Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy has undergone a massive transformation, particularly in the fight against the PKK, while the extra-territorial military operations have expanded towards Syria and Iraq where the PKK has been consolidating its political and military influence since the dissolution of the Syrian and Iraqi sovereignties.

Turkey began to operationalize its new counter-terrorism strategy with Operation Euphrates Shield (2016) in Syria and carried out its military operation against the PKK in Afrin with Operation Olive Branch (2018). Even though, these two military operations have different geopolitical aspects and execution methodologies, both military operations had the same strategic objectives: to de-territorialize the PKK in Syria, to eliminate its military capacity including manpower, and to weaken its international cooperation especially with the countries that provide militarily and political support to the PKK since the rise of DAESH.

Turkish authorities believe that the reactionary struggle against the PKK is not the best strategy to degrade and defeat the PKK’s terrorist campaign against Turkey. The best approach, according to Turkish authorities, should be designed by considering three interrelated variables: political decisiveness, Turkey’s military advantages and sustainability of military operations not only within Turkey but also in extraterritorial spaces such as Syria and Iraq.

Political decisiveness became a central element of the new counter-terrorism strategy following the collapse of the peace process in 2015. Turkish security forces have been able to defeat the PKK’s violent activities through domestic counter-terrorism operations; even though the PKK aimed to establish “liberated zones” by implementing violent urban tactics to widen the conflict zones towards significant city centers in southern Turkey.

The central rationality behind the PKK’s strategic consideration was the Syrian Civil War, in which Turkey has had to deal with many security and political challenges. In such a conflictual environment, the PKK could enjoy its territorial expansion. However, Turkey’s early military reactions against the PKK in the city centers of southeastern Turkey during the urban conflict between 2015 and 2016 have made substantial progress, and the PKK lost its entire terrorist mobilization and public support across the region.

Following domestic-counter terrorism operations, Turkey started to expand its actions towards the PKK in Syria. During this period, Turkey’s priority was to roll back the PKK’s geopolitical expansion along Turkey’s Syria border. Afrin, in this context, was a strategic threshold for Turkey to see how Ankara would be able to maintain its political decisiveness under the regional security vacuum that was somehow antagonistic and the U.S.’s apparent strategy over the presence of the PKK in Syria in the fight against DAESH.

Turkey’s military advantages along with its increasing capacity in defense technologies became central to sustain its military operations and ultimately defeated the PKK in Afrin. Operation Olive Branch resulted in a military and political victory for Turkey. Following the 58 days of the clash, the PKK was defeated and had to leave from the city centers. Following the triumph of Afrin, the Manbij agreement with the U.S. over the issue of the PKK presence showed how Turkey used its political decisiveness and military capacity to change the facts on the ground. From a domestic counter-terrorism struggle to Afrin and Manbij, Turkey has also shown its willingness regarding the continuation of the military offensive against the PKK, even though the regional and international conjuncture is against this policy.

Now, Turkey aims to maintain its counter-terrorism strategy against the PKK in Qandil where the PKK has settled as a safe haven thanks to the lack of Iraq’s sovereignty, the geographical sophistication of the region and the military capacity that the PKK has been building for almost 40 years. At his stage, Turkey has similar strategic goals: securing its border security against terrorist infiltration, eliminating the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq by holding terrorist camps in the region to isolate the PKK from its stronghold in Qandil and preventing the logistical mobilization of the PKK.

Turkey’s military operation now targets the PKK’s two strategically important locations in the region: Khakurk and Qandil. Turkish forces have already secured almost 500 sq. km in Khakurk and opened a safe corridor that reaches the Qandil Mountain since the beginning of the operation in March 2018. This time, the military strategy is not only targeting to eliminate PKK terrorists but also aiming to clean and hold the territory where the PKK has any presence.

The execution of military tactics in operational level on the ground is different compared to the OOB and OES in Syria due to the topographical feature of the region. But, the political decisiveness, Turkey’s military advantages, notably its technological superiority over the PKK, and willingness to maintain military operations toward the center of the Qandil Mountains seem to change the nature of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK.

