Türkiye's Role in Bangladesh's Defense Development and India's Concerns
Although China remains Bangladesh's primary military supporter, Dhaka is also seeking to increase Turkey's involvement in South Asian geopolitics.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended the 2023 G20 Leaders' Summit in New Delhi, the capital of India. President Erdoğan was officially welcomed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Photo by Anadolu Images.
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ach region has its own particularities. South Asia, for instance, is largely dominated by India. Any planning that ignores Delhi’s supremacy would be unrealistic. In a military context, the defence ecosystems of the countries in the region are fragile and remain in India’s shadow, with Pakistan being a partial exception. However, there is also significant dependency on Russia, China and the West.
Nevertheless, the search for multipolarity in world politics, brought about by upheavals in the international system, has also prompted countries to protect themselves from risk. Middle powers are now resisting having their destinies determined for them, instead seeking to determine them themselves. This creates opportunities for new partners who can respond to this quest. This is precisely the new reality of the quest for a multipolar world.
Although China remains Bangladesh’s primary military supporter, Dhaka is also seeking to increase Turkey’s involvement in South Asian geopolitics. This would enable Turkey to access the Bangladeshi defence market and gradually undermine China’s near-monopoly on Dhaka’s military supply.
Therefore, this pursuit has the potential to reshape regional dynamics. Discussions regarding the potential sale of Turkey’s HİSAR O+ and SİPER medium- and long-range surface-to-air missile systems to Bangladesh have raised concerns in India. India currently exercises strategic control over the Bay of Bengal and its eastern border, and is concerned that its air superiority on the eastern front may be diminished. While Dhaka’s acquisition of Turkish air defence technology does not match the reach of India’s Russian S-400 systems, it will provide Dhaka with a credible deterrent and complicate regional air planning near sensitive border areas. This could potentially reshape the balance of air defence capabilities in South Asia, where Russian systems currently dominate.
While India may not believe that the qualitative and quantitative superiority of its armed forces in the region can be questioned, it is aware that its strategic comfort could be disrupted. While Delhi is accustomed to managing Chinese influence in the region, the defence industry export initiatives of Turkey — a strong NATO member with an independent stance that aims to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific with its ‘Asia Anew’ policy — represent a new situation for India. Turkey offers NATO-standard technology and takes a warm approach to issues such as technology sharing and joint production, imposing fewer conditions than its alternatives.
Turkish defense influence in South Asia
While it is natural for Delhi not to consider its supremacy to be in question, the limits of its influence have been firmly questioned by even its closest neighbours for some time now. Last year, relations between India and Bangladesh became strained following the fall of the Indian-backed government amid protests in Bangladesh, and after Delhi hosted ousted Prime Minister Hasina, who had sought refuge in India and was recently sentenced to death in absentia.
Turkey–India relations have generally progressed cautiously due to the misconception of viewing them through a Pakistani lens. However, they have improved in recent years, particularly since Ankara’s diplomatic support for Islamabad during Operation Sindoor and Delhi’s subsequent show of solidarity with actors with whom Ankara has had friction in the region, such as the Greek Cypriot Administration, Greece, and Armenia. This is based on the unfounded claim that Ankara disapproves of these actors, with an eye for retaliation or tit-for-tat.
In this context, India accuses Bangladesh’s Yunus-led caretaker government of facilitating the resurgence of Islamist political forces and strengthening ties with Turkey. From this perspective, Bangladesh’s potential as Turkey’s next key partner in South Asia, similar to Pakistan, is unsettling for India.
Historically, Turkey’s foreign policy orientation has been Western-centric, limiting its outreach to more distant regions further east, such as South Asia. However, this situation has changed in recent years, particularly since the launch of the Asia Anew policy in 2019.
2025 can specifically be described as the year in which Ankara’s strategic consistency in its Asia Anew initiative converged with Bangladesh’s clear policy approach of seeking to expand its partnerships beyond traditional actors. Consequently, by 2025, Turkey–Bangladesh relations had reached a new peak, particularly evident in defence and security cooperation. While the defence rapprochement between Ankara and Dhaka is not a new development, being based on decades of institutional cooperation, it is important to note that this cooperation has manifested as a transition from an operational arms trade relationship to a comprehensive, strategically important partnership.
By incorporating at least 15 categories of Turkish military equipment, ranging from advanced rocket launchers and howitzers to Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicles and potentially Tulpar light tanks, Bangladesh has become the fourth-largest importer of Turkish defense products since 2021, recalibrating its security policy. Bangladesh’s 2030 subsequent goal of reducing its dependence on traditional suppliers and developing domestic defense-industrial capabilities by modernizing and technologically advancing military assets aligns with Turkey’s Asia Anew initiative.
Turkey’s role in Bangladesh’s defense transformation
Turkey’s involvement in Bangladesh’s defense transformation began in the late 1970s and 1980s with the provision of military training to the Bangladesh Navy and Army. This role expanded significantly in the 2010s. This expansion is evident in the scale of supplies, repairs and logistical support, as well as joint production and industrial cooperation.
