The Egyptian Perspective on Normalization

Riyadh wishes to bring Turkey and Egypt back to the table in order to form a strong coalition.

Firstly, Egypt’s relations with Saudi Arabia are an important factor. Riyadh was one of the staunchest supporters of the military coup in Egypt in 2013. Following the coup, the Saudi government provided significant financial assistance to the Sisi regime, enabling it to successfully manage the post-coup period. Despite the change in Saudi leadership in the beginning of 2015, Cairo-Riyadh relations have continued as usual. Saudi Arabia considers Egypt an irreplaceable ally in its struggle against Iran. In the same line, Riyadh also considers Turkey a crucial actor in balancing the expansion of Iran’s influence in the region. Because of that, Riyadh wishes to bring Turkey and Egypt back to the table in order to form a strong coalition.

A recent effort at reconciliation was made just before the summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul in April 2016. King Salman made a 5-day visit to Egypt where observers suspect he may have advised the Sisi regime to normalize its relations with Turkey. Notably, the Egyptian Foreign Minister came to the opening ceremony of the Summit in Istanbul, in the highest level visit between two countries since 2013.

Egypt is aware that Turkey is an important partner in economic relations. Egypt is home to a number of investments by Turkish entrepreneurs, and trade between the two countries has increased significantly since 2011. It is in Egypt’s best interest for Turkish companies to continue their investments in the country and create new job opportunities for Egyptians. Additionally, it should be remembered that Turkey is ever seeking to diversify its energy imports, and considers Egypt as an alternative source. Ankara is a potential buyer of Egyptian natural gas which can be piped across the Mediterranean.

Importantly, the Egyptian public is not comfortable with the political stance of the Sisi government toward Turkey. This is mainly because of the positive perception of Turkey in the Egyptian public view. Particularly in recent years, thanks to Turkish TV series and cultural activities, Egyptians perceive Turkey as a friendly nation. Turkey opened the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centre in Cairo and Alexandria, attracting thousands of Egyptian youth for Turkish classes and cultural events. Tourist exchange between two countries had increased significantly, particularly between 2011 and 2013. Considering this background, it is obvious that the Sisi regime provokes more discontent from its public by continuing its alienation from Turkey.

Why Would Turkey Change its Position?

The main motivation behind the Turkish government’s position toward Egypt was the undemocratic nature of the military takeover.

Turkish government has been one of the staunchest opponents of the military coup in Egypt. It strongly opposed the toppling of President Mohammad Morsi, who won the overwhelming majority of votes in the 2012 elections. Ankara has openly criticized the Sisi regime and has allowed persecuted Muslim Brotherhood members to relocate from Egypt to Turkey. The main motivation behind the Turkish government’s position toward Egypt was the undemocratic nature of the military takeover. Since 2013, Turkey has made every effort to undermine the military regime in Egypt. However, the political support of the Western countries and the financial assistance of the Gulf States have allowed Sisi to keep his regime alive. Ankara has realized that it would be very difficult, under the present circumstances, to go back to democratic rule in Egypt. Given these stark realities, Turkey may have to reconsider its politics toward this country for several reasons.

The first reason is the Saudi Arabia factor. Riyadh is one of Turkey’s most important allies in some of Ankara’s foreign policy actions, particularly in Syria and Iraq, and more broadly in its competition with Iran. Riyadh also serves as an important economic partner with huge stocks of natural resources. Therefore, both countries would prefer Egypt not to be an obstacle in their bilateral relations. As Ankara and Riyadh seek to deepen their relations with each other, they are aware of the fact that any differences in their foreign policy priorities should be minimized. This does not mean that both countries will have unanimous foreign policies. However, it should be mentioned that despite their differences, an alliance between Ankara and Riyadh has serious potential to play an important role in Middle East politics. Therefore, it would benefit Turkey to normalize its relations with Egypt, as a means of advancing its cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and wielding greater influence in the region.

An alliance between Ankara and Riyadh has serious potential to play an important role in Middle East politics.

Secondly, in recent months Ankara has confronted a number of foreign policy crises, particularly with the most important actors in the region, namely the US and Russia. Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet in November 2015 led to a serious crisis between Ankara and Moscow. And Turkey’s criticism of US support to the PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization, created tension between the two countries. In addition to these crises, Turkey has also been confronting Iran’s expansionist policies and hostilities by the UAE government.

Bearing these crises in mind, Turkey is considering new initiatives in its foreign policies. It has been continuing its normalization process with Israel and aims to calm things down with the UAE leadership. In this vein, the recent visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Abu Dhabi can be interpreted as a timely move. It would be also an important step for Turkey to normalize its relations with Egypt. This would allow Ankara to ameliorate its relations with the governments of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the main supporters of the Sisi regime.

Such a rapprochement could help thousands of illegally imprisoned Muslim Brotherhood members, if Turkey were to advocate for their release.

Maybe the most important factor in favor of Turkey’s normalization of relations with Egypt involves the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Normalization could have serious potential for the group’s survival by releasing the pressure imposed on it by the Sisi regime. Turkey could utilize its normalization initiative with Egypt to encourage the Sisi regime to loosen its pressure on the movement. In exchange for normalizing relations, Ankara could stipulate the release of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership from prison. Such a rapprochement could also help thousands of illegally imprisoned Muslim Brotherhood members, if Turkey were to advocate for their release.