This will be the first comprehensive counter-terror operation against the PKK. The regional dynamics are also behind Turkey’s military offensive. If Turkey can manage the dynamics emanating from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the central Iraqi government in favor of its new strategy, the PKK cannot sustain its presence in the region. But this does not necessarily mean that the PKK threat for Turkey will disappear in the near future.

Source: Suriye Gündemi

At this stage, there are two critical strategic challenges for Turkey in its fight against the PKK. The first challenge is about the question of how the PKK will transform its overall strategy in Syria and Iraq after the fall of Qandil. More importantly, the real challenge for Turkey is whether the PKK can find another safe haven in Syria or Iraq. The second challenge for Turkey is about the question of how Turkish military can maintain its military presence in northern Iraq particularly in the Qandil area. The Defense Minister of Turkey announced that Turkey would not withdraw its military force until the PKK is ultimately defeated in Iraq.

Turkey now has 14 different military bases in northern Iraq. Compared to the previous military operations against the PKK in this region, the presence of Turkish military troops in different places provide more space to maneuver. However, the continuation of Turkey’s military presence might undermine the relations between Ankara and Baghdad. Therefore, the success of the new counter-terrorism strategy is also part of a regional agreement between Iraq, Turkey, and Iraq against the PKK. Iran is currently neutral toward Turkey’s ongoing operation. If Turkey’s military strategy can succeed in the short term to defeat the PKK in Iraq, then reaching a midterm consensus between Turkey, Iraq, and Iran will be easier.

When the Syrian Civil War is discussed, the discussion tends to evolve around the number of refugees, the constant attacks conducted by the Assad regime and trilateral discussions between Turkey, Iran and Russia, who are the three guarantor states seeking to find an end to the years long conflict in Syria.

One very important aspect of society that has continuously been ignored in these discussions has been education. While education has become an asset difficult to sustain in Syria, following Operation Euphrates Shield, funds from the Turkish Ministry of Education and some partner countries have been able to re-provide education to 156,324 students, repair 472 schools and ensure over 5000 teachers were back in their profession. In regards to this initiative, the Turkish government has spent 250 million Turkish Liras since 2016.

 

A report written by Ipek Coskun and published by the Foundation for Political and Social Research (SETA), seeks to answer gaps in the education debate in Syria. In the introduction, the report provides a briefing about the general situation of education in Syria prior to the civil war. By issuing a comparison between figures prior to the beginning of the war and the current situation, in the report, Coskun highlights that the aim is to reflect the situation Syria has found itself in since the beginning of the conflict, the affect that this situation has had on education and to provide a perspective as to how education in Syria can be developed in the future. While the report highlights the facilities provided in areas freed by Operation Euphrates Shield, it maintains that these projects should be replicated across Syria.

In conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Turkey exercised its ‘right of self-defense’ and launched Operation Euphrates Shield on August 24, 2016. In cooperation with the Free Syrian Army, OES cleared terrorism completely from the Kilis-Gaziantep corridor and secured the control of Azaz, Jarabulus, Al-Rai, and surrounding areas. In total, the military operation cleared 1,000 km from terrorist groups including the PKK/YPG and Daesh.

After concluding the operation on March 31, 2017, the Turkish government pursued many social projects in order to ensure that the lives of people living in the liberated areas were close to normal. The most important aspect in this regard was thus education. As graphed in the report, following the liberation of areas under OES, 156,324 students, 5,150 teachers and 472 schools were located. While the education in Jarabulus, Al-Bab, Kabassin and Bizaah are coordinated by the Gaziantep Directorate of National Education, education in Azaz, Al-Rai, Akhtarin, Mare’ and Souran are coordinated by the Kilis Directorate of National Education. In regards to the breakdown of these students, according to data obtained from the 2017-2018 statistics, there are currently 2,254 pre-school students, 120,653 in nursery, 27,340 in primary, 1,148 in Imam Hatip primary schools, 4,291 in high school and 638 students in Imam Hatip high schools. The report further break downs in detail the exact year group of these students.

