Speaking at the award ceremony of The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) and the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TUBA) at the Nation Congress and Culture Center at Bestepe, Ankara, President Erdogan made some important comments after celebrating the work and effort of all scientists who had been awarded.

Highlighting the importance of the ‘national treasure’ that will carry Turkey stronger to the future, Erdogan said: “For a long time, we did not open the cover of this ‘treasure’ and benefit from it. For the past two centuries, not just as a country, but also as the Muslim world, we did not reach the success in intellectual studies, production, industry, scientific research, culture and arts. As a result of this, there is a huge impact of the attacks of imperialism on our country and the Muslim world.”

In addition to the sphere of intellectual production, Erdogan added that the Muslim world, which has a population of 1.7 billion, does not even have a permanent member at the United Nation’s Security Council.

“This is why I say ‘The world is bigger than 5.’ This is not far, not in terms of continents, religions, or ethnicities. An answer that comes out of their [permanent members] mouths finalizes everything. There are 194 members; 5 permanent members and they added 15 temporary members along just to raise and drop their hands. There is no meaning. The institution [UN] has been established to bring justice to the world, but this has not been the case. Do not expect or look for any justice from both the Security Council and the UN in general. There is no such thing.”

The Turkish president also added that during the past 16 years, the AK Party administration has managed to dismantle the ‘dependency suit’ that has been forced upon Turkey and its surrounding civilizations for centuries. He added that Turkey has made major improvements in terms of the economy, technology, industry, trade, transportation, democracy, and freedom. With these steps taken, the President underlined that the Turkish nation has increased its faith and self-esteem.

In addition to President Erdogan, during a press conference in Ankara yesterday, leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, also made important remarks and answered questions.

Responding to a question regarding the expected Turkish military operation in the east of the Euphrates, Bahceli stated that Turkey has a keen and determined attitude to wiping out terrorism, which was manifested with its two military operations – Operation Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield – and their successful results.

“The Turkish nation is aspiring the expected military operation in the east of the Euphrates. We also believe that this will take place. With regard to the fight against terrorism, we [MHP] continue to give our full support to the presidential system.”

In his answer to a question on whether it was necessary to start a dialogue with the Assad regime in order to maintain Syria’s geographical integrity and to limit the influence of the YPG/PKK, Bahceli answered, “I’m against any type of dialogue with the Assad regime as a thought. Turkey has walked a long way in the name of fighting terrorism and has paid high costs in this regard. At this point, it would be a shame and a loss for Turkey to give up on this process to the will and choice of Assad.”

Bahceli underlined that saving Syria from the Assad regime had to be done through democracy and that the policies that began in Sochi and continued in Tehran ought to be followed in order to reach a result.

Commenting on the phone call between President Erdogan and U.S. President Trump on December 14, which occurred just before Trump announced his decision to withdraw troops from Syria, Bahceli said that “Turkey has already ripped its shell” and is imposing its strong state tradition to different domains.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi 

In the past couple of days, Turkey’s political agenda has mainly been shaped by the upcoming local elections scheduled for March 2019. Understanding the importance of the local elections from a foreign point of view might be difficult if one disregards some crucial points. Although there is still over four months until election day, it won’t be wrong to focus on the main dynamics of the upcoming elections in Turkey.

The local elections planned to be held on 31 March, 2019, will be the first elections subsequent to the final establishment of the Turkish presidential system on 24 June, 2018. The previous local elections in all 81 provinces of Turkey were held in March 2014 when besides the mayors of the Turkish provinces, all other leading local offices had been elected as well. Furthermore, the 2014 local elections symbolized a key importance due to the prior judicial coup attempts by FETO members, who infiltrated the Turkish judiciary for over years.

Despite several moves and FETO-related – or manipulated – media supported campaigns, Turkish citizens did not accept a tutelage-like scenario by FETO and thus the ruling AK Party, led by then Prime Minister Erdogan, won the local elections without any heavy losses. Actually, this day could be thought of the acceleration day of the end of FETO, which even in this subsequent process tried to execute a bloody coup on 15 July, 2016, which also failed due to the people’s will that prevented the putschists.

After re-joining the party, President Erdogan, who was once the Mayor of Istanbul, pushed for reform within the local cadres of the AK Party. 

