Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is set to hold an independence referendum next week, which has drawn severe criticism from both Turkey and the US.

Residents in provinces controlled by the KRG are due to vote on September 25 on independence from Baghdad.

The oil-rich province of Kirkuk is among the contested areas where the vote is planned.

Regardless of calls for negotiations before the referendum, Barzani has announced that he will not be able to agree terms with Baghdad.

The KRG President continuously called for Baghdad to provide an alternative to the referendum if the Iraqi government wanted to see the referendum postponed. However, recent announcements are in directions that suggest the two parties will only sit together after the referendum has occurred.

Barzani stated that “Baghdad has failed to provide alternative solutions,” so therefore “we will sit at a negotiating table after the referendum.”

He also added that becoming a full autonomous state “can take up to two years.”

The central government of Iraq is opposed to the poll, claiming that it would affect the war against Daesh, cause instability and violate the Iraqi Constitution.

The referendum was also on the agenda during the 72^nd session of the UN General Assembly. During his speech, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on northern Iraq’s KRG to suspend its referendum for independence, stating that it would further engender instability in the region.

Baghdad and the regional government need to achieve compromises “on the basis of territorial integrity and the realization of the ideals to build a common future,” Erdogan told UN members.

“Steps such as demands for independence that can cause new crises and conflicts in the region must be avoided,” he said.

Potential sanctions

Following his speech at the UN, talking to reporters, Erdogan also warned of sanctions against the KRG if they intend to proceed with the planned referendum.

“We have always supported” the KRG, Erdogan told reporters. “We think this approach of theirs amounts to ignoring the Republic of Turkey, which has stood by them and counted them as a close ally.”

“The cabinet will undoubtedly evaluate this situation and assess possible sanctions, which will not be ordinary,” he warned.

Recent data indicates that the Turkish economy is recovering from the stagnation prevalent in 2016. The first indicator in this respect came with the announcement of the growth rate observed in the first quarter of 2017. The unexpected 5 percent growth rate raised the expectations regarding the following quarters and the annual growth of 2017. The subsequent indicators of the inflation rate also illustrate that Turkey will see a single-digit inflation rate through the year. Furthermore, this recovery has occurred without an increase in the current account deficit, which demonstrates that the growth is not solely driven by domestic demand. As a result of these developments, exchange rates have been stabilized while the BIST 100 index has eyed 110.000 levels. In addition to this, employment figures also started producing positive signals, which is particularly crucial for economic and social life. The only negativity in this positive framework is the high trajectory of interest rates. This article aims to take a closer look at unemployment and inflation since these two matters are the leading ones that concern society and affect expectations.

The correlation between growth and unemployment

Unemployment has been one of the most prominent challenges the Turkish economy has confronted all along. While successful results have been yielded on many issues, the unemployment rate could not be permanently decreased below 9 percent. It must be noted that unemployment is the leading challenge of economies in general as economic crises firstly affect employment figures. As the expectations regarding the depth and persistency of the crisis worsen, a high-speed and severe shrinkage occurs in employment. However, as the crisis is tackled and growth kicks off, the increase in employment unfortunately does not comply with this trend. One of the main reasons for this is the fact that the employer does not begin hiring new employees before being convinced that the crisis is over. Another reason is that the employer finds alternative ways to do the same job with fewer employees during the period of shrinkage and prefers to continue with fewer employees also in the period of expansion. For such reasons, the increase in employment always follows growth with delay, and consequently the increase in employment always takes longer than economic growth. The graphic below shows the unemployment rates in the U.S. between the years of 2008 and 2016. Having been increased by 2.5 times within two years due to the crisis, the unemployment rate returned to its previous levels in six years.

It is possible to contend that this period is shorter in Turkey. Another detail that must be considered is the relation between growth rates and unemployment in general.

The figure above shows the unemployment and growth rates between 2005 and 2016. As a matter of fact, while a longer time period must be taken into account for better insight, the period shown above is enough to indicate necessary results. First to note is the fact that rapid growths following crises in Turkey increase employment quite quickly.  To a certain extent, it is possible to make the same observation for the aftermath of 2001.  More importantly, it has been observed that an annual growth rate below 6 percent brings higher unemployment rates in Turkey. Having undergone a structural transformation beginning from 2000, an average of 800.000 people participates in the labor force annually and almost all of these employments are non-agricultural. This means that unemployment will roughly remain stable even though the Turkish economy creates the same amount of employment each year. Of course, this rapid growth in the labor force participation will slow down after a while. As the economy grows, a lower growth rate will create the same amount of employment. Based on this, it is possible to estimate roughly that Turkey is required to achieve at least 7 percent of annual growth in average in order to decrease the unemployment rate to 8 percent by 2023.

Unemployment estimated to fall to single-digit levels in 2018

Turkey has a potential to reduce unemployment rates to single-digit levels. Frankly, the past 15 years have illustrated the potential of what can be accomplished when political stability is ensured and when the economy is in safe hands. The most impressive achievement among all is the performance displayed within the recent period under the shadow of all the negative developments and assaults. While Turkey registered an annual growth of 2.9 percent in 2016,  this rate climbed up to 5 percent in the first quarter of 2017.

With this achievement in mind, it is appropriate to estimate that the second quarter will see a 6 percent growth, and it will be no surprise if the growth rate hits around 7 percent at the end of the year. The same success can also be observed in unemployment figures. The unemployment rate, which was 12 percent (seasonally adjusted) at the beginning of the year, decreased to 11.3 percent by the end of April. As mentioned above, considering the factor that the increase in employment follows growth with delay, it is possible to argue that the unemployment rate will near single-digit levels by the end of the year. The following year’s growth rate is likely to be above this year’s unless a hot war or an extensive instability emerges. From this point, it can be argued that the unemployment rate will decrease to around 9 percent again.

Inflation will close the year in single-digit levels

Another data remaining from 2016 and giving way to pessimism has been the inflation rate. Starting to climb as of November, the inflation rate hit 11.87 in April 2017, the highest level since 2008.

Inflation is accepted to have two main grounds: sudden increases in input prices (cost-push inflation) and increases in overall demand nationwide. Naturally, the cost-push inflation does not connote a constant price rise. An increase in input prices (e.g. energy prices) leads to a general increase in prices following period. However, if no other increase occurs in energy prices, it is no longer possible to see a cost-push increase in the general level of prices. Therefore, cost-push inflation cannot be the ground of longstanding increases in prices. It can also be said that if the inflation rise occurs in a country due to costs, the increase will tend to decelerate after a while. Demand-pull inflation, on the other hand, might be continuous.

Another concept that needs to be touched upon in this scope is the exchange rate transitivity. This concept denotes the effect of a currency unit’s loss in value on the general level of prices in the country. The level of the exchange rate transitivity determines how the changes in exchange rates will affect the general level of prices and the rate of this change. This transitivity is much higher in the countries where dollarization is at high levels. To put otherwise, an increase in exchange rates affects the inflation almost to the same extent in a short span of time. In this respect, it can be said that the exchange rate transitivity is a structural problem. On the other hand, the main determinants of this transitivity are the level of competition in the country (how easily the cost increases could be reflected in prices) and the market expectation regarding the persistency of the increase in the exchange rate.