Recommendations

While in the report Coskun details the facilities and education provided to Syrian students in liberated areas, in addition to this data, the conclusion section ‘Conclusion and Recommendations,’ is important to assess for the future of education in Syria.

Providing a comparison to the Bosnian War, in the conclusion it is clearly stated that as history shows us, if the conflict in Syria ends with the country breaking up into different sects, this will damage education the most. More, if one day a ceasefire and peace is secured in the country, there are two social factors that are going to struggle the most in the re-infrastructure of the failed state: 1) education and 2) human power. For these reasons, the recommendations provided in the report are important in order to lay a picture of what and how education in Syria could look like in the future.

Following the traumas of the war, whether children have had to migrate, been displaced or lost their families, it is most likely that they are going to need (and currently do need) psychological assistance. In fact, this is not only the case for children but for teachers too. Thus, for this reason, the report recommends for education facilities provided in the OES areas to be spread across Syria. This is because the system provided by Turkish authorities does not design education based on a specific ideological belief or sect of society. This is in comparison to education provided by Syria’s Ba’ath Party, which teaches children history as the party itself sees it.

In regards to providing and securing education facilities across Syria, the report calls for an independent international committee to be established with participation from Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. This committee will be in charge of supervising the current situation in order to lay a future program. Second, the effects of terrorism on education cannot be denied. For that reason, the report recommends for operations to be conducted in order to release children from the hands of terrorist groups such as Daesh and the PKK/YPG by securing deals with their families. Third, emphasizing the need to support Syrian teachers and provide them training, the report calls for an atmosphere of assurance that Syrian teachers who are currently refugees will be able to return to their professions when they return to their country. Fourth, highlighting failures of international organizations – especially that of the United Nations – the report recommends for the UN to work with countries such as Turkey in order to conduct concise assessment needs reports.

In addition to this, considering the fact that the social system in Syria has collapsed, the report calls for a new structure in accountability, budget planning and the education of teachers. In relation to this, and within this new structure, the needs of schools should be assessed and provided in a short period of time. As we know the Syrian Civil War has destroyed cities such as Aleppo and Idlib the most. Thus, such cities should be prioritized in regards to any social facilities provided. Finally, the report calls for the education of future teachers with no ideological bias and concludes with the emphasis that the education facilities provided in OES areas should be replicated across Syria.

 

Turkey has been in a long on-going preparation process for an extensive military operation against the PYD/YPG, which the country deems as a threat to both its own national security and to the territorial integrity of Syria. Ankara has been in constant dialogue with countries across the region along with prominent actors in Syria in order to establish political and military premises.

Turkey has launched an operation targeting Afrin, the western end of the terror belt. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had deployed military forces to the region near Afrin, it has also established a base in Idlib, south of Afrin, effectively surrounding the city. In addition to this, thousands of Syrian opposition soldiers, who were trained through the “train-and-equip” program, were deployed against the PYD/YPG. Turkey is pursuing an initiative similar to the Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), which was launched right after the July 15 coup attempt, and which simultaneously cleansed the defined areas from both Daesh and the PYD/YPG. Operation Olive Branch (OOB) was launched a short time after President Erdogan’s announcement on 20 January, 2018, at 17:00. While the TSK announced the name of the operation as “Olive Branch,” references were made to decisions made by the United Nations Security Council and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

What are the geopolitical and demographic features of Afrin?

Located in northwest Syria, Afrin is a district in the Aleppo Province. The district consists of seven towns: Central, Bulbul, Jandairis, Rajo, Sharran, Shayk al Hadid and M’abatli. Its border with Turkey renders the district important in terms of geopolitics. Its surface area is 1850 km², corresponding to 2% of the total surface area of Syria. Afrin is located in a mountainous region and its elevation is between 700-1269 meters. The distance between its easternmost and westernmost points is 55 kilometers, while the distance between its northernmost and southernmost points is 75 kilometers.

According to the 2004 census in Syria, 64,758 people live in the town center and the total population of the district is 172,095. The city is mostly populated by Kurds. However, Arab and Turkmen and a small population of Yazidis also reside in the region. The city experienced a population increase after the 2011 revolution, as the Syrian regime did not target the city. Yet, figures provided regarding the population of Afrin are contradictory – especially numbers released by pro-PKK/PYD sources are exaggerated. It is estimated that around 300,000 people live in the Afrin District.