In regards to the 31 March, 2019, local elections, there are some important points that have been taken into account by both the AK Party and the MHP. As one remembers, both parties had created an alliance during the 24 June presidential and parliamentary elections, which symbolized Turkey’s ultimate switch to a new system of government. Interestingly, despite some disagreements in the afterward concerning some certain policy issues, it became clear last week that both parties will once again cooperate during the local elections – this time in a limited range but still covering Turkey’s three provinces with the highest population. Thus, this time the alliance will focus on certain cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. It has to be stressed that approximately 25 million of Turkey’s total – 81 million – population, live in these three cities.

Following this path, during his speech on Saturday, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli stated, “No matter who the Justice and Development Party nominates in the three biggest provinces, we will provide full support. There has been no bargain, collusion or give-and-take in making our decision.” Bahceli also added by addressing the continuing importance of the presidential system while stating “Whoever aims to destroy the presidential system will find us standing against them. This is about the People’s Alliance, the presidential system and the composition of local administrations in line with that.”

Highlighting his support for an alliance during the local elections in Turkey next year, MHP chair Devlet Bahceli stated, “Whoever aims to destroy the presidential system will find us standing against them. This is about the People’s Alliance, the presidential system and the composition of local administrations in line with that.”

On the other hand, the AK Party, actually began the renewal of its local cadres in 2017 when President Erdogan was able to re-join the party after the constitutional ban. On the day he was able to join the party, President Erdogan stated, “We will update all of our provincial, district and town organizations by the end of the year (2017) because there is a fatigue. We have to overcome this. With more dynamic teams, we have to prepare for 2019 [elections].”

It was no surprise that once again Erdogan himself, who was the mayor of Istanbul between 1994-1998, had realized the urgent need for certain reforms within the AK Party with regard to the upcoming local elections.

By elaborating on the motivation of the opposition parties regarding the local elections, one should particularly keep in mind that the main opposition party, the CHP, is once again seeking some rationality absent alliances, as it had tried during the 24 June elections by bringing together all opposition parties under the same umbrella. By this, the CHP, aims to come together with the conservative Saadet Party, secular-nationalist Iyi Party and is trying to find other ways to cooperate with the Kurdish nationalist HDP. But whether these ambivalent moves will find a reflection and positive reaction among the CHP constituent is another question. The main point all opposition parties share is the rejection of the newly established presidential system. If the opposition parties gain any success in major cities such as Istanbul or Ankara, they will most probably trigger a questioning of the legitimacy of the presidential system.

The CHP is trying to come together with the conservative Saadet Party, secular-nationalist Iyi Party and is trying to find other ways to cooperate with the Kurdish nationalist HDP.

In addition, and interestingly, Kemal Kilicdaroglu – the CHP chair – who has lost 9 elections since he became the party’s leader in 2010, still insists on keeping his position and has ignored harsh calls made by close party circles for him to step down by actively preventing party conventions. Moreover, the party’s presidential candidate during the June 24 elections and potential new chairperson of the CHP, Muharrem Ince, is testing for new opportunities in order to achieve his main purpose to become the successor of Kilicdaroglu. For this, he currently seems to have a new short-term strategy, namely, becoming the CHP’s candidate in Istanbul. Whether this will happen and what Kilicdaroglu is planning will become clearer in the upcoming weeks.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu – the CHP chair – who has lost 9 elections since he became the party’s leader in 2010, still insists on keeping his position and has ignored harsh calls made by close party circles for him to step down by actively preventing party conventions.

All in all, it can be guessed that the campaigns regarding the local elections will be held in a rather general elections atmosphere as has been the case in previous local elections in Turkey.

Since 2013, Turkey has been experiencing deeply traumatic events one after the other. The country has chosen to deal with these events with a new constitution and elections, preferring something new rather than old in order to address the trauma. We are now in the final stretch of a marathon of elections that have been going on for the last two years.

After the local elections in March 2019, we will enter a 3-year period without elections, which will last until 2022. Considering the fact that we’ve continuously been under an atmosphere of elections since March 2014, which have been pretty fierce, this 3-year period will certainly feel different for the country.

Since the previous local elections held in March 2014, the nature of politics, political sociology, and voting behavior in Turkey have changed significantly.

What makes the upcoming local elections more important than a simple vote to determine local administrators is the fact that the opposition is trying to make it ‘a referendum vote’ for the Turkish government. And this effort may lead to the most critical stage of a struggle in voter sociology, which has been long ongoing.