Although the effects of it have been diminished, Turkey has a long-standing dollarization history, which is still ongoing. Among various reasons causing this, the leading one is the years with high inflation we had in the past. Fortunately, those days are left behind. Despite that, the effects of dollarization are still felt. Although it is not at alarming levels as in the past, it must be noted that the exchange rate transitivity is still higher compared to some other countries.

The main reason of the state of inflation in our country over the past 7 or 8 months is that it has increased the general level of prices through the increase in the exchange rate and exchange rate transitivity. Between July 2016 and April 2017, the U.S. dollar rose in value by around 30 percent. The rate in the currency basket consisting of Dollar and Euro is also close to this. The academic studies conducted on this matter indicate that in Turkey, 10 percent increase in exchange rate affects inflation by around 1.5-2 points within a year. Departing from this, it can be estimated that the 30 percent increase in the exchange rate over the course of six months will affect inflation by around 5 points, which is of course an effect that will roughly spread over a one-year period. In this case, it can be roughly estimated that around 3.5-4 points of the inflation rate will come from the exchange rate increase at the end of 2017 unless another leap occurs. We estimate that the annual inflation rate of 2017 will be slightly above 9 percent. If this rate is achieved and the contribution of the exchange rate transitivity occurs as we claim, we can suggest that the annual inflation rate will not diverge much from the targets of the Central Bank.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Turkish economy has been on an upward trajectory in 2017 due to the results of the referendum and the sound decisions made by the economic administration. Unless a major problem is witnessed in the global economy, in the following years the targets regarding inflation rates are likely to be achieved along with the increases in growth and employment rates.

Despite criticisms from local groups and regional governments, on September 25, residents in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq will vote in a referendum on whether they want to completely separate from the Republic of Iraq. While the region has enjoyed autonomy for decades, if the referendum approves the secession, an independent state will be born with a distinctly Kurdish identity, a long held aspiration for the ethnic group. But questions linger about the timing of the referendum, and how the new state will deal with the ethnic and sectarian schisms that are tearing apart the region.

Serif Dilek and Hazal Duran spoke with Hemin Hawrami, senior assistant to President Masoud Barzani, and the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

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Did you negotiate with Baghdad about the independence referendum? How does Baghdad approach this process? How do you expect Baghdad’s position to be after the referendum?

The independence referendum is not a new issue. We have discussed it with Prime Minister Abadi three times. And also, when President Barzani led a large Kurdistan delegation in September 2016, he discussed the forthcoming referendum for independence. But its date had not been fixed. In Baghdad, definitely there has not been that much negative reaction. The major concern of Baghdad is the continuation of dialogue. Of course, they prefer us to stay in Iraq. But we argue that a federal, an inclusive Iraq is over. The federal system has failed in Iraq. Because Iraq has not adhered in practice to a federal state structure although it is written in the constitution. This referendum in fact comes after a long process of dialogue with Baghdad. So, we hope that this positive atmosphere built on the cooperation against DAESH in Mosul and also on the cooperation that the Kurdistan region hosts nearly 1.8 million internally displaced Iraqi people (IDP) will help us to find new formulas in establishing bilateral relationships.

Does the referendum for the Kurdistan region indicate independence? If so, what kind of process does Iraqi Kurdistan expect after the referendum?

Yeah. The referendum is for independence and the referendum has one question: Are we with an independent Kurdistan, yes or no? So, there is no third question or a third option. After the referendum, there will definitely be a long process with Baghdad. The Kurdistan delegation, from representing all the political parties, all the components, including Christians and Turkmen; they will talk to Baghdad about for example how we can establish a healthy economic interdependence between Baghdad and Kurdistan in the post-referendum process; how we can continue on a joint military defense strategy built on what we did in Mosul together; how we can use, for example, pipelines between Iraq and Kurdistan; and how not to have visas; how to have one market for both sides and some kind of other further economic interdependency. So, these are the details that we will be taking in the post-referendum period.

Some Kurdish parties (Gorran, for example) harshly criticized the decision of the referendum. Was the referendum decision a result of general compromise between the Kurdish parties or just a decision of President Masood Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)?

I cannot speak on behalf of Gorran. But, in principle, Gorran is not against independence. The charter of Gorran stipulates that they support self-determination and the independence of Kurdistan. Maybe they have concerns about the mechanism of the referendum. Well, President Barzani has communicated with all the political parties, including Gorran and we sent invitations to them for a meeting on the  7^th of June. There are eleven blocks represented in the parliament and Gorran is one of them. Except Gorran and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the other nine blocks came to the meeting with President Barzani. The referendum issue was discussed and put to unanimous vote with the participation of the nine blocks. So, the decision was taken unanimously by all the political parties attending the meeting. It was not a unilateral decision made by President Barzani.

http://thenewturkey.org/intra-kurdish-approaches-to-the-independence-referendum-in-northern-iraq/

It is stated that the referendum will also be held in the disputed territories. According to Article 140 of the Constitution, it was specified that the people living in these regions would be connected to the Central Government of Iraq or Iraqi Kurdistan through a referendum, but the mentioned referendum did not happen. Will it mean that these regions will be a part of Iraqi Kurdistan if the result will be “yes” in the referendum?

The referendum decision was made unanimously by all the parties and with President Barzani. This referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan. Disputed territories mean that both the Iraqi government and Kurdish regional government have a right in administration. In fact, we have been waiting for 10 years for Article 140 to be implemented, however, it was not. If the people of this region participate in the referendum and if they vote ‘yes’, it means that they want to be part of independent Kurdistan.

Of course, Kirkuk has a special state in Kurdistan. We believe that the Turkmen, right now, enjoy much more rights and freedom than they enjoy in other parts of Iraq. The Turkmen will be the second largest ethnic group and they will be true partners in governing the Kurdistan region. If you look at the election results in 2005 in the disputed territories, the majority voted for the Kurdistani list, which included the Kurds, the Turkmen and others. And the fight against ISIS… If it was not for the Peshmerga and KRG, this area would have been controlled by ISIS like Mosul. So, although right now we have the full military, administrative and political control of the area, we don’t want to impose anything.

In addition to this, the disputed territories have been historically and geographically parts of Kurdistan as it has faced Arabization. But we don’t want to impose a de facto situation and asked them whether you want to have a Kurdish ethnic state. It’s a Kurdistani state based on partnership.

The regional and international actors’ approach to the referendum is not positive. How accurate is it to take a decision on independence at a time where international support is weak? In addition to this, is it possible that there will be any breaks in the relations between the Iraqi Kurdistan and some international actors after the referendum?

First of all, this is a domestic issue between Kurdistan, us and Baghdad. Secondly, the international community is more interested in whether this referendum might affect the fight against ISIS negatively. Well, long before the referendum in 2014, we had nothing but we fought against ISIS. We reassure the regional and international community that an independent Kurdistan will be much stronger in fighting terrorism. Thirdly, when the Iraqi government violated the constitution and the Iraqi army melted down against Daesh, was there really an international community to stand against the chaotic situation?

