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s the global and regional security environment has become more complex, unpredictable and fragile in recent years, it is evident that a country’s capabilities play an effective role in both deterrence and the establishment of a peaceful environment. In such a context, the EFES 2026 Combined Joint Live-Fire Field Exercise, hosted by Türkiye, goes far beyond being merely a military show of force. The exercise can be interpreted as a ‘deterrence and peace equation’ where military, diplomatic and technological messages are synchronized on the ground.

Both the tactical depth of the day and night scenarios and the domestic and national defense industry solutions integrated into the exercise each year are noteworthy. The Turkish Armed Forces’ (TSK) flawless capability in both “combined and joint operations” is being demonstrated. During the Distinguished Observer Day activities, attended by high-ranking state officials and representatives of friendly and allied nations, Türkiye’s role as a guarantor of regional peace and stability is proclaimed to the world through the language of strategic communication.

The Defense Industry Exhibition within the scope of the EFES 2026 Exercise serves as the clearest demonstration of Türkiye’s leadership in the transformation of modern warfare doctrines and its commitment to the goals of full independence. This exhibition goes beyond traditional fair concepts; it is not merely a space where systems are displayed statically, but also serves as a ‘laboratory’ where they are tested against the realities of the actual battlefield.

Integration with allies and partners: Libya and Syria

One of the key elements that makes the EFES Exercise unique on a global scale is the ability to manage forces from different nations—despite differences in language, doctrine and operational culture—with a ‘united and joint’ will within the same scenario. EFES 2026, meanwhile, saw a record level of foreign personnel participation, in line with both the current geopolitical context and Türkiye’s position within the global system. A particularly notable aspect was the fact that a total of 502 personnel from eastern (331) and western (171) Libya—regions that had recently been at war with one another—underwent joint training with the Turkish Armed Forces during the exercise.

This goes far beyond ordinary military cooperation. The fact that Türkiye’s long-standing objective of “One Libya, One Army”, pursued on the ground in the name of regional and global peace, has materialised in such a massive international exercise demonstrates Ankara’s capacity for diplomatic and military integration. Similarly, the participation of a core element of the Syrian army, which is currently undergoing a restructuring process, in the exercise demonstrates Turkey’s determination to shape the regional security architecture in line with its own vision.

“Putting the future concept of warfare into practice”

The Russia-Ukraine War, the US/Israel-Iran War and other regional conflicts currently dominating the global agenda are bringing the transformation of the modern battlefield into sharp relief. During this period, it has become increasingly clear that manned and unmanned platforms are working in tandem, decision-making processes are being accelerated through AI-integrated solutions, and autonomous systems are creating a multiplier effect. An examination of the EFES 2026 scenarios clearly demonstrates how closely Türkiye is following this transformation and developing pioneering doctrines.

The inclusion of Türkiye’s unmanned combat aircraft, KIZILELMA, in the demonstration flight formation alongside manned platforms such as GÖKBEY, HÜRKUŞ and HÜRJET during the various scenarios conducted throughout the exercise signals the dawn of a new era in air power. The fact that autonomous and AI-supported unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicle systems (Baykar K2 and Sivrisinek kamikaze UAV, VTOL KALKAN UAVs; Skydagger FPV drone; STM’s 20-strong KARGU swarm) struck targets simulated with live warheads astonished everyone. In exercises conducted worldwide, it has not previously been observed that unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicles of different types were operated in a similar scenario within a ‘swarm architecture’.

Either live warheads were not used, or only formation capabilities were demonstrated. EFES 2026 went down in the records as the first live, explosive application field. Furthermore, within the scope of the exercise, F-16s’ HGK-84 (Precision Guidance Kit), alongside the 20mm cannon of the ATAK helicopters and their attacks with UMTAS missiles, and the coordinated scenario involving supporting fire from 155mm FIRTINA II howitzers, demonstrates the level of network-centred warfare capability achieved by the Turkish Armed Forces. This ultimately proves that Türkiye is not merely limited to producing platforms; it has built up significant tactical expertise regarding how these systems are to be utilised as part of combined and joint forces within complex combat scenarios.

The defense industry’s field test

One of the most significant innovations that elevates the EFES exercises beyond a mere military manoeuvre is the organic integration of the Defense Industry Exhibition into the exercise. The realities of the battlefield are always different from laboratory tests. Thanks to the visionary coordination of the Ministry of National Defense and the Presidency of the Defense Industry, domestically developed systems are being tested directly under the dust, smoke and stress of the field. The entire process is operated within a structure that includes foreign personnel. The performance demonstrated by the systems will undoubtedly feature in the ‘reports’ that these foreign personnel will present upon their return to their home countries.

