Following its launching ceremony in the Dilovası district of Kocaeli province on June 20, Turkey’s second drilling ship Yavuz set off to the Eastern Mediterranean, near the other Turkish-flagged drilling ship Fatih. In doing so, Ankara declared to its friends and rivals once again that it will defend the rights of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the Mediterranean in accordance with international law.

With its two drilling ships along with its seismic exploration ships, Ankara made it clear that it will fight for its maritime zones and has the required skills for the fight that is ongoing as an energy struggle in neighboring waters. This has seemingly disturbed the officials of Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration, who have been issuing statements that disregard the rights of Turkey and the TRNC in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As known, the Greek Cypriot administration is striving to hinder the drilling activities of Turkey in Turkey’s own continental shelf and in areas where Turkish Cypriot authorities have licensed the country to work in the Mediterranean by using the advantage of being an EU member. By acting as if they represent the entire island, the Greek Cypriot administration renders the energy resources of Cyprus a component of the political stance that disregards the TRNC’s and the Turkish Cypriots’ right to have an economic presence.

This policy of the Greek Cypriot administration is not new. Greek Cyprus unilaterally declared a so-called exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by signing EEZ delineation agreements with Egypt in 2003 and with Israel in 2009. Subsequently, it made other agreements with foreign energy companies that allowed them to conduct drilling activities around the island without asking for the permission or approval of the TRNC, which made the agreements unlawful.

With such actions, the Greek Cypriot administration does not only ignore the presence of the TRNC and Turkish people on the island, but also paves the way for new formations that exclude Turkey, which has the longest Mediterranean coastline. Turkey is trying to be isolated as an actor in the discovery, drilling and sharing processes of energy resources whereas the TRNC, another important actor, is being completely ignored. Remembering the latest examples on the manipulation of these economic parameters for political purposes would be enough to understand the severity of the issue.

Ankara is exercising its jus natural in accordance with the outward bound limits of its continental shelf in the Mediterranean, which is recognized by the UN since 2004.

The Greek Cypriot administration co-founded the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum with Egypt, Israel, Greece, Italy, Jordan and Palestine and encouraged European leaders to issue statements stressing that the EU will stand against Turkey on the issue in the framework of the Union policies by acting with France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Greece during the MED7 Summit. The state or government heads of 28 EU countries, who gathered in Brussels on June 21, expressed that they condemn Turkey’s gas and oil exploration activities in the Eastern Mediterranean as a result of the propaganda run by the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece. Also, in a written statement issued by the European Council, Turkey’s activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean were declared unlawful with reference to prior decisions.

So, the EU and the energy alliance supported by Greek Cyprus and the U.S. have predicated their political purposes in the Mediterranean on the isolation of Turkey and the disregard of the TRNC. But it must be questioned whether they have achieved to do so in line with their expectations. Looking at Turkey’s capabilities in the region with the power stemming from the TRNC and international law, the answer is definitely “no.” Despite all their “serious” statements, the new energy alliance backed by the EU and the U.S. has failed in its policy of laying claims to the hydrocarbon reserves in the Mediterranean. The activities of Fatih and Yavuz drilling ships present the leading evidence to the failure of the anti-Turkey energy alliance.

Yavuz and Fatih drilling ships

The Greek Cypriot administration signed EEC agreements with Egypt in 2003 and with Lebanon and Israel subsequently on behalf of the entire island despite not having such a right. Although Turkey announced that it does not recognize these agreements, Greek Cyprus continued signing new energy and safety agreements with the riparian countries and conducting drilling activities in the Mediterranean despite all the objections of Turkey and the TRNC. Upon this, Ankara realized that the issue of appropriating and sharing the energy resources in the region was not built as an economic move but rather motivated to exclude the TRNC and Turkey, and took a series of measures against the moves.

So, Ankara is exercising its jus natural in accordance with the outward bound limits of its continental shelf in the Mediterranean, which is recognized by the UN since 2004, and acting in line with the offshore license guarantee granted by the TRNC to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) in 2009 and 2012. Ankara was also authorized to conduct hydrocarbon exploration activities within its maritime zones offshore Cyprus by making a license agreement with the TRNC in 2011 against the unilateral EEC declarations of the Greek Cypriot administration. The Mediterranean journey of Fatih drilling ship is ongoing within this legal framework and in the scope of the license granted to Turkey by the TRNC. Similarly, the drilling activities of Yavuz will start within this framework in early July.

