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amas’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, as the name suggests, was motivated by a central focus on the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Israeli aggression against the holy sites. The aim of the operation is to put an end to the 15-year blockade of Gaza and the related status quo in the Palestinian arena. It can be said that Hamas has achieved this goal at a tactical level in a short period of time. This operation has shaken global public opinion and forced it to take a position.

Although the operation carried out by Hamas’s armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has been hyperbolically described as “Israel’s 9/11,” it would be more accurate to characterize the al-Aqsa Flood as a successful deception operation in which Hamas skillfully managed to conceal its military plans by convincing Israel that it no longer wanted war.

Hamas meticulously continued its preparations for this operation while Israel, with an unexpected naiveté, thought that it was keeping Hamas under its control. It has even been claimed that during the preparation process, Hamas deliberately reduced the tempo and frequency of its actions against Israel. Military experts have claimed that the operation was the most surprising attack since the Yom Kippur War with some describing it as an unprecedented intelligence maneuver.

Why was Israel taken by surprise?

The timing of the operation, which coincided with the Sabbath, the Jewish day of worship and rest, created a shock factor that made it difficult for the Israeli forces to react immediately. Moreover, infiltration from multiple points (air, land, and sea) took the Israeli defense by surprise.

Hamas decided on the details of the operation with a very limited group of people in order to prevent leaks from within its ranks. Some analyses have also pointed out that recently Israel shifted its focus on the steps to be taken to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia and away from Hamas.

An analysis of the tactical phases of the operation reveals that as the rockets launched from Gaza caused surprise, infiltrations were carried out with motorized parachutes and hang gliders in the shadow of the rockets. The initial infiltrating elements and elite units of Hamas were seen fortifying area control and security which facilitated attacks on the concrete barriers reinforced with electronic systems. This allowed buldozers, motorcycles, and land vehicles to breach the barrier system, enabling more elements to infiltrate.

Drones carrying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) disabled the electro-optical systems of the Israeli watchtowers. At the same time, the communication line with the Israeli army headquarters was disrupted, limiting the ability to respond to the attack immediately.

The kidnapping of Israeli prisoners into Gaza will provide Hamas with political leverage to increase its bargaining power in future prisoners’ exchange.

Finally, it is argued that the Israeli army made a strategic mistake in deploying its troops mainly in the West Bank, which was one of the factors that facilitated the execution of this operation.

All facts on the ground in Palestine today speak of one reality: the Palestinian Authority (PA), which was created by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), has practically swallowed up its umbrella organization, making it increasingly insignificant despite claims by PA officials that the PLO is still the sole representatives of the Palestinian people.

The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is headed by Mahmoud Abbas, 86, and consists of 141 members, who are supposed to represent all Palestinian parties and bodies in the organization, including grassroots groups. On February 8, 2022, the committee voted to appoint Rawhi Fattouh, 73, the former speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), as a member of the PLO’s Executive Committee and the new chairman of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the legislative body of the PLO, replacing Salim Zanoun, 88, who had been serving as its chairman since 1993.

It also voted to appoint Hussein Al-Sheikh, the head of the General Authority of Civil Affairs of the Palestinian Authority (PA), as a new member of the Executive Committee, replacing the top Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, who was the secretary general of the PLO’s Executive Committee until his death by COVID19 in 2020.

New Appointments, Old Policy

The appointments of Fattouh and Al-Sheikh were met by protests from smaller PLO parties such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), two political parties with insignificant political representation in the Palestinian Legislative Council. The council’s most recent elections were held in 2006, and it was later dissolved by Abbas on December 22, 2018.

Other Palestinian political parties, which have a political representation similar or stronger than that of Fatah, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are not part of the PLO. For years, talks to include them have failed to materialize into an agreement because, partially, they both refuse to recognize Israel – as opposed to the PLO which did so in 1993.

