Many dynamics of political disagreements between Turkey and the U.S. over bilateral and regional issues have reached a crossroad that might lead to long-term strategic implications for both states. The nature of conflict is extraordinarily complex and the preceding discussion represents only a surface-level picture.

The U.S. administration has imposed sanctions against Turkish ministers and Turkey, has (and continues to) arm the PYD/YPG, which is known as the Syrian offshoot of the PKK – an armed terrorist organization that has been responsible for the deaths of thousands of Turkish citizens since 1984 and which is recognized as a terrorist organization by the United States in the fight against Daesh in Syria and Iraq – and more, the U.S. is currently hosting a so-called religious cleric who was the mastermind behind the July 15 military coup attempt that was orchestrated by Gulenist putschists.

At the center of the current crisis, the U.S. is requesting for the evangelist Pastor, Andrew Brunson, to be released from house arrest in Turkey and is trying to prevent Ankara from obtaining a Russian-made air defense missile system, which is scheduled to be delivered to Turkey by the end of 2019. More importantly, the U.S.’s new strategy in the wider Middle East region towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the status of Al-Quds and the Iranian nuclear deal is not comprised of Turkey.

Against these policies, Turkey seeks to recalibrate its foreign and security policies by alternating its geopolitical portfolio not only on economic terms but also through its foreign and security policies. Recently, President Erdogan called for alternative foreign and economic policies for Turkey. In his article published by the New York Times, following the sanctions crisis, Erdogan underlined that “before it is too late, Washington must give us the misguided notion that our relationship can be asymmetrical and come to terms with the fact that Turkey has alternatives. Failure to reverse this trend of unilateralism and disrespect will require us to start looking for new friends and allies.”

Since 2002, the AK Party governments and President Erdogan have followed a multidimensional foreign and security policy by redefining Turkey’s regional and international role in order to reconstruct Turkey’s power status from a middle-range regional power to a big power, which could relatively be noted as a more assertive reformulation of Turkey’s role in the international system. Since then, Turkish foreign policy has been under fundamental transformation not only because of the changes in foreign policy mentality but also due to the regional and geopolitical turmoil emanating mainly from the Arab uprising.

In the post-Arab spring regional and geopolitical landscape, Turkey had to adjust its foreign policy strategy and reformulate its military strategy, especially in Syria and Iraq. In the early stages, the Arab spring was observed as an opportunity to recalibrate Turkey’s power in the region. However, following the diversification of the Syrian war and other regional developments, Turkey was barred from getting a new power status on the regional level.

The Middle East crisis articulated around the Arab revolutions and counter-revolutions were also perceived as an opportunity to reformulate Turkish strategy towards the Syrian crisis and security threats across the region. Throughout all the stages of the Arab uprising, the U.S. has been the main country that caused a strategic shift in Turkey’s preferences. Due to ambiguity in U.S. strategy, Turkey had to change its policy in regards to Syria, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Iraq.

The existing crisis between Turkey and the U.S. is a consequence of the Arab uprising and the U.S.’s strategic choices towards Syria, Iraq and other countries. However, this time Turkey perceives the bilateral crisis as a real opportunity to reformulate its geopolitical portfolio. Ankara believes that the U.S. is still a strategic partner in nature but the unpredictable nature of the new American administration and “institutional chaos” in the U.S. foreign and security decision-making processes drive Turkey to seek new alternatives. The perception here is much more important than the realities of strategic relations between Turkey and the U.S. More importantly, the Turkish government believes that if they want to reach strategic flexibility in international and regional politics, Turkey’s geopolitical portfolio should be reformulated.

The question is how Turkey will reformulate its new geopolitical game, and this can be understood by examining Turkey’s response to U.S. policies that have been encountered against the Turkish will. There are three broad dimensions for Turkish strategy. The first one is Turkey’s bilateral strategic engagements with alternative power centers. Russia is the most crucial power that Turkey can utilize in order to balance U.S. pressure in the short term. Russia is not an economic giant for Turkey, but in terms of the strategic implications over Turkey-U.S. relations, Russia might become an external balancer for Ankara against the U.S. There is already increasing rapprochement between Turkey and Russia over various issues. However, the nature of the conflict in Syria and historical geopolitical codes in Turkey-Russia relations need to be carefully taken into consideration by Ankara.

China is another alternative power for Turkey, especially when considering the need to deepen and diversify the Turkish economy. Turkey’s political and economic engagements with the rising power also constitute important alternatives for the geopolitical portfolio of Ankara in the near future. There has also been increasing foreign policy initiatives taken by Ankara to extend its diplomatic and economic relations with Latin American, African and Asian countries.

