Minister of Justice, Abdulhamit Gül announced on Friday that Turkey had requested the extradition of 419 FETO (Fetullah Terrorist Organization) affiliated fugitives, members of the pseudo-religious cult which plotted the coup attempt of July 15, from various countries.

In an interview with Anadolu Agency, the minister noted that: “The extradition of 419 FETO leaders and members have been requested from foreign countries to date”. Adding that “red notice requests” had been issued for affiliates of the group who couldn’t be tracked down, Gul noted that there were FETO affiliates whose whereabouts were still unclear. Underscoring that the requests for extradition were issued after thorough investigation into the terroristic cult by the Turkish courts, Gul noted that these requests were conveyed via the Ministry of Justice to the respective countries that the fugitives escaped to or sought political protection in.

The threat that FETO poses is still underestimated by many countries. With a global network operating in over 160 countries, a net worth of 50 billion USD as of 2008, selflessly obedient followers who can give up anything and commit the most horrendous crimes on the command of their leader Fetullah Gulen, and a gruesome track record of devising a deadly coup across Turkey, martyring over 250 civilians and injuring over 2200 individuals in July 15, 2016. Turkey charges the organization with plotting to overthrow the state through an insidious decades-long infiltration into many state apparatuses spanning the military, judiciary as well as many strategic governmental organizations.

Minister Gul underlined that Turkey had reiterated its request for the extradition of the head of the cult, Fetullah Gulen, 7 times to the United States. Highlighting that the extradition requests were in line with the law of extradition and ample evidence and relevant documentation was submitted to the authorities, the Minister added that fresh evidence was shared with renewed requests.

The discrepancy between the judicial systems of the two countries is called to question as Turkey recently released Pastor Brunson after he went through a fair trial, whereas a leader that asks its followers to execute civilians -let alone being put to trial- is living merrily under state protection of the United States. Hopeful of the availing of justice, Justice Minister Abdulhamit concluded: “Our extradition requests are still held in the U.S. Department of Justice. At this point, our expectation is the initiation of a judicial process for extradition as soon as possible”

In the first year of President Trump’s tenure, Turkish-American relations went through what we can call a period of “sizing up,” as hopes for a new beginning were somewhat moderated by strategic challenges. The Trump administration had inherited the Obama policy of supporting “local forces” (read YPG) against Daesh with no U.S. boots on the ground save for the “military advisors.” Turkey was patient in Trump’s first year to allow the administration some time to re-evaluate the mission and start working with Turkey instead of the PKK’s Syrian branch. When it became clear that the Trump administration would settle on the same policy, Turkey launched a military operation in Afrin to ensure the YPG forces would not go west of the Euphrates river.

The serious divergence on the ground in northern Syria has continued, but efforts to put the U.S.-Turkey relationship back on track also continued, as outstanding legal cases (Brunson and Zarrab cases) were compartmentalized away from broader policy questions. However, the pressure from the Evangelical base of the Trump administration led to an ill-timed ultimatum by President Trump and Vice President Pence, resulting in yet another bilateral crisis.

As a result of the pressure, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Turkish ministers and additional steel and aluminum tariffs, a first against a NATO ally. These measures appeared to be largely symbolic, but they had a serious impact on the Turkish Lira’s devaluation against the U.S. dollar. As Turkey refused to bow down to such economic pressures, the relationship came to the brink of total breakdown. Clearly, the Brunson case was a major catalyzer in this process, but the underlying strategic disagreements and the already existing mutual distrust has created a fertile ground for a major crisis.

With the Turkish courts deciding to release Pastor Brunson last week, however, an important new phase might just be starting in the bilateral relationship. Brunson’s return to the U.S. and President Trump’s hosting of the pastor in the oval office with high level administration officials sends a strong message to the Evangelical base ahead of the midterm elections in November.