In order to overcome Egypt’s political crisis, the Sisi regime has been looking for a solution, particularly in its foreign policy. Normalizing relations with Turkey would be an important tool for Sisi to help ensure his regime’s survival. On the other hand, Turkey also may be better able to help Egypt in the long run by normalizing relations with the country. Normalizing relations would also give Turkey the chance to continue contributing to Egypt’s democratization efforts by serving as a successful model. It should be remembered that whatever steps Turkey may take in this regard would not be motivated by support for the military regime, but rather in the interest of giving Egyptians a light of hope for their future.

The debate surrounding relations between Turkey and Egypt is on the rise largely because of a series of political maneuverings and actions that have taken place in the last few weeks.

International society remained deaf and dumb in the wake of the coup. The countries that were expected to put pressure on the instigators of the coup—the USA, Saudi Arabia, and other western powers—acted in the exact opposite manner, actually being supportive of these actions. The USA interpreted the coup as a “political restoration”, while Saudi Arabia moved forward with Sisi against the Brotherhood and financed the Sisi regime alongside the UAE. Western Powers considered the coup in terms of costs and benefits and came to the conclusion that they benefited from the Sisi regime by selling it military equipment as well as by the possibility of gaining investment privileges in Egypt. The strongest reaction against the coup came from the Turkish government and public. Turkey’s position is quite understandable, considering the AK Party’s experiences in its struggle against military tutelage in the political arena. Alongside this, Turkey has been engaged in a crucial opening up to the Arab public since 2002 and has established a positive image in the eyes of the Arab people.

Is Saudi Arabia a Game Changer?

After King Salman’s enthronement in January 2015, various changes were observed in Saudi Arabia’s politics. King Salman’s new strategy was not through personal choice—it was rather based on necessity due to the changed landscape of regional politics. In these new circumstances, Iran’s expansion in the Middle East after the ‘Arab Spring’ had become Saudi Arabia’s priority. In this context, Salman attempted to consolidate the Gulf powers and to regulate his relations with Egypt and Turkey against the Iranian “threat”. Although there was some tension between Sisi and Salman at the start of the King‘s tenure, Salman’s latest visit to Egypt proved that the country is still a potential ally for Saudi Arabia. During this encounter, Salman made particular efforts to moderate the tensions between Turkey and Egypt for the establishment of a stronger coalition.

King Salman made particular efforts to moderate the tensions between Turkey and Egypt for the establishment of a stronger coalition.

There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia is one of the core countries in the region and the presumed leader of the Gulf. In this configuration, Egypt has been an irreplaceable country for Saudi Arabia, especially because of its army. On the other hand, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have gradually become closer since Salman came to power in January 2015. The expectation for moderation between Turkey and Egypt stems from King Salman’s encouraging initiatives. But the question here is, can Saudi Arabia create a bandwagon effect in the region? More particularly, does the King have enough influence to pressure Turkey and Egypt for rapprochement? Before answering this question, we need to look at current Turkish and Egyptian positions.

Political crises and economic deterioration have become routine in Egypt since the military coup, and Sisi has to seek new options. Normalizing its relations with Turkey will help Egypt not only in economic development but also in the normalization of its politics. However, there are several factors that do not allow for optimism about the occurrence of this scenario. Firstly, although Sisi has visited many countries since coming to power, he has not visited Turkey, nor does he appear to consider Turkey a partner in political or economic issues. Not only that, he has accused Turkey of interfering in Egypt’s domestic politics by hosting Brotherhood members. Secondly, Sisi remains unwilling to normalize his relations with Turkey. The Egyptian Foreign Minister’s visit to Turkey during the Organization of Islamic Cooperation summit last month was an indicator of Sisi’s position—the minister only stayed for a couple of hours in Turkey, and left without conducting any diplomatic meetings with his counterpart.

The Egyptian Foreign Minister’s visit to Turkey during the OIC summit last month was an indicator of Sisi’s position—the minister only stayed for a couple of hours in Turkey.

To reiterate, Turkey’s reaction to Sisi was due to the military coup as well as the bloody and suppressive methods used against opposition groups by him. Today, there is no significant development in these conditions to convince Turkey to change its position. There are two main factors that can lead to a change in Ankara’s position towards Cairo. First, the Sisi regime must stop violating the rights of the opposition groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. There is no doubt that the restraining of the Sisi regime and relations normalizing with Turkey are two interrelated factors. The debate here is which factor is the condition and which the outcome, producing a vicious cycle that is not easily broken. Any initiative for rapprochement from Turkey can be a step for Sisi’s survival; however, any initiative from Sisi can force him towards more extensive opening up in Egyptian politics. When considering that Sisi’s priority is to maintain his position of power, it is hard to remain optimistic that such a scenario will materialise. Secondly, because the outcomes of the ‘Arab Spring’ have proven to be significantly costly, Turkey has begun seeking new foreign policy options. But it is not easy to say that Egypt can play a part in becoming the first step for a fresh start.

To go back to the question of Saudi Arabia’s effect on the moderation of relations between Egypt and Turkey—one may argue that Saudi Arabia can make a contribution for the rapprochement of both countries. Iran’s expansion, however, forces Saudi Arabia into a stronger coalition that may include Egypt and Turkey, which could cause the Saudis to lose interest in facilitating a normalization between the two countries and to focus more on bilateral relations with both, thus lessening its contribution to this possible moderation. Firstly, that Egypt and Turkey have tense relations is not a key issue in terms of Saudi-Turkish cooperation. Secondly, and more importantly, it is in Turkey’s interest to be cautious of the growing polarization between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and to maintain a development of its own relations with Iran to the extent it does with Saudi Arabia.