With Olive Branch Operation (20 January-18 March), Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish-backed National Army (Free Syrian Army) captured Afrin in less than two months. Some analysts insist that the PKK/PYD did not lose the city but it was just a case of strategic exit only to strike back harder. Well, if true, it is very kind of the PKK to leave the city to the Olive Branch forces with a perfect timing right on March 18^th, to salute the anniversary of the iconic Canakkale War (Gallipoli Campaign) of 1915. Nevertheless, leaving aside the irony, there is still some truth to this absurd claim. The easy takeover of Afrin was a result of strategic planning, but not of the PKK. Turkey planned and executed how the city would be captured with full control from day one. There occurred some unexpected developments such as the temporary closure of the airspace by Russia in the early days of the operation but with no damage to the overall flow.

Hence, the YPG forces fled the city not as a result of their strategic planning, but out of despair. What was the YPG’s strategy then? Looking at the statements of PKK/PYD spokespeople, from the PKK leaders in Qandil to the commanders on the ground in Afrin, it was to wage a defense battle. On top of such statements, the full stack of ammunition depots around the city center, food storages in the PYD offices, and attempts to infiltrate into the city with new forces, it seems obvious that the goal was to wage a defense battle.

What about the Turkish strategy then? It was more of an encirclement as a form of siege warfare than rapid domination. While the operation was criticized in some circles for being slow for reasons still mysterious to me, it was proceeding smoothly at a steady pace. Almost too smoothly especially when compared to Turkey’s Euphrates Shield Operation (24 August 2016-29 March 2017), which witnessed stronger resistance by DEASH especially in the Battle of Al Bab. Now, let’s come to how this strategy flowed smoothly.

First, significant actors in Syria – Russia and the U.S – were informed about Turkey’s decisiveness to fulfill its self-defense. Russia agreed as a result of persistent diplomatic exchanges and the U.S. had to agree. Hence, the operation could avoid the cases of friendly fire and prepared the international community for what to come.

With the start of the operation, Turkish artillery and air force crushed the PYD fortifications and forces (and later the regime militia who were invited to help the PYD) in the outskirts of Afrin and neighboring towns. As Turkey captured the heights surrounding Afrin one by one, PYD forces went blind against Turkey’s surveillance and detection superiority. Turkey could use its reconnaissance points from the south in northern Idlib, from the east in Azaz, and from the west and north in neighboring Turkish towns. As the pre-constructed reconnaissance points and constant air surveillance met even closer ground surveillance with the captured heights, the blindfolded PYD doomed to fail. While the Olive Branch Forces were moving forward on multiple fronts, the PYD was left with no chance to concentrate its forces. As the villages were taken one by one, more significant towns such as Rajo and Cinderes were being encircled.

Nevertheless, Turkey’s encirclement strategy, which is known for not letting easy retreat, left an exit door – or a golden bridge, as it is called in the military literature – open for the YPG militants. The bridge was not big enough for a collective retreat but it allowed individual militants to flee their positions. Like in Cinderes and Raco, Afrin center had this exit door open until the day before the final takeover. As the militants tried to flee through the only exit left for them to vacate the civilian populated areas, what welcomed the Turkish forces in the city were full stacked ammunition depots. Hence, the PYD’s strategy(!) of giving Afrin to Turkey was not chosen by the PYD but forced by Turkey.

May 2017 has been a historic month for Turkish diplomacy. President Erdoğan had one-on-one meetings with leaders of prominent countries including the US, Russia, China and India. The importance of the month for Turkish foreign policy is due to the number, diversity and timing of meetings, rather than their content. These meetings may have the potential to shape the future of Turkish foreign policy, which has been stuck in a defensive mode since 2014 due to the Syrian Civil War and domestic political issues, and now is expected to take a new direction. Turkey’s active involvement in the Qatar crisis is also an important sign of returning to pro-active diplomacy and mediation efforts.

These proactive steps taken to shape Turkey’s foreign policy vision and its framework were not indicative of a clear strategic disposition, but were tactical attempts to widen Turkey’s shrinking economic and strategic field. For these steps to acquire a strategic quality, Turkey has to make an agreement with at least Russia, the US or the EU, which Turkey has fluctuating relations with.