Thanks to Yavuz, Ankara has attained the ability to engage in drilling activities down to 12.200 meters offshore Cyprus.

On the other hand, Turkey displayed a great determination and made a considerable progress in developing its A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) capabilities in the military field for the protection of its maritime zones in the Mediterranean that became an issue of dispute. In the current situation, Turkey’s step to purchase S-400 air defense systems is significant for Ankara’s area denial capabilities. When Ankara obtains and deploys these systems, it will have the opportunity to close an important area on Cyprus to its rivals and enemies. As Turkey’s area denial capabilities in the Mediterranean improve, it will be possible for the country to maintain its seismic exploration and drilling activities in energy field more freely. In a nutshell, as Ankara’s area denial facilities develop in line with the naval doctrine, the projects that exclude Turkey and the TRNC will be condemned to fail no matter who supports them. The Nabucco dream had lasted quite a while. And it is not hard to project that the East-Med dream will not last that long considering the measures taken and capabilities developed by Turkey.

Thanks to Yavuz, Ankara has attained the ability to engage in drilling activities down to 12.200 meters offshore Cyprus. Yavuz is expected to reach a depth of 3.300 meters at the Karpaz-1 spot in offshore Famagusta-Kahramanmaraş, which is the first location the drilling ship has been assigned to. Similarly, Fatih is maintaining its activities in 80 kilometers west of Paphos within the so-called EEC declared by the Greek Cypriot administration. By having two (Yavuz and Fatih) of the 16 deep-sea drilling ships in the world and demonstrating its naval capabilities to ensure the security of these ships with the operations it conducts in neighboring waters, Turkey does not only show that it is present in the Mediterranean energy equation but also makes it open that it will not allow this economic game in the Mediterranean to turn into an international political plot that disregards the rights of Turkey and the TRNC.

Turkey’s drilling ships operate on legal grounds

It is known that Ankara opposes the one-sided appropriation of natural resources around the island before the resolution of the Cyprus issue, and always stresses that the Turkish Cypriots have a share in these resources. Of course, the breach of international law and lack of common sense are not only seen in the cases related to the TRNC. Via the so-called “Seville Map,” Ankara is trying to be restricted to a very limited area in the Mediterranean by means of the disputed maritime zones.

Turkey’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister stated that the operations of Fatih and Yavuz drilling ships will be in accordance with international rules and regulations.

The Greek Cypriot administration continues insisting on the Seville Map that proposes to implement the median line method in sharing maritime zones. However, experts of international law such as Dr. Emete Gözügüzelli argue that an equitable sharing principle must be adopted in the Mediterranean instead of equal sharing among all the coastal states since it is a semi-closed sea. According to Gözügüzelli, Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea obliges the median line principle and stipulates that area restriction must be on an equitable basis. 

The gas excavation activities unlawfully conducted by Greek Cyprus offshore Cyprus and the attempts to disregard the rights of the TRNC increased tensions in the Mediterranean region. On top of this, the Greek administration issued a warrant for the arrest of Fatih drilling ship’s crew just before Turkey launched Yavuz drilling ship, which became the final straw. Turkey harshly responded to this step and openly expressed that it would resort to all legal measures if necessary. Amid the debates on the issue, the Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Fatih Dönmez stated in a speech he gave during the launching ceremony of Yavuz that the operations of Fatih and Yavuz will be in accordance with international rules and regulations. He also clearly remarked that Turkey would never back down from supporting the rights and interests of the TRNC in the Mediterranean, adding that it is an ineffective strategy to hide behind legal excuses to stop Ankara.

In brief, Turkey sent Yavuz to the Mediterranean after emphasizing its determination and righteousness once again. Yavuz was accompanied by the Turkish Navy frigate TCG Fatih in its journey to the Mediterranean, which shows that Ankara is poised to battle against any possible threat. So, Turkey is ready for the fight in the Mediterranean and asserts its presence in the region with its capabilities and legal arguments. The sirens of Fatih and Yavuz are now ringing like alarm bells to awake those dreaming about ignoring Ankara and Nicosia in the Mediterranean, while the region is on the brink of a global-scale geopolitical fight.