Why is Afrin important for the PYD/YPG?

Following the 2011 revolution, the PYD/YPG terrorist organization made an agreement with the Assad regime handed Afrin to PYD, which declared it as its canton in 2013. Since October 29, 2014, the region has been managed by an administration appointed by the PYD. The terrorist organization has eliminated all Kurdish opposition in the region, especially the Kurdish National Council, and has established its hegemony over the region.

After the downing of the Russian aircraft, the terrorist organization captured territories between Tell Rifat and Menagh to the east of Afrin from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with the support of Russian aircrafts. With this, the terrorist organization forced the Arab population in the region to immigrate. The group then attacked the town of Azez but failed to capture it. Since October 2016, the PYD/YPG has attempted to march on Al-Bab with the occasional air support from coalition forces. However, this march was stopped with the OES.

The YPG claims that it manages Afrin through 47 councils and 898 communes (communities) that organize the people. Even though the region is isolated from the PYD/YPG located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, it is managed by prominent figures of the PKK such as Halil Tefdem, Ahmed Hudro, Mahmud Berhudan, Behcet Abdo and Nocin, who all receive their orders from Qandil under the chain of command of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK).

This region acts like a springboard for the organization, which will allow it to access the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the terrorist organization attempts to establish a line of supply through the Amanos Mountains in Turkey in order to mobilize militants with weapons. The TSK and security forces have killed over 40 terrorists trying to cross the border from Afrin. The terrorist organization sees Afrin as an important source of recruitment. They are forcibly recruiting girls and boys aged between 16-18 for their “Self-Defense Force.” There are several boot camps established by the group where these teenagers are trained.

What are some of the alternative scenarios to the Afrin offensive?

Operation Olive Branch was launched at 17:00 on 20 January with military aircraft belonging to the Turkish Air Forces, which entered Syrian air space and began targeting terrorist targets in Afrin. The TSK announced that 108 different locations used as shelter and arsenal by the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG in Afrin and its surrounding towns were destroyed by 72 aircrafts. In addition, the TSK informed that lines of defense, command centers and border outposts of the terrorist organization were targeted by the Turkish forces from land and air.

During the pre-operation assessments, there were various scenarios about the Afrin offensive. Initially, re-capturing towns like Tell Rifat and Menagh in order to completely surround YPG militants in the region was being discussed. However, the first stage of the offensive indicates that an extensive military operation against the PKK in Afrin will take place.

The extent of the military operation will depend on negotiations made with Russia, as due to the result of an agreement made with the Syrian regime, Russia continues to control Syrian air space. It is known that Moscow is trying to persuade the Turkish regime to pursue a small-scale operation. However, it is definite that Turkey needs an extensive military operation in order to permanently remove the terrorist threat from Afrin.

The operation was launched with intense air raids and support vehicles. After the lines of defense are softened, ground war could be expected to be intensified around the Menagh Air Base-Tell Rifat to the east of Afrin and Shayk al Hadid-Jandairis-Burj Abd Allah to the south of Afrin.

It could be expected that land forces of the TSK and FSA will simultaneously penetrate the defense lines of the PKK/YPG on the southern and eastern sectors, effectively isolating Afrin. In the following stage, the TSK may force PKK/YPG militants to retreat to Afrin by pushing from northern and western sectors. These terrorist elements may attempt to use civilians in Afrin as human shields in order to draw the Turkish armed forces into urban warfare.

The PYD/YPG had been preparing for a probable military operation by Turkey. The PKK controls over 1500 km² of territory including Afrin and its surrounding cities, where Russia has also begun to establish checkpoints.

It could be assessed that PKK/PYD militants, whose numbers are around 5000-6000, along with Jaysh al-Thuwar elements consisting of approximately a couple of hundred of militants, may attempt to halt the TSK and FSA through asymmetric warfare and hybrid methods. It is known that the terrorist organization has been digging trenches, forming tunnels, placing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and mines to certain locations. Moreover, with the courtesy of the U.S., the YPG may attempt to transport anti-tank weaponry that is currently located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates to Afrin. Considering the topography of the region, terrorist elements may attempt to use mountainous parts that are located towards the midwest and northwest of Afrin.

