağrı, PKK members attacked military officers. Four officers were injured.

5 May 2015

Bese Hozat said, “Convening the congress is not on our agenda at the moment because the process has not worked and no step has been taken. Let alone negotiations, the dialogue process was removed. Negotiations have not been held with our leadership for a month, the delegation did not pay a visit to our leadership.”

June 7, 2015

The HDP imposed pressure on ballots in the eastern regions. Block votes were cast in hundreds of ballot boxes in villages.

June 12, 2015

After Demirtaş’s call that the PKK could lay down its arms with Öcalan’s call, the KCK announced, “We own the will of disarmament. Demirtaş or Öcalan cannot urge us to lay down our arms.”

The KCK: “We must clearly emphasize that the PKK’s will to end the armed fight against Turkey belongs completely to us. Everyone should know that the HDP is not the official party of the PKK. Consequently, the HDP does not have a right to issue such a call. Besides, it is not possible for Öcalan to issue a call in his present conditions in İmralı. Expecting the HDP and Öcalan to call for disarmament and putting pressure on that frame means the insistence on insolubility and it is not possible for our movement to recognize that. This attitude aims at neither listening to Öcalan nor blocking the HDP’s policy-making.”

June 29, 2015

Karayılan: “Let me put this clearly. If they intervene in Rojava, we will also intervene in them. Then the whole of Turkey will turn into a battlefield. The Turkish authorities should not forget the uprising of our people on Oct. 6, Oct. 7 and Oct. 8. It is well known that Öcalan, who did not approve of the great uprising of our people, was barely able to stop it. It is obvious that the people would not allow such an intervention. In brief, such a decision would be a strategic one for Turkey, and a new period would start for the Kurdish people. We will not beg to anyone on that matter. They can do whatever they want. If they attempt it, of course, we would reply to that as Kurdish people.”

July 11, 2015

KCK’s announcement on ending the cease-fire: “The cease-fire is over. The meticulous attitude of our liberation movement was exploited. The dams and vehicles used for dam constructions will be targeted by our guerilla forces. Every detainment from now on will be a reason for the reprisal of our guerillas. Our liberation movement will not accept the exploitation of the cease-fire conditions, and stands against the policies that leave the Kurdish question unresolved.”

July 12, 2015

The PKK opened fire on a minibus.

July 14 2015

KCK Co-Chair Bese Hozat wrote an article entitled “The new process: a revolutionary people’s war,” calling the conflict a revolutionary people’s war.

July 20 2015

ISIS attack in Suruç: An explosion took place in Kobani simultaneously with an explosion in Suruç. Thirty-two people were killed in the Suruç explosion.

20 July 2015

Military officer Müsellim Ünal was killed in a clash between the PKK and officers in Adıyamanç

KCK Co-Chair Cemil Bayık called on people to take up arms, dig trenches and create tunnels in their homes.

22 July 2015

Police officers Feyyaz Yumuşak and Okan Acar were shot dead in their houses in Şanlıurfa’s Ceylanpınar district.

In Adana, Kalem-Der member Ethem Türkben was killed by the PKK in front of his pregnant wife and three children.

23 July 2015

In Diyarbakır, a police squad heading to a traffic accident scene was ambushed. Polis officer Tansu Aydın was killed and one officer was injured.

24 July 2015

Turkey launched operations in northern Syria and northern Iraq.