Syrian War Archives - Politics Today https://politicstoday.org/tag/syrian-war/ Fri, 19 Feb 2021 07:18:46 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.8 Syrian Refugeehood, Racism and the Lebanese Question https://politicstoday.org/syrian-refugeehood-racism-and-the-lebanese-question/ Fri, 19 Feb 2021 07:18:46 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/syrian-refugeehood-racism-and-the-lebanese-question/

Today, while the Lebanese sectarian system is discriminatory par excellence, whether between the Lebanese themselves or against the “other,” it is an inaccurate assertion to say Lebanese are racist.

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The most recent major and public act of racism Syrian refugees faced in Lebanon, dates to December 27, 2020, when hundreds of them—75 families according to local news—had to flee for their lives from a makeshift camp in the Miniyeh region near the northern coastal city of Tripoli after their tents were set alight. The incident came against the backdrop of a fight between camp residents and members of a local Lebanese family.

In November 2020, a Syrian refugee allegedly killed a Lebanese resident in Bcharre, a town in the North Governorate of Lebanon. Soon after, a group of Lebanese residents went on a witch-hunt, demanded the eviction of Syrians from the area—even the ones who lived and worked there prior to the Syrian refugee influx—and set fire to their homes in the town.

While the list goes on, two examples in two consecutive months and from two Lebanese regions with different sectarian undertones, are evidence to extrapolate about the multi-layered acts of racism Syrian refugees face in Lebanon.

Nevertheless, slapping the word racism and Lebanon on any search engine shows us that racism in the country is not a new phenomenon simply synonymous with the influx of Syrian refugees following the violent crackdown by the Syrian regime on the 2011 revolution. Racism in Lebanon is one form of discrimination that is rampant and mainstream, while other forms extend to classist discrimination, sectarian, geographic, and so on. However, racism specifically against Syrians could be traced back to the country’s “founding moment.”

Read: What Does Sectarianism Mean for Lebanese Society?

While Lebanese racism is not strictly directed towards Syrian refugees, the article aims to tackle discrimination against Syrian refugees in particular. Nevertheless, Syrian and Palestinian refugees paid the brunt for the “founding narrative” and fragility of the Lebanese state that was envisioned during the process of its insurrection following the first World War.

Modern-day Lebanon was initially formed between 1918 and 1926 from the debris of “Ottoman Syria” at a time when the victors of the World War, Britain and France, were “redrawing” the map of the modern Middle East and divvying the spoils among them.

Primarily, it was the French who put the territory of Lebanon together and organized it as a state, laying the foundation for the autonomous “Mutasarrifiyya” of Mount Lebanon within the framework of “Ottoman Syria” in 1861.

In November 2020, a Syrian refugee allegedly killed a Lebanese resident in Bcharre, a town in the North Governorate of Lebanon. Soon after, a group of Lebanese residents went on a witch-hunt.

While the French wanted the country to remain a compact territory with a Christian-dominated majority in an ocean of Arab Muslims, Lebanese Christians and more specifically the Maronite-majority amongst them, saw an opportunity to set up the “national homeland” they had dreamed of with expanded territory, autonomy and independence, and pressed the French while making the best use of favorable circumstances at the time until they achieved their goal.

The moment of creation and what accompanied it as political narrative, inherently created a schism in the newly found country, which Middle East historian Meir Zamir touches upon in his book, “The Formation of Modern Lebanon,” that examined the critical period in the history of Lebanon from when the modern state was created in 1920.

Particularly perceptive are two remarks Zamir points to in his book, the first stipulating that: “[T]he strong ties of the Christians, particularly the Maronites, with Europe led the Muslims to identify them with the European powers and to regard them as traitors … The Christians … often behaved in a superior and provocative manner, further increasing Muslim hostility …’.

Syrian refugee kids are seen in a refugee camp after their tent camp was set on fire in clashes between a group of Lebanese and Syrian refugees in Tripoli, Lebanon on January 03, 2021. Photo by Mahmut Geldi, Anadolu Images

While the second claims that “[B]etween 1918 and 1920 the Christian demand for an independent state in Lebanon appeared to the Muslims of Syria as a more immediate and serious threat than the corresponding Zionist demand in Palestine.”