The second and probably the most important point here is Turkey-EU relations which have been under fundamental pressure for almost more than five years. Historically, Europe has always played a vital role in Ottoman diplomacy. Following the dissolution of the Empire, one way or another, European powers maintained a way to influence Turkish diplomacy and facilitated Turkey’s balance of power game against Soviet Russia. This time, Turkey can use European powers as an opportunity to readjust its geopolitical game vis-à-vis the U.S. There are two important aspects of Turkey-EU relations following the Turkey-U.S. crisis. Turkey, firstly, can use this opportunity to repair its institutional relations on the EU level. Secondly, Turkey can effectively join the European side in balancing the U.S. in the trade war and can especially contribute to European powers in reshaping NATO’s strategic mission while Trump holds a different view of NATO.

Last but not least, Turkey’s third option to alternate its geopolitical portfolio is the Middle East. The Middle East region is geopolitically important for Turkey in regards to protecting its national security, deepening its economic lifeline, and recalibrating Turkey’s international actor role by consolidating its military tools in the region. It seems that Iran is perceived as an important strategic partner by Ankara in the region but there are some limits as well potential risks for Turkey. The Gulf countries except the UAE seems a real economic life-line for Turkey. As the Qatar case shows, the more security investment in the region provides more space of maneuver for Turkey, especially on an economic level.

Within this context, therefore, it seems that the crisis in relations between Turkey and the U.S. is pushing Turkey to rethink its current foreign policy strategy and gives Ankara an opportunity to readjust its geopolitical portfolio.

As the relations between Turkey and the U.S. have turned tense, the economic cost of the tension is increasing for Turkey with the USD skyrocketing vis-a-vis the Turkish Lira. The outcome is heavy for the Turkish economy but it is not what Turkey deserved when bilateral relations are examined retrospectively.

The Turkey-U.S. alliance had better days over the past seven decades. While it’s not in its best mood today, it’s not in its worst either. Turkey served as a significant pillar of the containment strategy of the USSR during the Cold War era. The logic was simple. Turkey would not be part of the Soviet sphere of influence. It would allow the American intelligence to operate freely from Turkey to monitor the Soviets. It would host NATO military bases. It would be okay for the nuclear-tipped Jupiter rockets to be deployed in its own soils to deter the Soviets. It would also be okay if the U.S. uninstalls its military equipment on a whim. It would be ready to absorb a possible offense from the Soviets so that the “West” would save some time for its defense, and so on. This way, Turkey was a key part of the Western defense strategy against the USSR. This way, the Black Sea has never been a Soviet lake, the Soviets could not rule the Eastern Mediterranean, and they could not have direct access to the Middle East. In return for this great strategic favor, Turkey would get NATO’s word for its collective defense against any possible Soviet aggression and, further, would receive economic aid and cheap credit from the West.

Nevertheless, this seemingly plausible anti-Soviet alliance was tested multiple times. The opium crisis and Turkey’s military intervention against the Greece-backed junta in Cyprus let to the most memorable crisis between the allies. While the U.S. placed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, Turkey responded by closing the military bases that were hosting American troops in the country. The crisis did not last long though. As Turkey changed its opium policy in a way to satisfy the American demands, the U.S. ended the embargo and did not push Turkey too hard on the Cyprus matter. Yet, it costed Turkey to diverge from the American orientation with its shrinking economy in the late 1970s. After all, it was and is still costly to annoy a superpower. Annoying the global sheriff led the Turkish economy in the late 1970s to something very much reminiscent of today.

The U.S. will fail to leave a smooth legacy in the Middle East without the support of Turkey. Thus, there’s still time to transform relations from a lose-lose to a win-win situation.

The Turkey-U.S. alliance did not die as did the enemy, that is the Soviets, died in 1991. By the time it became clear that the old enemy was collapsing, the U.S. had already found new enemies. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990 was about to be the first rogue state of the new world order. As a loyal American ally, Turkey provided assistance to the U.S. for its first Gulf War against Saddam. It was an easy military win but not a final victory with a persistent legacy. It was not the end but a whole new start for Turkey.

With its role in the war, Turkey seemed happy to show its utility as an ally in the post-Cold War era but what it did not know was Iraq would never be a stable neighbor again for the next 17 years until now. The power vacuum in its neighbor was filled by the PKK and Turkey has witnessed years of terror attacks originating from Iraq. For that reason, Turkish policymakers did not welcome the idea of a second Gulf War across its borders in 2003.

The Turkish parliament denied the U.S. permission to use the base in Turkey to store its military equipment before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This was the most significant turning point and the heaviest crisis between the allies after the opium crisis of the 1970s. The alliance has become a pseudo-alliance since then. The Syrian War was and still is proof of the fact that Turkey is not being treated as a genuine ally by the U.S. Turkey’s refugee problem due to the Syrian Civil War has been disregarded by the U.S. as it rejected Turkey’s calls for joint action. Further, Turkey was left alone when it got really close to a war with Russia after it downed a Russian jet in 2015. By the time Turkey found a formula to get out of the tight corner it got stuck to in the course of the Syrian War, the U.S. had already started to cook a new alliance with Turkey’s long-time adversary, the PKK (its Syrian branch PYD to be precise).