The “Steel Dome” system demonstration presented to the country’s leadership and international guests as part of the Distinguished Observer Day marks the pinnacle of the strategy on display. The participation of the STEEL DOME – the integrating element of Türkiye’s layered air defense architecture – in an international exercise simulating combat conditions serves both to convey the message of “full independence in national defense” and to demonstrate the system’s operational readiness to potential buyer nations. Projects such as the Denizhan, a national naval gun produced by MKE and currently in active service, are the clearest indication of how Türkiye is gradually breaking its dependence on foreign sources. The opportunity for foreign delegations to meet directly with the engineers responsible for production on the operational field ensures that they experience Türkiye’s technological capabilities not through brochures, but by observing them in the field. This situation creates an invaluable opportunity and reference point for defense exports.

T

he century-long development journey of the Turkish defense industry can be characterized by its pioneering actors and decisive breaking points. The developmental phases of the Turkish defense industry can be outlined in the following phases: (i) Early Republican era (1923-1950), (ii) NATO accession (1952-1964), (iii) the Cyprus Peace Operation (1964-1978), (iv) embargoes on the Turkish defense industry (1980-1990, (v) change in domestic and foreign procurement models (1990-2002), and (vii) the final development phase of the Turkish war industry 2003-2023.

First Steps

The importance of the first phase (1923-1950) lies in the awareness of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the new republic after its heroic liberation struggle, who encouraged self-reliance in national self-defense by developing military skills and capabilities with domestic and national resources. The legacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the century-old Sevres conspiracy of the Great Powers, and the transformative impact of World War I on military technology and the arms race played an important role in this consciousness.

For this reason, on the one hand, Atatürk adopted a “peaceful” rhetoric in foreign, security, and defense policies with the principle of “Peace at home, Peace in the world”, and, on the other, he considered the formation of a land, air, and naval war industry as essential for the political, military, diplomatic, and economic rights and interests of the country.

With his instructions, the small arms and cannon repair ateliers, and cartridge and carpentry facilities were gathered under the umbrella of the General Directorate of Military Factories, which was established in 1921 and transferred to the Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKEK) in 1950. This initiative accelerated the activities of the arms, ammunition, and chemical factories.

Another distinctive feature of Atatürk’s era was the encouragement of private sector entrepreneurship. Revolutionary names such as Nuri Demirağ and Vecihi Hürkuş, as well as the Turkish Aeronautical Association (THK) and the Turkish Aircraft, Automobile and Engine Limited Company (Tayyare, Otomobil ve Motor Türk Anonim Şirketi, TOMTAŞ), which are today cited as pioneering actors in the history of the Turkish defense industry, are products of the early Republican period.

Likewise, the Gölcük Shipyard, the largest facility of the naval warfare industry today, was established based on the decision to found the Naval Base in Gölcük with Law No. 2173 approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in May 1933. However, despite the attempts made during this period, Turkey continued to procure weapons from abroad.

The reason for foreign defense procurement was the desire, on the one hand, not to burden the state with the new enterprises, and, on the other, the time that was required for Turkish companies to reach the technological level to meet the needs of a more modern Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and to move to the mass production stage. Meanwhile, following Atatürk’s death and World War II, the Turkish warfare industry entered a period of stagnation.

While the destructiveness of the war and its impact on the world economy put many countries into financial bottlenecks, the East-West struggle centered on the Soviet Union and the U.S. was instrumental in strengthening Turkey’s warfighting capability and capacity, while at the same time sowing the seeds of a long-lasting “dependency.”

The third phase (1964-1978) was characterized by the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1964 and the subsequent arms embargo imposed by the U.S. until 1978. With the so-called Johnson Letter Turkey once again realized how vital it was for its national security and interests that it establishes a war industry and maintains it with national sources.

In fact, this bitter experience was not only about the shortage of spare parts and logistical support for the TAF; it also led to the realization of how quickly Turkey’s foreign policy decisions could isolate it from its regional alliances, with which it had developed high-level and multiple engagements.

Thus, Turkey once again turned to indigenous initiatives, this time in a more institutionalized and industrialized manner. The Air, Naval and Land Forces Foundations (Turkish Armed Forces Foundation as of 1987) and companies such as Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ or TAI in English), ASELSAN, a defense electronics company, Rocketsan, a rocket and missile manufacturer and defense contractor, and HAVELSAN, a software and systems company, which are the leading institutions and organizations of the Turkish defense industry today, were born in the 1970s.