Prominent Lebanese historian, the late Kamal Salibi, wisely attributed that to the fact that, “the Muslims of Syria in 1920 identified Zionism as an external danger, but they diagnosed the call for Christian Lebanese separatism, in collusion with Western power, as treason and subversion from within. Their diagnosis of the Christian position may have been uncharitable, but so was the dominant Christian Lebanese attitude towards the aspirations of the Muslims of Syria at the time.”

As such, while Maronites had a choice between a smaller Lebanon or a confederation of autonomous Syrian cantons—sectarian ones, they opted for a “Greater Lebanon,” hoping to create and mold a larger country on the Mediterranean, in their own image.

The question of “who is Lebanese” emerged and the answer to it was: the “non-Syrian,” and the answer to “who is Syrian” question became: the “non-Lebanese.”

With that, the question of “who is Lebanese” emerged and the answer to it was: the “non-Syrian,” and the answer to “who is Syrian” question became: the “non-Lebanese,” Lebanese writer Wissam Saade concludes, sowing the seeds for Lebanese racism towards Syrians, in specific, and towards any component that challenged the Christian-dominated “concept of Lebanon,” in general.

The “othering” process, which preexisted even before Lebanon’s insurrection, was institutionalized at that moment. It drags on till today despite the different context.

Following the moment of creation, the Maronite practice in ruling the country further exacerbated tension between Muslims and Christians and eventually led to the “sectarianizing” of the social setting it on a track of collision. According to Salibi, “[W]hat the Muslims had opposed from 1920 until 1975 was not necessarily the concept of Greater Lebanon.

Rather, it was the Christian interpretation of this Greater Lebanon, as a country where the Christians were the Lebanese in a special way… By persisting in giving Lebanon a Christian interpretation, heedless of the changes that were taking place among their Muslim compatriots… contributed to reawakening the demon of tribal contradiction among the other Lebanese communities.”

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Seven decades passed, between 1920 and 1975, without Lebanese Christians paying much attention to the changes that were taking place, first among their Lebanese Muslim compatriots, and then the larger region. Following the disastrous Arab-Israeli war of 1967, dubbed an-Naksah, the setback, and the incidents of Black September of 1970 in Jordan, the Muslim-dominated Palestinian refugee influx to Lebanon became a source of paranoia to the Christian leadership.

For them, the Palestinian refugeehood was perceived to be a factor of demographic change, hence, an outright contestation of the fragile “concept of Lebanon” referred to above. The paranoia and fear were ultimately and directly translated into racism leading down the slippery slope of confrontation which resulted in a 15-year civil war.

The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) created a new set of grievances and animosities, among the different Lebanese constituencies and between Lebanese and Syrians as well. The Syrian army’s direct military intervention in the Lebanese war, which in the long run resulted in tilting the balance towards the Muslims against the Christians, dealt again a huge blow to the “concept of Lebanon” as per the Maronites. The war was concluded in 1990 with the signing of the Ta’if Agreement, which reshuffled the system, diffused power from the hands of the Maronites, made it more inclusionary, and gave Syria a “guardianship” status over Lebanon.

The Syrian regime’s guardianship lasted for 15 years (until 2005) with authoritarian practices that only sought to humiliate Lebanese in general and specifically Maronites, who saw their two main leaders either imprisoned or exiled. Lebanese racism mutated in that case and became coupled with feelings of oppression, an exercise the Syrian regime’s troops and lieutenants exercised every day to remind the Lebanese who ruled their country.

On the flip side, all this was internalized by Lebanese and projected later on even towards regular Syrian citizens that constituted an essential labor force in the country. Such blanket approach racism dismissed nuances, as in separating between the oppressor—the Syrian authoritarian regime—and the oppressed (both Syrians and Lebanese citizens).

The breakout of the Syrian revolution in 2011 and the regime’s conscious decision to violently suppress it, resulted again in a Muslim Sunni-dominated Syrian refugee influx to Lebanon. The country received around 1.5 million Syrian refugees as per the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, meaning around 36% of its population. Despite the different current-day political dynamics, the most dominant Christian-Maronite political party, at the time, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) found it befitting to capitalize on previously mentioned historical grievances and paranoia, to solidify its grip on the Christian constituency in the country and advance its own political goals.