Please look at the last 26 years and make an analogy. Kurdistan’s contribution to Iraq’s security and stability is immense. Take Turkey, for example. Kurdistan contributes to Turkish national security by acting like a buffer zone between the unstable part of Iraq and the Turkish southern borders. It also makes a positive contribution to the trade relationship with Turkey and the other countries. It provides energy security. In terms of governance, despite a small region with only 5 million people, we are hosting 1.8 million IDP’s and refugees. So, if we were not a functioning political entity, all these people would flee to Turkey or Europe.

Of course, we don’t except the international community to say “okay, we are officially supporting the breakup of Iraq.” But our message for the international and regional community is that the current status quo cannot continue; that Iraq is already divided on sectarian and ethnic lines between the Shiites and Sunnis, between the Arabs and the Kurds. I recently have heard from the head of a Shiite endowment, who said that “there is no room for Christians to stay in Iraq anymore.” Even if you take Kurdistan out, the remainder of Iraq is divided. It is a failed state and we need to prevent the Iraqification of the Kurdistan region.

As you know, the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan is largely dependent on oil revenues and also the budget of the region is dependent on Baghdad. How can a politically independent Kurdistan survive in economic terms? What kind of policies are you going to implement to ensure economic independence?

First, I don’t agree with the term “economic independence.” Now, all economies are interdependent and there is no independent economy. Secondly, we have survived two sets of sanctions in the past: UN sanctions on Iraq and Iraqi sanctions on Kurdistan. Third, Iraqi Kurdistan – here I should underline that I did my masters on the political economy of Kurdistan, on the rentier state – primarily wants political independence, because we want to get rid of the understanding of a frontier mentality we inherited from Baghdad. We want to diversify our economy by not relying only on oil.

We don’t have a taxation system in Kurdistan because of the central budget law. We need sovereignty first in order to go through a systematic reform to change the equation from a public-oriented economy to a private-oriented one and to help the private sector to grow. So, the Kurdistan region can survive. And Kurdistan has the 9th largest oil reserves in the world and has 8 trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas. The world economy needs that. Turkey needs that. You need our resources; we need your pipelines and your transportation. So, it’s a win-win situation. We do believe an independent Iraqi Kurdistan will be a more strategic economic partner for Turkey.

Do you have another option to export your natural gas or oil to other countries?

Turkey is our strategic partner but we will also be looking forward to have a strong partnership with Baghdad so that our economic interdependence would allow us to export our natural gas and oil through Baghdad.

We just want to get back to the point we have discussed earlier. There is ongoing regional instability in the Middle East. In addition to the chaotic situation of Iraq and Syria, there are millions of people who have either been displaced or became refugees because of DAESH. Today Iraqi Kurdistan is home to about 1.9 million refugees. How suitable is it to take a decision of referendum in such kind a complicated environment?

My question to you: when will there be a perfect environment? Those who criticize and say that it’s not perfect timing, our question to them is “just tell us two or three perfect times in the next ten years?” When is the ideal timing? There is no ideal and perfect timing. If we keep the current status quo, we can’t be sure of our future.

I am asking myself, “have we been part of the problem or have we been part of the solution?” It was not us who created DAESH but it was us who broke the myth of DAESH. In terms of the Shiite-Sunni sectarian fight, we are not taking a side. The Kurds are Sunnis, we say. We don’t care about Shiite-Sunni division because we are Sunnis.

Look, we’ve been providing support to the IDPs regardless of their sectarian affiliation. In terms of the economic stability, we were the second largest market for Turkey after Germany. Out of $12 billion trade with other parts of Iraq, why is there $9 billion with Kurdistan region? Because we’ve been part of that solution for Turkey. So, when some argue about the instability, we have not been the factor behind it. Actually, the instability in the Middle East is the result of post-colonial failed state systems, Sykes-Picot more precisely. The borders are not reflecting the true realities of the people in the region.

What do you think the referendum will result in?

In 2005, we did an informal referendum and 96% of the people voted ‘yes.’ So, this time, I believe that the landslide majority of people, including the Turkmen, Christians, and Arabs living in the disputed areas, will vote “yes” and prefer to live in a stable Kurdistan rather than for an unknown future.

How about your personal expectation about the forthcoming elections in Iraq, the general and provincial elections?

Are you sure that there will be elections? Because we aren’t. If the Iraqi parliament is going to be elected according to the current election law, which gives Shiites majority, no matter how many Kurds or Sunnis participated, we, as the Kurds, are not going to participate in the next Iraqi parliament election. Because we are giving legitimacy to an illegitimate situation. For example, if all Kurds participate in the upcoming election, we will have only 60-65 seats. That’s why we want this election law to be amended from 18 constituencies to make all of Iraq one constituency.

How will an independent Kurdistan deal with minorities such as the Turkmen, as they are opposing the independence referendum at some point, and some minor groups also oppose this idea. Which rights and guarantees will they have?

We don’t call them minorities. That’s the first guarantee. Irrelevant of their number, we will accept them as ethnic groups. Secondly, they have 5 members in the current parliament. They have the right to have education in their native language from kindergarten to university.

We don’t call it a Kurdish state; we call it Kurdistan state. Because, Kurdistan, like Turkey, is the homeland for the Kurdistani citizens. You don’t call everyone who lives in Turkey a Turk. Right? Because Turkey is home to citizens with Circassian, Armenian, Kurdish, Turk, and Arab background. So, Kurdistan is also home for whoever lives there and that’s another guarantee.

Absolutely, we will need international support for it. I mean how we can draft the constitution before the declaration by law. The rights of different ethnic groups must be guaranteed and what kind of mechanism could be established to assure their participation? I can assure you the oppressed people are not going to oppress others.

http://thenewturkey.org/mosul-in-ruins-kirkuk-awaits-a-similar-destiny-what-can-turkey-do/

What are your ideas about the PYD in Syria? Commonly, you know that there is a major dispute between them and PDKS (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê li Sûriyê – Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria).

PYD is the PKK. There is no difference between them. We have supported the Kurdish uprising and Syrian opposition since the beginning. We wished and supported them to have a kind of Supreme Council through the first Erbil Agreement in 2012, Second Erbil Agreement 2013 and then the Duhok Agreement in 2014 to help them to have a kind of shared and common administration. But unfortunately, the PYD did not have a clear vision for the future of the Rojava. They’ve been collaborating one time with the Syrian regime and with others without having a political future. And the PYD has been oppressing non-PYD political parties like closing their offices by not allowing them to have any political activities, or by arresting them. Because of that we’ve been against such actions of the PYD.

Do you have any ideas of a population exchange?

No. I want to make it clear. This independence referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan and it is not going to change the current Iraqi international border, which will be the official border of Kurdistan with Turkey, Iran, and Syria. This is a propaganda by some PKK circles, who argue that there will be a connection between Rojava and Kurdistan. That’s not true. That’s not going to happen.