Late last month, the U.S. Senate voted to lift a 32-year arms embargo against the Greek Cypriot administration after months of campaigning spearheaded by Senators Marco Rubio, a Republican, and Bob Menendez, a Democrat. The bill, dubbed the “Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act,” aims to deepen U.S. security ties with the internationally-recognized “Republic of Cyprus,” and, in the words of Sen. Menendez, “usher a new era for an eastern Mediterranean architecture rooted in shared security and prosperity.”

Calls to lift the embargo were first brought up in December 2018 in a letter sent to the State Department penned by Republican Congressman and co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Hellenic Issues, Gus Bilirakis. He was supported by fellow members of congress, including Democratic representatives Ted Deutch, who serves as the co-chair of the Congressional Hellenic-Israel Alliance and chairman of the U.S. House Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee. In addition to the lifting of the Cyprus arms embargo, the bill also envisions greater energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece, Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration through the establishment of a United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center, and the authorization of millions of dollars of financial and logistical assistance to the Greek and Greek Cypriot militaries. Most significantly, however, the bill further aims to halt the delivery of American F-35 fighter jets to Turkey in a bid to dissuade Ankara from going ahead with the purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system.

Turkey struck the deal with Russia to purchase the S-400s in July 2017 after Washington refused to share technology from its Patriot system with Ankara.

Turkey struck the deal with Russia to purchase the S-400s in July 2017 after Washington refused to share technology from its Patriot system with Ankara. Some critics in the U.S., such as Representative Eliot Engel, have argued the Russian system is not compatible with NATO systems. But the dispute between Turkey and the U.S. over the Russian missiles is just one of a number of ongoing issues that continue to plague relations between Ankara and Washington. The two NATO allies have had a number of differences in recent years, particularly over the U.S.-led alliance’s arming of PKK-linked militants in Syria, as well as Washington’s failure to extradite Fetullah Gulen, a Pennsylvania-based criminal cult leader accused of orchestrating a coup attempt in Turkey in 2016.

Last year, U.S. President Donald Trump declared sanctions against two ministers in the Turkish cabinet over the jailing of an American pastor in Turkey who expressed support for the PKK. The sanctions caused the U.S. dollar to spike to record highs against the Turkish lira. Even though Turkey later released the pastor, Trump’s words opened the door wide for further anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S., with some critics even calling for Turkey to be expelled from NATO. At the same time, amid talk of distancing Turkey from the military bloc, conversations about opening the doors of NATO membership to the “Republic of Cyprus” were sparked.

The lifting of the arms embargo could be seen as the start of a process designed to gradually integrate the Greek Cypriots into a greater alliance with the West. It is therefore no surprise that the bill passed by the U.S. Senate also comes with some anti-Russian strings attached. Two last-minute amendments to the bill requires the U.S. administration to submit reports to Congress at least once a year to certify that the Greek Cypriot administration “has made and is continuing to take the steps necessary to deny Russian military vessels access to ports for refuelling and servicing” and is “continuing to cooperate with the United States government in efforts to implement reforms on anti-money laundering regulations and financial regulatory oversight.”

The Russian foreign ministry warned the U.S. against “anti-Russian plans” in Cyprus.

Back in December, the Russian foreign ministry warned the U.S. against “anti-Russian plans” in Cyprus. Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Nikos Christodoulides reassured the Russians that closer Greek Cypriot-American ties were not “prejudicial” to Nicosia’s other diplomatic relations with Moscow and that its foreign policy doesn’t engage in a “zero-sum game.” In early June, before the bill was passed, Stefanos Stefanou, spokesman of the Greek Cypriot opposition left-wing party AKEL, argued the lifting of the arms embargo served as “part of the promotion of US foreign policy in the region … to prevail in a competition with other countries like Russia, China and Iran in the wider region”. Stefanou said this strategy would prove dangerous to Cyprus and put at risk Nicosia’s diplomatic relations with other countries “which Cyprus needs at least as much as the US”. Even Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades described the amendments as “unfortunate” and an attempt to interfere with his country’s sovereignty. Indeed, Greek Cypriot compliance with the amendments would undermine a 2015 agreement between Anastasiades and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to allow Russian military ships access to the island’s ports. Nonetheless, Greek Cypriot Defense Minister Savvas Angelides brushed off the amendments after the bill passed, telling state radio: “No country can impose on Cyprus an obligation to stop providing facilities to Russian or other ships”.

