Two parties are simply arm-wrestling to prove their points in a historical evaluation process of their alliance in the rapidly changing age of the new international system.

Since the July 15, 2016, failed coup attempt in Turkey, bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. have been deteriorating. The recent S-400 conflict may lead to a new phase of relations between the two NATO allies. The cause of this conflict is Ankara’s determined stance in buying S-400 air defense missiles from Russia. In return, the U.S. has threatened to apply CAATSA sanctions on Turkey and remove the country from the ongoing F-35 project, which involves 8 countries in total.

How did this happen in the first place? Merve Seren – Associate Professor at Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara, argues that Turkey has been using Nike Hercules and I-HAWKS defense missiles, dating back to the 60s technology, with an updated version of i-hawks (improved hawks). However, Ankara’s neighbors have all been updating their defense systems and this has proved as a serious threat to Turkey’s national security.

Ankara’s neighbors have all updated their defense systems and this has proved as a serious threat to Turkey’s national security.

Merve Seren highlighted how Turkey declared the need of a new defense system to its NATO allies back in 2006, before the Syrian Civil War kicked off, but that no serious development took place. After the break out of the crisis in Syria, Turkey’s need of an updated defense system became vital and therefore Ankara asked for offers from producing countries. Based on price, delivery time, co-production and various other criteria, China initially won the bid. However, the contract was cancelled due to pressure coming from the U.S. administration at the time.

Merve Seren also notes that in 2015, Turkey requested missiles from NATO. Batteries arrived, but Seren adds that due to differences among Turkey and other NATO allies in their policies towards the ongoing Syrian crisis (e.g. buffer zone, YPG/PKK), batteries were removed from Turkey in 2016. According to Seren, these developments isolated Turkey among its NATO allies, which is why the country had to seek to purchase an alternative system.

The alternative came from Russia. After the Russian plane crash incident, Russia and Turkey declared a strategic alliance to find solutions to the Syrian crisis. The Turkish government signed a deal with Russia and purchased S-400 missiles to be delivered in July 2019. Meanwhile, Turkey conducted two successful military operations in Syria with the support of Russia.

The issue is not about F-35s or S-400s; the real issue is the balance of power in the region.

According to TRT Middle East producer Muhammad Valid, the issue is not about F-35s or S-400s; the real issue is the balance of power in the region. Turkey and Israel are the two most important military powers balancing each other in the region, together with other regional actors. Since the Obama administration, the U.S. has wanted to keep Turkey weak and fragile, as opposed to increasing support for Israel. Valid adds that “Keeping Turkey weak would prevent President Erdogan from criticizing Netanyahu and Sisi – two close allies of the U.S.”

Similar to Merve Seren, political analyst at TRT World, Yusuf Erim, argues that Turkey has been left alone by the U.S. administration during the process. He gives the example of cancelled Sig Sauer hand-guns to Turkish President Erdogan’s security guards. Erim argues that the U.S. strategy to keep Turkey fragile forced the latter for an alternative, and when Turkey did try alternative defense systems, the U.S. applied political pressure. This is why the HQ-9 contract with China was cancelled. However, Erim notes that this time round Turkey did not only engage with Russia to purchase S-400s, but is in a strategic cooperation, which is why Ankara did not cancel the contract on this occasion.

The experts we have contacted confirm that the S-400 row between the U.S. and Turkey can be solved technically by a joint group from both sides.

At the moment the U.S. administration is forcing Turkey to cancel the contract, claiming that the placement of S-400s in Turkey and F-35s flying over them is “incompatible.” The experts we have contacted so far including Merve Seren, Muhammad Valid and Yusuf Erim, confirm the possibility to some degree with some objections, but they all seem to think that the issue of security can be solved technically by a joint group from both sides.  

According to records, President Erdogan and Donald Trump had a phone call and discussed the joint group option regarding the procurement of the S-400 defense system at the end of April. During a meeting held on May 1 in Ankara, Turkish Defense Minister Huluski Akar emphasized this point to U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, James Jeffrey. During an interview, Akar stated that the cancellation of Turkey’s order of F-35s (100 planes) or removal of Turkey from the F-35 project are both against international law and would damage both the project’s future as well as the companies and countries involved.