As long as the U.S. does not change its policies regarding the PYD and FETO, Turkey will see its alliance with the U.S. as no more than a pseudo-alliance no matter how much it hurts the Turkish economy.

Further, the U.S. is also hosting the FETO (Fethullahist Terror Organization) network on American soil. FETO is the organization that carried out the coup attempt of June 15, 2016. These two issues are direct threats to Turkey’s very basic national security and far more significant than the following crises whether it be last year’s visa crisis or today’s Brunson crisis. It seems like as long as the U.S. does not change its policies regarding the PYD and FETO, Turkey will see its alliance with the U.S. as no more than a pseudo-alliance no matter how much it hurts the Turkish economy. This may not sound as a big problem for a superpower like the U.S. Nevertheless, it should also see that it can win wars in Iraq or Syria but cannot leave a smooth legacy without Turkey.

The bilateral relations can still change course from a lose-lose scenario to a win-win one. Perhaps American policymakers no longer need Turkey to contain Russian expansion for now, but it will not help the U.S. to alienate Turkey and push it to the revisionist camp of the American hegemony. I still think the U.S. is not blind to lose Turkey altogether and will flex its muscles in its dealing with Turkey. If it does not, Turkey has its own instruments. It cannot hurt the USD by threats on Twitter, but Turkey is a growing country in its capabilities, population, and significance on the world scale.

As the financial pressure increases over Turkey, it will search for an exit, which may lead to an increasing financial linkage to China, which I believe will not please American interests. As Turkey will try to overcome the current financial risks with domestic structural reforms and a quest for new international economic partners, it is still not too late to resurrect the pseudo-alliance. Some easier solutions on the Brunson or Halkbank matters based on mutual respect can spill over toward something better and bigger.

Relations between Turkey and the U.S. are underway fundamental challenges following the U.S. administration’s reaction to Pastor Andrew Brunson, who has been under house arrest since July 8. The tension reached peak due to the remarks made by Washington and Ankara regarding the freezing of two American officials’ assets – namely interior and justice ministers. However, given President Erdogan’s treatment of the issue, the continuation of diplomatic contact between the two countries at the highest level of crisis, and the preferences of President Trump, an expectation emerged that will help to overcome the Brunson crisis. It should be expected that the Brunson crisis will be overcome shortly. However, both sides have to intensify efforts in order to close down the deeply-rooted political rift in Turkey-U.S. relations.

One of the primary things that have to be accomplished shortly after the resolution of the tension is to redefine bilateral relations on a very realistic ground. For this reason, both sides need to communicate and understand the significant global, regional and domestic challenges that constrain relations. To do so, both sides should avoid conceptualizing bilateral ties within the framework of “strategic partnership,” “model partnership” and “alliance” – terms that have never entirely fulfilled the Turkish-American cooperation objectives. This, in turn, requires also the recalculation of the long-term strategic vision of Turkish foreign policy. It is important to note that Turkish-American relations are at the center of Turkish foreign policy if the existing foreign policy engagements of Turkey are taken into consideration, particularly in the Middle East region.

At this stage, both sides should analyze the real damages caused following the multidimensional conjectural crisis in Turkey-U.S. relations. Later on, it is also necessary to make a list of possible short-term problems that have been encountered in Turkey-U.S. relations and make clear what can be done and what cannot be to recover bilateral relations.

Managing the lack of trust in bilateral relations

The most important issue that both sides should bear in mind about damage assessment is the lack of trust in bilateral relations. The lack of trust between states is one of the oldest hidden rules of international relations. States usually do not trust each other. There is a simple explanation for that; a state can never be sure whether the intention of another state is good or not. It is possible to make a list of issues that fueled the lack of mutual trust between Turkey and the U.S. One of the most important reasons, and perhaps the most unlikely to be overcome soon is the role of the U.S. in the July 15 coup attempt. It is not possible to say that Turkish public opinion on this subject is very positive, given that Fetullah Gulen, the commander of the July 15 military coup, remains free in the U.S. and other members of FETO perceive the U.S. as a safe haven. The issue of lack of trust is not limited to this. With the support of the U.S., the PYD-YPG, the political and military branch of the PKK, enjoys its terrorist insurgency against Turkey. This further deepens the lack of trust between the two countries. Turkey strongly believes that providing more space to the PYD-YPG consolidates the PKK’s political and military power that ultimately undermine Turkey’s national security.

The crisis of the lack of trust in bilateral relations is not one-sided. The U.S. administration does not perceive Turkey as a “reliable ally.” From the U.S. strategic view, Turkey refuses to join the U.S. strategy towards Iran, continues to work with Russia, and undermines Trump’s Israel strategy. Therefore, the lack of trust is reciprocal.