VIDEO: Racism and hate against Syrian refugees in Lebanon

Ironically, the same party was a staunch ally of Syrian President Bashar Assad and defended him throughout the war despite the war crimes and crimes against humanity he committed, while ramping up the racist political rhetoric against Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Additionally, Hezbollah who is not only allied to the FPM and the Syrian regime but who became an active member of the Syrian Civil War through direct military intervention, often instrumentalized the Syrian refugeehood in Lebanon depending on its interests. The sectarian militia played a dichotomy at times painting the refugees as radicals and at times portraying itself the tolerant and hospitable host, when in reality Hezbollah participated in the forced displacement of Syrian citizens from their own villages at the Syrian-Lebanese border, contributing to the Syrian refugee plight.

On the flip side, Lebanese political parties opposed to the Syrian regime played a major role in hosting Syrian refugees and defending them as an extended part of the open political confrontation with the regime and its allies in Lebanon. Hence why, the Bekaa governorate, North Lebanon and Beirut host around 88% of the Syrian refugee presence in the country.

However, no one in Lebanon expected the Syrian war to be as prolonged nor did they expect the current fait accompli of “indefinite” refugee presence in the country. While the Syrian refugee presence became a source of income for the Lebanese state, creating a whole new job market due to foreign funding addressing the Syrian refugeehood in Lebanon, the downward spiraling social and economic situation in the country as a result of the failure of the “sectarian system” has started to backfire on Syrian refugees increasing tension between them and the Lebanese.

With Lebanon entering a long and dark tunnel due to the unprecedented political and economic crisis it faces, a crisis generated by its sectarian ruling elite, discrimination—whether between the Lebanese themselves or towards Syrian refugees—will only be exacerbated and probably “weaponized” at some point. However, the nationwide transcendent uprise of October 17, 2019, offered a gleaming light in all that darkness that overwhelms the country now, by creating a fierce and youth-oriented public opinion that clearly dissects hollow political narratives often utilized by sectarian ruling parties and accurately assigns blame to the different predicaments the country faces.

Rebelling Lebanese youth today are not sold on “identity-related” xenophobic political rhetoric anymore and the globalized citizenship they represent constantly pushes them to stand for international human rights principles including refugee-related ones, often shattering stereotypes about “Lebanese racism” in general. Today, while the Lebanese sectarian system is discriminatory par excellence, whether between the Lebanese themselves or against the “other,” it is an inaccurate assertion to say Lebanese are racist.

Read: The Beirut Port Explosion: the Chernobyl of the Lebanese Sectarian System?

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]]> Breaking Myths: Arab-Turkish Interaction and the Syrian War https://politicstoday.org/breaking-myths-arab-turkish-interaction-and-the-syrian-war/ Fri, 12 May 2017 03:34:30 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/breaking-myths-arab-turkish-interaction-and-the-syrian-war/

It seems there are some coincidences which suggest hope lies in the future for Turkey and the people of the region. Recognizing that Turkey’s power lies in its history — when the country was at the center of an empire — Turkey is opening itself to the partners who share the same history. The Turkish government’s reification of Muslim identity, rather than ethnic, has both spatial and temporal significance.

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The ongoing Syrian war is a slice of history which we, out of amnesia, tend to isolate. A century ago, when the British and French were planting flags of Arab nationalism across the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Arabs barely knew that seeds of a multipronged division were being sown. As Arabs woke from the dust of World War I they were to find themselves under a new configuration — Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine/Israel. These nation-states were designed by Britain and France under the secretive Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.

The Western colonists had primarily deployed two forces to accomplish this project: Arab nationalism and Sharief Hussain of Mecca’s so called “Arab Islamic rebellion” against “Turkified Ottomans.” While Arab nationalism served to separate Arabs from Ottomans, at least imaginarily, Hussain’s revolt served to divide the Arab region internally. In return he got a reward for his sons, Faisal, Abdullah and others, from his colonial masters. However, knowing that they had been used as an accessory to serve colonial interests, Arab nationalists would soon turn against the West, and their struggle continued for decades in the form of the socialist-secularist Ba’ath Party and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.