Turkey’s relations with the US are expected to stay fragile due to Washington’s insistence on supporting the PKK in Syria. With the EU, Germany will be the determining factor but stagnant relations seem likely to continue until Germany’s federal parliamentary elections. Among these three actors, Russia seems to be the most viable option for a positive structural change in the short run.

Whether to cooperate with Russia in strategic terms is a vital question for Turkey. This cooperation has the potential to directly affect Turkey’s relations with the EU and the US. However, contrary to economic relations, Russia seems to be refraining from negotiations with Turkey at an equal level, along with binding diplomatic actions. Ankara’s negotiation with Moscow to buy the S-400 air missile defense system is an important move that has strategic value, but any strategic effort with Russia has the potential to be overshadowed by friction between the two countries when it comes to Syria.

Limitations of Strategic Cooperation

The most prominent diplomatic meetings in May were the ones with the leaders of the US and Russia. The main focus of both the meetings was to manage the effects of the Syrian Civil War on Turkey and limit the support being given to the PYD/YPG. The crisis which emerged with the downing of the Russian SU-24 aircraft by the Turkish Armed Forces in November 2015 ended with Erdoğan and Putin’s meeting in Sochi in May 2016. While the normalization process between the two countries is often described as being complete, there are still disparities in bilateral relations.

Due to their diverging positions with the US and EU, Turkey was forced to take the path of least resistance during this process. Even though Turkey tried to use the relations with Russia as a counterbalance for the strained relations with the West, it could be said that it was not a complete success. Despite the warm messages from the Moscow, Russia has utilized Turkey’s isolation from the West for its own interests.

http://thenewturkey.org/rebalancing-turkey%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy/

Breaking away from this strategic congestion difficult because without a significant detachment from the West, Turkey has little chance to develop a strategic relation with Russia. This kind of disengagement would leave Turkey more vulnerable and in a disadvantaged position as Turkey and Russia’s strategic vision on the Middle East, the Balkans and the Black Sea are mostly contradictory.

Russia would see Turkey’s disconnection from the West as a sign of weakness and a chance to impose its own will. It is also possible for Turkey to have worse tension with Russia than it does today with the EU and the US. Turkey seemingly will have a hard time in overcoming this paradox in the short term. Conducting meticulous diplomacy that does not antagonize any of these actors should be Turkey’s priority.

Despite the disparities on Syria’s future, Turkey and Russia establishing a joint political platform during the Astana Summit is a positive development. Even though Russia takes Turkey’s concerns about the PYD into consideration, it has also kept the possibility for cooperation with the Syrian Kurds on the table. Russia is simultaneously attempting to keep relations with Turkey at a certain level and not letting the US have all the influence over the PYD. For Russia, a partial agreement with Turkey on Syria means counterbalancing Iran’s influence in Syria. Restraining Iran would also prove useful for the regime.

Meanwhile, Turkey having various operations in Syria, such as the Operation Euphrates Shield, which aimed to establish a presence on the field, serves as a potential risk to the relations with Russia. A closer look at this complex web of relations reveals that all actors are trying to counterbalance each other, especially in the context of Syria. Turkey, due to its strained relations with the US and EU, is at a disadvantaged in this game.

Search for Balance in Trade

In terms of trade, limitations on Turkish agricultural exports to Russia were largely removed and a partial agreement reached between Turkey and Russia. Meanwhile, Russia continues to enforce limitations on tomatoes, which are an important agricultural export item for Turkey. After the meeting between the Turkish and Russian leaders, Turkish tourism business leaders were relieved and entered the new tourism season with more hope. The issues in fields where mutual interest is at hand were resolved quickly and the two sides cooperate in many cases; however, it is not possible to talk about similar progress or agreement in strategic issues.

The most important field of cooperation between Turkey and Russia that has a strategic aspect is energy. While multinational platforms like the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization diversify Turkey’s economic and diplomatic relations in terms of both quantity and quality, these platforms offer little strategic value for Turkey. None of Turkey’s strategic priorities can be addressed with a deeper level of cooperation with these organizations.