It could be argued that Greek Cypriot closeness to Russia during the Cold War was the reason why the U.S. arms embargo was implemented in the first place, although in more diplomatic terms it was just seen as a measure to prevent an escalation of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Only four years prior to the ban, Turkish Cypriots in the north of the island had declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey. That was following nine years of failed peace negotiations between the island’s two largest communities after a Turkish military intervention in response to a Greek-inspired coup in 1974 saw Cyprus split in two.

Although the “Republic of Cyprus” has long been an ally of the West, going on to gain EU membership in 2004, as a non-NATO state it has also been seen as susceptible to falling into Russia’s sphere of influence. Turkey, on the other hand, boasts of having the second largest army in NATO and is a committed Western ally with a proven track-record of loyalty. That being said, the international community considers Turkey’s continued presence in northern Cyprus to be an “occupation,” rejecting Turkey’s legal argument for the intervention.

And while Turkey was also on the receiving end of a U.S. arms embargo following its 1974 intervention, the arms trade between Washington and Ankara returned to normal just four years later when the embargo was lifted. Today, despite their differences, Turkey and the U.S. continue to cooperate in the field of security. Even President Trump at the G20 summit in Japan in late June showed understanding towards Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, saying that Turkey was treated unfairly by the previous Obama administration when Ankara sought to acquire the American-made Patriots.

When it comes to the “Republic of Cyprus,” however, Washington still approaches the Greek Cypriot administration with a degree of mistrust due to Nicosia’s ongoing warm ties with Moscow. Despite a gradual decline since 2012, Russian investments still account for a huge proportion of economic activity in Cyprus. Furthermore, the EU has expressed concern over the Greek Cypriot administration abusing its EU membership by allowing Russian oligarchs with strong ties to the Kremlin a backdoor entrance to the bloc and its market through passport sales, as well as the corruption and money laundering.

The Greek Cypriot administration has also notoriously defied EU sanctions by allowing Russian ships destined for Syria to dock at its harbors, and has additionally granted Russian navy vessels in the region access to the port in Limassol. It is precisely this behavior that the US seeks to curb with the amendments of the aforementioned bill. Yet despite receiving no firm guarantees from the Greek Cypriot administration that it will fulfil its part of the deal to lift the arms embargo, the U.S. continues to support the Greek Cypriots in its moves against Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests in the region.

Despite receiving no firm guarantees from the Greek Cypriot administration, the U.S. continues to support the Greek Cypriots in its moves against Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests.

Notably, the international community continues to ignore the repeated cries of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots over unilateral Greek Cypriot efforts to exploit hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey and the TRNC have both insisted that attempts to exploit the reserves before a peace deal between Turkish and Greek Cypriots is agreed is a violation of Turkish Cypriot rights to those reserves. To add, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have also warned that Greek Cypriot unilateralism on this issue threatens peace and stability in Cyprus. Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriot administration has started offering licenses to investors, including firms from the U.S., France and Italy. This has already led to a few incidents involving Turkish vessels that have been deployed block developments surrounding the hydrocarbons off the Cypriot coast.

Turkey has also recently started taking unilateral steps of its own to search for hydrocarbons around Cyprus in response, irking condemnations from the West. And instead of working to de-escalate tensions, bills like the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act have been seen as an endorsement of Greek Cypriot provocations. Kudret Ozersay, the foreign minister of the TRNC, argued the bill would prove to be counter-productive to U.S. interests, saying: “A peaceful and prosperous Cyprus, with both sides working together in good faith to resolve their problems, would be a good model in a region where peace is hard to preserve. Promoting dialogue is in the interest of the United States. The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act is not.”

But in early July, Rep. Bilirakis, who initiated the process of lifting the embargo, in an article he wrote with the President of the American Hellenic Institute, Nick Larigakis, insists that the 1987 embargo on Cyprus “appears to have been imposed in the erroneous belief that it would somehow encourage Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to resolve the nearly 45-year division of the territory,” and is “as anachronistic as Turkey’s perspective on the Cyprus issue,” while claiming Turkey’s “occupation” of the island’s north was the main obstacle to peace. “It is in the best interests of the United States for Cyprus to look to the United States, and not any other nation, to procure its defense articles,” the article said.