Not that Trump risked losing the support of the Evangelicals, but Brunson’s return gives his standing with Evangelical supporters a big boost. Turkish leadership has maintained the legal process played itself out and both sides insisted there was no specific deal. We should note that there does not need to be a deal for this development to have a positive impact on the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

The fact that a legal case derailed the relationship between two NATO allies should give everyone a pause. It underscores the complexity of the strategic environment in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood and heightened security concerns Turkey feels as a result of U.S. policies in the region. President Trump’s positive remarks about Turkey reflect his concern over his standing with the Evangelical voters, but this will not be enough for a broader strategic conversation between the U.S. and Turkey.

The recent changes in the U.S. Syria policy have given at least a limited amount of reassurances to Turkey that its interests would be taken into consideration more carefully. The U.S. rhetorical support for Turkey against an imminent military operation against Idlib was a welcome development in this sense. Yet, without a more comprehensive policy coordination between two sides, the mutual skepticism will continue, especially as the U.S. continues to support the YPG.

The upside for the relationship is that the “sizing up” period may be over and both sides are much clearer about their positions. The ambiguities regarding northern Syria as well as the uncertain fate of the Brunson case are no longer excuses for the lack of an honest dialogue. The regional crises will almost certainly create new challenges and the U.S.-Turkey ties will be tried. The lesson from the Brunson case is that Turkey will not bow to threats and pressures, and that the U.S. will need to pursue diplomatic options instead. Going forward, a talk-first-shoot-later approach will have to win for a healthier U.S.-Turkey relationship.

Nowadays, Turkey’s political agenda is full with international issues. The new term in Turkey-U.S. relations after the release of Pastor Brunson has become a matter of curiosity in the last couple of days. Moreover, the missing Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, seems to have shifted the U.S. approach against Saudi Arabia and thus will affect the current dynamics in the Middle East.

Under this ambiguous environment, Turkey’s domestic agenda and the upcoming local elections have become of secondary importance for the public. Nonetheless, political parties have already began to concentrate on their possible strategies in the local elections.

As part of their preparations for local elections, Turkey’s political parties held consultation and evaluation meetings in order to draw a road map. All parties had an idea on the possibilities and limitations in choosing the right candidate. The governing AK Party, for instance, underlined that the upcoming elections would be a turning point for Turkey’s future and it was an obligation to increase both the vote rate and the number of mayors in order to successfully implement the new presidential system. Party officials and members contributed to the ongoing discussions on possible electoral strategies in accordance with this purpose.

One of the major issues that will determine electoral strategy is whether the AK Party and the MHP will form an alliance in order to maximize their benefits. Since the unofficial meetings between the two parties have just started, it is still not possible to clarify this issue. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that both parties pay a significant attention to forming an alliance and are trying to form a consensus on possible ways of achieving this. It seems that the further details of this issue will surface in the following days.

On the other hand, preparation meetings held by the MHP and the Iyi Party revealed the increasing tension between these two parties. Even though both parties have had hot discussions since the June 24 elections, the degree of discussions altered in the last days. The Iyi Party blamed the MHP for betraying nationalist ideals by forming an alliance with the AK Party.

Since the Iyi Party faced serious existential crises after the June 24 elections and was about to collapse, it is now trying to find a new identity and purpose for existence. In accordance with this aim, the party is working to develop a nationalistic stance instead of its catch-all approach, which failed in the previous elections.

The main opposition party, the CHP, has also been discussing possible election strategies. During the meetings held, party officials criticized the party’s current discourse on being so elitist and left-wing oriented. The solution proposed for this problem was to adopt rightist and populist discourse in the upcoming local elections in order to change the image of the party.

At this point, the CHP faces a serious dilemma in deciding whether or not to form an alliance with the Iyi Party and the HDP. Due to the fact that the Nation Alliance failed in the last elections, the party is hesitant to cooperate with these parties. While an intra-party group is working hard to convince the sides to form an alliance with the HDP, some party officials are wary of this and are aware of the risks.

However, the supporting group sees this as the only way of achieving success in the local elections. The more nationalist wing of the party wants to form an alliance with the Iyi Party, especially in Ankara and some provinces in the Mediterranean and Aegean.