Nevertheless, the terrorist organization does not stand much chance against the TSK and FSA on the plains towards Afrin as well as around Tell Rifat and Menagh regions. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has learned valuable lessons from OES, especially in terms of fighting against anti-tank weaponry and asymmetric warfare methods, and has new inventory such as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), which could counter such attempts. All in all, Turkey is much better equipped for the Afrin offensive.

What has Turkey learned from Operation Euphrates Shield?

When drawing comparisons between the OES and OOB, there are both similarities and differences. Even though Turkish forces encountered PKK/YPG elements on the bank of the Sanjur River after capturing Jarabulus, it was essentially an operation against Daesh.

OES cleared a territory of 2200 km² from terrorist elements. While the conflict was mostly on the plains, it was concluded with urban warfare in Al-Bab and surrounding towns. Regime forces along with the PKK constantly harassed the TSK and TSK-backed Syrian opposition forces. As Daesh adopted hybrid and asymmetric strategies along with using civilians as human shields, the TSK had to exact the operation meticulously and steadily. Daesh had carried out asymmetric attacks throughout the OES, attempting to halt the march of the TSK and Syrian opposition forces through bombed car and suicide bomber attacks. The fact that Daesh was effectively using anti-tank weaponry was one of the greatest challenges of the operation. As Turkey engaged in urban warfare for the first time on a cross-border operation, there were certain handicaps regarding military equipment and experienced personnel. Moreover, Syrian opposition forces were not very effective during the initial train-and-equip program.

The majority of these handicaps were addressed with the experience gained from OES. While increasing the number of UCAVs improved close air support and precision strike capacities, protection systems against anti-tank weaponry that is implemented within Turkish tanks made the TSK a force to be reckoned with. There are more personnel in the force who are experienced in asymmetric hybrid conflicts. Meanwhile, Syrian opposition forces are trained and equipped better than before. There is a significant improvement in their battle-readiness. In this respect therefore, when compared to the OES, Turkey is more advantageous in the current operation.

Following Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield, which saw the Free Syrian Army (FSA), backed by Turkish forces, clear Daesh from the territory in north Syria between August 2016 and March 2017, the Idlib operation has been the second phase of Turkish direct involvement in Syria.

As a guarantor state within the Astana Talks, which Russia and Iran are also a party to, and as part of the mission to establish “de-escalation zones,” the main force of Turkish troops have entered Syria’s Idlib.

While the military convoys crossed from Reyhanli in southern Turkey’s Hatay province on Thursday night, the military announced that Turkish troops have crossed into Idlib in order to monitor de-escalation zones, with the aim to bring an end to the six-and-a-half-year conflict in Syria.

In a statement published by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), the military informed the soldiers had begun establishing observation points.

“Turkish Armed Forces elements that are to serve in the Idlib de-escalation zone have started their activities by establishing observation posts from Oct 12, 2017, as part of the Astana agreement…”

“The Turkish Armed Forces continue to carry out their duties in the territory within the engagement rules agreed by the guarantor countries in the Astana negotiations.”

During the weekend, reconnaissance teams entered Idlib as part of an international agreement to establish four de-escalation zones cross Syria.

According to the statement released by the TSK, the de-escalation zones were created in order to “enhance the effectiveness of the cease-fire regime, end conflicts, bring humanitarian aid to those in need [and] establish the necessary conditions for the return of those displaced.”

The Syrian Islamic Council and the Syrian Interim Government called for an initiative to unite all Syrian rebellion factions under one command – the National Army. The initiative had many positive reactions from the opposition factions, but to make it reality will be a hard task due to the overwhelming power of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or due to ideological differences. On the other hand, time is running out amid a possible big regime-assault on Idlib and its surrounding areas.