Fatah rejected the PFLP and DFLP’s criticisms of appointing Al-Sheikh and Fattouh, noting that it has the majority in the Central Committee. This is true but is only so because other parties did not join in the election yet. Hamas won 76 out of 120 seats in the PLC election in 2006 while Islamic Jihad refused to run as it considered the election part of the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel, which it refuses. In the Oslo Accords, the PLO recognized Israel as a state and Israel recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

Later it was revealed that Abbas issued a decree that declared the institutions of the PLO, the umbrella organization of the PA, as institutions of the PA. This caused much outrage on Palestinian streets, pushing Abbas to reverse the decision, according to Wasil Abu Yousef, a member of the Executive Committee, who stressed the need to keep the PLO’s institutions independent of the PA.

Israel’s Army Minister Benny Gantz: “Palestinians in the future will have an entity not a state.”

Meanwhile, Israel’s Army Minister Benny Gantz told the Munich Security Conference on February 20, 2022, that Palestinians in the future will have an entity not a state, and this entity should respect what he called the “security needs of Israel.” He added, “Eventually we will find ourselves in a two-entity solution, in which we respect Palestinian sovereignty and governance, but we will be respected for our security needs.”

The majority of the world, all Palestinians, and many Israelis know that a Palestinian state, which the PLO created the PA to prepare Palestinians for, will not see the light anytime soon – if at all. What we have today on the ground is a Palestinian entity, which does not represent all Palestinians, both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and which has practically swallowed up the PLO, its own umbrella organization.

The Way Out?

Palestinians today rarely hear of the PLO and its institutions, and the younger generation has little idea about its structures, roles, and bodies. In light of the PLO not including other major parties, for many Palestinians – although some still view the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people – it is an inactive body which is only brought and pushed to the agenda when the PA needs it for the sake of galvanizing legitimacy.

The PA gaining legitimacy from the PLO included inviting the PNC to be held in Gaza in 1996 after nearly five years (it had last been held in 1991), and after abrupt sessions over the 1970s and 1980s. The goal was to nullify important articles in the PNC’s charter to make it consistent with the Oslo Accords, such as recognizing Israel and denouncing violence. Since then, the PNA was held in 2009 and 2018, but was boycotted by the major Palestinian parties with the exception of Fatah.

The question is what is the point behind sticking to Oslo, which has made Palestinians more divided and has deprived Palestinians both in Palestine and the diaspora of representation? More so, this entity has failed to prepare Palestinians for statehood and has practically swallowed up the PLO, its own umbrella organization. This is especially true in light of repeated Israeli statements that there will be no Palestinian state.

The PA and the PLO, having a blurry relationship. to the extent that it not possible to distinguish the two bodies, might indirectly push other Palestinian parties, including critical voices within Fatah itself, to take actions to ‘reclaim’ representation, which will only leave the Palestinians move divided. The PLO, the sole representative of the Palestinian people, should take moves to reform the organization especially in light of Israel’s insistence not to grant the Palestinians a state of their own.

In what seemed a surprising move, the Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on January 15, announcing that general elections will take place in Palestine this year. The elections, which are the first of their kind in 15 years, will be held on three phases: Palestinian Legislative Elections (PLC) on May 22, 2021; presidential elections on July 31, 2021; and Palestinian National Council (PNC) elections on August 31, 2021.

The move was welcomed by Hamas, Abbas’s main rival. It was a surprise for many Palestinians who have witnessed Palestinian reconciliation talks taking place over the last 14 years in several capitals, including most recently in Istanbul and Cairo, with no tangible results.

The election decree by the PA president raised many questions in terms of its timing and practicality. Is it possible to hold elections in a Palestine under occupation, including Jerusalem, without ending the Palestinian national rift? The answer is “yes” according to the decree, but this plan will likely face many challenges on the ground.

Will Israel Allow Elections in Jerusalem?

Israel, which won a long-awaited U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over Jerusalem, will most likely decline the PA’s request to hold the election there. Israel approved the Palestinian elections in Jerusalem in 2006 under U.S. pressure, which will not be the case this time. In 2006, the U.S. plan was to include Hamas in the political process in an attempt to tame it, which proved unsuccessful – to the contrary, Hamas has grown more stubborn over the years.

The Palestinian elections this year, unlike 2006, will be held according to the list proportional representation system, where voters will choose whole lists of political parties rather than individual candidates in specific electoral districts.