I will attempt to explain the reasons for this.

Now that Turkey has fully transitioned to the presidential system, the government is stable and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will rule the country until June 2022. However, the situation is not the same in Parliament. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party) does not hold the majority. Thus, the AK Party needs to maintain good relations with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – its electoral ally during the 2018 elections. (The opposite also holds here, meaning that the MHP needs the AK Party as well).

The continuation of the alliance that was established prior to the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2018 had become a political necessity. Leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was the first to state this, arguing that for a presidential system to be truly established, the success of the People’s Alliance must continue in the local elections, since the opposition would rekindle discussions regarding the presidential system in case of a decrease in votes.

Bahceli was not wrong with this opinion. Similar to the efforts between the AK Party and MHP, the Nation Alliance, which was first established for the 2018 elections, between the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Iyi Party and Felicity Party also seems interested in employing a strategy of cooperation and alliance for the local elections.

While the Felicity Party does not yet appear to be a part of this equation, CHP and Iyi Party have begun flirting with the idea of an alliance. In my opinion, Bahceli’s analysis still carries its validity. However, the dynamics have significantly changed when the AK Party and MHP publicly declared following the Student Oath debate that they will not form an alliance in the local elections.

Political scene after the parliamentary elections in July 2015

To recall the last parliamentary elections, Turkish voters were roughly divided into two major blocs. The first and majority bloc represented by the People’s Alliance consists of 54% of the voter base. The Nation Alliance received 34% of the vote. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which entered the elections outside of any alliance, fortified its position in the Turkish political landscape with 12% of the vote.

When examining these results, we see that the percentage of votes received by the AK Party has decreased to the levels obtained during the 2015 July elections. This is when the party failed to receive a majority in Parliament for the first time (since coming to power in 2002). The only consolation for this was that President Erdogan was selected as the first president of the presidential system in the first round, with 52.6% of the vote. The AK Party now cooperates with the MHP in order to achieve a majority in the parliament, meaning this is a de facto legislative coalition.

MHP’s key position

In comparison to the number of votes it received, this situation gives the MHP disproportionate influence. This is how, despite being the fourth largest party in Parliament, with only 50 members, the MHP could suggest for a general pardon for prisoners convicted of certain crimes.

MHP is evidently trying to use this position as a “leverage.” The last of such cases is the recent Student Oath debate, which has been the last the straw that broke the camel’s back causing the two parties to break up and follow their own ways during the local elections of 2019.

Likewise, the slowdown of the Turkish economy, along with the rising levels of inflation and unemployment, seems to have increased public discontent regarding the AK Party prior to the election. The general election held in June 2018 has shown that while the MHP lost a significant amount of votes to the newly formed nationalist Iyi Party, it has retained its significance by drawing a similar amount of votes from the AK Party. MHP now intends to recapture the nationalist vote it lost by employing its public perception.

Some recent polls reveal a remarkable trend among voters: voters continue to switch from the AK Party to the MHP. Some studies even conclude that this dynamic may have led to the MHP gaining 20% of the total votes. These studies and polls may be the reason behind the increased confidence Bahceli has shown in his relations with the AK Party and with Erdogan.

In both the constitutional referendum and the June 2018 elections we saw that with respect to opposing FETO and defending the country from future threats of terrorism, voters tend to hold the AK Party and MHP, Erdogan and Bahceli, in the same regard. The voter base of both parties constitute a “common pool” of 53% of the total vote, and the transition of voter preferences between the two parties takes place only in that pool.

The ongoing economic turbulence in Turkey gives a golden chance to the opposition parties at capturing votes from the 53% “common pool.” The CHP and Iyi Party are working hard to claim symbolically important victories against the AK Party.

Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality undoubtedly carries the utmost significance for the AK Party in the local elections. Recalling that the elected mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbas, was made to resign by the AK Party and President Erdogan, Istanbul emerges as a possibly problematic area for the AK Party. Formerly to negotiate with the AK Party, MHP had suggested that it would act in favor of the AK Party and not nominate a candidate in Istanbul, expecting a similar act in a different place for their benefit. However, there was not much that the AK Party could gain from the MHP in Istanbul; for the AK Party to win Istanbul, instead of MHP, the party should have focused more on the Kurdish electorate. The same is also happening between the Iyi Party and CHP, in the lines of “We should give Istanbul to them and they should give us Ankara.”