However, both Arab nationalism (a supra-nationalism) and nation-statism were flawed from the very beginning. They produced dictators that would last right into the twentieth first century (Bashar al Assad as its latest product). Their failure was imminent because they rejected one significant reality about the Arab world: the Arabs had historically exhibited loyalty towards their Islamic heritage (macro identity) and their local clans or tribes (micro identity). Ottomans for centuries had maintained this balance through the fluid nature of their governance system that allowed people from diverse cultures to live a stable life.

The current war in Syria is actually a continuation of this historical legacy left by the colonial powers. Hafiz al Assad (Bashar al Assad’s father) established his regime in 1971 riding on an Arab nationalist wave after working with the Ba’ath Party for decades. Today’s dictator Bashar al-Assad inherited the throne on his father’s death in 2000. So far the war has consumed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced millions.

Amid the destruction and gloom caused by the war, a peculiar phenomenon has been developing outside of Syrian territory. There have been wars in the Middle East in the past as well, but migration towards Turkey at such a large scale is something not seen before. During the earlier wars, migration by people escaping death remained confined within the Arab region. The Syrian war, for the first time, has driven large numbers of people towards Turkey, the last remaining stable country in the region: others are either torn by wars or already hosting millions of refugees.

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At the moment every big and small city in Turkey hosts thousands of Arabs who have escaped the war. Apart from the southern provinces of Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis and Şanliurfa there are thousands of others living in Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Konya, Kayseri and Mersin. This has produced some unforeseen consequences, opening new avenues for multidimensional interaction between the former Ottoman partners, Arabs and Turks, at a massive scale. Currently Turkey offers a rare image of its former self, when it was the center of an empire of peoples from diverse cultures and colors. It is an image of the time when multiculturalism was not an ideology, but the natural flow of life.

There are primarily two levels of interaction between Arabs and Turks: conscious and unconscious. The conscious level involves interaction between two peoples under formal and informal settings such as debates, discussions, conferences, seminars, and normal interaction between two individuals. These practices lead to knowledge sharing and the clearance of confusion. The Turkish and Arab interchange mainly falls within the paradigm of Islam and the main reference point are the Ottomans, since both are Muslims and share a common political and social history.

The unconscious interaction is a psychological experience. Its significance is more lasting as it is deeply rooted in cultural sharing. Mere living together, the frequent visibility of one another in schools, universities, localities, markets and work places, the sharing of cultural objects like food and clothing, are the ways unconscious interaction is exercised. Since mythological nationalist ideologies unleashed by the West over the past two centuries have sustained on simplification of the complex and complication of the simple, unconscious interaction offers a promising resistance tool against such divisive and stereotypical ideologies. People directly experiencing one another leaves no scope for a middleman’s manipulation.

Wars destroy hopes. They destroy myths as well. For the past century lies about Arab-Turk antagonism have been groomed. The current interaction is demolishing the false myths; turning them upside down. The phenomena of the Arab-Turkish interchange is strongly backed by Turkish media coverage of the Syrian war. At this time most of the European media, politicians and intelligentsia are preoccupied with two things: creating paranoia about foreigners who are stealing “our jobs,” and focusing on the identity of the refugees coming to Europe. However, Turkish media has mostly been highlighting the daily miseries of the Syrian war, the human character of the refugees and so on. This works as a major driving force for Turkish national perception about the refugees; they are treated more with compassion than paranoia. Besides, Turkish people’s hospitality for migrant “Muslim brethren” draws inspiration from the 1400-year-old Islamic tradition. When Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and his followers were persecuted and forced out of Mecca, they migrated to Medina amid fears of a plot to murder the Prophet. Madinaites welcomed them all.