In 2006, the voting system was 50% candidate-based and 50% proportional representation. The reason why both Hamas and Fatah agreed to this system is because it reinforces partisan politics, where the electorate votes for a specific political party, rather than candidates, who might be independent or from the other party.

Hamas is worried it might lose many of the votes it won in 2006 in Gaza, and Fatah is equally worried it might lose many of the votes it won in 2006 in the West Bank.

This system was in favor of Hamas in 2006, where Hamas won nearly 45.4% of the party list votes, and 69.7% of the candidate lists. Hamas is worried it might lose many of the votes it won in 2006 in Gaza, and Fatah is equally worried it might lose many of the votes it won in 2006 in the West Bank. The full proportional representation system is the way out for both groups.

Irony and Obstacles

There have been speculations that both parties, Hamas and Fatah, might run for the election in a single united list. Although it sounds ironic, considering the division and the history of hostility between the two parties, this reveals how they view this election: it is all about managing the division rather than ending it.

Another challenge to these Palestinian elections is how both parties, and other smaller parties, will ensure that the losing party accepts the results of the election. In fact, there is no guarantee that the elections will not be forged considering the environment of security repression which has resulted from 15 years of rift politics where security forces have always had the final say and the upper hand in domestic politics.

The proportional representation system also aims to crush smaller political parties and groups that will not be able to get enough votes to pass the election threshold easily. This translates into reproducing the division and reinforcing Hamas and Fatah as the only political parties in charge of Palestinian politics.

Other smaller political parties, both from the left and right, along with many Palestinians, especially the younger generation, will choose not to vote. Today, many Palestinians no longer believe that their votes in an election under occupation and without solving the political split will matter.

What is the value of an election under occupation? Elections are meant to choose representatives of a system that is supposed to have sovereignty over a territory.

They know too well that their votes will not improve their living conditions and that major political parties have long decided to adapt to division rather than solve it.

Elections or Liberation?

In the first place, what is the value of an election under occupation? Elections are meant to choose representatives of a system that is supposed to have sovereignty over a territory. Palestinians don’t have any sovereignty over their land and resources, and without an Israeli permit, the head of the Palestinian Authority can’t move in and out of the West Bank.

In other words, Palestinians need to focus on liberation and independence rather than having a pseudo-state under occupation that only serves as an excuse for Israel, the occupying power according to international law, to abandon its responsibilities towards the Palestinians. The titles of presidents and members of parliament in the Palestinian context do not count, nor do they make any sense under occupation.

The Abbas decree noted that the Palestinian National Council (PNC) elections, which matter the most, will be held “where possible.” This vaguely worded statement means that the PNC elections, which are supposed to include Palestinians of the diaspora, could be held in a limited number of countries, depending on whether the host countries will allow the elections or not.

An election that does not fully include the Palestinian diaspora is a vote over self-autonomy under occupation. Wasting too much time thinking about statehood under occupation will not serve the Palestinians, and today, what Palestinians need the most is a unified approach to end the Israeli military occupation and a call for full equality.

What Palestinians Need to Do

In fact, calling for equal votes with Jewish-Israelis under the system Israel established between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River would be more pragmatic for the Palestinians than holding elections most probably without Jerusalem and some areas of the West Bank.

This is especially true in light of the current reality of military occupation, which Israeli human rights group B’Tselem described recently as apartheid (whisper: Palestinians have been saying this for a long time). In other words, Palestinians need to address the roots of their reality today, rather than looking for elections that will only serve to reinforce division and give the false impression that they have a sort of statehood and sovereignty under occupation.

The Palestinian elections might take place as planned in May 2021, but a large number of Palestinians will boycott them and a larger number will not be represented in them. Elections that do not include Jerusalem and much of the Palestinian diaspora sound more like municipal elections of self-autonomy under occupation.

Such elections will only deepen the divide among the Palestinians and falsely proclaim before the world that Palestinians have a state and can hold free and fair elections. The only thing that Palestinians have today is Israeli military occupation and any attempt to bypass this truth is misleading.