Our last question is about the name of the state. How will it be named if the referendum results in “yes”? Kurdistan or the Republic of Kurdistan?

Definitely, it will be a liberal republic. But the name, I can’t tell. It has something related to Iraqi Kurdistan. Honestly, I have no idea. You should ask that question after the referendum either to the referendum committee or to the founding fathers.

2017 seems to be a crucial year for the world politics. Donald Trump’s coming to power, the elections in Austria, Netherlands, France and Germany, and Turkey’s recent referendum are all significant events. Long before the actual date of the referendum in Turkey, Europe had been reunited in saying “No” to the referendum. State-sponsored and financed propaganda campaigns in Germany against a possible “Yes” aroused disappointment and frustration for many Turks. Not only were private media corporations such as Spiegel, Stern, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung constantly, almost daily, apparent with their traditional tools of anti-Turkish headlines, images and cartoons—who made every effort to strengthen the “No” camp—but also state institutions such as the TV-Channel ARD, which broadcast propaganda regarding Turkey’s referendum by presenting false claims to their audience. Perhaps the most brutal case was the denial of Turkish ministers’ entry to Europe in order to campaign for the referendum.

It is of no surprise that after the referendum which resulted with the victory of the proponents of the constitutional change, populist and racist remarks began to flood in the media: AFD’s Beatrice von Storch tweeted that those Turks who voted for the constitutional change (in her words “Islamic dictatorship”) should please immediately leave Germany. Voices of the political center from the CDU to the liberals FDP spoke in favor of breaking up negotiations with Turkey for a EU-membership. This seems to represent the current state of mind of many Germans: according to a survey done by ARD-DeutschlandTREND, 64% are in favor of ending the negotiations with Turkey. But, in the same survey, a restriction was postulated which would effect their fellow citizens directly. 58% of Germans took a clear stand against dual citizenship. Around 3 million people of Turkish origin are living in Germany, out of whom 1.4 million have only a Turkish nationality whereas around 500,000 have dual nationality. The suggestion against the legality of multiple nationalities comes not out of nowhere and is not a new threat against the Turks either. Since a pro-democracy rally in Cologne in the aftermath of the coup attempt in 2016 in Turkey, the validity of dual nationality had become a heated debate topic. But why is the question of a legal status of such an important matter when it comes to Turks?

Before answering that question, it is necessary to outline the development of the right of citizenship for non-natural Germans. The first nationality law was created in Prussia in 1842, in which it was written that German citizenship was based on the right of the blood (Ius Sanguinis). Hence, naturalization was not possible. In 1913, the legal definition was changed and naturalization was allowed. This law lasted until 2000, and in order to be naturalized as a German, one had to reside in Germany for 15 years. One of Angela Merkel’s closest CDU politicians, Peter Altmaier, and a new generation of different party members started to question this legal regulation in the midst of the 1990’s. The coalition of SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens renewed the nationality law in 2000— the so-called “model of options”—which extends German citizenship based on the right of the soil (Ius Soli). The children of immigrants born in Germany— for example whose parents live in Germany for 8 years or have permanent residence— would have dual citizenship until their twenty-third birthday, at which time they were supposed to choose only one nationality/option to keep.

Additionally, since 2008, German language skills are required to fulfill the naturalization. The general rule for citizenships of other nationalities is quiet simple: if you are elected to become a citizen of another country, you lose German citizenship, which is relative due to many exceptions of having dual citizenships. For Turkish citizens, the right to have dual citizenship was denied for a long time. The younger generation was favored by the most up-to-date reform in 2014, which is the center of conflict today. The model of options was eliminated for those children of immigrants from non-EU countries who still had the option to chose amongst the citizenships, and also either lived at least 8 years until their age of 21 in Germany, went to school for 6 years, or have an adequate verification of education.

After 400,000 Turks voted “Yes” in the referendum (63.1 % of the total), the governing party CDU and her allies made it clear that the dual citizenship for Turks would be a central election topic. Stephan Mayer from the CSU was quoted in the newspaper Die Welt as saying, “I think it is important that in the next legislative period we revoke the easement of the dual citizenship.” CDU’s Thomas Strobl told the same journal that “Germany must react with clear consequences towards the dual citizenship of Turks in Germany.” The argument for those claims is that one who lives under the liberties of Germany in a constitutional parliamentary democracy cannot vote for such a system change in Turkey.

Following the remarks made in 2010 by Chancellor Angela Merkel which suggested that multi-culturalism had failed, integration now seems to be a failure (again). But the dominant arguments in the German public have, for quite some time, ignored social, political and cultural dimensions of decisions in Turkey made by the Turkish diaspora. Firstly, Turkey has become neither an autocracy nor a dictatorship—both being result of a persistent propaganda that created a clear prejudice in minds.

No doubt, it can only be considered a bad adaptation of orientalism by persons such as Julia Klöckner of the CDU who characterizes the Turkish President as the “despot of the Bosphorus.” The historical legacy of the term “Despotizm”, used from Montesquieu to the colonial British power in the 19th and 20th century intended to degrade the legal order in Ottoman Turkey, saying that their leaders are despots – not bound by law. And why and with which right is the political maturity of Turkish citizens voting for a “Yes” to be disregarded? This actually resembles a paternalistic, arrogant attitude which is best summarized by Gustav Le Bonne who simply put it as “for the people, despite the people.”

Finally, the political atmosphere in Turkey can hardly be compared to any other institutionalized country in the West. Having a war on its border in Syria, overcoming a coup attempt on July 15th, and having been threatened by three main terror organizations within and outside his borders, namely the PKK, FETÖ and DAESH, the Turkish people are predominantly looking for security, economic prosperity, and, above all, social service. And this is what the AK Party and, its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has provided the Turkish people over the last 15 years as a government.

After the referendum, self-reflection and critique has not been common among the German public. But it should be remembered that there is a deep divide among Turks and German authorities as well as, sadly, the common citizens. If Germany was able to both take a positive step towards the Turkish minority and refrain from demonizing Turkey, the country would have acted culturally in a more modest and proper manner. However, discussing the abandonment of dual citizenship for Turks means continuing the deteriorating pattern which will bring about nothing more than injustice.

If the referendum on the presidential system in Turkey was a close call for “no,” for instance with 50.1% of the total votes, no one in this world would question its legitimacy. It would have been deemed as a tremendous victory of the anti-Erdoğan wing. It didn’t come to pass and the bill passed the referendum with 51.4%. Then, it must be Erdoğan’s triumph! President Erdoğan received the public support by acquiring 1,300,000 more votes than “no” in a referendum which was attended by 86.4% of the eligible voters. Kurdish votes showing 10-20% increase in certain cities played an important role in Erdoğan’s victory,  who has been at the helm of the government for 15 years, first as the prime minister and then as the president.

