Despite criticisms from local groups and regional governments, on September 25, residents in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq will vote in a referendum on whether they want to completely separate from the Republic of Iraq. While the region has enjoyed autonomy for decades, if the referendum approves the secession, an independent state will be born with a distinctly Kurdish identity, a long held aspiration for the ethnic group. But questions linger about the timing of the referendum, and how the new state will deal with the ethnic and sectarian schisms that are tearing apart the region.

Serif Dilek and Hazal Duran spoke with Hemin Hawrami, senior assistant to President Masoud Barzani, and the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

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Did you negotiate with Baghdad about the independence referendum? How does Baghdad approach this process? How do you expect Baghdad’s position to be after the referendum?

The independence referendum is not a new issue. We have discussed it with Prime Minister Abadi three times. And also, when President Barzani led a large Kurdistan delegation in September 2016, he discussed the forthcoming referendum for independence. But its date had not been fixed. In Baghdad, definitely there has not been that much negative reaction. The major concern of Baghdad is the continuation of dialogue. Of course, they prefer us to stay in Iraq. But we argue that a federal, an inclusive Iraq is over. The federal system has failed in Iraq. Because Iraq has not adhered in practice to a federal state structure although it is written in the constitution. This referendum in fact comes after a long process of dialogue with Baghdad. So, we hope that this positive atmosphere built on the cooperation against DAESH in Mosul and also on the cooperation that the Kurdistan region hosts nearly 1.8 million internally displaced Iraqi people (IDP) will help us to find new formulas in establishing bilateral relationships.

Does the referendum for the Kurdistan region indicate independence? If so, what kind of process does Iraqi Kurdistan expect after the referendum?

Yeah. The referendum is for independence and the referendum has one question: Are we with an independent Kurdistan, yes or no? So, there is no third question or a third option. After the referendum, there will definitely be a long process with Baghdad. The Kurdistan delegation, from representing all the political parties, all the components, including Christians and Turkmen; they will talk to Baghdad about for example how we can establish a healthy economic interdependence between Baghdad and Kurdistan in the post-referendum process; how we can continue on a joint military defense strategy built on what we did in Mosul together; how we can use, for example, pipelines between Iraq and Kurdistan; and how not to have visas; how to have one market for both sides and some kind of other further economic interdependency. So, these are the details that we will be taking in the post-referendum period.

Some Kurdish parties (Gorran, for example) harshly criticized the decision of the referendum. Was the referendum decision a result of general compromise between the Kurdish parties or just a decision of President Masood Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)?

I cannot speak on behalf of Gorran. But, in principle, Gorran is not against independence. The charter of Gorran stipulates that they support self-determination and the independence of Kurdistan. Maybe they have concerns about the mechanism of the referendum. Well, President Barzani has communicated with all the political parties, including Gorran and we sent invitations to them for a meeting on the  7^th of June. There are eleven blocks represented in the parliament and Gorran is one of them. Except Gorran and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the other nine blocks came to the meeting with President Barzani. The referendum issue was discussed and put to unanimous vote with the participation of the nine blocks. So, the decision was taken unanimously by all the political parties attending the meeting. It was not a unilateral decision made by President Barzani.

http://thenewturkey.org/intra-kurdish-approaches-to-the-independence-referendum-in-northern-iraq/

It is stated that the referendum will also be held in the disputed territories. According to Article 140 of the Constitution, it was specified that the people living in these regions would be connected to the Central Government of Iraq or Iraqi Kurdistan through a referendum, but the mentioned referendum did not happen. Will it mean that these regions will be a part of Iraqi Kurdistan if the result will be “yes” in the referendum?

The referendum decision was made unanimously by all the parties and with President Barzani. This referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan. Disputed territories mean that both the Iraqi government and Kurdish regional government have a right in administration. In fact, we have been waiting for 10 years for Article 140 to be implemented, however, it was not. If the people of this region participate in the referendum and if they vote ‘yes’, it means that they want to be part of independent Kurdistan.