The main objective behind the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act is to sideline Turkey in the region and to oust all rivals to US foreign policy from Cyprus.

In May, Bilirakis also said the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act will enable the U.S. to support the trilateral relationship between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, which he hailed as a “new example of cooperation in an increasingly turbulent Eastern Mediterranean region.” Based on the congressman’s words, it is clear that the main objective behind the bill is to sideline Turkey in the region and to oust all rivals to US foreign policy from Cyprus. The bill is designed to assert U.S. control over the developing partnership between Athens, Nicosia and Tel Aviv to stop the emerging alliance falling prey to Russian agendas. However, Russia, which in recent years has been expanding its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean through its bases in Syria, is not taking such plans lightly. A statement released by the Russian foreign ministry said the bill “contains the provisions which are directly aimed at undermining Russian-Cypriot cooperation” and, in the event of the bill being adopted, would “seriously take into account its consequences” on Moscow’s foreign policy. “We consider any attempts to set an independent and sovereign country before an artificial choice with whom to cooperate, with Russia or Washington, as the most blatant violation of any possible rules and norms,” the statement added.

The probability is, however, that Russia would not have to take any real action to secure its interests in Cyprus, as the Greek Cypriot administration is not likely to shut the door on Moscow any time soon, especially as Nicosia is still heavily reliant on Russian money. Russian sympathies also run deep within Greek Cypriot society, with allied proxies ever-ready to stand their ground against further Western integration. Even the incentive of an end to the U.S. arms embargo is unlikely to persuade the Greek Cypriots to disown Russia, as Nicosia has never had a problem securing arms from other countries in the past, including an order of Russian-made S-300 missiles in 1997. And while the head of the governing Greek Cypriot center-right party DISY, Averof Neophytou, exclaimed “we will go tomorrow (to Washington) to order weapons” in a retort against AKEL’s scepticism toward the U.S. bill, the actual demand in Cyprus for U.S.-produced weapons is negligible.

Sanctions would only push Turkey further into Russia’s arms. Until then, Turkey is likely to stockpile American-made weapons to avoid the problems it faced during the last embargo in 1974.

As a small island-state surrounded by powerful nations, the “Republic of Cyprus” cannot rely on fire-power alone to ward off military threats. Frankly put, the Greek Cypriot army does not have the capacity to take on the responsibility that comes with owning a large amount of heavy weapons. Even with such weapons, the Greek Cypriots would still stand little to no chance against countries that have more enlisted soldiers than the entire population of Cyprus. Of course, the U.S. would be foolish to sell heavy weapons to an ally that may not be able to prevent them falling into the hands of elements hostile to U.S. interests. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot administration is unlikely to swerve from its current strategy of lobbying to politically isolate its enemies by forming alliances with neighboring countries – namely Egypt, Israel and Greece – who if need be would do the fighting for them.

If anything, the lifting of the arms embargo is no more than a symbolic gesture of solidarity to the Greek Cypriots, as well as a test of their loyalty to U.S. foreign policy. More importantly, however, the bill serves as a message to Turkey, which faces being expelled from participation in the F-35 program by July 31, as well as other sanctions due to the S-400s deal. A separate resolution submitted to the House of Representatives on June 10 proposed sanctions that could hamper Turkish bids to acquire CH-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters, F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft, and funnily enough, the Patriot missile defense system. Naturally, such sanctions would only push Turkey further into Russia’s arms. Until then, Turkey is likely to stockpile American-made weapons to avoid the problems it faced during the last embargo in 1974. In the meantime, the U.S. needs to consider whether the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act will actually work for its interests in the region, or strengthen its rivals even more.

As Turkey’s economy grows and its external energy demand increases, the country does not want to be dependent on a couple of suppliers, and seeks to form policies on alternative resources and suppliers. In this sense, despite the region’s complications, the Eastern Mediterranean, with its newly discovered energy resources, is seen as the primary option for Turkey. As seen in the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP), which will transport Azeri natural gas to Europe through Turkey, the country is continuing to implement projects ensuring its energy supply security. The strategic location of Turkey can be seen as a chance to transmit the Eastern Mediterranean energy resources to the European market.

