D
evelopments in Mali over recent months indicate that the security crisis in the Sahel region has entered a new phase. In particular, the “tactical cooperation” that has emerged between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin – JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (Front de Libération de l’Azawad – FLA), which represents the Tuareg separatist faction, has exerted serious military pressure on the Bamako administration.
The recapture of Kidal in April 2026, the targeting of the areas around Bamako and Kati, and the assassination of Defence Minister Sadio Camara have demonstrated that Assimi Goita’s administration is facing one of the most severe security crises of recent years. However, the emerging picture suggests, contrary to initial appearances, not the regime’s imminent collapse in the short term, but rather the deepening of a protracted war of attrition between state authority and armed groups in Mali.
The fundamental issue in Mali today is not so much the military capacity of the armed groups, but whether this capacity can be transformed into a sustainable political order. Indeed, whilst the recent coordination between JNIM and the FLA has yielded significant results in terms of wearing down the regime, it has failed to articulate a shared political vision capable of jointly governing Mali. Consequently, whilst this alliance may be able to put pressure on the Goita administration in the short term, it remains far from producing a comprehensive alternative capable of establishing a new model of governance across the country.
Developments in Mali over the past two years have brought this structural problem into sharper focus. Whilst clashes between the FLA—which reorganised in the north by the end of 2024—and the Malian army intensified, JNIM also expanded its influence, particularly in central and western Mali. Attacks carried out along the Dioura, Boulikessi and Timbuktu line throughout 2025 have highlighted the Malian army’s capacity issues. Meanwhile, JNIM’s systematic attacks on fuel convoys along the Senegal-Mali border during the same period have demonstrated that the group effectively employs not only military but also economic pressure tactics. The fuel crisis, power cuts and transport problems in the capital, Bamako, have laid bare the erosion of the state’s capacity to provide basic services.
In response, the Goita administration has further restricted the political sphere in parallel with the security crisis. The closure of political parties, the suppression of opposition figures and the postponement of the electoral process on the grounds of ‘pacifying the country’ have reinforced the trend towards the institutionalisation of military rule in Mali. The Goita administration has transformed the security crisis into a tool of legitimacy not only in military but also in political terms. In particular, anti-French rhetoric and an emphasis on sovereignty play a significant role in the Goita regime’s ability to generate social support.
In fact, this is precisely the fundamental reason why the Goita regime remains in power today. It survives not because the regime is strong, but because its rivals have failed to present a common state project. The armed opposition in Mali, whilst appearing militarily effective, is politically fragmented. At the heart of this fragmentation lie the structural differences between JNIM and the FLA. JNIM is an al-Qaeda-linked organisation that ‘exploits Islam’, and this radical group claims that its long-term objective is to establish a Sharia-based order in Mali. The organisation is attempting to establish alternative governance mechanisms, particularly in rural areas.
It is filling the state vacuum through methods such as tax collection, setting up checkpoints, mediating local disputes and operating Sharia courts. Consequently, JNIM has become a hybrid actor seeking to establish influence not only in the military sphere but also in the social and economic spheres, deriving legitimacy from these domains. The relationships it has developed with Fulani communities, particularly those spreading across the Sahel region, have given the organisation significant social depth in central Mali.
In contrast, the FLA’s primary motivation is not ideological but ethno-regional. The Tuareg separatist movements have for many years been advocating for autonomy or independence centered on Azavad in northern Mali. Consequently, the FLA’s priority is not to Islamize the Malian state, but to establish a Tuareg-dominated political sphere in the north. This explains why the relationship between JNIM and the FLA is limited and fragile. Both actors seek to weaken the Bamako administration; however, they have quite different political projects regarding ‘how Mali should be governed’.
This difference becomes particularly apparent in discussions regarding the ‘post-victory order’. Whilst JNIM aims to establish ideological hegemony across the whole of Mali, the FLA appears to be seeking regional dominance in the north. In other words, whilst one seeks ideological transformation of the unitary state, the other advocates a political model based on the fragmentation of the state. Consequently, whilst joint military operations may be possible, a joint governance model appears a highly unlikely prospect.
Moreover, the difference between these two structures is not merely ideological. Their spheres of legitimacy also differ. The FLA’s social support is largely confined to the Tuareg region in the north and lacks a strong political counterpart in southern regions such as Bamako, Sikasso or Kayes. JNIM, on the other hand, is able to operate across a wider geographical area, particularly in regions where state violence is intense, presenting itself as an ‘alternative security provider’.
However, even this does not grant the organization a sustainable governance capacity across the country. Indeed, as seen in the case of Mali, armed groups in the Sahel, whilst possessing the military capacity to erode state authority, are unable to produce a sustainable and inclusive governance model capable of replacing it. JNIM’s economic blockade and rural control capacity may exert pressure on Bamako, but it lacks the administrative and economic infrastructure to replace modern state mechanisms. The same applies to the FLA. There is a significant difference between establishing control over symbolic areas such as Kidal and governing a country with a population of over 20 million, which is ethnically fragmented and economically oriented towards the south. Consequently, the current situation in Mali represents the ‘spread of multiple spheres of authority’ rather than the ‘construction of an alternative state’.
The Goita administration’s external support commitments are also bolstering the regime’s resilience. The security vacuum created following France’s withdrawal and the conclusion of MINUSMA has been attempted to be filled by Russian-backed security structures. The transition from Wagner to the Africa Corps demonstrates that Russian influence is taking on a new form. Although Russian support has not fully ensured security in Mali, it constitutes a significant security buffer preventing the regime’s sudden collapse. Furthermore, the Sahel States Alliance (Alliance des États du Sahel – AES) axis, developed by Mali alongside Burkina Faso and Niger, provides the regime with a regional sphere of solidarity.
Consequently, the most likely scenario in Mali in the coming period is the deepening of a fragmented security order rather than the country falling entirely under the control of a single party. A prolonged war of attrition, in which the FLA increases its influence in the north and JNIM in the central regions, whilst the Bamako-based military core maintains its presence, appears a more realistic prospect. In this process, internal power struggles within the regime and new military alignments may also come to the fore.
However, current data suggests that whilst JNIM and the FLA do not possess the capacity or a shared vision to jointly govern the whole of Mali, JNIM is strengthening its position within the FLA and pursuing a medium- to long-term strategy. Consequently, the crisis unfolding in Mali today is not merely a security issue. It is also a crisis of state capacity, representation, centre-periphery relations and legitimacy. One of the factors fueling JNIM’s growth is the inadequacy of state capacity and exclusionary security policies. The factor fueling the FLA’s resistance, however, is the chronic issue of autonomy and representation in the north. Yet the common ground between these two structures is merely their opposition to the current regime. Indeed, this alliance is insufficient to produce a sustainable political vision and also fuels the underlying rivalry between these groups.
Consequently, the picture emerging in Mali today reflects a ‘crisis of mutual governance’ rather than a regime change. The Goita administration is unable to establish effective sovereignty across the entire country, yet its rivals are also unable to offer a comprehensive political order capable of replacing it. Therefore, however remarkable the recent “military successes” of the JNIM and Tuareg groups may be, it is quite difficult for these successes to translate into a sustainable state model. In Mali, the determining factor in the short term will not be the decisive victory of one side, but rather how this long-term balance of attrition between the state and armed groups will shape the nerve centers inside and outside Bamako.
(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)
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