Formerly, Saudi Arabia had only allowed Israeli airplanes flying from Tel Aviv to the UAE and Bahrain through its airspace.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought the broadened range of political, economic, and strategic partnerships of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with Russia and China to the fore, and renewed a scholarly focus on the two Gulf states’ pivot to the East.
Until MBS visited Turkey on June 22, Saudis preferred to talk with Turkey behind the scenes and extend the negotiation…
In particular, the ongoing normalization of the relations between Turkey and the UAE, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel, and Turkey and Egypt have paved the way for the end of the polarization prevailing in the region during the Trump era.
Furthermore, the latest IRGC attack on Arbil and the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE only complicate the situation.
Read: Why the UAE is Denouncing Israel’s Brutality A closer look at how Erdoğan’s visit was read in Saudi media and by Saudi analysts indicates that, in general, Saudi Arabia regarded it as a “new beginning” in relations, while acknowledging that the two countries have not yet abandoned their foreign policy goals.
During the UN Security Council vote condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one of the United States’ most important partners in the Gulf, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), ignored Washington’s pleas and abstained from condemning the invasion.
Al-Sisi found reliable allies in Saudi Arabia and the UAE that supported his government with large sums of money from 2013 to the present.
Most recently, Turkey signed a 5-billion-dollar currency swap deal with the UAE for three years.
Read: How Will the Russia-Ukraine War Affect the Balkans? The UAE and Jordan, on the other hand, were on the opposite side and supported the Syrian opposition to varying degrees, but after the Russian intervention in 2015, the situation on the ground had changed, which, along with other factors such as the UAE's attempt to counter Turkey and contain Iran with a different approach in Syria, led to a change in the countries' priorities in their foreign policy toward Syria.
In parallel, some regional states, like Israel, Egypt, the UAE, and the KSA, engaged in subsequent normalizations with Turkey as insurance on the eve of great power competition in the region.
” UAE and Israel grow wary of the possible revival of the JCPOA Israel has been vocal about its opposition to the nuclear deal.
Recently, the Houthis, or Ansar Allah, of Yemen launched another missile attack on Abu Dhabi, called on foreign companies and investors to leave the UAE, and vowed to make the country unsafe.
All prominent players in the Middle East such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel as well as the UAE and Qatar–who happen to be also traditional U.
Perhaps Saudi Arabia has more reservations and conditions than the UAE, or it is behaving in accordance with its foreign policy approach, “Better to delay than rush,” to assess the ramifications of what its pint-size GCC neighbors are doing.
In a strained relationship with the Biden administration, Bukele finds in Ankara a potential partner to develop a broad cooperation agenda, while later visiting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in his regional tour.
Read: Will Biden Upend the Controversial US-UAE Arms Deal?Two states, namely Israel and Singapore, are procuring the F-35 as Security Cooperative Participants (SCP) under agreements signed in 2003.
For example, the negotiations by former director of Mossad Yossi Cohen, in 2020, within the scope of the normalization of relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel can be given as an example of intelligence diplomacy.