The fourth phase (1980-1990) of the Turkish defense industry was characterized by overt and covert embargoes. Turkey’s counterterrorism operations against the PKK—as well as its Syrian offshoot, the PYD/YPG today—often lacked support from its NATO and European allies, who introduced new procedures and decisions that made it difficult for Turkey to use the weapons, ammunition, and equipment that Turkey had procured from them.

However, as a result of the lessons learned from the 1970s, Turkey entered the 1980s with a higher level of awareness which led to institutionalization efforts to achieve a more modern defense industry, first with the establishment of the Presidency of Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (SAGEB) in 1985 and then the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) in 1989.

Another important aspect of this period is that, despite all the political conflicts of interest and challenging economic conditions, Ankara highly valued cooperation, and in this sense, the joint establishment by the U.S. and Turkey of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and TUSAŞ Engine Industries (TEI) provided an extremely important theoretical and technical input to the domestic defense industry.

The fifth phase (1990-2002) saw a change in domestic and foreign procurement models thanks to this institutionalization. In this context, Turkey’s procurement trend shifted from smart supply to production under license, co-production, technology transfer, and cooperation.

While the F-16 project was valued as an important acquisition of knowledge and experience, new projects were initiated by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation companies from this accumulation and capability enhancement.

The indigenization of the defense discourse

The sixth and final development phase (2003-2023) of the Turkish war industry is the period from the beginning of the 21st century to the present day. The defining characteristic of this period is the defense industry discourse of the AK Party, which has been in power for the last 20 years, and which has been widely featured in both the party charter and election manifestos.

This discourse is based on the pursuit of indigenization, nationalization, and strategic autonomy, and subsequently took on a more robust face with the “National Technology Initiative.” A Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSİK) meeting in 2004 represented the first breaking point in these discourses and practices. In this meeting, it was decided to cancel many foreign procurement projects that were already on the table, and to develop the new procurement structure, which was envisioned to be applied to many old projects whose seeds were sown in the 1990s, by maximizing the support of domestic resources and capabilities. In the new period, Turkey has given higher priority to indigenous design and R&D models, taking advantage of co-production, technology transfer, and cooperation models.

This revolutionary decision initially raised some concerns about meeting the needs of the TAF in a timely manner and with competent technology. However, the projects that were realized in a short period of time, and the platforms that were quickly brought into the national inventory and put into the development phase with feedback from the field, gained the confidence of the TAF.

Turkey has recently requested the sale of 40 F-16V fighter aircraft from the United States and upgrade kits for 80 F-16s in its inventory. This move came amidst the strained relations between the two countries and shortly after Turkey’s removal from the fifth-generation fighter aircraft F-35 Lightning II development project by the U.S. because of Ankara’s procurement of the S-400 air defense system from the Russian Federation.

Under normal conditions, the F-16 sale would be a military/technical matter, managed through complex bureaucratic procedures and formalities. However, due to the lengthy list of complex issues between Ankara and Washington, most of which have direct implications for Turkey’s near periphery and NATO alliance, the outcome of the F-16 inquiry will most likely be a major turning point in Turkey’s foreign relations.

To understand better the significance of Turkey’s possible F-16V procurement in terms of military capabilities and strategic implications, we must first take a look at Turkey’s current air power and force structure.

The F-16 and Turkey

Turkey is one of the major users of Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. The Turkish Air Force (TurAF) had taken delivery of a total of 270 F-16C/D Block 30, Block 40, Block 50, and Block 50+ aircraft.

Shortly after the lifting of the U.S. arms embargo in 1978, Turkey started a program to modernize its air force. The majority of the combat aircraft fleet was nearing the end of their useful service, and the lack of spares because of the embargo significantly decreased serviceability. As a result of a technical evaluation, the F-16 Fighting Falcon by General Dynamics was selected.

An agreement for the purchase of 160 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon aircraft was signed between Turkey and United States on December 9, 1983. The agreement covered the sale to Turkey of 160 F-16C/Ds, Block 30 and Block 40 versions, under a project designated “Peace Onyx” through local production.

Turkey’s Türk Uçak Sanayii A.Ş (TUSAŞ) formed a joint venture with General Dynamics, named TUSAŞ Aerospace Industries (TAI) and with General Electric under the name of TUSAŞ Engine Industries (TEI) for the manufacture of the F-16s and its engines, respectively. For the electronic warfare systems of the aircraft, another joint venture, named Mikrodalga Elektronik Sanayii (MIKES) was established.