Yusuf Erim and Muhammad Valid confirm that the removal of Turkey from the F-35 project will affect the future of the project in a negative way. In the first place, Erim argues that the project has already been delayed enough, and that the removal of Turkey from the project will further delay the process for at least two years. This would have a negative impact on the confidence of the companies and countries involved. Secondly, while there are some technological problems in the project, it is not easy to remove Turkish companies from the project as these companies are producing critical parts that require years of know-how knowledge and experience. Finally, Turkey has the advantage of using F-35s in real conflicts toward the threats from the south, test the product, record valuable information about the product and its combat capabilities. According to Erim, this point is quite important for the market confidence in F-35s. Therefore, he argues that the U.S. will keep Turkey inside the project and deliver the F-35s.

Buying F-35 does not mean Turkey can use the planes wherever-whenever. The joint system of F-35s does not allow you to act independently but only together with the U.S.

Merve Seren adds that buying F-35 does not mean Turkey can use the planes wherever-whenever. The joint system of F-35s does not allow you to act independently but only together with the U.S. In other words, buying F-35s does not give property rights to Turkey – there are only 4 countries that have this right: Israel, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore. Seren specifically highlights that purchasing S-400s would not cause Turkey to leave NATO, but rather that both NATO and Turkey will benefit from this purchase. She also adds that the locations of deployment of S-400s is quite crucial in this process. Seren argues that it is important to highlight the fact that Turkey is not a threat to NATO or the West. In fact, Turkey is protecting NATO’s western borders in the hardest line of alliance and without Turkey’s strong stand, Europe would face greater threats.

Muhammad valid argues that the U.S. administration will sell F-35s to Turkey, but that if F-35s do not arrive to Turkey, then the latter could purchase SU-35 from Russia, which are more practical, cheap and one of the best air superiority planes in the market. In fact, he adds that F-35 is not an air superiority plane (like SU-35), but a multi-function plane.

If F-35s do not arrive to Turkey, then Turkey could purchase SU-35 from Russia, which are more practical, cheap and one of the best air superiority planes in the market.

Yusuf Erim argues that the U.S. sees the situation as damage to its reputation and does not want this product to be sold to Turkey. Erim states that according to Americans, the issue has become one of precedent, which allows for Russia to emerge as a competitor in the military industrial market. Therefore, they are forcing Turkey to cancel the deal. Erim argues that the U.S. administration describes the situation as Russia selling a ‘big ticket item’ to an important NATO ally for the first time in history.

The S-400 crisis is just one of the many differences of opinion between Turkey and the U.S. Other areas of differences include the YPG/PKK existence in northern Syria, excessive U.S. support for Israel, and U.S. sanctions on Iran. Both sides are changing their policies according to their new position in the rapidly changing developments both in the region and the world. However, Turkey, which declares a strong defense system is vital for its national security – based on the developments in the region – seems to have the upper-hand in the wrestle, as opposed to the U.S., which is basically trying to keep an ally under control. The relationship between President Erdogan and Donald Trump may help find a solution to S-400 row. However, many uncertainties in the region may lead to new other crises between the two.

Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), which are produced by and are in the inventory of limited number of countries, could be deemed as a military superiority. There are 150 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems used by 48 countries. The global market of UAVs is around US$2.8 billion, which is expected to skyrocket to US$9.4 billion by 2025. Turkey is one of the very few countries who are successful in producing UCAVs, and it seems the country intends to maintain this success.

As domestic production increases and national resources are pooled, the dependency rate in the defense industry declines swiftly. The most vital aspect of military technology is the nationalization of military capacity. If a country is unable to produce its own weaponry and develop new technological systems, it will be forced to acquire its needs from other countries. This situation would surely complicate independence in terms of military capacity and may cause further issues through time.

As discussed recently, the focus here should be how UCAVs add a strategic value to Turkey’s military capacity. Moreover, the current status of UCAVs in the world should also be addressed. Firstly, UCAVs have yielded positive results especially in terms of counter-terrorism since their inclusion to the inventories of the Turkish Armed Forces and the police. In respect of tracking terrorist activities and destruction of terrorist elements in rural areas, detecting terrorist elements on mountains and preventing terrorist incursions, UCAVs are filling a prominent gap.

In addition to its operational successes during counter-terrorism operations, it is also possible to assert that UCAVs constitute a successful and strategic military capacity as they provide security to personnel, allow a stronger grip over the field and are cost-efficient. Pressure asserted upon the PKK and the preventative nature of UCAVs and UAVs could be understood through the complaints of terrorist elements.