It seems there are some coincidences which suggest hope lies in the future for Turkey and the people of the region. Recognizing that Turkey’s power lies in its history — when the country was at the center of an empire — Turkey is opening itself to the partners who share the same history. The Turkish government’s reification of Muslim identity, rather than ethnic, has both spatial and temporal significance. Spatially it connects Turkey more closely with its neighborhood, which is religiously Muslim and ethnically diverse. Temporally it connects the country with its rich and outstanding past. This policy absorbs not only external but also internal political dynamics as the country itself is over-growingly multi-ethnic. It is important to note that hatred among people living in Africa, the Arab world, and in certain Asian countries against their former Western colonial masters has not ended, but on the contrary has grown due to a new wave of right wing radicalism that dominates in the Western countries. At a time when the West is becoming inward, Turkey is becoming more outward and the country is projecting itself as an inclusive and tolerant political power in a swiftly changing regional environment.

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]]> Aleppo’s fall and the Role of Russian, Iranian, and YPG forces https://politicstoday.org/aleppos-fall-and-the-role-of-russian-iranian-and-ypg-forces/ Wed, 14 Dec 2016 10:50:19 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/aleppos-fall-and-the-role-of-russian-iranian-and-ypg-forces/

It is not possible to say positive things about the fate of the Syrian Revolution if there isn’t a major change in the field soon. If the rebels don’t unite under a unified leadership they will go on to lose step by step.

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In the biggest battle of the ongoing Syrian war for Aleppo since July 2012, the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian allies benefited from the international community’s discord to corner the rebels into a small area of the city. By knowing the military and political importance of Aleppo, the regime and its allies targeted civilians to force the city’s surrender. Only in the last week, nearly a thousand civilians lost their lives, and thousands more were wounded.

The type of operations by the regime resemble the Russian strategy of “scorched earth” already used in Chechnya. Among the prominent tactics being used are the use of barrel bombs, which goes back to the notorious General Suheil Hassan from the pro-regime “Tiger Forces”. Hassan argued that a normal life in Aleppo must become impossible. Only that circumstance could lead to loyalists regaining a foothold in eastern Aleppo. Specifically infrastructure like markets, schools, electric stations, and hospitals were targeted by the regime. This shows the long-term strategy for Aleppo.

It is a broadly used strategy by the regime to force civilians out of cities that the regime could not take back by conventional force. Therefore it decided to seize by bombs emptied cities. This has been witnessed also in Homs, Ghouta and now in Aleppo. With the Russian intervention, the “scorched earth” strategy became more violent. Besides barrel bombs, phosphorous, napalm, and cluster munitions have also been dropped. As a result barely any humanitarian infrastructure has been left standing. There are no longer any hospitals in the besieged rebel-held districts of Aleppo. One of the fatal results of this strategy is the huge amount of civilian causalities. Since the beginning of the battle in Aleppo, civilians lost their lives or had to migrate out of the city.

The two steps of besieging Aleppo

The capture of rebel-held Aleppo would not have been possible without Russian air support, and simultaneous offensives by the PKK-affiliated YPG and DAESH that forced rebels to fight on multiple fronts.

In February 2016, the regime and its allies started an offensive from Bashkoy and were able to reach Nubbol and Zahra. The three year old partial siege of Nubbol and Zahra could only be broken with massive Russian close air support for Syrian Arab Army (SAA) troops on the ground. Nubbol and Zahra was besieged from three sides by rebel forces and the other side bordered the YPG-held territory of Efrin. With this move the partial siege was broken and the main supply road of the rebels from Azaz to Aleppo was cut. After this the Kurdish YPG invaded Tal Rifaat, fighting the FSA-rebels there with massive Russian air-support too. The YPG created a buffer zone between rebels in the north and regime forces and its allies. During the YPG assault on Tal Rifaat, DAESH also attacked Marea, which seriously put pressure on the rebel forces. It should be noted that the capture of the infantry school in Aleppo by DAESH from rebel forces helped the regime advance towards Bashkoy.

After this, the regime started its second step of the offensive in June 2016. It imposed its own siege on rebel-held territories in Aleppo. The Russian and regime air forces systematically bombed the last supply-road – the Castello Road – to the eastern parts of Aleppo, which runs through northwest Aleppo. The Castello Road became unpassable after regime forces and their allies advanced from Handarat towards the Mallah farms and constantly bombed the road from the north, while YPG forces attacked the last supply-road from the south. This situation led to the de-facto siege of Aleppo. The rebels started an offensive against the YPG forces in Sheykh Maqsoud but they failed. The regime and its allies, who captured the Mallah farms, started a joint operation with the YPG and seized the Castello Road. The siege of Aleppo started in July 2016.