A Turkey which is surrounded by wars, hosts 2,500,000 Syrian refugees, has been targeted by both Daesh and the PKK, recently overcame a coup attempt on July 15 Gülenist infiltrators instructed by Fetullah Gülen who tried to move the country into an unprecedented chaos. Considering the reactions of especially the US universities and think-tanks, along with some Europeans ones, there is a president who is being condemned for “surviving the coup attempt.”

A president who has been more eager than his predecessors in making Turkey a full member of the EU, who has recognized the Kurdish problem and commenced the reconciliation process, who has realized education reforms for thousands of women that were forcibly thrown out by the police and forced to leave their schools just because they were wearing headscarves, and who extended his condolences to Armenians on April 24 and asked for an international commission to research what has transpired during 1915 incidents… A president who embraced the doorkeeper of the hotel he was staying in Brussels, along with the German Chancellor Schröder, who calls and talks with his childhood friends, who has earned the love and interest of the people… The most significant political leader since Atatürk.

It has become ambiguous when it did happen; however, the said president started to be compared to the cruelest man of the last century, Hitler, deemed as a dictator and alleged for massacring Kurds with an elaborate perception management that was devised by the West. In a short time the anti-Erdoğan club became quite cosmopolitan: even Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, PKK, Gülen and his henchmen became the members of it. A fabulous cosmopolitan coalition of opposition! It should be mentioned that this coalition inevitably brought quite a support to Erdoğan and affected the result of referendum in a positive way.

Talking about Turkey, there are a few members of the opposition who voted “no” and constantly criticize as they want the system to become more democratic and have a robust judicial system. Nevertheless, whatever be the discussion, the “no” movement has always been spearheaded by the main opposition party CHP which comes from a Kemalist tradition. Justice and Development Party (AK Party) which has been governing Turkey for 15 years, has proposed numerous proposals about changing the 1982 constitution that was implemented by the junta.

The main opposition party opposed all of these proposals. This wasn’t surprising, as this is the nature of the Kemalist opposition parties. However, what is surprising is that the opposition party has never proposed a change or an alternative to the 1982 constitution, the same constitution that the all people in Turkey unanimously want to change. Let alone preparing a proposal that could worry AK Party, they haven’t even scribbled a draft of a constitution. Indeed, for 15 years AK Party and its leader Tayyip Erdoğan have been always challenging their own records in elections and broke them with unprecedented figures.

Erdoğan and his party that don’t have to worry about a legitimate opposition have overcome numerous illegitimate attempts aiming to depose them. The referendum was held under the conditions of the state of emergency that was declared right after the July 15 coup attempt. The subject matter was a change in the system of government; however, this wasn’t being voted in the referendum. It was between those who are against Erdoğan, both in Turkey and the world, and those who stood with Erdoğan.

Despite the campaigning since February, almost none of the voters regardless of their point of view are aware of either the so-called parliamentary system that grants excessive authority to the president or the presidential system which is different than the existing system. Among those who are aware, the objections of the main opposition party’s voters were not taken much into consideration as they refrained from criticizing the existing odd system and, moreover, as they were the ones that made it stranger. On the other hand, even though the AK Party voters were concerned about certain things, the “yes” won because of the trust in Erdoğan.

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) which allied with AK Party for the referendum failed to garner the expected support. However, the Kurdish votes played a decisive role in the referendum by increasing support for “yes” in 14 cities located in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Considering the vote AK Party garnered in November 1 elections in 2015, there is a varying increase between 10% and 20% in cities in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. The concerns for security, believing Erdoğan will resolve issues of the region and the reaction against PKK’s trench and urban warfare contributed to the victory. Moreover, there were those who voted “yes” as they believed that 1982 constitution is indefensible and it is impossible to resolve the Kurdish problem with the existing parliamentary system. For this reason, Erdoğan was able to increase its votes in Diyarbakır from 22.2% to 32.43%, in Batman from 30% to 36.48%, in Mardin from 30% to 40.96%, in Siirt from 40% to 48.1%, in Şırnak from 13% to 28.41%, and in Şanlıurfa from 67.8% to 70.82%.

As a result, it could be said that Erdoğan who is the indubitably the most prominent political figure of Turkey for 15 years has received less votes than his potential. However, the precedents of Turkish political history and sociology, along with the experience, show that Erdoğan will be able to maintain his government. Even if the transition to presidential system wasn’t realized, he still would be a powerful president due to the provisions of the constitution, along with being elected president in the first round with 51.8% of the votes. He himself was powerful before; now, his seat is also powerful.

A small portion of the AK Party voters abstained from voting “yes” not because of a concern about Erdoğan, but because they weren’t sure of the answer to the following question: “what will happen after Erdoğan?” Erdoğan, who will become the leader of his party due to the constitutional change, will probably take some steps that will answers the expectations and concerns of his voters, while also taking the Kurdish voters’ support into consideration. It is also highly probable that the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) which is perceived as the only representative of Kurdish politics by the international community will face new rivaling competitors in the region, beside their only rival AK Party.

On Sunday April 16, fifty-five million Turkish citizens will cast a historic vote on the possibility of transforming the Turkish republic from a parliamentary to a presidential system. This change has been a long time coming. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling AK Party have been advocating the transformation for over a decade. Former prime minister and Erdoğan’s mentor, the late Necmettin Erbakan, had advocated the presidential system since at least the 1990s because of the instability of the current parliamentary system. In its ninety-three year history, there have been 65 different governments in the Turkish republic for an average of 16 months for each government. If the stable AK governments of the last 15 years were not taken into account, the average length of each government would be much less.

Ever since the current parliament approved the 18 constitutional amendments for this transformation last January, there has been much tension in the debate but little clarity. The nation has been polarized by the yes “Evet” and no “Hayır” campaigns. Instead of focusing on the merits of the constitutional amendments and the presidential system, most of the criticism has focused on the fears that the new presidential system could serve as a platform for authoritarianism, or worse dictatorship, by the overwhelming personality traits of the strong president.

But to be fair, an objective analysis should focus on the merits of the amendments and the proposed presidential system aside from the character of the sitting president. Once such analysis is conducted, one must assess the proposed changes to evaluate the checks and balance mechanism in the amendments to guard against the possibility of authoritarian rule.

The key argument for a presidential system is in providing political stability for the government, headed by a president elected popularly for a fixed five-year period. In such a system, the government will not be vulnerable to threats of needless vote of confidence in parliament or partisan political maneuvers designed to extract concessions from the largest party in coalition-type governments, which have been the hallmark of much of Turkey’s modern history. The main reason a government in a presidential system is strong is because it would be formed by a popularly elected president, with cabinet members who mostly represent his political ideology and programs, and thus govern in a more harmonious and effective manner.

Even though they have to adhere to the political programs of the president, many cabinet members and senior government officials would often times be non-partisan experts or technocrats, appointed on their merits because of their management skills and qualifications. In contrast, parliamentary governments tend to represent conflicting ideologies, programs, strategies and tactics. Because different ministers in such coalition governments belong to different political parties, or worse, are subject to sectarian or ethnic quotas, it’s not uncommon for one ministry or government agency to be the main obstacle to the implementation of the programs of another ministry or agency, thus leading to confusion, economic stagnation or political paralysis in the country.