Turkey’s economy is dependent on the EU, whose member countries account for Turkey’s largest foreign trade volume. While Indian, Chinese and especially the Gulf markets have gained prominence for Turkey, the volume of Turkey’s exports to these countries is still below a level that could compete with trade with the EU. Chinese and Indian markets do not offer a rich potential that could lead to the creation of substantial employment in Turkey in the short and midterm. In terms of exports, Turkey has yet to find alternative markets that can compensate if there are any hiccups with the EU market. Turkey’s fragility in its European relations lies in trade, rather than security and diplomacy. Turkey’s alternatives to the European markets are much more limited than Europe’s. Creating market options besides the European one has become a strategic aspect for Turkey.

A game-changing strategic agreement in terms of economy, security and foreign policy seems impossible for Turkey in the short term. Turkey and Russia’s joint initiative on the de-confliction zones in Syria is an important venue for strategic cooperation. Most pressing issue for the Kremlin is, however, the choice between tactical ally in Syria, the PYD, and a possible strategic partnership with Turkey. Turkey’s most essential dilemma, on the other hand, is to try to achieve a strategic alliance either with the US or with Russia, while keeping which one would be the right choice in mind, to overcome the impasse in foreign policy and security aspects that were caused by the Syrian Civil War. The disagreement of the said two powers causes the elongation of the Syrian war. On the other hand, an agreement between them could leave Turkey out of the loop.

Turkey’s border security cannot be maintained only by the physical presence of border posts along the border of the country, but needs a holistic approach that requires an efficient border management system and intelligence capacity for pre-emptive measures on both sides of the border.

The Limits of Authority

Turkish law assigns three military forces to securing the borders. The Turkish Army is responsible for the protection of land borders while territory under water at the coasts is directed to Turkish Coast Guard Command and air space is under the coverage of the Turkish Air Force. But Turkish law flags the Ministry of Interior as the authorized body for the border affairs through provincial Governors. Customs, on the other hand, is under the Ministry of Customs and Trade. Hence the laws pertaining to border affairs involve three different ministries, which may make coordination more difficult, although their lines of authority are clearly demarcated. But the issues of centralization and the unity of command to cover all borders are concerns, especially if the Turkish General Staff is added to this list, since the law also gives it authority in some respects.

Border Security Architecture

Turkish borders are far longer than many European borders, and have a complicated terrain. Hence the usual approach by the European Union to secure borders does not meet the realities of the Turkish border coverage. For this reason, Turkey is confronted with numerous challenges to design a new sui generis architectural structure to secure her borders in accordance with new threats, security needs, and geographical positions and domestic/foreign policy choices. Turkey needs to tighten security measures and augment the current structure along the Syrian and Iraqi borders because of the demographic facts, contradictory political strategies of outer powers, and the presence of secessionist groups.

Initially, a promising border security architecture needs to be constructed upon the regional characteristics of Turkey’s borders and its neighbourhood. The issues include illegal immigration, human trafficking, goods and drug trafficking, infiltration by terror networks, communication between divided families and tribes, reconnaissance and surveillance activities of neighbouring states, potential conflicts over disputed islands and isles, and containing crises surrounding Turkey in their countries of origin.

Aside from static factors (like geography) and a global power struggle in the Middle East, there are also other dynamics or newly-emerging factors forcing Turkey to improve security at its borders. For instance, since the 1990s Turkey has long been faced with illegal immigration stemming from migrants and refugees fleeing from conflict zones such as Iraq, Syria, Iran and Afghanistan in order to reach Europe. These problems, which no state actors aside from Turkey face, require a determined stance at the borders with active and pre-emptive undertakings to respond to all the listed concerns.

Contrary to the security picture, the relevant Turkish law limits the border security units by having them stay in designated zones except in exceptional circumstances, meaning securing the area requires an active and flexible border security strategy. An active border security strategy should have a holistic and flexible nature based on a functional decision making process that addresses concerns far beyond the borders. Regarding these static and dynamic risk factors, Turkey should reconstruct the border architecture with more ‘preventive’ security measures which would go beyond the formal distance limits determined in the applicable law.

More precisely, Turkey needs to adopt and implement a much more ‘proactive border security strategy’ than ever before, in order to meet current and urgent needs for detecting and deterring security threats. The border units must have the capability of confronting threats, mainly emanating from international terror networks.