As stated above, Turkey is partly dependent on external energy suppliers. Although the country produces a significant amount of coal, it only accounts for 26% of its total primary energy consumption (TPEC). Moreover, since the low levels of domestic natural gas and oil production do not meet internal demand, which represents 29.8% and 29.5% of TPEC respectively, Turkey needs to meet its demand from different countries and to contribute to its energy security, as well.

The country imports almost 99% of the natural gas it consumes from Russia (55.3%), Iran (16.2%), Azerbaijan (12.7%), Algeria (8.1%) and Nigeria (2.6%). According to the Key World Energy Statistics 2016 by the International Energy Association, Turkey ranks 5th among the world’s top 10 net natural gas (including pipeline gas and LNG) importers. In that context, the amount of proven natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean region is significant. The Tamar and Leviathan Basins of Israel have 900 billion cubic meters (bcm), the Aphrodite Basin of Cyprus has 140 bcm, and the Zorh Basin of Egypt has 850 bcm. All of these basins together can meet the demand of the countries of the region.

Energy operations in the Eastern Mediterranean began with Israel’s discovery of the Tamar Field in 2009, and continued with the discoveries in the territorial waters of Greek Cyprus and Egypt. The Eastern Mediterranean region, where significant natural gas reserves have been found in recent years, desires to start production and export the gas to countries with higher gas demands, mainly in Europe and Turkey. Nevertheless, these discoveries have resulted in new disagreements in the region where there is already an ongoing dispute over the Cyprus issue, and discussions on maritime borders have become a major problem again.

Since Greek Cyprus declared the region within its own sovereignty, the explorations have raised tensions with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and problems in the political field have spread into the energy field. Although the two sides have held meetings several times to resolve their issues, this long-lasting problem could not be solved yet. In this context, on January 9, 2017, the parties (TRNC, Greek Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, and England) met in Geneva, but once more could not reach an agreement on the island’s future, along with the future of the waters and natural gas surrounding it.

The current economic situation and lack of infrastructure in the whole of the island of Cyprus has pushed the leaders to form an alliance with Israel and Greece. The present energy situation of the whole island shows that the gross inland energy consumption only includes oil (94.9%) and renewables (6.8%), and the island lacks any infrastructure enabling gas trade, production and consumption. It also is not integrated and not interconnected with any neighboring power systems. Thus, these countries, due to their multi-faceted interests, are now debating over the construction of an LNG regasification terminal and the Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Pipeline, which will carry gas from the Aphrodite Field in Greek Cypriot waters to Greece. Although the Aphrodite Basin in the island’s territorial waters is the smallest among other basins in the Eastern Mediterranean, nearly 7.4% of the current proved reserves, it is estimated that it would contribute to both the island and the region by bolstering energy security.

A future project called “Eurasia Interconnector” is also a part of the debate, which would link the Greek Cypriot, Israeli and the Greek transmission networks. However, since the economic situation that each of the three partners faces could complicate the implementation of the project, it seems that they need support from the other actors in the region. And Turkey, as one of the countries having a right over the exclusive economic zone of the region, along with the EU, are the possible investors of these projects.

Analysts have found that transmission of the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas to Europe directly through pipelines under the Mediterranean is not the best course of action. In order to distribute the gas to the European market, Turkey is seen as the best option, with its present infrastructure, and TANAP and Turkish Stream projects. A possible pipeline from the island to Europe through Turkey’s infrastructure would be the least costly way of transmitting the natural gas. In October 2016, seeming to agree with this, Israel consulted Turkey for the first time on the issue of the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas deposits, and stated that Turkey is the best route for transmission.

Israel’s Energy Minister, Yuval Steinitz held meetings with his Turkish counterpart Berat Albayrak in Istanbul, expressing the hope for cooperation on extracting from the natural gas, consuming and trading, which Israel sees as essential for its own energy future. Steinitz said that they agreed to start examining the feasibility of building an undersea gas pipeline to pump Israeli gas to Turkish consumers and on to Europe. “Israel will also be glad to see Turkish companies involved in the Israeli energy sector including in the exploration of gas fields”, and although they are also building regional energy cooperation links with Jordan, Egypt and Greece, the Turkish option is vital, Steinitz said.

Even though the other states in the Eastern Mediterranean region have come out against Turkey, the country’s geo-strategic position makes it the most advantageous route for the trade of the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas. After all, it is now more apparent that the other states having reserves in the region also aim to transmit their gas to external markets as soon as possible.