F-16 upgrades

TurAF started a modernization project for the F-16 fleet in the early 2000s in order to increase the capabilities of the aircraft. Designated as Peace Onyx III, the project covered the upgrade of the mission systems of the aircraft. The project was started in July 2007 and covered a total of 175 Block 40 and Block 50 F-16s. A total of 35 Block 30 F-16s also received limited upgrade. TAI delivered the first aircraft to TurAF on November 2, 2011, and the project was completed in April 2015.

Meanwhile, Turkey also undertook a national upgrade program under the Özgür Project, which started in 2010. The project aims at the development of an indigenous mission computer and mission systems avionics for the F-16. With the nationalization of mission computers, the project aims to ensure the integration of national air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons. Furthermore, the experience gained from the Özgür Project will be incorporated into the advanced jet trainer and light attack aircraft HÜRJET, and Milli Muharip Uçak (MMU or National Combat Aircraft) fighter development projects. An F-16C Block 30 has been used as the prototype aircraft in the project, and the upgrade of the remaining Block 30 fighters is on the agenda.

Another major improvement of the F-16 fleet is the Structural Modernization Program, under a contract signed in 2015. The project covers structural improvement work to increase the service life of 35 F-16C/D Block 30 aircraft. With this modernization, the service life of the F-16C/D Block 30 aircraft is planned to be extended from 8,000 to 12,000 hours.

What is the F-16V?

The F-16V is the latest version of the F-16 Fighting Falcon family. The aircraft incorporates several improvements over the previous model – the most important of which is the new radar, named AN/APG-83. The AN/APG-83 is an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which does not have any moving mechanical parts unlike its predecessors. AESA radars offer greater detection and tracking ranges, and are capable of tracking multiple targets compared to mechanical pulse-Doppler radars.

In addition to the AESA radar, the F-16V is equipped with a modern commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)-based avionics subsystem; a large-format, high-resolution cockpit display; and a high-volume, high-speed data bus. The flight control system is enhanced by an Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto GCAS) to prevent crashes in case the pilot loses control due to blackout, which usually occurs during agile maneuvers. The service life of the aircraft has also increased from 8,000 flight hours to 12,000, thanks to structural improvements.

The F-16V is offered as a new production aircraft and an upgrade package to existing F-16s. Taiwan is the first customer of the F-16V solution as the country signed a $1.85 billion contract with the U.S. in 2012 to upgrade 142 F-16A/Bs. Singapore, South Korea, and Morocco signed contracts to upgrade their F-16s to the F-16V standard. The latest customer for the F-16V upgrade is Greece, which will have 84 of its F-16C/Ds modernized under an agreement signed with the U.S. in late 2019.

In addition to upgrade projects, there have been several contracts for newly built F-16Vs: a total of 149 F-16Vs have been ordered by Bahrain, Bulgaria, Morocco, the Philippines, Slovakia, and Taiwan. A heavily modified F-16V, designated as F-21, is being offered to India.

Turkey’s F-16V request

According to press reports, Turkey submitted a letter of request (LOR) to the U.S. government on September 30, 2021 for the acquisition of 40 F-16V aircraft and kits to upgrade 80 aircraft to the F-16V configuration.

The LOR is a document prepared by the customer government and submitted to the U.S. government to initiate the formal procedure under the Foreign Military Sales procurement system, which is one of the U.S. arms sales schemes. The LOR defines the requirement of the recipient government, the number and type of the weapon platform or system that is desired to be purchased, and the administrative details.

The preparation and submission of the LOR does not guarantee the sale per se, but it is important to note that during its preparation, militaries and bureaucracy from both sides work together, confer, and discuss the general content of the letter. Therefore, the submission of the LOR for the F-16Vs implies that some military/technical discussion between the Turkish and United States’ militaries had taken place.

So, why has Turkey asked for F-16s from the U.S. that previously denied the delivery of F-35 next-generation combat aircraft and imposed sanctions on it?

The procedure’s next milestone is the approval by the U.S. government and congress. Subject to many factors – most of which are political – upon getting congressional approval, the U.S. Department of Defense will prepare a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA), which can be described as a contract. Therefore, the F-16V request will be a stress test for the relationship between Turkey and U.S., which has already been extremely strained for the past few years.

So, why has Turkey asked for F-16s from the U.S. that previously denied the delivery of F-35 next-generation combat aircraft and imposed sanctions on it? There are two main factors that resulted in this request.