The counteroffensives of the rebels

To break the siege the two major rebel umbrella organizations, Aleppo Jaysh al-Fath and the Fatah Aleppo Operation Room, started a joint operation from the south of Aleppo. After a week the rebels took the 1070 settlement complex, the Artillery School, Ramousah and Musherfah, which again led to the break of the siege. The operation from inside and outside the siege was both successful. But in the following days the rebels weren’t able to widen the area by capturing the 3000 complex and the cement factory from the SAA. The rebels weren’t able to open the new supply route through Ramousah to be wide enough. The regime artillery and the Russian and regime airstrikes imposed a de-facto siege on Aleppo once again. On the ground the regime started a counteroffensive with a huge amount of foreign Shiite fighters. In this offensive the Iranian strategy of “human waves”, which proved itself in the Iraq-Iran war, were used by the foreign Shiite forces fighting for the regime. It also demonstrated how heavily the regime relies on foreign fighters. Rebels lost Ramousah, Musherfah, the Artillery School and half of the 1070 complex. Aleppo was besieged again.

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At the end of October, Jaysh al-Fath and the Fatah Aleppo Operations Room tried another joint operation to break the siege. By taking into account the weaker effectiveness of airstrikes in urban areas, the rebels didn’t attack from the area around the Artillery School. They attacked the Dhahiyat al-Assad region further to the southwest of Aleppo’s center. Dhahiyat al-Assad and Minyan was captured in the operation by rebels. They made some gains in the 1070 complex, but the SAA and its allies repelled attacks on the 3.000 complex and the New Aleppo district. An offensive launched on the Zahra district produced some gains, but again all of them were reversed the same day. During this operation it was seen that Jaysh al-Fath began relying heavily on VBIEDs, also known as car bombs.

A total of 17 VBIEDs were used. Six of them were used at the 3000 complex, three VBIEDs in New Aleppo and the same amount in the 1070 complex, two in Dhahiyat al-Assad, two in Minyan and one at the Zahra district. Three of the VBIEDs were remote controlled VBIEDs. They belonged to Ahrar al-Sham. Eight VBIEDs were from Turkistan Islamic Party and six VBIEDs from Jabhat Fath Sham. Rebels tried to compensate for their lack of air superiority by using VBIEDs. This tactic was not significant enough to change the fate of rebels in eastern Aleppo.

After the failed rebel attempt, the regime began its own large scale attack from the air and ground. The eastern parts of Aleppo were attacked with intensive firepower, which led to a step by step withdrawal of rebels. Besides the regime forces, Russian Special Forces, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Shia militias and the Lebanese Hezbollah participated in the offensive. The PKK-affiliated YPG forces joined the al-Assad side from Sheykh Maqsoud. The Kurdish organization attacked the rebels and cooperated with the regime. Rebels and civilians started to withdraw to the southern parts of besieged eastern Aleppo and were squeezed into an area less than 30 km². As a result they gradually lost other parts of the last remaining rebel-held areas as well.

There are reports that the regime and its allies have begun arrests of opposition figures, while some rebels have started to negotiate with Russia for an evacuation route from Aleppo under Turkish mediation.

Behind the bombardment by the regime and its allies, which has not distinguished between fighters and civilians, is the idea that a full capture of Aleppo could break the willpower of rebels to win this war.

After the fall of Aleppo the regime will try to eliminate the rebels in south Syria and Idlib militarily or they will try to force them to surrender. Or at least they will try to impose a political solution on the negotiation table against rebels who have lost the war.

It no longer seems possible to change the military fate of Aleppo. After this it seems more logical to try to find a solution on the negotiation table and try to avoid more civilian causalities, which is the current strategy of Turkey.

It is not possible to say positive things about the fate of the Syrian Revolution if there isn’t a major change in the field soon. If the rebels don’t unite under a unified leadership they will go on to lose step by step.

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