Moreover, when a partisan cabinet member takes over a particular ministry, especially a service type, such as transportation, health, or energy, rather than calling on civil servants or career officials, the minister would often appoint his partisan officials in the most important positions within the ministry as rewards to his supporters regardless of the national interest. With the high turnover of coalition governments, this practice becomes endemic, which potentially leads to the spread of government inefficiency and corruption. On the other hand, with its strong grip on the executive branch, a presidential system generates strong bureaucracy resulting in political stability, government efficiency, and potentially sustained economic development and growth.

Furthermore, a presidential system by definition strengthens the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government since members of parliament cannot simultaneously hold legislative and executive positions. This strengthens the role of parliament as a watchdog over the executive branch. On the other hand, the parliamentary system’s weakest point is the blurring of the separation of powers where the government (with most ministers and their deputies being members of parliament) controls both the legislative and executive branches making it almost impossible to hold government officials accountable to the representatives of the people. In short, in a presidential system the accountability function of the parliament is not only restored but also strengthened as potential cover-ups and corruption (as a result of the failure of the government to investigate itself) would be largely curtailed and under check.

Furthermore, the presidential system not only reinforces the separation of powers between the different branches of government but also establishes the appropriate balance between them. For example in the American presidential system, while Congress makes laws and passes budgets, the President could veto any of its bills. But Congress could also override the presidential veto with a two-third majority vote, as each branch can then check the other.

In addition, the interpretation of laws is the domain of the Supreme Court, where both Congress and the executive branch are subject to the orders of the judiciary, while neither Congress nor the President could dismiss a judge. Nor the President could dissolve Congress, or Congress dismisses the President without elaborate impeachment proceedings, followed by a trial in the Senate. In short, a good “checks and balances” system distributes power to the three branches of government in order to limit any potential abuse of power.

Perhaps the area where the presidential system is most effective is in implementing foreign policy. It provides a unified and consistent national security policy making it very difficult for foreign powers to exploit domestic disputes and differences or playing rivals against each other within a coalition government for partisan advantages. On the other hand, because of different policy positions on many fronts such as military interventions, security policy, trade, or foreign relations, coalition governments tend to invoke weak responses or even paralysis, especially on the most contentious issues.

Since the emergence of its fifth republic in the late 1950s, France functioned as a semi-presidential system, with a president largely in charge of foreign policy, and a prime minister, largely in charge of domestic policy. But the system has demonstrated its inherent weakness as both powerful positions clashed repeatedly especially when they represented different political parties. The Islamic Republic of Iran adopted this model in 1979, but abandoned it ten years later when the inevitable rivalry led to confusion, economic instability, political paralysis, and lack of accountability.

However, the underlining assumption of the presidential system is having independent judiciary, government transparency, strong and vibrant civil society institutions, and robust and independent media, not only representing the interests of the citizenry, especially the most vulnerable among them, but also holding all government branches accountable to the people.

On the other hand, the strength of the parliamentary system is in fragmenting political power so that no party or individual could accumulate so much power, especially within a tribal or primitive society, and turn it into an authoritarian regime or repressive dictatorship with little or no oversight. But this genuine concern is dealt with through strong civil society institutions and constitutional safeguards of personal freedoms, civil and political rights, bill of rights including freedoms of expression, assembly, and beliefs, and protections for vulnerable minority communities and political oppositions.

In addition, one way to limit any potential executive presidential abuse of power is to distribute this power to the provinces and local authorities allowing for its exercise over several jurisdictions. Fortunately, Turkey has a long history of having strong local governments with considerable power and effective administration that are subject to periodic, free, and fair democratic elections. For example, Turkey has 81 cities, 30 of these are metropolitan municipalities and others have municipalities and also provinces, while Istanbul has 39 district municipalities, with each elected periodically by their constituencies.

So how do the proposed amendments to the constitution fare with such a transformation? Could the new proposed constitution allow for a one-man rule or a potential dictatorship as the critics contend?

Clearly, there is no doubt that after spending fifteen years as the central figure in Turkish politics, the character and presence of President Erdoğan is dominating and overwhelming. But the proper assessment requires that one evaluate the text of the amendments for the potential abuse of power aside from personal or political calculations or fear of the unknown.

Much of the proposed executive powers transferred from the prime minister to the president are standard and routine: heading the government, appointing ministers, or holding executive power (Article 104). But the new constitution also strengthens the separation of powers in many areas. Any member of parliament must resign if appointed to the executive branch (Article 106).

Parliament can hold any member of the executive branch accountable, including the initiation of preliminary investigations (by simple majority), the launch of official investigations (by three-fifths majority) and dismissal (by two-third majority), which is quite similar to the American system of impeachment (Article 105). While the President could issue executive orders (same as the American system), parliament could annul these decrees by a simple majority (Article 104).

However, the most disturbing aspect of the new amendments is the ability of the President to dissolve parliament (already in the current constitution.) But even this authority carries with it a huge political risk. Because the new constitution calls for simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections (Article 77), if the president dissolves parliament, he would also shorten his term and would have to stand for elections himself, in addition to have the concurrence of three-fifths of the members of parliament (Article 116), a requirement that is much more that any party has ever assembled in Turkish political history.

Moreover, unlike the American constitutional system that requires a two-third majority for a veto override, the proposed Turkish constitution allows the parliament to override a presidential veto with a simple majority (Article 89). But perhaps the most sweeping reforms enacted with the new amendments include the total abolishment of military courts (Article 142), which has a long and ugly history of abuse against civilians. In addition, the president’s ability to declare a state of emergency would be subject to parliamentary approval, while the parliament could extend, remove or shorten it.

While states of emergency could be extended for up to four months at a time, every presidential decree issued during a state of emergency would still need parliamentary approval (Article 119). While the U.S. president nominates all federal judges and Supreme Court justices, the new Turkish constitution allows the president to nominate 12 out of 15 for the Constitutional Court (Article 146) and 6 out of 13 members of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (Article 159), while parliament appoints the remaining members.

Polls in Turkey vary widely and internal polling of major political parties show a slight edge for the “yes” campaign with about 10 percent as undecided. Hence, the vote for the referendum could go either way. Even though the proposed constitutional amendments would solve many of Turkey’s endemic political problems, there are still concerns and fears of the critics for a potential authoritarian rule, but they have been blown out of proportion. As the response to last summer’s coup has aptly demonstrated, the Turkish public is keen on preserving its democracy, strengthening its political institutions, holding power to account, and is not prepared to cede its sovereignty or future.

Turkey is rushing towards the April 16 Referendum, which is potentially one of the most important events in the history of its democracy. No matter what the results will be, this referendum will always be remembered as a case and cited as a milestone in Turkish political history.

What makes the April 16 Referendum important is that Turkish people for the first time are going to vote for such a large-scale constitutional reform. Turkey has experienced several constitutional amendments before, but most of them were related to fundamental rights and freedoms. They had little or no significant effect on the state structure. This referendum, however, aims to change the state structure directly. It is, therefore, unique and unprecedented.