Of course, Kirkuk has a special state in Kurdistan. We believe that the Turkmen, right now, enjoy much more rights and freedom than they enjoy in other parts of Iraq. The Turkmen will be the second largest ethnic group and they will be true partners in governing the Kurdistan region. If you look at the election results in 2005 in the disputed territories, the majority voted for the Kurdistani list, which included the Kurds, the Turkmen and others. And the fight against ISIS… If it was not for the Peshmerga and KRG, this area would have been controlled by ISIS like Mosul. So, although right now we have the full military, administrative and political control of the area, we don’t want to impose anything.

In addition to this, the disputed territories have been historically and geographically parts of Kurdistan as it has faced Arabization. But we don’t want to impose a de facto situation and asked them whether you want to have a Kurdish ethnic state. It’s a Kurdistani state based on partnership.

The regional and international actors’ approach to the referendum is not positive. How accurate is it to take a decision on independence at a time where international support is weak? In addition to this, is it possible that there will be any breaks in the relations between the Iraqi Kurdistan and some international actors after the referendum?

First of all, this is a domestic issue between Kurdistan, us and Baghdad. Secondly, the international community is more interested in whether this referendum might affect the fight against ISIS negatively. Well, long before the referendum in 2014, we had nothing but we fought against ISIS. We reassure the regional and international community that an independent Kurdistan will be much stronger in fighting terrorism. Thirdly, when the Iraqi government violated the constitution and the Iraqi army melted down against Daesh, was there really an international community to stand against the chaotic situation?

Please look at the last 26 years and make an analogy. Kurdistan’s contribution to Iraq’s security and stability is immense. Take Turkey, for example. Kurdistan contributes to Turkish national security by acting like a buffer zone between the unstable part of Iraq and the Turkish southern borders. It also makes a positive contribution to the trade relationship with Turkey and the other countries. It provides energy security. In terms of governance, despite a small region with only 5 million people, we are hosting 1.8 million IDP’s and refugees. So, if we were not a functioning political entity, all these people would flee to Turkey or Europe.

Of course, we don’t except the international community to say “okay, we are officially supporting the breakup of Iraq.” But our message for the international and regional community is that the current status quo cannot continue; that Iraq is already divided on sectarian and ethnic lines between the Shiites and Sunnis, between the Arabs and the Kurds. I recently have heard from the head of a Shiite endowment, who said that “there is no room for Christians to stay in Iraq anymore.” Even if you take Kurdistan out, the remainder of Iraq is divided. It is a failed state and we need to prevent the Iraqification of the Kurdistan region.

As you know, the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan is largely dependent on oil revenues and also the budget of the region is dependent on Baghdad. How can a politically independent Kurdistan survive in economic terms? What kind of policies are you going to implement to ensure economic independence?

First, I don’t agree with the term “economic independence.” Now, all economies are interdependent and there is no independent economy. Secondly, we have survived two sets of sanctions in the past: UN sanctions on Iraq and Iraqi sanctions on Kurdistan. Third, Iraqi Kurdistan – here I should underline that I did my masters on the political economy of Kurdistan, on the rentier state – primarily wants political independence, because we want to get rid of the understanding of a frontier mentality we inherited from Baghdad. We want to diversify our economy by not relying only on oil.

We don’t have a taxation system in Kurdistan because of the central budget law. We need sovereignty first in order to go through a systematic reform to change the equation from a public-oriented economy to a private-oriented one and to help the private sector to grow. So, the Kurdistan region can survive. And Kurdistan has the 9th largest oil reserves in the world and has 8 trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas. The world economy needs that. Turkey needs that. You need our resources; we need your pipelines and your transportation. So, it’s a win-win situation. We do believe an independent Iraqi Kurdistan will be a more strategic economic partner for Turkey.

Do you have another option to export your natural gas or oil to other countries?

Turkey is our strategic partner but we will also be looking forward to have a strong partnership with Baghdad so that our economic interdependence would allow us to export our natural gas and oil through Baghdad.

We just want to get back to the point we have discussed earlier. There is ongoing regional instability in the Middle East. In addition to the chaotic situation of Iraq and Syria, there are millions of people who have either been displaced or became refugees because of DAESH. Today Iraqi Kurdistan is home to about 1.9 million refugees. How suitable is it to take a decision of referendum in such kind a complicated environment?

My question to you: when will there be a perfect environment? Those who criticize and say that it’s not perfect timing, our question to them is “just tell us two or three perfect times in the next ten years?” When is the ideal timing? There is no ideal and perfect timing. If we keep the current status quo, we can’t be sure of our future.