Even if consultation and evaluation meetings were a stage for drawing a road map for the local elections, political parties still need more time to finalize their strategies. Due to this, parties are expected to focus more on domestic policy in the upcoming days.

The past week in Turkey’s foreign affairs agenda was quite busy. The disappearance of Washington Post opinion columnist Jamal Khashoggi topped this. After entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, the Saudi journalist mysteriously disappeared. The Turkish authorities showed the footage of his entrance to the consulate but he simply did not come out, at least, in the way he was expected to. The Saudi side claims that Khashoggi left the consular building but they cannot provide evidence because their cameras were not recording that day according to their statement.

The Turkish side on the other hand shows the footage of Khashoggi’s entry as well as a well documented story of a 15-man team of Saudi officers (including special forces and intelligence officers) who flew in Istanbul with two private jets and left hours after, allegedly, after “handling” the Khashoggi case. As the Saudi squad left the consular building, Khashoggi’s fiancée was still waiting for him outside the consulate.

The second matter with respect to Turkey’s foreign affairs agenda came a week after Khashoggi’s disappearance. Andrew Brunson, an American pastor living in Turkey and on trial for alleged espionage with links to the Gulenist terror network, was released by the Turkish court on Friday, 12 October. His arrest for almost 2 years and following house arrest for the following 2 months was a major issue deepening the crisis between Turkey and the U.S. (Here is an earlier assessment of the matter).

The third major event with regard to Turkey’s foreign affairs agenda came out from President Erdogan’s statements regarding a possible incursion into the Northern Syrian city of Manbij. During his speech in Isparta on Friday, 12 October, Erdogan touched upon the recent news on the trenches being dug by the PYD/SDF in Manbij against a possible Turkish offensive. Erdogan gave a clear message in his speech and said that “we will enter there too.”

While an offensive does not seem imminent, it is well-known that Erdogan is pretty straightforward when it comes to Turkish military incursions. We saw similar remarks by Erdogan before Turkey’s offensives in Jarablus and Afrin and also before Turkey’s establishment of observatory posts in Idlib, all in Syria. Turkey’s ground incursion into the PKK-controlled territories in Iraq also came after similar remarks by Erdogan. In all these cases, the President gave the orders after making his warnings in public. Hence, it is natural to question whether we will see new developments in Manbij.

Looking at the three events of the past week, one can see the parameters are about to change in the Saudi Arabia-Syria-U.S. triangle of Turkish foreign politics. The Saudi case is likely to make the already tense relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia even tenser. Turkey has leaked strong evidence against the Saudis on Khashoggi’s disappearance but for now is keeping itself back from a more aggressive strategy against the Saudis. Perhaps the country wants to keep escalation under control and avoids escalating the tension to a no-turn level given that the economic relations with the Saudis still matter.

Or, Turkey may be willing to play the Khashoggi case against the Saudis to the fullest degree but does not rush for it to make the full impact at the right moment. Further, Turkey’s evidences have already hurt the Saudis in a number of ways. A number of U.S. senators have already discussed invoking the Global Magnitsky Act on Saudi Arabia. Further, a long list of global media sponsors have already dropped out of the Saudi conference, The Future Investment Initiative (popularly marketed as Davos in desert). While these are the first tangible effects of the Khashoggi case, the biggest strike was about the well-funded and well-crafted “reformist leader Muhammad Bin Salman” propaganda.

In the eyes of many in the Middle East, Europe, or North America, Saudi Arabia is now nothing more than a brutal tribe-state. It is too hard for Muhammad Bin Salman to fix this damage to his PR campaign. That being said, a real blow can only become possible if Trump turns his back to Bin Salman, which is not likely at the moment.