A “proactive border strategy”

Accordingly, national law as well as the implications of cross-border legislation should be reviewed and a “proactive border strategy” should be reformulated after determining and describing the focus and scope of the new border policy, instruments to be developed for tasks and tools to be used for control mechanisms. Likewise, this new architecture must allow dispatching through a central control center while possessing an enriched and authorized structure in terms of intelligence tools, technologically-oriented border control systems, deeply echeloned and retaliation capabilities. What is intended with the word ‘integrative’ when speaking of new border architecture is not to demarcate borders by land, sea or air but rather taking border incidents in all their three-dimensional aspects; hence using the accurate and efficient tools that are available to the state.

By adopting such a holistic approach, no matter what kind of challenges are being confronted, the crucial thing is determining the engagement rules which will be then comprehensively enforced by all government bodies, in the light of previously defined policies and strategies of the Turkish state. However along with the provincial governors who are the national authorities responsible for the administrative tasks in implementing border management policy, it is necessary to create a new organization that can coordinate the entire capabilities of the state. Hence a centralized border organization, like a Directorate of Border Security, is a vital need to track all reported events, create a rapid decision-making mechanism and guide the relevant border units in accordance with the policies and strategies of the Turkish Government. Thus, a management system for land, sea and air borders appears to be a pre-condition for efficient coordination and integration of efforts.

The second issue appears to be the intelligence organizations and assets possessed by border units. Within the overall framework of border security management, deploying the assigned (frontier) personnel in watchtowers or on monitoring/surveillance activities run by these personnel at the borders is not merely inadequate but also potentially risky. On the other hand, considering the wide terrain which a border battalion is in charge of, technology-focused solutions must be taken into account with a broader perspective of border security.

Turkey has modernized the equipment used by its border units/troops, and also has procured and deployed armored vehicles equipped with long-range detection and tracking systems in recent years. Furthermore, Turkey has developed various projects related to the procurement and use of unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) on the borders as well as accelerated procurement of foreign and domestically produced surveillance balloons. As a result of these developments, many positive steps have been taken towards implementing a comprehensive border security strategy. These efforts have without doubt contributed to securing the border and augmenting force protection of Turkish border units.

Technology-focused solutions

As for intelligence-driven border security, it is an undeniable fact that technology-focused solutions are crucial in intelligence-related systems. Due to the high insecurity level in risk-based environments, border guards/units on all levels should be legally authorized and equipped with high-tech intelligence systems in order to detect, deter and prevent threats effectively. In particular, the threat of infiltration or attempted attacks on Turkish troops by terrorist organizations harboring separatist tendencies deployed across the Iraq and Syria borders can be diminished by establishing an integrated and effective working intelligence mechanism.

Ground radars and thermal cameras, for instance, can be used for short range surveillance tasks. Mini-UAVs can fly up to 15 km while tactical and operative level UAVs are allotted for strategic collation tasks. But border units should see far beyond these limits to identify threats by exploiting high-tech intelligence assets of various intelligence disciplines to verify or falsify suspected border threats long before they are close to Turkish borders. The integration and coordination of border units’ intelligence gathering will provide early warnings to all positioned border units before any potential attack occurs.

The threat of terror emanating from Syria and Iraq especially calls for Turkey to prevent infiltration and attacks by these networks using effective intelligence systems. To construct such an intelligence system, Turkish border units need to extend their surveillance capacities 50-100 km at both sides of the border at battalion level for tactical purposes. Furthermore, strategic intelligence systems need to be procured that can be directed to 200 km at least. These assets are not only ground radars, but all sorts of intelligence assets. An integrated all source intelligence system; say combining assets of imagery, open source, human, measurement and signature, signal intelligence at tactical and operative level appears to be the essential system needed for border security.

In order to secure the homeland, it is key to ensure border security, to prevent the illegal crossing of humans and goods. Hence current border security needs to be bolstered with a new security architecture. The current border security of Turkey is functional and adequate, but needs to be improved by, first, an efficient management system that coordinates the involved institutions of four ministries. Secondly, high-tech products rather than human-based solutions, mainly intelligence capabilities, appear to be an urgent field requirement to detect border threats before they are too close to combat. A multi-disciplinary intelligence perception is needed to build such a system.