The idea to form a national army was proposed by the opposition’s interim government in exile and by the Syrian Islamic Council, a body of Syrian Muslim clerics established in 2014 in Turkey. More than 44 factions put their weight behind the project in officially published statements: prominent factions like Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Feylaq-ur-Rahman and Feylaq as-Sham; brigades located in northern Aleppo like the Hamza Division, Sultan Murad Division, Muaatasim Brigade or Levantine Front, factions in the Idlib region, which are backed by the MOM operation center like the Free Idlib Army; former member of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham alliance Nureddin Zengi movement, which was supported by the US in the past and many other smaller factions. It is also claimed by Usama Abu Zeid that the Southern Front alliance of the Free Syrian Army factions in south Syria will also join the National Army.

After initial support by Syrian rebellion factions, the interim government provided its President Jawad Abu Hatab temporarily with the duties of the Minister of Defense to form a joint commission in order to appoint the Chief-of-Staff of the army. On September 4, the formation of the National Army was officially declared, but to bring it to reality on the ground will remain a hard task. The first step towards making it reality on the ground was the appointment of Fadlallah al-Haj from Feylaq-us-Sham as the Minister of Defence. Haytham al-Afisi from the 51. Brigade was appointed as his deputy.

First of all the experience of Jabhat al Islamiyyah, which was a unity of rebel brigades with similar ideologies located all over rebel-held territories in Syria, have not been forgotten  it was  unity on paper. Members of the group only had similar logos, but there was neither a real unified military structure nor a unified political body. The National Army project on the other hand, desires to unite several brigades with many different political views, different kinds of organizational structures and diverse size of members. Main support for the project is rooted in the current political and military situation on the ground. Syrian rebels are losing foreign support, ground and strategic positions and supplies. Awareness for unity heavily increased after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham^[1] (HTS) started to take more power in northern Syria, after it defeated Ahrar al-Sham and captured the strategic border crossing Bab al-Hawa. The initiative of the National Army is also a reaction to the initiative by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to create a unified body and civil administration, which was seen as a plot by the HTS to force its rule over all rebel factions.

Also within the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham body are many internal disputes. The second biggest faction of HTS, Nureddin Zengi, defected from the organization. . In addition, prominent scholars like Muheysini and Ulyani defected from HTS due to its unjust politics and ignorance towards its own judicial body. Recently, the former Ahrar al-Sham units of the prominent military commander Saleh Tahhan also left HTS. Resistance within Syrian society against the rule of HTS is increasing. Many elected civil administrators rejected the offer of HTS and was therefore forced out of power by HTS militias. Many Syrian rebel brigades perceive this trend as highly dangerous. They assume that their areas will soon be declared as Al-Qaeda-land, which will result in a massacre conducted by the regime and its allies.

The National Army project may be the last hope of Syrian rebels to protect themselves from the projection above, but it will be inevitably hard to achieve. Officially declared unities may not reflect themselves on the ground. Therefore, in hope for the National Army initiative to become a reality in practice, many brigades are seeking international foreign support. One member of the political office of Ahrar al Sham stated that “it depends on the Turkish support to the National Army project against Jolani^[2] to be successful and command all units.”

On the other side in northern Aleppo, Syrian rebel brigades operating in the Euphrates Shield area are still not organized under a single command. Three different bodies were formed by the Syrian rebel brigades in the region, which is a result of different funding and foreign support for the factions. The National Army project by the Syrian Islamic Council and the Interim Government was officially supported by all factions in the Euphrates Shield region. To unite the factions in this region may be easier due to the Turkish presence on the ground. Turkey already managed to command all factions in one operation center, but to unite all under a National Army is a difficult task, yet it is not impossible.

This initiative launched by the Syrian opposition themselves aims to obtain foreign support. Under current circumstances in which the MOM operation center supports some chosen brigades, while others were supported by foreign nations or individuals, the National Army project could not become reality. As long as the support is not united under one structure, which will benefit the interim government, the Syrian opposition factions will also be unable to unite. In this case, it is only a question of whether the HTS or the Syrian regime will be first in eliminating Syrian opposition on the ground.

