Read: Why the UAE is Denouncing Israel’s Brutality
A closer look at how Erdoğan’s visit was read in Saudi media and by Saudi analysts indicates that, in general, Saudi Arabia regarded it as a “new beginning” in relations, while acknowledging that the two countries have not yet abandoned their foreign policy goals.
During the UN Security Council vote condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one of the United States’ most important partners in the Gulf, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), ignored Washington’s pleas and abstained from condemning the invasion.
Read: How Will the Russia-Ukraine War Affect the Balkans?
The UAE and Jordan, on the other hand, were on the opposite side and supported the Syrian opposition to varying degrees, but after the Russian intervention in 2015, the situation on the ground had changed, which, along with other factors such as the UAE's attempt to counter Turkey and contain Iran with a different approach in Syria, led to a change in the countries' priorities in their foreign policy toward Syria.
In parallel, some regional states, like Israel, Egypt, the UAE, and the KSA, engaged in subsequent normalizations with Turkey as insurance on the eve of great power competition in the region.
Recently, the Houthis, or Ansar Allah, of Yemen launched another missile attack on Abu Dhabi, called on foreign companies and investors to leave the UAE, and vowed to make the country unsafe.
Perhaps Saudi Arabia has more reservations and conditions than the UAE, or it is behaving in accordance with its foreign policy approach, “Better to delay than rush,” to assess the ramifications of what its pint-size GCC neighbors are doing.
In a strained relationship with the Biden administration, Bukele finds in Ankara a potential partner to develop a broad cooperation agenda, while later visiting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in his regional tour.
Read: Will Biden Upend the Controversial US-UAE Arms Deal?Two states, namely Israel and Singapore, are procuring the F-35 as Security Cooperative Participants (SCP) under agreements signed in 2003.
In recent days, the Government of Yemen “liberated” energy-rich Shabwah while the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed al-Amaliqa Brigades has been advancing into Marib.
For example, the negotiations by former director of Mossad Yossi Cohen, in 2020, within the scope of the normalization of relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel can be given as an example of intelligence diplomacy.
n December 3 and 4, 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron traveled to the Gulf for a short visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.
Read: Turkey and Greece: Exploratory Talks under the Shadow of Third PartiesIn February 2021, the Philia Forum brought Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain together to integrate into the pre-established Greek-Egypt-Cyprus cooperation.
Houthis have greatly benefited from this huge stockpile to fight a long-term battle, and to maintain a superior position in terms of military equipment and firepower compared to the Yemeni national army and the popular resistance groups supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Australia and Japan and numerous states of the global South, including India, Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, and a few African states.