The constitutional referendum is also vital since it is, independent of its results, a significant democratization step on its own. During the period of democracy, Turkish constitutions were either completely built by military bureaucrats or changed under their pressure and threats. Thus, the real powers who made or revised the constitutions were the army and its official and civilian allies. During the AK Party governments, this situation began to change and reached its peak with the introduction of the April 16 Referendum package. For the first time in the modern history of Turkey, civilian forces have pioneered such a large-scale constitutional amendment aimed at subordinating constituent power in the real sense.

The third feature of the amendment package is that it is more comprehensive, broader, and deeper than several columnists -including myself- and experts anticipated at the first glance. Although the change in the government system lies at its center, this step will affect the entire state structure. Although the “no” wing claims the opposite, the regime will not change, i.e., the republic and democracy will not disappear, but many things will either be renewed immediately or will enter a phase of renewal. Both the principal and relative positions of the prevailing forces will change. It is due to the fact that there is a network of relations and equilibrium between the forces in the current system and the change in the system will predictably affect the position of others. This change will inevitably affect bureaucracy, the culture of government or governance, and the modes of operation of the existing forces over time.

What Happens if Turkey Votes “No”

A “No” vote, despite being a weak possibility, is still a possibility and it became even weaker because of the impudent and anti-democratic attitudes of several European countries. If the referendum results with a “No” vote, then, it still might lead to some “good” consequences. The current political situation in the country made it clear to everyone that the country needs a governmental system that is, we must overcome the situation we are now in. No one can deny this and cannot avoid responsibility – as the main opposition party did. If the proposal does not get approval from the people, it does not mean that the necessity of change in the government system will disappear. On the contrary, the need to establish a governmental system will appear even more urgent. Starting from the morning of April 17, the search for a new system will begin.

Once the way is paved for the referendum, the public will make it easier to carry out subsequent similar undertakings. Thus, Turkey’s democracy will have surpassed an important threshold. Those of circles who have long ignored the basic purpose and duty of politics, that is to lead, will find themselves encircled with this all-encompassing trend.

What Happens if Turkey Votes “Yes”

If “Yes” wins the referendum, it will lead to several consequences that will spread to various phases. It will radically affect and change our political system and political culture.

Center-right parties constitute standard democratically elected political governments in Turkey. Left governments are not a standard, but a deviation in Turkish politics. So far, all center-right governments have complained about the governmental system in the country. Pointing out to the fact that the area of democratic power is arbitrarily limited, they wanted to change it. As a center-right political movement, the AK Party did not go beyond this line. (Let me answer the objections that may arise in the assertion that the AK Party is the center-right wing party. The best evidence to prove the AK Party is in the center-right is that both the Gülenist Terror Organization, which is a totalitarian religious movement, and radical religious trends aiming at the Islamization of the Turkish society, which is overwhelmingly a Muslim society, according to their understanding of Islam, complain about and even hate the AK Party.)

In Turkey, the bureaucratic guardianship system has established its sovereignty by encompassing the executive power of the democratically elected governments. Now the situation is changing. The process of change that began decades ago accelerated during the AK Party governments with the influence of various factors. If the outcome of the April 16 referendum turns out to be “yes,” the two-headed executive power will end. Thus, the bureaucratic guardianship system will lose an important base.

This will also reinforce the democratic character of the executive power. The government will not have indirect legitimacy as in the parliamentary system, but will have direct democratic legitimacy since it will directly be elected by the people. This will facilitate its struggle with the bureaucratic guardianship. This scenario is predictable since none of the elected governments wants to share its powers with bureaucratic foci and to get under their yoke.

The amendment will also bring stability. The parliamentary system leads to executive instability, especially in countries where politics is overly divided. When elections do not produce a government, parliamentary games and negotiations start. Ineffective coalition governments emerge and the executive power can be blocked by tempting the smaller partners in the coalitions. The government may fall at any moment if it cannot obtain a vote of confidence. This also makes the governmental responsibility unclear.

The proposed system, however, offers an effective government power. Just after midnight on Election Day, it will be apparent who will be the executive organ. Executive power will complete its normal duration period since it will be independent of the judiciary. Politics, to a certain extent, will have a new outlook far away from being an area of ugly bargains. So, the governments foresee and make long-term plans accordingly. This will also allow citizens to recognize the success and failure of the governments easily.

The new system will encourage parliament to move far from executive to legislative affairs. The number of deputies who specialize in legislative activities will increase. The parliament thus will spare more time on legislation.

The separation of legislative and executive powers will also reduce and alter lobbying activities for the members of the legislature, voters, and interest groups. Deputies will not be considered as people whose main and only job is to do business follow-up.

The presidential system also leads to significant changes in the political culture. The new system encourages democratic reconciliation. Since the presidential election will have two rounds at almost every time, voters will participate in the main wings in the second round. To express it in as an analogy, creeks will join rivers. Thus, democratic politics become stable over time and political traditions and customs will start to have a form and shape.

An important problem of Turkish politics is that the speed of renewal of political staff is rather slow. This is not only valid for the victorious leaders and their teams, but for leaders and their staff who constantly lost the elections. The current parliamentary system is one of the most important reasons for this phenomenon. Names such as Bülent Ecevit, Alparslan Türkeş, Süleyman Demirel, and Necmettin Erbakan became the leaders of political movements for 40 to 50 years. They left their seats only after health problems and death. However, a successful leader in the new system will have a maximum duration of ten years. Let us look at this issue through Erdoğan to better explain it: Erdoğan has been governing the country for fourteen years first as the prime minister and then as the president.

If the proposed system was the current system, Erdoğan would have already left the political scene. If the proposed system does not pass and the old system continues, Erdoğan may return to the AK Party in 2024 and, if God gives him a prolonged life, he can continue to govern the country as the prime minister for another twenty years. The contribution of the new system to the renewal of Turkish political life is also apparent for the oppositional party. In the new system, it will be difficult for the leaders who lose the elections to keep their seats. Their parties will seek new ways and methods to win the next election and thus the defeated leaders find themselves in the position to leave their seat. Both the government and opposition parties will therefore enter a phase of renewal.

The April 16 Referendum means, to some extent, setting the spirit free. The spirit cannot be forced to enter the bottle again. Whatever the result is, there is no turning back from change. That is the reason why April 16 will be a turning point in Turkey’s political history.

The hotly debated referendum on Constitutional amendments that is to be held on April 16th is not confined within Turkey alone. It also happens to be one of the most important topics that leads the debate among European politics within the framework of the referendum in Turkey.

Why are the European countries and the politicians of the EU so anxious about the amendments to the Constitution in Turkey?

The fact that Turkey’s politics has attracted so much interest in Europe is nothing new. In fact, developments in Turkey have always been important for Europe. This is because since the last days of the Ottoman Empire, a number of European countries have often struggled to exercise influence over Turkey. When looking at the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottoman state was the subject of the struggle for influence between England, France, Russia, and Germany. The Republic of Turkey, which was established as the Ottoman Empire’s successor, formed into a sphere of influence for German and British politics until the Second World War where it remained under the influence of the United States.