While Turkey seems to be committed to pressure Saudi Arabia on the unfortunate disappearance and probable murder of Khashoggi, it also has other plans in its Middle East strategy. It seems like Turkey will keep Saudi off the loop in its affairs with the U.S. with regard to Syria. Given the Saudi vulnerability vis-à-vis Turkey (after all, they are accused of murdering a journalist in Turkey in the most brutal, and silly way), Saudis may also not risk a further escalation with Turkey on the question of Syria.

As Turkey released Brunson and hopes a significant improvement in its relations with the U.S. (despite all the other problems between the two), it can also be more demanding with respect to the future of Manbij. While the power game in Syria continues in its fullest sensitivity, the fates of individuals from the tragedy of Khashoggi to the release of Brunson will have reflections in Turkey’s complex and interdependent foreign affairs calculations.

The most striking feature of the Brunson case is that the U.S. has resisted to understand Turkey’s new foreign policy, and this led to a crisis between the two countries. Just to remind the reader, American Pastor Andrew C. Brunson has been kept under arrest for almost two years with the accusation of aiding terrorist groups such as the PKK. He was put on trial, found guilty and was condemned to a three year plus imprisonment by the Turkish courts.

U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence claimed earlier that he had been innocent and expressed that he had to be released immediately. The language adopted in those statements bore a degree of threat and was disrespectful to the Turkish judicial system. That’s why Turkish officials have criticized President Trump and Vice President Pence for not showing patience and being disrespectful to the judicial process after the release of the pastor. They underlined that Turkey is a country where the rule of law is shown due respect. In fact, the issue was more than being about the rule of law, it is more of respecting Turkey’s sovereignty and recognizing its new international status.

The Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi’s probable murder in the Saudi Arabia Consulate in Istanbul also points to the same problem. It is clear that the Saudi crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman ordered the killing of Mr. Khashoggi on account of his critical stance towards the Saudi regime. Regarding the very close and special relations between Prince Salman and President Trump’s son-in-law and senior envoy to the Middle East Jared Kushner, it is not hard to guess that the U.S. was closely following the issue and was informed that Mr. Khashoggi was ordered to be killed. Choosing Istanbul as the location for this outrageous act, which directly defies the norms of international politics, does not seem to be random. It has been rightly put forward by some analysts that the purpose of this unfortunate act of killing was not just to get rid of an opponent of the Saudi regime but to get Turkey involved into this unfortunate incident and to violate its sovereignty.

Combining these two recent incidents with the Trump administration’s supply of heavy weapons and diplomatic protection to the Syrian branch of PKK (YPG) and its unabashed and militant foreign policy towards Palestine and Jerusalem, one can conclude that the U.S. shows no respect to Turkey’s security concerns and sovereign rights. More to the point, the Trump administration fails to understand Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine. Turkey has been following a revisionist foreign policy for a couple of years. It has been seeking adjustments in the existing distribution of power in its region and in the international system in general.

Turkey’s current Syrian policy and its call for reforming international institutions such as the UN Security Council on the basis of new international realities can be given as examples to this revisionist turn in Turkish foreign policy. Despite that these are defensive policies, since they were put into action after Turkey came under attack by terrorist groups and its long-term allies, they manifest the desire for change in international politics.

The U.S.’s uncompromising posture pushes Turkey towards more activism in its foreign policy. President Erdogan has just vowed to eliminate all the YPG militants in Manbij and cleanse off the region from the terrorist elements located in the east of the Euphrates river. This would be a punch in the face to the YPG (and also to the U.S.) who has already suffered a terrible loss in the Operation Oil Branch in Afrin. After that done Turkey would secure the control of all its southern border with Syria and become a more powerful actor in Syrian politics and in the region in general.

As long as the U.S. clings to its current policy of disrespecting Turkey’s sovereignty and supporting its enemies, this will get Turkey to feel more insecure and as a result it will accelerate its policy of defensive expansion in its vicinity. The Trump administration has to find a better policy to be able to contain Turkey. Supporting the YPG, giving unconditional support to Israel, disrespecting Turkey’s sovereignty and opening an economic war have so far backfired. Turkey has grown more powerful.