I am asking myself, “have we been part of the problem or have we been part of the solution?” It was not us who created DAESH but it was us who broke the myth of DAESH. In terms of the Shiite-Sunni sectarian fight, we are not taking a side. The Kurds are Sunnis, we say. We don’t care about Shiite-Sunni division because we are Sunnis.

Look, we’ve been providing support to the IDPs regardless of their sectarian affiliation. In terms of the economic stability, we were the second largest market for Turkey after Germany. Out of $12 billion trade with other parts of Iraq, why is there $9 billion with Kurdistan region? Because we’ve been part of that solution for Turkey. So, when some argue about the instability, we have not been the factor behind it. Actually, the instability in the Middle East is the result of post-colonial failed state systems, Sykes-Picot more precisely. The borders are not reflecting the true realities of the people in the region.

What do you think the referendum will result in?

In 2005, we did an informal referendum and 96% of the people voted ‘yes.’ So, this time, I believe that the landslide majority of people, including the Turkmen, Christians, and Arabs living in the disputed areas, will vote “yes” and prefer to live in a stable Kurdistan rather than for an unknown future.

How about your personal expectation about the forthcoming elections in Iraq, the general and provincial elections?

Are you sure that there will be elections? Because we aren’t. If the Iraqi parliament is going to be elected according to the current election law, which gives Shiites majority, no matter how many Kurds or Sunnis participated, we, as the Kurds, are not going to participate in the next Iraqi parliament election. Because we are giving legitimacy to an illegitimate situation. For example, if all Kurds participate in the upcoming election, we will have only 60-65 seats. That’s why we want this election law to be amended from 18 constituencies to make all of Iraq one constituency.

How will an independent Kurdistan deal with minorities such as the Turkmen, as they are opposing the independence referendum at some point, and some minor groups also oppose this idea. Which rights and guarantees will they have?

We don’t call them minorities. That’s the first guarantee. Irrelevant of their number, we will accept them as ethnic groups. Secondly, they have 5 members in the current parliament. They have the right to have education in their native language from kindergarten to university.

We don’t call it a Kurdish state; we call it Kurdistan state. Because, Kurdistan, like Turkey, is the homeland for the Kurdistani citizens. You don’t call everyone who lives in Turkey a Turk. Right? Because Turkey is home to citizens with Circassian, Armenian, Kurdish, Turk, and Arab background. So, Kurdistan is also home for whoever lives there and that’s another guarantee.

Absolutely, we will need international support for it. I mean how we can draft the constitution before the declaration by law. The rights of different ethnic groups must be guaranteed and what kind of mechanism could be established to assure their participation? I can assure you the oppressed people are not going to oppress others.

http://thenewturkey.org/mosul-in-ruins-kirkuk-awaits-a-similar-destiny-what-can-turkey-do/

What are your ideas about the PYD in Syria? Commonly, you know that there is a major dispute between them and PDKS (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê li Sûriyê – Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria).

PYD is the PKK. There is no difference between them. We have supported the Kurdish uprising and Syrian opposition since the beginning. We wished and supported them to have a kind of Supreme Council through the first Erbil Agreement in 2012, Second Erbil Agreement 2013 and then the Duhok Agreement in 2014 to help them to have a kind of shared and common administration. But unfortunately, the PYD did not have a clear vision for the future of the Rojava. They’ve been collaborating one time with the Syrian regime and with others without having a political future. And the PYD has been oppressing non-PYD political parties like closing their offices by not allowing them to have any political activities, or by arresting them. Because of that we’ve been against such actions of the PYD.

Do you have any ideas of a population exchange?

No. I want to make it clear. This independence referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan and it is not going to change the current Iraqi international border, which will be the official border of Kurdistan with Turkey, Iran, and Syria. This is a propaganda by some PKK circles, who argue that there will be a connection between Rojava and Kurdistan. That’s not true. That’s not going to happen.

Our last question is about the name of the state. How will it be named if the referendum results in “yes”? Kurdistan or the Republic of Kurdistan?

Definitely, it will be a liberal republic. But the name, I can’t tell. It has something related to Iraqi Kurdistan. Honestly, I have no idea. You should ask that question after the referendum either to the referendum committee or to the founding fathers.