CHP’s HDP deadlock

CHP wants to gain the majority in Istanbul but whether the Iyi Party alone would achieve this is uncertain. Thus, the CHP needs to attract HDP voters as the HDP does not have a meaningful chance of winning the city. However, getting closer to the Kurds has become the biggest taboo of Turkish politics in recent years. If CHP were to name a candidate that would draw the support of Kurdish voters, they would distance themselves from Turkish nationalist Iyi Party voters. But without the support of Kurdish voters, it is highly unlikely for the CHP to win.

AK Party and MHP have both been accusing CHP of “allying with terrorists” and saying that HDP is a direct extension of the terrorist organization, the PKK. This discourse is very effective among voters. Non-Kurdish voters, regardless of which party they vote for, do not have any doubt regarding the HDP’s close relationship with the PKK. All research confirms this striking political reality. Now, seeing that the People’s Alliance is in some kind of coma, will there be a change in this discourse? Will the AK Party adopt a more soft approach to Kurdish politics? We’ll see.

While search for an alliance during the local elections has ended for the AK Party and the MHP, these efforts are likely to continue between the Iyi Party and the CHP. If the opposition parties, including the HDP, manage to form a block despite their substantial differences in micro and macro policies and gain vote from the ruling bloc of the AK Party and MHP in the elections, for example reducing the 53% total vote of the two parties to around 45-47%, Turkey might enter a discussion of legitimacy that might last until 2022. The opposition may claim that President Erdogan and the AK Party-MHP majority in the Parliament have lost their legitimacy on the following morning of the elections.

Scramble for symbolically important municipalities

The fact that the MHP and AK Party will not form an alliance in the local elections will prevent others from calculating the votes of the two parties and saying “look, this is the state of the People’s Alliance.”

On the other hand, due to the complex system of local elections in Turkey, it is hard to determine the percentage of votes a given party has received nationwide. Therefore, the real result of the election will not be determined by vote percentages but by which parties win the symbolically important municipalities and which party wins the most municipalities in total. This is why the AK Party losing metropolitan areas such as Istanbul and Ankara means a lot to the opposition.

In previous elections, the AK Party used to run a serious election campaign in Izmir, which traditionally strongly votes for CHP, but in this election it seems like the AK Party will act more defensively and prefer to focus on retaining its previous majorities. It will be interesting to watch the AK Party’s efforts to retain its popularity not only in Istanbul and Ankara but also in cities such as Antalya, Bursa, and Balıkesir.

All these constitute the reasons why this election will be decisive for AK Party’s future. If the party shows that it has retained its influence and popularity, it will prove that it has successfully emerged from the dangerous turbulence Turkey has experienced since the last months of 2013 as the “founding” party, and will continue to carry Turkey to its future. If it experiences a significant decrease in votes and fails to rejuvenate after such a loss, it will enter a period of very hard days.

In 2013, the Ministry of National Education abolished the administrative regulation that ordered the recital of the Student Oath, an oath that begins by stating “I am a Turk, honest, and hardworking,” which used to be recited in schools at the beginning of each day. A teacher’s union known for being close to the MHP had opened a case in the Administrative Court regarding this decision made by the ministry. During the time in which the oath had been abolished, Turkey was conducting a series of talks with the outlawed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in order to resolve the Kurdish question.

MHP was strongly opposed to this process calling it “Dissolution Process” that was indeed called by the government as “Reconciliation Process.” The Oath was considered racist by non-Turkish groups living in Turkey and MHP saw its abolition as a concession made to the PKK.

The Student Oath Case, which was opened in 2013, was concluded in October 2018 by the 8th chamber of the Council of State. The decision ruled that the Ministry of National Education cannot abolish its own administrative regulations.

This is a problematic decision for a number of reasons. First, the ministry abolishing an administrative regulation does not create a new legal situation, meaning that the Council of State has no ground for a decision concerning it. Second, the Council of State goes beyond matters of law in its decision by stating, “Sufficient scientific ground supporting the Ministry of National Education’s decision to abolish the oath does not exist,” meaning that the court is arguing whether such a decision is right on grounds of pedagogical science rather than legality. However, the Council of State does not have the authority to conduct examinations regarding the aptness of administrative decisions. Its authority is limited to examining and supervising legal matters.