^[1]Hayat Tahrir al Sham was a unity between the famous Nusra Front, Ahrar al Sham defectors, Nureddin Zengi and others small units, but after internal tensions Nureddin Zengi and half of the former Ahrar al Sham members left the group

^[2]Jolani was the chief of the Nusra Front and is now the military overall commander of Hayat Tahrir al Sham, but new leaks show that he is the unofficial leader of the organization. 

The Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) which was launched on August 24, 2016 in order to clear the presence of terrorist organizations along Turkey’s southern border and to prevent the illegitimate PKK entity in Syria, seems to have reached its major objectives. While Turkey has carried out an intense counter-terrorism campaign at home in recent years, she has also adopted a strategy of eliminating terrorist threats at their roots by increasing military activism abroad. Along with the waves of frequent terrorist attacks in the country, the rapid proliferation of terrorist groups with the exploitation of the civil war in Syria made this strategy shift imperative.

Although it is often claimed that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) would face capability problems in case of a military operation in foreign lands due to the discharges after the July 15 coup attempt, the OES was successfully completed on March 30, 2017. The OES, planned and implemented with the concept of Joint Operations, has demonstrated that the TAF has the level of capacity and readiness, capable of dealing with hybrid terrorist threats in foreign lands as well as in urban environments. The fact that the operation was carried out with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), is an experience that further raises the value of the success and makes the OES an exemplifying campaign. However, it is understood that hybrid warfare practices and innovative terrorist tactics encountered in the theatre of war have created some problems for the course of the OES.

Military and Tactical Experiences

During the operation, the biggest threats faced by OES elements were Suicide Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). A significant number of the martyrs given during the operation was the result of SVBIEDs, and many of the destroyed armored vehicles are of those ATGMs. Particularly in the western and northern parts of al-Bab, the tanks were repeatedly exposed to ATGMs allowing SVBIED attackers to become more able to reach the OES base areas. The fact that suicide attackers instantly had car bombs ready in their present location at the time increased the shocking effect of the threat, exacerbating  the obstruction of the attack.

Smashing the enemy defense lines with the maneuverability and the fire power of the armors and mechanized units was a vital component of the OES. However, the high level of armor losses calls attention to the necessity of a number of regulations and developments in the tactical deployment, use, and handling of tanks in the hybrid warfare environment. On the other hand, due to limited TAF personnel at the beginning of the operation, the armor advances that were heavily dependent on the FSA infantry capacity, has come to a standstill due to the problems originated from the FSA components in adapting to the rapidly developing battle environment. This situation was only improved after the deployment of the Turkish Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Commando Teams to the battlefield at increasing rates. Furthermore, the lack of close air support was felt in many cases, in particular when the armored units were in vulnerable positions against the sudden attacks.

It was observed during the OES that DAESH evaluated the timing factor in the theatre of war. The time slot in question is the period of temporary fragility of the OES elements during deployments in liberated areas immediately after it was captured. In that time slot, which generally came across the early hours of the morning, DAESH resorted to its traditional counter-attacks with raids and hit and runs. SVBIED, guided missile and mortar attacks were followed by the close engagement of small DAESH teams into OES elements. During these raids, it was observed that DAESH provided effective cover for its attacking militants as well as putting pressure on the OES elements by suppressive fire via ZSU-23 Shilka anti-aircraft weapons. DAESH militants also harassed positioned tanks through these weapon systems, aiming tanks to leave their positions and to turn them into open targets for guided missiles. Another significant factor that created difficulties in DAESH counter-attacks was the weather conditions. Particularly the serious fall of visual range due to the dense fog made it inevitably difficult to counter asymmetrical and sudden threats.

The Necessity of Stable Diplomatic Relations

It should be noted that the inability to overcome some diplomatic problems is another critical factor that slowed down the operation. After rapid acquisitions in the early days of the OES, the Manbij became a target of the operation. However, it was forced to halt by the US’s manipulation and intimidation strategy. Afterwards, the OES continued towards the western direction. Another development was that in the time period between the capture of Dabık and the preparation stage for the al-Bab operation, both Syria and Russia created various problems with military threats by means of air forces, which caused the operation tempo to be adversely affected. In the same period, the US-backed YPG/PKK attacked elements of the OES in the vicinity of Mare, rapidly multiplying and complicating instant security threats. The fact that the Russian Air Forces hit Turkish soldiers on the 9th of February shows the seriousness of the whole complexity. Therefore, stable dialogue between interstate relations is a necessity for the military initiatives carried out on thin diplomatic lines.