On Oct. 31, 2015 the Iraqi National Alliance, a front of Shiite political groups, announced that they are in the process of drafting an important document called the “Historical Settlement.” On February 6, 2017, Ammar al–Hakeem, the leader of the Alliance, stated that the project is the result of intensive and constructive talks with all Iraqi groups and has the backing of regional stakeholder governments. Moreover, the United States and the UN will have a role in it too, and it will be announced after the end of the war against DAESH. Thus, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) will draft the final version of the Historical Settlement after the document is approved by both the parliament and the Cabinet and Iraqi parties agree to abide by it. UNAMI will try to convince regional institutions, namely the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to support the project. The document is to addresses key issues, including power and wealth distribution between the Federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the grievances of Sunni Arab provinces. The implementation of the Historical Settlement has many opportunities as well as insurmountable challenges, and to succeed Iraq needs to avail itself from the experience of other countries who have dealt with the same kind of divisions.

Road to Historical Settlement

Iraq, like other countries which have witnessed dictatorship and civil war, is in need of a national reconciliation. Though Iraqi governments in the past have officially committed themselves to the achievement of national reconciliation, very few tangible steps have been taken so far. In 2003, the government of Ayah al-Alawi, the leader of Iraqiyah Bloc, and Nouri al-Maliki, who would serve as Prime Minister, officially committed their governments to the process, but no concrete steps were taken. As Prime Minister, Al-Maliki pursued sectarian and authoritarian policies which resulted in alienating Sunni Arabs and Kurds, and led DAESH to try championing the Sunni cause.

In July 2014, Haider al-Abadi came to power as prime minister with a promise to curb corruption and broker national reconciliation. However, his efforts were hindered by the pro-al-Maliki group and the rising power of al-Hashd Shaabi, Shiite militias which have Iranian backing. Those Shiite militias have taken very uncompromising steps. Besides, pro-Iranian political circles used their best to prevent the formation of a National Guard in Sunni Arab majority provinces, and they made the long awaited Amnesty Law, which was passed in the parliament on August 2016, toothless and too late. For these reasons, even if DAESH were to be expelled from the cities, the grievances of Sunni Arabs will continue.

Opportunities

Through Iraq’s distant and modern history, it is evident that its diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural communities have succeeded in peaceful coexistence and intermixing. Unlike many other countries, where Shiites and Sunnis live apart, before the effects of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Shiite and Sunni Iraqis lived in integrated communities in many mixed regions, especially in Baghdad. There are several powerful tribal confederations which have a mixed Shiite and Sunni membership. These are potential resources, which need to be tapped in for reconciliation. For example, in 2007 a group of facilitators from the US Institute of Peace (USIP) in the district of Mahmoudiyah, an area south of Baghdad which was known as the “Triangle of Death,” helped to broker a reconciliation pact through tribal chieftains from Sunnis and Shiites that still endures. This experience needs to be generalized to other regions in Iraq. Besides, the implementation of the stated policies of US president Donald Trump with regard to the curbing of Iran’s undue influence in Iraq and al-Abadi’s imminent victory against DAESH will have a combined impact of weakening the al-Maliki camp and pro-Iranian Shiite militias. These will give national reconciliation internally a great momentum.

Challenges

The most serious challenges to national reconciliation are the lack of trust among various Iraqi groups, the exclusiveness in the nature of some influential elements on both sides, structural flaws in the post-2003 government, Iranian interference in Iraq, and the lack of a determined will to have reconciliation. After the US invasion, Iraqis agreed to form governments of communities, instead of government of citizens, as a power-sharing formula. Since 2014, al-Maliki’s group, supported by Iran, has been calling for the formation of a government of a “political majority.” In reality, al-Maliki is trying to use democracy to establish the government of a Shiite majority to the exclusion of Sunnis (Arabs and Kurds). In addition, al-Abadi’s inability to live up to his government program with regard to the Kurds has forced the Kurds to distrust Shiite politicians in Baghdad. During the first week of February, al-Hakeem visited the KRG to sound them out on his project. He received a cold response from their leaders, who have mostly opted for separation from Iraq and waiting to see what Trump’s future policy on Iraq will be.