In the “Old Turkey,” to use the term coined by the AK Party, courts often examined the “aptness” of government decisions and acted as if they were opposition parties, banning certain behavior. It has been a long time since this situation was named “judicial tutelage” and many efforts were made to end it.

The government has tried to change judicial cadres in order to end this practice by Kemalist and statist groups. However, these changes led to the rise of FETO in the judicial system, and this terrorist organization tried to establish its own practice of “tutelage.”

Following FETO’s bloody coup attempt on July 15, 2016, extensive crackdowns occurred in the judicial system in order to eliminate FETO members and prevent such attempts of establishing a “tutelage” from occurring again. More than half of the judges and prosecutors working at the time were dismissed. While all this was happening, the greatest supporter of President Erdogan and the AK Party was MHP and its leader Devlet Bahceli.

The Council of State’s decision discussed above thus raises questions as to whether or not those close the MHP among the judiciary came to power after the FETO crackdowns and whether they are prominent enough to show such strength against the government.

The strong open support Bahceli displayed for the Student Oath and his criticisms targeting AK Party’s former Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdag, who comes from an ethnic Kurdish background, makes the MHP’s stance on the subject very clear. MHP wants the oath back in schools.

All these together are issues that made it difficult to continue with the People’s Alliance during the local elections. Unlike MHP leader Bahceli, President Erdogan never brought these issues to the agenda until 23 October. However, the general atmosphere from Erdogan’s surroundings was that MHP’s demands in regards to the pardon of prisoners and the Student Oath was not going to be accepted.

When Devlet Bahceli was at the lectern to speak before his party’s group meeting on October 23, as always, he looked angry and stiff. In this speech, Bahceli announced that the MHP had stopped looking for ways to form an alliance with the AK Party during the local elections. He also used ambiguous language about the future of the People’s Alliance. Due to the questions launched at him after he finished his speech, Bahceli stated that the “People’s Alliance is continuing.” However, it’s not difficult to suggest that the alliance had cracked.

President Erdogan spoke after Bahceli’s speech and his decision to end the alliance possibility during local elections and bluntly stated, “Everyone can go their own ways.” While Erdogan had stated this in regards to the local elections, I think the most important part of his speech was when he defended Bekir Bozdag against Devlet Bahceli and said that “We have no other oath apart from our National Anthem.” Erdogan’s disapproval of this type of Turkish nationalism was also an illustration that the President wanted to highlight the difference between the AK Party and MHP.

Now, it’s possible to see the People’s Alliance in some kind of coma or in the fridge. Although both sides suggest that the alliance is continuing, we’ll only see the reality of this when the MHP votes either in favor or against the 2019 budget formation, which is still being discussed in Parliament. If the MHP votes against the budget then not only will the People’s Alliance die, but the newly established presidential system will also enter a serious crisis due to its failure in processing its first budget. If MHP votes in favor of the budget, this will show that the People’s Alliance will continue.

Of course, the MHP can choose to abstain from voting. In this case, the budget will pass with AK Party votes. However, the People’s Alliance will maintain to sleep in a coma.

It’s highly likely that we’ll see whether this alliance will continue and what the new rules for the two parties will be after the local elections. After observing their votes, the AK Party and MHP will do a cost-benefit analysis in order to observe how the alliance suits them best.

During his press statement on January 8, 2018, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli clarified certain ambiguities surrounding the 2019 elections that were the main items on the political agenda. In this statement, Bahceli announced that MHP would not nominate any candidate, but support President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2019 presidential elections. More, MHP leader highlighted that his party is open to alliance with Erdogan’s AK Party for the parliamentary elections as well. This alliance, it was suggested, should be implemented into a legal framework, allowing parties to maintain their corporate identity and to identify the percentage of votes each party receives. President Erdogan responded to MHP’s call positively, which then led to the two parties establishing their own alliance commissions.

With this, Devlet Bahceli carried out the AK Party-MHP alliance, which was formed after the July 15 coup attempt and which aimed to ensure the survival of the state, on to a next level. This was a requirement necessitated by the presidential system, as political parties have to seek alliances in order to secure the election. Therefore, after party-member presidency, the political reflections of the presidential system began to be apparent on the road to 2019.