The second issue emerges as a result of the lack of trust. Turkey has a serious difference as compared to the U.S. in addressing global issues. Turkey criticizes the U.S.-centric international order, believes that the international order should be reformed and underlines that the U.S. undermines the very nature of the international order, which is based on universal norms and institutions. Therefore, Turkey seeks to establish a more balanced international order. To do so, Turkey is working with the alternative power centers such as Russia and China to develop an alternative relationship and seeks to consolidate its relations with the rising powers to balance out the U.S.-centric international order.

Harmonization of foreign and security policies

Even if the conjectural crises experienced in bilateral relations are to be overcome shortly, the harmonization of foreign and security policies, which is the primary driving factor of the lack of trust, is crucial for the re-positioning of Turkey-U.S. relations. However, the issues that the two countries have to deal with in the near future are very complex in nature. One of the first issues that both sides should think about is Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy. Turkey does not embrace any foreign policy option that could threaten U.S national security and territorial integrity, unlike the U.S. administration. If Washington D.C. maintains its current strategy regarding PKK presence in northern Syria and does not prevent the PKK from threatening Turkey’s national security, the U.S. may face a stricter face of Turkish military activism in the region. Immediately after the Brunson crisis is overcome, both sides have to develop a more comprehensive strategy on how the Manbij model will be implemented towards the other regions in northern Syria. This strategy should not be handled separately from the general solution to the Syrian crisis.

Even if the PKK problem in Syria is overcome, it is unlikely that the two countries will share the same strategy on Israel after the Brunson crisis. A new political structure has emerged in Washington and the Middle East following the Trump administration’s Al-Quds decision. The Washington administration has an agenda that gives Israel a “blank check” on its policy towards Palestine. In the region, there is also a turning point in the policy of Arab states towards Palestine. Turkey is the only country in the region that has many objections against the policy of “abandoning Palestine.” Turkey’s Israel policy will be directly affected by its relations with the U.S.

After the Brunson crisis, the more difficult issue that the two countries are unlikely to overcome is Turkey’s desire to obtain an air defense system from Russia. Provided that the Turkish administration ultimately receives the S-400 systems at the end of 2019, the U.S. administration might impose a series of additional sanctions against Turkey. One of the first results of this purchase will be seen in Turkey-U.S. military relations. The U.S. considers removing Turkey from the F-35 program. Another short-term problem that can potentially disrupt bilateral relations is the Trump administration’s strategy towards Iran. Turkey believes that the new U.S. strategy on the Iranian nuclear program would destabilize the region and undermine Turkey’s trade relations with Iran. Turkey’s early reaction against the U.S. administration’s decision about imposing new sanctions against Tehran highlights that Turkey will not follow the U.S. strategy. Therefore, the U.S.-Iran conflict would bring more instability to the U.S.-Turkey relations.

As long as there is no structural change on the regional or global level, it is not true that Turkey-U.S. relations will collapse. In this transition period, it is necessary to contain the costs of damage for both sides. Therefore, in the post-Brunson Turkey-U.S. relations, both sides should carefully follow a damage control policy. One of the most fundamental things that the Turkish administration should be aware of is the fact that under the Trump administration no single strategic logic can run bilateral relations and other regional issues. For this reason, it would be more appropriate for Turkey to remind itself that the tensions in Turkey-U.S. relations are shaped by mutual foreign policy choices rather than a single actor-centered determination.

When a glance is taken at the history of Turkey-U.S. relations, it becomes evident that the relations follow a rough course. Even though the tradition of initiating this relation dates back to the Cold War era (1945), one could tell that the contact that was attempted in the 19th century at the last Ottoman period was full of issues. Along with the 1947 Truman Doctrine, Turkey had attracted American attention on a strategic level. As a result of the 1952 NATO membership, Turkey became part of a relation that was going through an institutionalization process on military and political levels.

Unfortunately, since then, cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. has not been exempt from issues. Putting the idea of being exempt aside, it is possible to argue that the course of Turkish-American relations has had direct impacts on Turkish politics. The cause of these issues has been the fact that the U.S. administration portrays Turkey as a passive operator of its own strategies. In other words, the U.S. has considered Turkey as a country to facilitate American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East without hesitation. This consideration has prepared the ground for an interfering character over time. The American interference in Turkish politics, including the facilitation of military-coups and enforcement of a series of unjustified political methods, have resulted in the deterioration of relations between the two countries. Consequently, this situation has given birth to a deep trust problem in bilateral relations. Since 1945, due to a lack of structural change in international systems, the conjunctural crises in Turkey-U.S. relations have been left behind and repaired in one way or another. However, along with the 2003 Iraq invasion, the fluctuations experienced in relations have taken deeper structural forms as opposed to short-term interest discrepancies.

Even though the international system continues to be U.S.-centric, Turkey’s perception of this system, the partial transformation experienced within the system (proliferation of power centers), the change of Ankara’s priorities in terms of its foreign policy, as well as the tensions and fractions experienced in the geopolitical environment involving Turkey make it even more difficult to overcome the crises in Turkey-U.S. relations.