Besides intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, these vehicles also ensure dominance over the field. UAVs have a positive impact in preventing terrorist activities not only in mountainous and rural regions, but in urban areas as well. Therefore, the contributions of UAVs and UCAVs could be considered as an unparalleled development, especially as terrorist organizations are having a hard time in moving without any interference.

UAVs and UCAVs provide military advantage

On the other hand, strategic contributions of UCAVs are not limited to counter-terrorism operations; they constitute a glaring advantage in border security, cross-border operations and in combat zones. UAVs and UCAVs had a positive impact in the success of the Operation Euphrates Shield. These vehicles facilitated the process of tracking elements of terrorist organizations on the field such as Daesh and PYD. Similarly, they were also crucial in preventing border transgressions along with weapon and ammunition smuggling attempts. The previously costly activities realized by numerous military personnel have therefore been streamlined.

One glimpse at the Syrian civil war is adequate to assess the crucial role of UAVs and UCAVs. The fact that Russian UAVs have completed over 14,000 sorties since the beginning of Russia’s operation in Syria is illustrative of the prominence of these vehicles. Therefore, actors possessing these systems undoubtedly gain a military advantage in the combat zone. Utilization of such military systems is not limited to national states, as terrorist organizations are also trying to benefit from the advantages of the vehicles in concern. Daesh’s assassination drones and the PKK/PYD/YPG’s mini drones are only some examples.

Aware of its benefits, many countries are trying to add UCAVs to their military inventory. For instance, France announced that it would arm UAVs procured from the US until 2019, with the purpose of using them in West Africa. Moreover, France’s attempts to produce UCAVs jointly with Germany, Spain and Italy has been covered by the media. It should be expressed that the US, China and Israel are well invested in the development of these vehicles.

Genuine and domestic software is a must

Meanwhile, China’s aggressive policies in terms of UAV and UCAV sales must be underlined, as it concerns the region. It is possible to see that China is selling these vehicles to many countries in the Middle East and Africa. Besides sales to Egypt, a UAV factory has been agreed to be constructed in Saudi Arabia.

While China acting freely in a matter which the US is reserved will be crucial for the balance in the region, unless the software is genuine and domestic, these systems are vulnerable to being tampered by the producing country. In this respect, it could be asserted that Iran, Turkey and Israel are in a better position in the region, as they have their own national systems.

While criticizing Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy Sezgin Tanrıkulu over the allegations of targeting civilians, President Erdoğan said “You are employing Qandil’s [the mountain where PKK’s headquarter is located] discourse. We have worked for years to produce our own unmanned aerial vehicles.” Indeed, it was not easy for Turkey to reach this capacity. As Turkey’s experience with Israeli-made Herons suggest, these systems are vulnerable to tampering as long as the software is not genuine and domestic.

Moreover, Turkey is attempting to further its capacity. Enabling more efficient military operations, these systems are expected to progress onto the next level – it was announced that unmanned fighter jets will be produced in the short-term. Unmanned fighter jets will definitely add a prominent strategic value to Turkey’s military capacity. Currently, there are 30 Bayraktar Tactical-Class UAVs in the inventory of security forces, 8 of which are UCAVs. Meanwhile, an additional 16 of these vehicles will be delivered to the security forces in the short-term. Considering the security risks emerging from Syria and Iraq, it would not be wrong to suggest that the number of UCAVs should be increased.

In the meantime, 6 Anka-S UCAVs produced by Tusaş are expected to be added to the inventory before 2018. It should also be noted that a Turkish company, Vestel, is also working on a UAV named Karayel [Northwest Wind].

All in all, Turkey has a strong base in this field; further progressing this base with the development of unmanned fighter jets will grant Turkey a strategic military advantage in the region in terms of counter-terrorism operations and deterrence.

The evolving uncertainties of world politics and diverse forms of threats have compelled Turkey to take new decisions in terms of strategy. There are both realized and impending changes that are to follow these tendencies in order to establish partial alliances and to increase the capacity of strategic weaponry. In this respect, the S-400 missile system is at the junction of the aforementioned two trends.

Global fluctuations and security threats evolving around Turkey requires the country to be prepared for multiple risks. While new phenomena, such as using terrorism as a weapon and proxy wars have emerged, these have not completely eradicated the concept of conventional war. Therefore, precautions against conventional and nuclear warfare are as vital as those taken against terrorism. In this respect, the threats Turkey has faced in the last 7 years, especially those after June 2015, are striking.