These and other challenges have been spelled out in a well-written piece by Nazli Tarzi in the Middle East Eye. Tarzi rightly points that there is a lot of vagueness in the project and it has been drafted in the dark unilaterally by Shiite groups. It is not so inclusive either. But all these challenges could be overcome, if al-Hakeem’s proposed document was to be discussed openly with prominent Sunni groups and the international community lends its support to it.

Turkey and Iran have many stakes in its success and they should and could play an important role in this regard. Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group in a 2007 report, and more recently the al-Bayan Center for Study and Planning, an Iraqi think tank based in Baghdad, have prepared projects for national reconciliation which reiterate the same points: the complex nature of the conflict in Iraq has reached a point where an international and regional intervention is necessary. Iraq needs to upgrade the role of Jan Kubis, the head of UNAMI, from that of good will ambassador to that of an arbiter. The US also needs to use its influence and leverage among all communities in Iraq for this purpose. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan must put pressure on Sunnis (Arabs and Kurds) to show a readiness for a historical compromise to achieve a durable and lasting peace. Iran has to be pressured to exercise a positive influence on Iraq’s Shiites. Except for a few extremist groups, the war-weary majority of Iraqi groups are now ready to accept this.

And the Iraqis need to benefit from other countries which had experienced civil wars. The formation of a body in Iraq similar to the Committee of Truth and Reconciliation, which was established in 1990 in South Africa, for example, is noteworthy. This Committee addressed the needs of the victims of the Apartheid regime by recognition and remedies instead of revenge and punishment. It convinced the perpetuators of the crimes to admit and apologize for their deeds. The new constitution of 1996 guaranteed the rights of black majorities and safeguarded that of white Afrikaners.

Traditional and tribal institutions were utilized to bring harmony to the conflict-torn country. The hastily drawn Iraqi constitution of 2005 needs to be amended to address the needs of Sunni Arabs. The controversial practice of de-Baathification should be reversed and de-politicized and be left to the judicial authorities. The controversial current Iraqi laws and regulations on terrorism have to be either eliminated or amended to exclude its future abuse. The high-ranking Iraqi religious authorities among Sunnis and Shiites need to act as peace-makers similar to the role South-African Archbishop Desmond Tutu played. Furthermore, the issue of disputed territories and control over oil and gas revenues with the KRG needs to be addressed by resorting to a third-party for mediation, as well as the Supreme Court of Iraq.

Iraq has a chance to achieve a much needed national reconciliation, if political groups exhibit a true will to do so and receive the needed external support.

Considering the advanced age, 76 years, and the poor health of Khamenei, there is a possibility that the newly elected Assembly will be charged with electing Iran’s third Supreme Leader. Secondly, the elections, especially for the parliament, came at a critical time with advantages for the non-conservative fronts. The nuclear deal reached between Iran and the P5+1 countries which consists of US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany and the consequent lifting of longstanding and burdensome sanctions on the former came shortly before the elections for which the Rouhani government was given credit. Rouhani demonstrated his intention to carry a similar dialogue process to solve some of the pressing domestic problems such as restoring the freedom of the two reformist leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohsen Karoubi, who have been sentenced to house arrest because of their involvement in the Green Movement in 2009. Thus, conservative power holders, most notably the Supreme Leader, used every opportunity, during and after the nuclear talks, to denounce the Americans and warn Iranians of the malevolent enemy, closing the door on such expectations.

Considering the advanced age, 76 years, and the poor health of Khamenei, there is a possibility that the newly elected Assembly will be charged with electing Iran’s third Supreme Leader.

With a slightly over 60 percent voter turnout, 68 of the 290 seats in parliament had remained empty on February 26 when no clear winner emerged; according to the Iranian laws, a candidate must win at least 25 percent of votes cast in an electoral district to qualify as a deputy. These 69 deputies have been elected in the runoff election held on April 29, 2016. A number of distinctively Iranian features – some essential, others conjectural- make a comprehensive appraisal of the election results challenging. For instance, no political parties as such exist in Iran and the seats of the deputies are determined by drawing lots every six months. Besides, only about half of those who registered to run for parliament, 6,229 out of 12,000, were approved by the Council of Guardians. So, many notable reformists were disqualified by the Council and Iran experienced yet another conservatively well-engineered pre-election process. Further, the right–left political spectrum as it exists in Iran hardly makes any sense in other contexts. Therefore, one should not overstate the results in favor of the vaguely defined reformists.