During the post-Cold War era, the influence of the EU on Turkey increased substantially with Germany in particular taking the lead and in direct competition with the US. With Berlin making headway to penetrate Ankara, the institutional structure of the EU and the nature of Turkey’s relations with the EU being the point in question.

Europe’s Politics of Influence

There were two important reasons behind the efforts of the Western powers to include Turkey in their spheres of influence: First, Turkey’s weaknesses in economic and military affairs over the last 150 years had allowed the possibility for these countries to influence its politics. Second, the fact that Turkey is straddled in a uniquely strategic location between the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus has made it a country necessary to be controlled by these states.

It can be seen that the interventions of Europe have consistently tried to direct the politics of Turkey and this effort changed shape according to the international conjuncture. In some periods, the European countries that faced off Istanbul / Ankara with demands for land also showed themselves as the forces that helped to “protect” the territorial integrity of Ottoman / Turkey in other periods and portrayed themselves as the forces that demanded the opposite in various ways. In both cases, they have influenced Ottoman / Turkish politics and have tried to manipulate this for their own agenda.

European intervention in Turkish politics continued well after the Second World War. These interventions sometimes came directly in support of the various coups that took place in Turkey, and sometimes by way of pressure on Ankara under the guise of human rights and democracy. At times the UN has also given support to terrorist organizations that have threatened Turkish security and have also created circumstances designed to corrode the economic activity of Ankara.

Europe on the “No” Front

Defaming undesirable politicians, keeping a tab on the local media and using that media to create a smear campaign against Turkey have become increasingly popular methods of the Europeans to topple those that they are against in Turkey. Their aim is to discredit the politicians that are their chosen targets, overthrown by way of elections, with the goal of having them replaced with those who are easier and more open for manipulation.

Since the cost of overthrowing politicians – which cannot be changed through the polls – have become a heavy financial burden, their primary objective has been manipulation of the electorate by media campaigns.

For this reason, the elections and referenda held in Turkey have been the focus of interest for European countries. The April 16 referendum points to a process in which Turkey will undergo a fundamental change in its administration system and for this reason, it has become a point of interest for Europe.

Within this framework, it is evident that many circles in Europe have made their position on the referendum clear and have shown support for the “no” campaign. Turkish politicians and NGOs opposed to the constitutional change are freely permitted to work for the campaign whilst Turkish ministers and other senior politicians of the AK Party have been prevented from participating in events among the Turkish diaspora in Europe on the grounds that “Turkish politics should not be carried into Europe.”

Despite the fact that the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization in Europe, it has held rallies in favor of the “no” campaign there, yet the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu was barred from addressing Turkish citizens at the Turkish Consulate General in Rotterdam, with the Dutch government also refusing permission for his plane to land in the country. Yet again, Germany failed to intervene in a rally of the terrorist organization PKK, with posters of Ocalan and other slogans and symbols of the terrorist organization clearly on display despite the fact that the German Interior Ministry had prohibited these only days earlier. In addition, Fatma Betul Sayan Kaya, Minister of Family and Social Policy, meeting with Turkish voters in Rotterdam was hindered by violence, detained by the Dutch police at the consulate before being deported to Germany, as Turkish supporters of the minister who had gathered in protest were attacked by police dogs.

Now let’s look at this picture calmly. Turkish government ministers have been prevented from being able to conduct a campaign in NATO member countries of the Netherlands and Germany, whilst the PKK, a terrorist organization, is free to hold a public rally and campaign against the constitutional amendment in Frankfurt, Germany, another NATO member country. Whilst the ringleaders of the terrorist organization were freely able to participate in a PKK rally in Cologne, the German Constitutional Court prohibited a meeting organized by Turkish citizens who were supporting the Turkish government protesting the failed coup. This meeting was also to feature a video address by the Turkish President Erdogan that was also banned.

The same Constitutional Court had also ruled that the German authorities could prevent Turkish politicians from conducting election campaigns amongst the Turkish diaspora in Germany, but approved HDP politicians who have an arrest warrant in Turkey on charges of support for terrorism, allowing them to work for the referendum in Germany.

These facts make it explicitly clear that Turkey’s NATO allies have shown preference not with Ankara but with the outlawed PKK, which is the country’s foremost security threat today. Continuation of these policies will undoubtedly be decisive in the shaping of Turkey’s future alliance preferences as well as its general security policies.

An Obsessive Hostility

At this point, it is useful to look at why Europeans are so enthusiastically opposed to the constitutional amendment. For example, what is the uniting factor that made the German political parties hold hands siding with the “no” campaign in the Turkish referendum? All political parties, from Christian democracies to Social Democrats, from the Liberals to the Greens movement, from the anti-immigrant AfD to the extreme leftist Die Linke, are making an effort in order for the Turkish people to reject the constitutional amendment. The voices that say, “The referendum to be held in Turkey concerns Turks, let’s not break our bilateral relations by interfering with Turkey’s internal affairs,” have diminished so much so that they can hardly be heard.

German television broadcasts debate programs regarding Turkey every evening, insult Turkish leaders with calls for sanctions against Ankara flying through the air. It seems that for years, the campaigns against President Erdogan in the media have surpassed their own personal views and they now believe that they have no other option other than overthrowing Erdogan. They have difficulty recognizing that the majority of Turkish people and Turks living in Europe love and have preferred him again and again at every election. It is clear that they do not want to understand anymore, nor do they hold back in expressing their fury at the choices of the people.

Perhaps the increasing anger is fueled by the Turkish people’s growing love of Erdogan, which has demonstrated the failure of their defamation campaign that they have conducted against him. As prisoners of their anger, this also paves the way for making mistakes in their politics against Turkey. They are now struggling to manage the turmoil they have tried to sow in their own people against Turkey, against their ruling power in Turkey and its people. Anti-Turkish lobby (consisting of dissidents of Turkey and their German sympathizers) in Germany, who are behind this effort, have now become more influential in Germany’s Turkish politics. Blocking the Turkish ministers’ meetings while allowing PKK rallies shows the effectiveness and the power that this lobby wields.

The fact that the Turkish issue has taken up so much space in European politics and the public agenda, combined with the fact that so many negative perceptions about Turkey are floating in the air, constitute a serious obstacle to European countries and the EU’s rational policy monitoring of Ankara. Is there any chance that European politicians, obsessed with overthrowing Erdogan from power, can be freed now from this pathological interest? At this point, it is useful to underline again what this means in terms of Turkey. As far as the current power balances are concerned, the hostile policies of Erdogan-obsessed European countries that are more powerful than Turkey in terms of economic and military, might have the potential to harm Turkey. This damage may be far less than the damage that Turkey will incur at the hands of those who try to “wheel-align” our democracy, often with the support of terrorist organizations such as the PKK, all the while appearing friendly and an ally of Turkey.