Therefore, it is not possible to take the newly emerged Pastor Brunson crisis out of this context. It is also not quite possible to overlook the new evangelist, conservative and extreme right religio-political identity of U.S. foreign policy that has accelerated under the Trump administration when examining the Pastor Brunson case. More importantly, it is worth noting that the Brunson case is likely to be used for leverage in the upcoming elections by the Trump-Pence duo. The difference between Trump and Pence is also notable here. Trump is very likely to make use of any tools at his disposal to continue his presidency, and this fact is not only limited to Turkey. Trump’s interactions with countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Russia also prove this point. However for the vice president, Pence, this situation contains more ontological reasons. Pence’s expressions, relationships, and foreign policy engagements lie in the heart of evangelist political existence. The cases of Pastor Brunson and Jerusalem both represent a ‘clash of civilizations’ and even a ‘religious-conflict.’ This should be noted as the most significant exposal of the messianic wave in U.S. foreign policy.

The reparation of Turkey-U.S. relations is now more challenging

Today, the crucial pillars of the Turkey-U.S. relations have been weakened, and this makes it even more challenging to overcome the bilateral crises.

The Cold War led Turkey to position itself in the Western bloc under American supervision. However, Turkey no longer positions itself as such. Furthermore, the current international system is no longer unipolar, which enables regional actors to obtain wider impact zones. It is possible to examine the Middle East, where most actors have acquired independent policies apart from American interests to comprehend this phenomenon.

Nowadays, being part of the Western bloc represents nothing but a means of strategic, economic and political engagement for Turkey. Thus, U.S. supervision is no longer seen as necessary when it comes to Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, the Turkey-U.S. relations are now being redefined with factors including anti-Americanism and American-suspicion. From now on, the U.S. is positioned as ‘the other’ of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish state identity. Turkey is no longer an advocate or critic of an American-centric liberal international system, and that is not because Turkey disapproves a liberal world order, but because it is one of those state actors that advocate a fair restructuring.

It is now evident that Turkey and the U.S. have lost intersections when it comes to their foreign policy objectives. The U.S. is reluctant to respond to Turkey’s security concerns, and as compared to the beginning of the 2000s, there is less cooperation between the two states. In fact, due to the cases of S-400s, Jerusalem, Syria, Iraq and Iran, they are far apart regarding opinion. Turkey’s regional foreign policy priorities do not approve American regional foreign policy approaches and generate ‘troubles.’ Iran sets a good example in this regard. Even though Turkey is upset about Iran’s regional policies, and disapproves the Iranian Nuclear program just as much as the U.S., it does not support the harsh American policy towards Iran.

Even though it is possible to argue that the military pillar of the Turkey-U.S. relations, NATO, stands still, it cannot compromise the issues experienced as a whole. Within this framework, it is clear that even more challenging periods are awaiting, and it can be argued that relations between the two can worsen.  If Turkey can level up in the international system and increase its share of power through the new system change, it could also fix the asymmetric issues in its relations with the U.S. More importantly, if Turkey has taken the initiative to step out of the Western bloc, it should create a new identity complying with real power capacity and means. The first thing that comes to mind in such a context is the ‘alternative world’ definition. The issue that requires attention is that actors such as Russia cannot replace the U.S., as superpowers. Instead of leaning towards power dilemmas, Turkey should establish its own independent identity. Despite the issues experienced by the U.S., Turkey’s foreign policy practices still carry a transatlantic nature. This character cannot be changed all of a sudden. Therefore, Ankara should be careful regarding reducing costs. It is necessary for Turkey to stand firm against the insistent and menacing behaviors, the country should respond to every single step taken by the U.S. determined to proceed with its independent foreign policy.

On August 1, 2018, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the Department of the Treasury  announced that two high-level government officials of Turkey, namely Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gul and Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu were sanctioned. The main motivation of taking the measure was the detention of Pastor Brunson.

The OFAC relied on an Executive Order which was signed by President Trump to mainly target individuals from different countries, such as Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Serbia and so on. The President finds his authority to issue this Executive Order in widely different laws. For instance, the first one was the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which was the one of the charges brought against Hakan Atilla. The second law was the National Emergencies Act (NEA) that was enacted in 1976 and gives the President the authority to declare “national emergency” under certain circumstances. The third law mentioned in the Executive Order was the notorious Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Magnitsky Act) which was enacted in 2012 to target certain Russian officials who were responsible for the loss of Sergei Magnitsky’s life in a prison under serious human rights violations. While the target was initially Russian individuals, Congress invented this legal tool, giving it to the executive power to target other foreign individuals as well. The final legal text was the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which is related to the immigration and citizenship law in the domestic law of the U.S.