Yet, certainly the results were utterly disheartening for the conservatives who lost all of the capital’s 30 parliamentary seats to the “List of Hope” of the reformist-moderate fronts. For instance, while Mohammad-Reza Aref, the former presidential candidate and a professed reformist, was among the thirty elected deputies from Tehran, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, the principal candidate of the conservative camp, was denied a seat in parliament. A similar result came out of the Assembly of Experts’ elections. While Rouhani and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani were elected to the Assembly such principle conservative figures as Muhammad Yazdi, the current ultraconservative Chairman of the Assembly, and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, one of the protagonists of conservative thinking, could not make their way to the new Assembly.

Elections and Domestic Politics

For a long time, Iran’s Middle East policies have turned attention away from its domestic developments and towards its foreign policies. The country seemed to many a monolithic body which, say, pursued harmonious policies to preserve its strongholds in Iraq or Syria or conducted painstaking talks over its nuclear question. Yet, major disagreements between conservatives and non-conservatives have existed throughout; disagreements which surfaced again during the last weeks. Now that the next presidential elections are only a year and a half away Iran has a lot to debate at home. Above all there are economic issues which are among the direst problems for most Iranians. Inflation is still high, the number of the unemployed is on the rise, income inequality is becoming greater and even the essentials are getting harder for low income groups to afford. The nuclear deal has not yet produced the expected outcomes for the Iranian economy. The economic problems are and will continue to be amongst the most challenging for the Rouhani government.

It is safe to suggest that the gap between the conservative and reformist policies will continue to widen in the newly elected 10th Parliament.

There is also the current government’s reformist agenda. Although Rouhani and other prominent moderates and reformists are among the outspoken supporters of the Revolution and the Islamic Republic regime they differ from the conservatives on some crucial points. They see the future of the regime in being willing and able to meet the plausible popular demands which can fill the growing gap between the state and society. Economically speaking, they favor, in the words of Rouhani, a ‘competitive economy’ which will attract foreign capital into the country, while the conservatives see, what Khamenei calls, a ‘defensive economy,’ which basically refers to the promotion of home industries that will remove the need for foreign imports, as the only viable policy.

The favorable election results will bring a challenge on a macro level since the frustrated conservatives will probably follow more aggressive policies against the government. Therefore, it is safe to suggest that the gap between the conservative and reformist policies will continue to widen in the newly elected 10th Parliament. Also, disheartened by the long list of disqualified candidates many pro-reform voters boycotted the elections. Rouhani needs to convince them to vote for the next presidential elections in 2017 for which his economy performance, but not only, will play the determining role. Yet, considering the many inexperienced deputies and the numerous moderates who have been elected from the ‘List of Hope’ and the approximately 80 independent deputies as potentially key groups in parliamentary politics, it is not clear to what extent they will be able to back the Rouhani government and act harmoniously. On his Labor Day speech, Rouhani commented on the results and said that, “people chose the best people in the elections, and we are happy that the next parliament will be more coordinated with the government.” This, more than anything else, remains to be seen.

Iran and its Neighbors

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a clear message to friends and foes alike that Turkey is strictly against sectarian policies and denounced any attempts at deepening the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.

Having lifted the Western-imposed isolation by the nuclear deal, Iran is on the edge of a new isolation, this time by its Sunni neighbors which have been disillusioned by the former’s regional policies, as reflected in the Final Communique of the 13th Session of the Islamic Summit Conference held in Istanbul in mid-May 2016. In that, Iran was deliberately criticized for supporting terrorism and interfering in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries including Syria and Yemen. Further, in his speech during the Summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a clear message to friends and foes alike that Turkey is strictly against sectarian policies and denounced any attempts at deepening the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.

It would be an overestimation to suppose that the Rouhani government is necessarily at odds with the conservative establishment on such critical foreign policy issues as Iraq, Syria and Yemen but it certainly supports more friendly relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors, primarily Turkey. Rouhani declared, in his visit to Ankara following the Summit, his intention to improve relations with Turkey and added that the post-sanctions era brought about a suitable environment for such a development. The new parliament provides a good opportunity for both Rouhani and Iran’s neighbors, primarily Turkey, to build mutually beneficial and reciprocal relationships. This can also help solve some of the region’s chronic problems.