This territorial dispute stems back to the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in July 1974. Turkey acted as a legal guarantor of peace following a coup on the island which was part of a plot to annex Cyprus to Greece. In accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, to which Greece and the UK are also signatories, Turkey reserved the right to intervene, unilaterally or otherwise, with the intent to re-establish the state of affairs on the island. Yet Turkey stopped short of a full takeover and only took control of the north, which became a de facto safe haven for persecuted Turkish Cypriots. As Turkish Cypriots holed up in enclaves in the south fled to the Turkish-controlled north, some 200,000 Greek Cypriots were displaced from their homes.In November 1983, Turkish Cypriots declared independence in the north and started issuing new deeds for Greek Cypriots properties that were left behind. These properties were either sold or handed out to migrants from Turkey who arrived after the island was split in 1974. Today, these migrants comprise around half of the population in the Turkish north. Around 40,000 of them, mainly earlier arrivals, were granted citizenship rights in the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The remainder live in the TRNC on a residency permit or illegally.Admittedly, to clean up the past problems, the Turkish Cypriots are prepared to make some concessions. While some Greek Cypriots who had their properties seized will have those properties returned, others may be compensated either through a payout or by being given other properties elsewhere equal to the value of their seized property. The Greek Cypriot administration has therefore demanded that Guzelyurt be ceded to the Greek Cypriot federal zone so that some 100,000 Greek Cypriots can be moved there. They have also demanded that around 66,000 Greek Cypriots be allowed to live and be given full rights within the Turkish Cypriot federal zone. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots want the administration of Christian religious sites in the Turkish Cypriot zone, as well as four Maronite villages, to be handed over.

The Turkish Cypriot side, however, seems keener on compensation payouts than drastically changing borders and demographics. Under any deal, the Turkish Cypriot side will already have enough trouble deporting some 80,000 migrants back to Turkey, which includes the children of migrant families who were born and raised on the island. They too will require compensation.

Having failed to reach an agreement in November, the two sides are expected to submit new maps in the next meetings in Geneva on January 9, 2017. Three days later they will be joined by the three guarantor states – Turkey, Greece and the UK – to discuss the issue of guarantorship.

Both Greece and the UK have previously stated their willingness to waive their guarantor rights. The Greek Cypriot administration has also demanded a complete pull-out of Turkish troops from the island. But the Turkish Cypriots oppose the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops. Turkey’s stance, meanwhile, remains ambiguous. If offered the right incentives, such as greater integration with the EU or the financial benefits of hosting a pipeline, Turkey may forgo its guarantor rights, or settle for a military base on the island, similar to the British bases.

In many ways, the fate of Cyprus partly depends on Turkey’s relationship with the EU. These relations took a turn for the worse recently when the European Parliament condemned Turkey for its crackdown on a network of state infiltrators who stand accused of being behind a failed coup attempt in July. Greece’s recent refusal to extradite fleeing coup plotters to Turkey also hasn’t helped.

Likewise, a rapprochement between Turkey and Russia following almost a year of strained ties presents its own problems. With Moscow and Ankara deciding to push ahead with the Turk Stream pipeline, which will pump gas from Russia to the Turkish-Greek border via the Black Sea, it is likely that any pipeline built through Turkey from the eastern Mediterranean will join the same network. This means that any gas Europe seeks to import from the eastern Mediterranean or Central Asia will be mixed with Russian gas as well. So much for Europe cutting off its dependence on Russia.

Low global crude oil prices also risk putting off potential investors from approaching the eastern Mediterranean reserves. Energy giants must first be convinced that exploring, exploiting and exporting natural gas from the area will be profitable. So far, the reserves found in Cypriot waters are not enough to economically justify such investment, which means it would need to be combined with Egyptian and Israeli reserves. But in a region already plagued by political instability, investing in the eastern Mediterranean may prove to be a risk no company is willing to take.

As the gas fueling these peace talks begins to run low, Eide’s inspiring grin is gradually turning into a frown. Eide himself is now warning of a “deterioration of trust” and a “hardening of positions” among ordinary Greek and Turkish Cypriots. For many Cypriots, these talks are a last chance for peace on the island. If they fail, it is unlikely that anyone will accept the continuation of the status quo.