The recent action taken by OFAC raises a question as to how the Executive Authority chooses this legal basis. Although OFAC mentioned the Magnitsky Act specifically in its announcement, it is not precise whether the Magnitsky Act was the only legal basis of this decision. In other words, OFAC explained that the action taken “pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” which builds upon Treasury’s Global Magnitsky Act authorities, albeit it did not specify whether the Magnitsky Act was the only basis. Therefore, it was unclear whether the other abovementioned laws, such as IEEPA or NEA, were at issue when deciding to impose sanctions. These laws require the President to determine whether the situation in Turkey constitutes a national emergency or unusual or extraordinary threat for the U.S.

Since OFAC frequently mentions “serious human rights abuses” in their claim, it is implied the only legal basis relied on was the Magnitsky Act. The OFAC’s allegations against two ministers raise several doubts whether OFAC interpreted the text of the Magnitsky Act properly. Section 1263 of the Magnitsky Act requires two different things for the president to determine. First, the president needs to determine the violation of human rights occurred, and second, the targeted individual is responsible for this violation. According to this one page explanation, these determinations hardly appear. The responsibility was understood by OFAC as a mere political responsibility which does not necessitate any concrete evidence to show why these people officials bear responsibility.

The other problematic aspect of the interpretation of the Magnitsky Act is related to the level of seriousness of the abuse of human rights. The text of the law specifies this level as “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” It also gave examples of internationally recognized human rights as torture and extrajudicial killings. However, OFAC left no detailed analysis of what level of human rights abuses in Turkey attained to qualify the situation in Turkey as “serious human rights abuses.” It is difficult to declare Turkey as a country of “serious human rights abuses” based on the alleged violation of rights of one individual. Nevertheless, in the case of Brunson it is not plausible to claim that the principles of due process and fair trial are seriously violated by the Turkish authorities.

The future of the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey is difficult to predict because of the unexpected and unclear scope of the sanctions. At first glance, claiming the responsibility of these two individuals implies that OFAC put the responsibility on the two government officials exclusively. However, then it is reported that the scope of sanctions against Turkish officials may broaden, including many more individuals and entities. It is fair to conclude that these legal tools were used to gain a leverage in U.S. domestic and foreign policy.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is faced with yet another crisis, this time over the Brunson case. Crises are increasingly becoming the rule rather than the exception largely because of the underlying strategic dissonance between the two NATO allies. The U.S. and Turkey continue to fundamentally diverge over the PYD’s position in northern Syria, the Turkish purchase of the Russian S-400s, and arms transfers. The legal cases such as the Gulen extradition, the Halkbank case, and the Brunson case further deepen the existing discord. Added to this picture, the Trump administration’s domestic political troubles are pushing the relationship to the brink.

In the latest episode, Vice President Pence’s need to satisfy the demands of his evangelical constituency ahead of the November elections seems to override the need to engage Turkey rather than punish it. Pence’s harsh rhetoric was matched by President Trump’s social media message on the matter, which was clearly coordinated. As with many other foreign policy issues, President Trump used harsh rhetoric despite the welcome progress underlined by high level administration officials such as the Secretary of State Pompeo just days earlier. There is a chance diplomatic channels may produce a result acceptable to both sides on the Brunson case, but the ultimatum-like rhetoric used against Turkey would only make it harder to arrive at a political understanding, if any.

The ongoing efforts in the U.S. Congress to block the transfer of F-35s to Turkey indicates the detrimental effect of domestic political calculations on foreign policy. Congress has asked the Pentagon to provide a report evaluating the implications of Turkey’s potential purchase of Russian S-400s. Lawmakers cited the Brunson case to justify this move but the potential blockade of the transfer of the planes would hurt the very strategic partnership that the F-35 project is supposed to strengthen. President Erdogan has already pointed to international arbitration in case of such a move, which would only cause delays in the program and further damage the U.S.-Turkey security partnership.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship certainly has the capacity to overcome this latest crisis but a lot more effort is required to put it on the right track. Both sides had been avoiding public statements that would damage the ongoing working groups for a while now. But the most recent spat shows that domestic political considerations can be spoilers and it is crucially important to prevent such mishaps. The Turkish public continues to be deeply distrustful of the U.S. and the American public opinion is shaped by negative media coverage as well. Turkish politicians have made a serious effort to work with the Trump administration on all problem areas through various proposals and mechanisms to resolve problems but it is clear they will not respond well to sanction threats. The U.S. leaders need to give time and space to diplomatic channels instead of issuing counterproductive threats.

President Trump’s style of raising the stakes in order to secure a deal that benefits the U.S. seems to be at work here. However, raising the stakes based on domestic political calculations and adopting a maximalist approach cannot provide solutions in an already troubled relationship. The U.S. support for the PYD was already a move that was unilateral in its approach despite assurances provided to Turkey. Now, if the Trump administration goes down the road of unilateralism seeking to force Turkey’s hand, the relationship will only suffer damaging the national interest of both allies. The U.S.-Turkey relationship can hopefully overcome this latest crisis but we will almost certainly see more crises in the future given the instability and unpredictability in the region as well as the increasing insecurity and distrust among NATO allies.