The way out from such a subjective evaluation is to expose, on the ground of minority rights, whether or not such interventionist actors act solely or primarily in their own interests, or truly in the interest of the sectarian groups with whom they share similar sectarian sensitivities.If a policy specifically focuses on the rights of only a certain minority sect, rather than being a general policy or approach to minority rights, then it is possible to claim that such an attitude signals sectarian politics.The answer to the second question is easier. That is to say, if states or non-state actors take advantage of the same or similar sectarian identities of others in different countries to serve their interests only, then such states or non-state actors are definitely engaged in sectarian politics.

The aim of a state in such a case is not to, in essence, protect the aforementioned minorities, but to use sectarian ties with the minorities as a means to accomplish their own foreign policy objectives.

The answer to the question of why some states generally use minorities, who share common sectarian identities with them, in ways that harm them, is hidden in the nature of international affairs.

States competing with each other for superiority not only use military, economic and diplomatic instruments in their struggles; they also use peoples (often by leveraging their ethnic, sectarian and/or class identities) as tools in these struggles.

From this perspective, the identities of the (minority) people that differ from those in their home countries, but overlap with those of the other (interfering) countries may become part of the “soft power” of the latter.

Today, such politics are drawing not only the Middle East, but also other territories of Islam into conflicts, due to the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia in sectarian politics.

However, if these like-identities (sectarian similarities in particular) are used as a means to gain advantage in power politics, they inflict almost unhealable wounds in the Middle East. The sectarian dimensions of clashes to which some regional countries were drawn during the Arab Revolutions clearly attest to this problem.

The answer to the third question signals sectarian politics also. In other words, the activities of regional countries to spread their own sectarian values in other Muslim countries (Shi’ization, Salafization, or Sunnization) represent another aspect of sectarian politics.

Why some countries follow such sectarian politics boils down to two answers – one theological, the other political. From a theological perspective, the propensity to be intolerant of anothers’ religion, to staunchly defend (or impose) one’s own religious perspective over those of others, has always been a fact of social groups. In this perspective, the Shi’ization, Salafization, or Sunnization efforts of radical groups may be interpreted as a kind of missionary activity.

From a political perspective, a state may seek to increase the number of communities with common sectarian features in other countries in order to increase its soft power.

Such sectarian activities, instigated by many Middle Eastern countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia in particular, increase the feeling of insecurity in the region. States that view sectarian activities as a threat to their security describe other actors involved in such activities as enemies, and initiate similar counter activities themselves.

In light of the above determinations, it is possible to identify sectarian politics as follows:

If a state or a non-state actor follows a policy to take advantage of the common sectarian identities of peoples in other countries for self-gain, or if it is involved in similar sectarian activities in other countries to increase the number of such communities in other territories to use them for its own interests, or if it interferes in the internal affairs of other countries with the excuse of protecting the rights of minority sects, then that country follows sectarian foreign politics.

However, it is important not to be satisfied with such a definition while answering the question of “What is sectarian politics?” as the consequences of sectarian politics must also be analyzed. In every period of history, policies which place sectarian identities at center stage, and use them as a means for political gains, have resulted in disasters for the targeted peoples.

Pro-sectarian politics is one of the most important obstacles to the development of a politics of cooperation in the Middle East based on a win-win scenario. Today, such politics are drawing not only the Middle East, but also other territories of Islam into conflicts, due to the competition particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia in sectarian politics. For example, Salafi organizations supported by Saudi Arabia and radical Shiite groups backed by Iran play a pivotal role in sectarian clashes in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

If the actors behind sectarian conflicts in the region recognize the damage they inflict and understand that such conflicts do more harm to themselves than good, such awareness will be the way out of the regional conflicts caused by sectarian politics.

Having respect for the sectarian identity of the other party, abstaining from involvement in missionary activities among peoples of other countries, and not turning sectarian identities in other lands into tools for power politics, will eliminate the possible damages incurred by the sectarian frame of mind.