Important examples of the supply scale include Otokar Cobra light armored vehicles, guided missile frigates and the TRG-300 Kaplan medium-range missile system. Turkish personnel have also been training Bangladeshi military personnel on the system within the country. Turkish assistance has also extended to repairing Bangladeshi navy ships damaged in the Beirut port explosion in 2020. This has been followed by further steps, including establishing a production line for artillery shells at Bangladeshi ammunition factories, efforts to establish defense industry zones in Chittagong and Narayanganj, and forming a bilateral Defense Industry Working Group. Last year also saw the Turkish naval corvette TCG Kınalıada (F-514) make a goodwill visit to Chattogram Port to celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations and signal greater maritime engagement.
Turkey is also institutionalizing cooperation in counter-terrorism, cybercrime, counter-narcotics operations and intelligence sharing. It is supporting the development of the capacities of the Bangladesh police, border guards, coast guard and paramilitary forces. It is also providing humanitarian and technical support for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, including the reopening of the field hospital in Bhasan Char.
India’s concerns
In 2025, high-level discussions were held regarding the supply of Turkish-made combat UAVs and opportunities for joint UAV production, as well as the supply of Turkish-made HİSAR O+ medium-range and SİPER long-range air defense systems to Bangladesh. Some commentators in the region suggested that these discussions indicated a shift in strategic balances in South Asia that would cause India strategic headaches.
For Delhi, this may not be a routine arms deal. It could signal that Dhaka is diversifying its defense partners and breaking the old regional monopoly. This time, however, the supplier is Turkey, a powerful NATO country that is expanding its strategic presence right next to India’s troubled eastern flank, rather than China, with which Delhi has experience. This makes Delhi feel that its neighborhood diplomacy is facing a new, high-tech challenge.
For Bangladesh, the instability of its neighbor Myanmar is a serious problem and the frequent violation of its airspace and borders naturally compels Dhaka to demonstrate a strong defense capability. However, balancing the strategic asymmetry with India is also an important consideration for Dhaka.
Dhaka’s efforts to diversify its defense partnerships — with the aim of reducing excessive dependence on Chinese and Russian systems, and ensuring interoperability with Western hardware — position Turkey as not only a supplier, but also a long-term partner in Bangladesh’s evolving security environment. This is a direct response to Ankara’s goal of expanding its defence exports beyond traditional markets in the Middle East and North Africa, and of strengthening its role as a rising global defence exporter that can compete with Russian and Western counterparts without political constraints by offering affordable, ITAR-exempt systems. Bangladesh’s Ambassador to Turkey, Amanul Haq, emphasized in his statement to the Bangladeshi media that the developing cooperation with Ankara on defense is providing Dhaka’s armed forces with NATO-standard interoperability.
Pakistan’s return to Bangladesh’s defense sphere
Alongside Turkey’s growing presence in Bangladesh, the Pakistani army’s invitation to train Bangladeshi military personnel at the end of last year, and Pakistan’s return to Bangladesh’s defense sphere in February 2025 were seen as signs of the delicate three-way relationship that Turkey has established with Pakistan and Bangladesh. Ankara’s embrace of Islamabad has provided a diplomatic bridge that has facilitated the rapprochement between Islamabad and Dhaka.
Since Hasina’s fall in August 2024, the interim Yunus government’s diplomatic restructuring — involving high-level visits to China and renewed security cooperation with Pakistan — has begun to raise concerns in Delhi. During his visit to China in March, Yunus made remarks about India’s northeast in the context of the Siliguri Corridor. He described the region as landlocked and said that Bangladesh was the sole protector of the ocean for the entire area, which could be an extension of the Beijing economy. These remarks caused deep concern in Delhi. Delhi now fears that access to, and influence over, the Siliguri Corridor — which connects India’s north-eastern states to the rest of the country — could become subject to competing claims or pressures.
Bangladesh, once a staunch regional ally of India, is now deepening its defense and economic engagement with Turkey, renewing its interaction with Pakistan, and expanding its cooperation with China. This reflects a strategic and geopolitical realignment in South Asia. A Pakistan–Bangladesh rapprochement involving China and Turkey is causing Delhi to worry that India could potentially be excluded from its own region.
From Delhi’s perspective, ideological initiatives and access to naval power in the Bay of Bengal, along with Turkey’s growing presence in Bangladesh’s defense industry in particular, are perceived as threatening India’s regional influence. The prospect of renewed hostility and instability on India’s eastern borders, facilitated by the Pakistan-Bangladesh military rapprochement, is also a cause for concern. China’s continued infrastructure and financial presence in Bangladesh alongside Pakistan is another issue that challenges Delhi.
Geography is a destiny
Geography forces you to accept certain immutable realities. For Bangladesh, this means that it cannot afford to alienate India. For India, this means that any reactive or coercive step taken by Delhi would push Dhaka further away. Delhi is planning a measured political realignment with Dhaka in anticipation of the handover to an elected government following general elections in February 2026. However, given the negative public opinion in Bangladesh, this will not be easy.
It is important to note that India still holds significant leverage in the region due to its historical ties, geographical proximity and Bangladesh’s strong economic dependence on it. The new geopolitical reality in South Asia is this: China is the largest defense supplier to both Pakistan and Bangladesh, while Turkey is the second largest. From India’s perspective, rather than viewing Turkey’s participation in the changing geopolitics of South Asia as a zero-sum game, it seems reasonable to view it as a win-win situation.