A 50-year-old evangelical pastor of the Izmir Resurrection Church has been living in Turkey since 1993. He has now become a source of controversy in the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the U.S. after Trump announced his plans to impose sanctions against Turkey. The U.S. President Donald Trump used a different tone when he tweeted about Turkey, sending a message that the sanctions against Turkey are on the table if Andrew Craig Brunson, an American citizen, is not released.

Before the criminal trial, the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs reviewed the status of Brunson in Turkey soon after the coup attempt on July 15. Brunson was informed that he was a “national security risk” with the decision of the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate General of Migration Management. Apart from a judiciary process, the Ministry went through another administrative process for Brunson.

In March 2018, the indictment charge against Brunson was released. According to this indictment, Brunson was allegedly responsible for “forming organized groups with the intention of committing a crime” and “political or military espionage.” The prosecution relied on the testimony of witnesses and authenticated evidence collected from the phone of Brunson. For instance, in relation to the aftermath of the coup attempt, Brunson said: “we were waiting for some events to shake the Turks […], the coup attempt was a shock, many Turks trusted the military as they did in the past […] We will eventually win.” A secret witness, DUA stated that Bekir Baz, a.k.a. Ramazan, a senior member of FETO, met with Brunson, advising him to establish an association to circumvent the restrictions in relation to the establishment of new churches. There have been three hearings in the trial process, and Brunson was released from prison and is now under house arrest.

“We were waiting for some events to shake the Turks […], the coup attempt was a shock, many Turks trusted the military as they did in the past […] We will eventually win”

While the criminal process took place in İzmir, Turkey, the threats coming from President Trump added another layer to the bilateral relations between the two countries. The question arises as to how the President will potentially give economic harm to the Turkish economy. Imposing sanctions is not new, and the Congress has raised the adoption of several laws to compel the administration to implement the sanctions. For instance, the National Defense Authorization Act, as in the final stage of the legislative process, will prevent the administration from delivering the F-35 aircraft to Turkey. The letter written by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, who was not in favor of introducing such a sanction, had revealed that the administration was not interested in imposing this sanction. However, the recent tweets appear to change this attitude, undermining the interest of the countries participating in the F-35 program.

Another example is the Turkey International Financial Institutions Act, which was passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. According to the draft of this legislation, Congress will oblige the Secretary of Treasury to instruct the U.S. executive directors of well-known international financial institutions to vote against extending any “loan or financial or technical assistance” to Turkey. The increasingly aggressive attitude of the president will lead his administration to sign this law once it has passed Congress and to implement the obligation to instruct officials in the international financial institutions.

As to an existing law, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) obliges the administration to impose sanctions against Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, the administration can introduce a waiver, deciding to exclude Turkey from punitive measures based on a determination that the sanctions would run against the “vital national security interests” of the U.S. Despite this authority, the recent tweets of Trump show that the administration is no longer interested in issuing such a waiver to protect the relationship between the two countries.

Turkey’s official Anadolu News Agency reported that Brunson, 50, an evangelical Christian pastor originally from North Carolina, was let out of jail to serve home detention because of “health problems” which were not further specified.

Brunson was charged with spying for the PKK, a designated terrorist group in the U.S. and Turkey, and the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) which orchestrated the defeated coup attempt on July 15, 2016.

The cleric denies the charges.

The Izmir 2nd High Criminal Court said Brunson would be electronically monitored and barred from leaving his house. The cleric left prison with a police escort after completing certain procedures.

Brunson, who has lived in Turkey for 23 years serving as the pastor of Izmir Resurrection Church, is also prohibited from leaving Turkey.

The court decided to allow Brunson to live at his home address in Izmir, and as his trial continues his “abandonment of residence” is prohibited and he is also banned from leaving the country.

If convicted, he will face up to 15 years in prison for “committing crimes on behalf of terror groups without being a member” and another 20 years if he is found guilty of espionage.

The pastor’s detention has strained ties between Ankara and Washington. The two NATO Allies are already at loggerheads for some time.

Citing Brunson’s case and Turkey’s plan to buy the S-400 missile system from Russia, U.S. senators are pushing to delay Turkey’s acquisition of American-made F-35 fighter jets.

President Trump and Vice President Pence’s Twitter bluster

On Twitter, U.S. President Trump threatened to impose sanctions on Turkey if Ankara continues to refuse to free Brunson.

“The United States will impose large sanctions on Turkey for their long time detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson,” Trump tweeted. “He is suffering greatly. This innocent man of faith should be released immediately!”

Trump called Brunson “a great Christian, family man and wonderful human being.”

Previous to this tweet, again on Twitter, Trump tweeted that the detention is a “total disgrace.” “He has done nothing wrong, and his family needs him!” Trump tweeted.

