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n East Africa, radicalization has targeted specific societal groups that experience real or perceived threats that are easy for terrorist organizations to exploit. The terrorist groups recruit members willingly into the ranks of their organizations to gain support for their acts of violence against groups they perceive as enemies.

It continues to be an issue of debate whether radicalization actually leads to violence. One side argues that there is no causal link between radicalization and violence, and that radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence. They contend that individuals should be allowed to hold radical views and that this should be recognized as part of social freedoms, including freedom of thought and expression.

The argument goes that there should be a limit to the extent to which security services should intervene when people believed to be radicalized are involved in violent acts. People believe that there are other factors that contribute to involvement in violence and radicalization, the surrounding environment being one of them.

A second group places more emphasis on the root causes of radicalization. They argue that individual factors, including psychological factors, are the main cause, and that certain types of people are more prone to being radicalized than others. Of course, in addition to these two groups, there are also those who argue in favor of social factors causing radicalization.

However, this argument raises the question of whether every individual is equally susceptible to radical views and beliefs. The social primacy thesis is gaining momentum because it tends to link radicalization to social interactions and factors in the individual’s social environment which include exposure to poverty, education, environmental challenges, technological equipment, and access to technology.

The nature of radicalization and the means it uses have led to new debates including the question of whether individuals can become radicalized on their own, without the help or radical views of a third party. Even with little exposure to radical content, individuals have gained enormous potential for self-radicalization with the help of the internet whose impact on the field of radicalization has led to further differences of opinion.

For example, why when the internet provides easy access to radical content, some segments of society and individuals are potentially radicalized simply by accessing and consuming radical content, while others are not? Radical content is being accessed and processed differently by an increasing number of different internet users, but mass radicalization is not occurring. Online communication technologies have increased the likelihood that individuals who do not engage in violent acts will become radicalized.

How and why are they radicalized?

How do these actors conduct their radicalization and terror campaigns in East Africa? Who are their main targets and why? Violent actors have proven to be highly adaptable, particularly in response to counterterrorism measures implemented by legitimate authorities in the region. Initially, groups such as al-Shabaab used public spaces, including mosques and schools, to disseminate radical ideologies, particularly to young people. In Kenya, for example, where counterinsurgency operations can claim to be the most discreet, a number of iconic public mosques in Nairobi and Mombasa were infiltrated by pro-al-Shabaab clerics who conducted radicalization campaigns targeting young people.

Some of the clerics were high-profile Islamic figures who commanded respect among their followers, likely increasing the impact of their message and popularizing calls for violence in the name of jihad.

In addition to illiterate segments of the population, al-Shabaab also benefits from large numbers of educated and highly skilled but unemployed youth. The organization places great emphasis on using ethnic diversity, regional circumstances, and even family connections for radicalization and recruitment. Individuals targeted for radicalization are approached by people who are familiar and close to them, such as wives tasked with radicalizing their husbands. The increased reconnaissance and surveillance of open areas suitable for radicalization has limited the group’s activities to rural areas, where it targets young people.

Closer surveillance of open areas has also forced these groups to turn to online communication technologies, where they can target wider audiences with tailored messages, including translation into local languages. However, better regulation and control of online content by the authorities is preventing prolonged online radicalization. A fierce competition has emerged between the authorities and terrorist groups to open and close social media accounts, which, in turn, has led to almost instantaneous censorship of many online channels.

Measures against extremism and terrorism

It is important to focus on the counter-radicalization measures taken by the authorities in East Africa. In terms of the effectiveness of these measures, the authorities have initiated three main approaches in partnership with civil society organizations and other groups within society, while developing key measures to increase society’s overall awareness and resilience to terrorist recruitment and radicalization. In the case of Kenya, key interventions have been decentralized to the county and grassroots levels for maximum impact.

Through public awareness programs such as “Epuka Ugaidi” (Shunning Terrorism), community members in Kenya were sensitized and equipped with the necessary skills to prevent radicalization at onset. Other measures include the use of intercommunity forums and even sensitizing critical sectors of society to increase the effectiveness of their role in countering radicalization. Somalia has prioritized the sensitization of academics, religious figures, and community leaders to maximize their influence in eradicating al-Shabaab narratives.

The second category of measures are more specific interventions targeting groups considered high risk and vulnerable to radicalization. However, such classifications are essentially meaningless and can undermine the effectiveness of counter-radicalization programs. Such profiling potentially fuels resistance and increases the likelihood of mass community radicalization.

Secondary measures to counter this are, therefore, more comprehensive and more likely to be community-led violence prevention initiatives. Reputable civil society organizations and faith-based groups have been involved in supporting community-led processes. The implementation of targeted secondary measures prioritizes the highest levels of transparency, respect, and honesty to achieve better results.

The final category of measures, called tertiary, targets those who have already been radicalized and joined violent groups. Rather than actively preventing violent groups from recruiting new members, tertiary programs aim to disadvantage violent groups by creating discord and discontent among new members, potentially leading to defections. Interventions have included disarmament, demobilization, deradicalization, and reintegration programs, particularly for those who have defected, been rescued, or returned from al-Shabaab.

For counter-radicalization purposes, the Kenyan and Somali authorities have granted amnesty to defectors and returnees in return for them sharing their views on their horrific experiences within the organization. The employment of defectors and returnees sends a strong anti-radicalization message to the general population. The exploitation and victimization of these individuals for the purposes of radicalization and recruitment to terrorist violence using religious texts to justify or explain acts of violence and terrorism.