Allocating events in chronological order might provide some clues about the bigger picture: In June 2012, a Turkish military aircraft was downed and in response, the air defense systems demanded from NATO were placed six months later. Turkey changed its rules of engagement and transitioned into an alert state. Later in March 2014 and November 2015, Turkey downed a Syrian and a Russian military aircraft, respectively. While the PKK declared autonomy in Syria, Daesh was on the border of Turkey, and the YPG/PKK threat become more prominent after Daesh’s attack to Ayn al-Arab. After the said siege, Daesh bombarded Turkish soil with mortars and rockets. By the end of 2015, Russia placed S-400 missile systems in Syria. Turkey was at the brink of war with Russia after the downing of Russian military aircraft. Following the June 7 elections, the PKK started to commit terrorist attacks in Turkish cities. The terrorist organization tried to gain ground through its “trench strategy.”

First Germany then the US withdrew their Patriot air defense missile systems from Turkey. In other words, they left Turkey vulnerable to attacks from terrorist organizations and other international actors.

Amongst these crises and attacks, first Germany then the US withdrew their Patriot air defense missile systems from Turkey. In other words, they left Turkey vulnerable to attacks from terrorist organizations and other international actors. Turkey fought against these threats on its own and incapacitated many of them. The most prominent consequence of these series of events was Turkey’s further advance into the defense industry – there were also certain initiatives in the past years in this respect.

While on one hand the Turkish administration accelerated the production of weapons with use of its own resources, the government preferred to buy products, such as defense systems, whose production and usage is feasible in the long-run, from other countries. While the pursuit to acquire defense systems goes back to the 90s, an important step in this regard was taken by announcing a tender for the procurement of such systems. With the ultimate aim of protecting its own territory, the conditions declared that Turkey also placed importance on common production and technology transfer. While these conditions suspended the financial burden of such systems, the condition of “50% joint production” was a premise for developing, diversifying and nationalizing the imported defense system in the following years. While the Chinese company CPMIEC satisfied the requirements of the Turkish administration and thus won the bid, the process was later cancelled in September 2015, as it was announced that Turkey decided to initiate the process of producing its own long-range missiles.

The Process of Procuring S-400s

After 4 years, Turkey was back to square one in terms of air defense systems. Comments made by Western politicians and military figures along with the discussions in the public sphere were reminiscent of what can be called a “déjà vu” – Same arguments, similar statements! Not so concerned about the country’s national security, the western public sphere, media and bureaucracy once again diverted their criticisms towards Turkey. This attitude is embodied in the statement made by the US Chief of Staff, merely “concerning.” This matter was also up to debate in the US Congress, and the purchase of S-400s were described as “worrying.” Ironically however, it is also a US Special Forces commander who is able to mockingly state that they advised the YPG to change their name. More, it is the US that supplies the YPG in Syria with weapons that many countries do not even possess. The US can only guarantee by word of mouth that these weapons will not be used against Turkey. This reminds us of the withdrawal of Patriot air defense missiles from Turkey, as discussed earlier. It can strongly be stated that, the guarantees provided by these actors in regards to Turkey’s fight against threats it faces is only bound by words. Hence therefore, Turkey has to take necessary precautions.

Responding to a question asked by reporters on the way back from his Gulf tour in July, 2017, President Erdoğan stated that negotiations for the S-400 defense system was coming to an end. Following, during the second week of September, Erdoğan announced that the agreement was almost complete and that a deposit payment had been made to Russia. The cost of this system for Turkey is going to amount to approximately US$2.5 billion. The first two systems and its equipment will be transported from Russia to Turkey, while the rest of them will be produced in Turkey. Nowadays, there are reports that an intensive work process is continuing for S-400s to be placed and become ready for use in Turkey. Since the emergence of the issue into the public agenda, many questions have begun to be debated intensively. These are the main questions:

How does an S-400 function and what are its features?

What is an S-400 defense system? Why does Turkey need it? Is it possible to integrate with NATO?  Does this preference mean that Turkey has detached from the West on a political level? Is co-production and technology transfer possible in the short term?

The main function of an air defense system is to detect and destroy attacking aircraft and ballistic missiles. In general, the system has four stages of operation: detection, identification, tracking and destruction. The only defense system that has the ability to detect a missile from its launch and destroy it out of the atmosphere is currently possessed by the US alone. The US realizes this tracking system through satellites. Other systems are usually able to detect and destroy missiles after they enter a certain range. The length of this range can vary depending on the radar support of the defense system. For instance, NATO has numerous command centers, radar systems and missile launchers deployed in very large and diverse locations.