Population Centric Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence

Through the OES experience, it became clear that counter-terrorism strategies must be population-centric. The reason for this is due to the fact that public acceptance of the OES components was not only essential for the successful completion of the operation but also for its long-term returns. In respect to counter-terrorism, it can be suggested that Turkey has succeeded in the activities of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) during the operation. The most crucial factor that contributed to this success was the support of the local people. While the evaluation of HUMINT during the OES highlights its success, it can be stated that technical intelligence activities should be intensified and surveillance in general should be upgraded to a stronger technological infrastructure.

Military Operation with a Local Partner

By allying with the local opposition groups, Turkey initiated the OES as an alternative model of Joint Operations. Conducting a military operation in a different geography, operating in an environment in which the dominant language is different and variations in socio-cultural dynamics in the region made Turkey more reliant on FSA forces during the operation. While combating hybrid threats, operations with local partners require a number of improvements in terms of motivation and battle performance.

On the tactical and organizational level, an ideal military cooperation that overcomes the principal-agent problem can be achieved through an integrated approach to the concepts of initiative, intelligence, and integration between units and services, leadership, motivated soldiers and learning. However, in these phases, it is inevitable not to encounter structural problems. First of all, local partners participating in the operation may need to conduct patrol and ambush operations outside the garrison and at night, so that an operation against irregular/terrorist elements can be successfully carried out. Disruptions in the implementation of these tasks may slow down the operational tempo and may even cause retreatment of the forces. At this stage, taking into account the components of the FSA forces, it should be noted that the traditional warfare culture of FSA is different from the TAF. In the light of this information, it may be necessary for the FSA forces to be trained at a tactical level regarding the necessities of the battlefield.

Secondly, in areas of complex conflicts like the Syrian Civil War, the advantage of local opposition groups is to have a deep and strategic knowledge of the population and local conditions. However, being deprived of this advantage or reducing it to a minimum can have vital consequences. In order for intelligence regarding the  population and local conditions to be beneficial for the operation, it is important to integrate intelligence gathering as well as analyzing and spreading capabilities and general knowledge of acquired knowledge. However, most of the time, information may not be shared among armed actors formed by the integration of several different groups such as the FSA, and informational disparities between the units may have negative consequences on the scene. In this context, it is necessary to establish a common ground between the commanders and the units to provide trust and information sharing.

Thirdly, in order to ensure complete control and security of an area in the operation, it is necessary for the forces participating in the operation to have the ability to work together. Besides, when unexpected resistance by terrorist elements are detected, reinforcement of forces may turn out to be a necessity. In the case of OES, the FSA forces formed an important part of the offensive force, while the armored units supported the FSA forces. This situation increased the role and significance of the FSA in the operation, as the main offensive force in the elimination of potential anti-tank units targeting armored troops.

Establishing Dynamic Coordination

On the other hand, the collaboration of commanders with leadership qualities among local partners constitutes a more dynamic coordination of the co-operative forces. From time to time disagreements among the commanders of the components of the FSA, and the suicide attacks of DAESH on these commanders have been one of the major problems affecting the course of the operation during the OES.

Moreover, the disagreement between the local partner and the protecting power may lead to motivation problems. For a long time, Turkey tried to persuade the opposition forces, who perceive the Syrian regime as the primary threat, to fight against DAESH instead of the regime. With the change of this threat perception of the FSA towards DAESH, the integration of the groups with low motivation to the operation posed a trouble in the conduct of the OES.

There is no doubt that tactical training is intended for conventional military operations. However, operations such as the OES, which are conducted with a local partner against irregular/terrorist elements, will require continual learning for conventional and hybrid threat operations, moving beyond high-level skills and standard procedures.