The content and political implications of the presidential system were not discussed during the referendum campaign due to the manipulations of the opposition, refusing to allow people to understand the importance of this political transformation in terms of democratization. For instance, the “no” bloc distorted the truth about certain amendments, such as decreasing the age to be eligible for parliamentary candidacy to 18 or increasing the number of deputies to 600. Moreover, opposition leader Kilicdaroglu claimed that the 4 million Syrians who are seeking refuge in Turkey would be naturalized if the referendum succeeded. These kinds of manipulations obstructed the essence of this new system and the political implications it would bring from being understood.

Not polarization, reconciliation

Analyzing the developments in Turkish domestic politics, it becomes obvious that political parties are experiencing changes brought by the presidential system. As it is known, a simple majority is sought in the presidential elections and this condition will shape Turkey’s political landscape.

First of all, the simple majority factor renders political and social reconciliation inevitable. In the new era, political parties will be inclined to be more inclusive, agreeable and appealing to voters. In this respect, “bloc politics” foreseen by the new system enforces political reconciliation instead of polarization. Thanks to these political blocs, the public will observe which parties are working with each other and will decide accordingly. Therefore, the success of the alliance political parties will form in the presidential system is to be determined by their appeal to the public.

In terms of seeking reconciliation and alliance that is brought by the new system, the AK Party and MHP have agreed on national stance and an alliance that appeals to the majority of the public. Considering this alliance, it could be asserted that the MHP is pursuing a realistic political stance. The party sought to transform its existing cooperation with the AK Party into an alliance since the July 15 coup attempt. Bahceli’s statement about being true to the “Yenikapi spirit” and desiring to incorporate the new system is the most important indicator of this. MHP is aware of the necessity of adopting a national unity discourse amid global and regional conflicts and that this discourse appeals to the public.

What caused MHP to depart from its previous bloc was the failure of this bloc to maintain a national stance, which inevitably discomforted the public. In other words, unlike the other bloc consisting of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) along with several smaller parties, which prefer to cooperate behind closed scenes, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently thanks to its public consent.

No coalition but pre-election alliance

The alliance-forming process between the AK Party and the MHP also revealed another tangible outcome of the presidential system: reconciliation between political parties in a different form other than a coalition in the parliamentary system. During the discussions on transitioning to the presidential system, it was expressed that the new system would eliminate coalition governments and provide opportunities for new forms of reconciliation and cooperation. There is significant difference between presidential and parliamentary systems in terms of reconciliation. Unlike in the parliamentary system, the presidential system also seeks reconciliation among the public instead of only party leaders and political elites.

While the public only observes coalition negotiations in the parliamentary system after casting votes, the presidential system allows the public to shape alliance discussions between political parties. This is due to the fact that alliances have to be formed prior to the elections. If the agreement is only among political elites, the public may punish their political parties by not voting for them. Therefore, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently and prior to the election, accepting to face any repercussions in the case of public dissatisfaction.

Coalitions formed under the parliamentary system do not necessarily allow the public to know which party will have executive power. However, in the case of the AK Party-MHP alliance, the public is aware that Erdogan will maintain executive power if he is elected. In addition, even if MHP withdraws its support from the AK Party after the elections, it will not create a political crisis, as it would do in a parliamentary system.

For all these reasons, the presidential system does not have coalitions, but pre-election alliances. The process between the AK Party and MHP is a reflection of this. Therefore, criticisms about not being able to eliminate coalitions despite transitioning into the presidential system are just not true.

The process between the AK Party and MHP reveals only a part of the reconciliatory aspect of the presidential system. If the president’s party fails to secure a majority in Parliament, the President will be inclined to reconcile with other parties that possess seats. If the AK Party fails to secure a majority of seats in the 2019 elections, its alliance with MHP will most probably permeate the Parliament as well. Indeed, Bahceli clearly stated that his party will do all that is required to render the new system permanent in 2019-2024 period.

In this sense, the presidential system enforces pre-election alliances, not government coalitions. These alliances will reveal the political blocs indicating social reconciliation rather than social polarizations. Considering its voter base, it had been inevitable for MHP to become party to a different bloc. Meanwhile, the discourse on national unity, which has gathered support by the general public and which is shared by the AK Party has allowed MHP to leave the “no” bloc and join powers with the government.