The system works as a whole. Simply put, satellites, or the radar system in Kürecik detects a missile, relays the information to the command center in Germany and the battleships in the Mediterranean destroy the missile.

One of the questions raised at this point is whether this system will be integrated into NATO. When reviewing different explanations made at different times in this regard, Turkish experts stated that they could create an interface for the defense system that was to be acquired from China, which would allow integration with the NATO system. This is also true for the S-400 defense system. The latest statement made by the NATO Secretary General is also significant in this respect. While Stoltenberg stated that member states were free to acquire any equipment they wanted, he did not make a technical statement about NATO compliance. He only mentioned that this matter could be discussed in case of such a demand. This indicates that the will of respective parties will be the determining factor in this matter. It is certain that there will be many concerns and drawbacks. For instance, US military experts are talking about the possibility of Russia accessing NATO data by manipulating the system. It is important to note that this disclosure is directed at the public, as the system has not yet been tested in this sense. Moreover, the deployment of S-400s in Turkey does not account for the dismissal or replacement of NATO.

Will the S-400s not integrated into NATO remain completely dysfunctional?

This question is answered with a “yes” quite boldly. Although the reasons are not explained, it is asserted that S-400 defense systems that are not integrated with the NATO system will be unable to detect and destroy ballistic missiles. However, although the radars integrated into the S-400 system do not have satellite capability, they are able to destroy missiles in the specified range, as illustrated in Table 1. Moreover, S-400 defense systems can also detect all kinds of hostile aircrafts, ranging from fighter jets and heavy bombardment aircrafts to UAVs. Turkey’s primary technical aim is to reconfigure the detection system according to its own military doctrine and friend-or-foe definition.

In this respect, it could be asserted that S-400s have the capacity to satisfy the needs of Turkey in the short-term. Naturally, advanced defense systems that are integrated with satellites could be preferred. However, as stated earlier, only the US possesses such systems and they are reluctant to sell them. Turkey’s preference of S-400s is not limited to facilitating its security in the short-term. The publicized information suggests that work on joint production, technology transfer and human resources are prominent aspects of this agreement. While the details of the agreement are yet to be announced, it is definite that the first batteries will be transported from Russia and the remaining batteries (50%) are to be produced in Turkey. Therefore, this procurement will allow Turkey to establish an infrastructure for defense systems in the long-term.

Air defense system is a must for Turkey

Considering the transformation of international politics and the emerging potential of threats posed, Turkey’s need for a defense system is urgent. The preference of S-400s was thus shaped within the framework of Turkey’s needs and the positions of its allies. It was frequently expressed that the first offers were made to the Western allies of Turkey in respect to eliminating this need. However, the US and other NATO allies’ reluctance to sell or jointly produce these defense systems had the potential to increase Turkey’s dependency. Therefore, Turkey’s preference of S-400s as an alternative is partially an outcome caused by the attitude of its allies.

The point to be questioned here is that although Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952, and the closest to the Soviet threat in terms of proximity, the country still does not have a defense system and is totally dependent in this area. The circumstances of the Cold War are now irrelevant as the threat is not posed by a single actor. Turkey is not a country that could ensure its security by being completely dependent on either NATO or Shanghai. A Turkey failing to achieve independence in terms of defense and offense can never become a true global actor. In short therefore, Turkey’s quest for a defense system and its insistence on S-400s should be regarded within this framework.

Turkey stepped up efforts to acquire its own missile-defense system after the US, Germany and the Netherlands – all NATO members – decided at the end of 2015 not to renew their Patriot-missile deployments in southern Turkey.

Under the $2.5 billion agreement Ankara is due to receive two batteries of the antiaircraft missile from Moscow within the coming year and then produce two more batteries in Turkey.

While this has been a major step in modernizing Turkey’s defense system, worries have elapsed over Turkey’s affiliation with NATO. Although members of the security pact have expressed their concerns with Turkey shifting away from NATO, the Turkish administration have made it clear that the deal with Russia will not affect its duties under the organization.

It is true that relations between Turkey and NATO have been strained due to the recent negative press during the German federal elections, the on-going war in Syria and the unsupportive comments made by western allies during the July 15 Coup attempt, where FETO attempted to hijack the Turkish government.