U.S. Vice President Mike Pence speaking in Washington D.C., at a conference on religious freedom hosted by the U.S. State Department, made a similar threat of “significant sanctions” against Ankara over the imprisoned pastor.

Pence, threatened President Erdogan and the Turkish government via Twitter to “be prepared to face consequences if Pastor Andrew Brunson is not released immediately.

Evangelical support for Pastor Brunson

The reason why Brunson’s detention has received so much attention is due to the evangelical Christian lobby in the U.S. – as they are among the president’s most reliable supporters. The White House has been pressured by these groups to take steps in order to ensure Brunson’s release.

On Wednesday Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also expressed his opinion about the decision of the Turkish court to place Brunson under house arrest.

“We welcome long overdue news that Pastor [Andrew Craig] Brunson has been moved from prison to house arrest in Turkey,” Pompeo said in a tweet.

Pompeo, described the court’s decision as “not enough” while he added that there is “no credible evidence” against Brunson.

Turkey’s response

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also responded to the statements of the White House on Twitter, saying, “We will never tolerate threats from anybody.”

Turkey’s Foreign Ministry insisted that the Brunson Case is under Turkey’s jurisdiction as a sovereign state, and told the Anadolu Agency that the White House’s rhetoric was “unacceptable.”

“With regard to the Brunson case, necessary information has been provided to our U.S. counterparts on various occasions and it has been clearly expressed that this issue is totally within the competence of the independent Turkish judiciary,” the ministry added.

After the threats of Trump and Pence via Twitter, Ankara’s Ambassador to Washington, Serdar Kilic, said that the United States should not resort to threats against Turkey.

“My message was crystal clear; No one should expect Turkey to give in to threats and that as an Ally US should not resort to threats against us,” the Ambassador said in a post on his Twitter account, adding his disappointment that U.S. authorities had failed to take his explicit advice at all levels into consideration.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan

U.S. President Trump had another one of his Twitter moments on Thursday. This time, the target was Turkey. He tweeted as follows: “The United States will impose large sanctions on Turkey for their long time detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson, a great Christian, family man and wonderful human being. He is suffering greatly. This innocent man of faith should be released immediately!” The tone and means of the message is far from diplomatic conventions but this is not something unusual for Trump. There are stranger things in this matter.

First, who is Andrew Brunson and why was he jailed (currently under house arrest)? Brunson is an American pastor who has lived in Turkey over two decades. He was arrested on December 9, 2016, about 4 months after the failed coup attempt in Turkey. He was arrested for terrorism and spying charges. It is no secret that countries send spies to other countries, even to the ones they ally with. Hence, whether or not Brunson is one of them, it would not surprise anybody if some people spy in Turkey for the U.S. When people are found spying, they might be exchanged, which is not uncommon between countries. But there is more to this story.

To open it up further, Brunson was claimed to be linked to FETO (Fethullahist Terror Organization) which plotted the June 15, 2016 coup attempt and is responsible for killing 250 Turkish nationals and injuring thousands on the night of the coup attempt. Speaking of FETO, the leader of the organization and the mastermind of the coup attempt, Fethullah Gulen lives in his mansion in the U.S. Gulen is not a U.S. citizen but Turkey’s calls for his extradition does not find ears in the States. U.S. politicians keep referring to the issue as a matter of judiciary and avoid taking initiative. Yet, when it comes to the Brunson case in Turkey, Trump can easily threaten Turkey with “large sanctions.”

Something is not right in this picture. Why would the U.S. not extradite a non-U.S. (Turkish) citizen to Turkey despite the bloodshed he spilt in Turkey? Why would the U.S. allow the remnants of Gulen’s network to organize in the country, while some other partners of Turkey extradite the members of the organization? What would any sensible person think about such a situation? Gulen is a Turkish citizen who plotted a coup attempt in Turkey but seeks and finds support from the U.S. As a result, many, if not all, Turkish nationals see the July 15 coup attempt as an American project.

In fact, it is easy for the U.S. to end these suspicions by simply extraditing Gulen. But for some reason it is not. Why not? When this is the case, naturally, many Turkish nationals think the U.S. will not extradite Gulen because he knows too much! And because his extradition would hurt the American credibility in the eyes of its future partners in crime. Yes, this is the overwhelming public opinion in Turkey on the U.S.-Gulen affair. And who can claim this line of thinking does not make sense?

At the end of the day, the U.S. has not extradited Gulen so far despite Turkey’s insistence on the matter. Yet, the very same U.S. asks Turkey to release Brunson, who is suspected of spying in Turkey and being linked to Gulen’s coup attempt. This is not fair. This is the stronger side imposing its will on the side that it sees weaker. This is like a quote from the famous Melian dialogue: “While the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Well, the story might have a different end this time if the U.S. keeps alienating Turkey and pushing it to seek alternatives to its long-lasting alliance with the U.S. Hence, the question is, will the U.S. try to keep a significant ally on its side or push it closer to its global rivals?