F
ollowing Viktor Orbán’s defeat, the elections held in Hungary attracted considerable attention in Turkey. Various predictions were made based on election assessments and comparative analyses. Analyses comparing the election winner, Péter Magyar, with Orbán, in particular, interpreted the election results through classic dichotomies, such as democracy versus authoritarianism, liberal democracy versus populism, and the right versus the far right.
However, regrettably, many of these analyses relied on these clichéd distinctions and interpretations. Furthermore, the post-liberal rise in Hungarian and international politics was analyzed from a liberal perspective, resulting in erroneous interpretations. Initial assessments such as the return of liberal democracy, the retreat of authoritarianism, and the defeat of the far right and populism demonstrate an inability to understand the true nature of the sociopolitical transformation occurring in Hungary and around the world.
The true significance of the Hungarian election results
The clearest conclusion to be drawn from the election results is that there is a significant crisis of legitimacy and trust within the political landscape, rather than an ideological shift. Orbán was defeated by another post-liberal figure who uses similar language, draws on the same social base, and shares a similar perception of the crisis. In other words, contrary to what is often assumed, the new prime minister, Magyar, is not so much a liberal democrat as he is another figure who largely represents the post-liberal current due to the rhetoric he employs and the ideological position he occupies. From this perspective, the Hungarian elections should not be viewed as a regime change or political transformation but rather as a renewal and cleansing of actors within post-liberalism itself.
More precisely, Orbán’s defeat and the winner’s profile do not, contrary to many interpretations, signify that the social demands he represented and championed have disappeared. On the contrary, the election results indicate that post-liberal tendencies persist, but the current government has lost its ability to represent these demands.
The most significant indicator of this is that the dynamics underpinning the post-liberal quest remain firmly in place. The inequalities brought about by neoliberalism, the uncertainties arising from technological transformation, and the perceived cultural disintegration caused by liberal democracy continue to generate a strong need for security and meaning across broad sections of society. People still expect a political stance that delivers public services and defends their own values.
For this reason, the election results should be interpreted as a rearticulation of the social demands represented by post-liberalism, despite the fact that these demands are being discredited with labels such as populism, authoritarianism, and far-right extremism. When Orbán’s political platform could no longer meet these expectations, the electorate did not abandon that platform. Instead, they chose a new leader whom they believed could represent it more effectively. Thus, the transformation witnessed in the Hungarian elections is more indicative of a crisis of representation being resolved than an ideological rupture. Society did not change its demands; it simply updated its choice of who would represent them.
Why did Orbán lose?
The real breaking point that led to Orbán losing his 16-year reign was not the depletion of his ideological framework. As the standard-bearer of the post-liberal movement, Orbán began contradicting his own claims. Over time, he formed a new power bloc to replace the “corrupt elites” he had criticized. This network, centered on the distribution of state resources, became the focal point of accusations of corruption and nepotism.
In foreign policy, however, his decision to replace the “corrupt EU,” which he claimed was victimizing the Hungarian people through liberal democratic impositions, opposing moral values, and neoliberal economic policies, with Putin’s Russia and Trump’s U.S. began to backfire. The hegemonic rhetoric of foreign policy suffered as a result of the increasing visibility and influence of Russia and the U.S. Indeed, anti-elitist rhetoric has lost credibility and is now perceived as merely anti-EU.
Furthermore, the deterioration in economic performance has accelerated this crisis of legitimacy. Financial pressures arising from high inflation, interventionist policies, and tensions with the EU have undermined the government’s claims of “stability” and a “protective state.” Consequently, the disconnect between rhetoric and material reality has become more apparent. Orbán, the champion of the post-liberal movement he defines as “illiberal democracy,” was unable to maintain the moral and political framework he had established. This has led to the collapse of his credibility, reliability, consistency, and moral superiority claims. All of this has driven centrist voters, who were already opposed to Orbán and predominantly reside in major cities, as well as peripheral voters, where Orbán traditionally enjoys a high concentration of support, to seek an alternative.
The political significance of Magyar
Péter Magyar’s rise and electoral victory are most significant at this juncture. Magyar is neither a radical alternative nor an outsider to the political discourse established by Orbán. However, it cannot be said that he has abandoned Orbán’s ideology and “found the right path,” as is often assumed. On the contrary, Magyar is a figure who speaks a similar language yet promises to anchor it within a more rational, balanced, and trustworthy framework.
What sets Magyar apart is his promise to rebuild the political ground represented by Orbán and sustain it more honestly and fairly. Consequently, Magyar is not a representative of a classical liberal restoration, and his frequent emphasis on the rule of law should not be interpreted as such. He neither abandons the idea of a strong nation-state within the post-liberal framework nor entirely abandons the space for debate and politics of self-valorization opened up by the Orbán era. Instead, Magyar promises to embed post-liberalism and politics of self-valorization within a more rational, institutionalized, and sustainable framework. In this respect, Magyar does not aim to abandon the “post-liberal” approach t rather to fulfill their requirements honestly and successfully. Thus, the political significance of Peter Magyar should not be assessed as an ideological break in Hungarian politics but rather as a recalibration of the same line.
Taking all this into account, Magyar can essentially be described as the leader of a populist initiative that takes the form of “anti-Orbánism.” His strategy is based on an anti-corruption narrative and the idea of “cleansing the state of a handful of corrupt Orbánist elites.” This is a powerful manifestation of populism. By projecting an ethical stance, Magyar positions himself as a central figure in rebuilding a legitimate and just order. This is precisely the area that was most eroded during Orbán’s tenure, and Magyar has succeeded in winning over peripheral voters with this approach.
The difference in approach toward relations with the EU is also a significant indicator of anti-Orbánist populism in foreign policy. Unlike Orbán, who sometimes relies on a confrontational rhetorical style, Magyar aligns more closely with the principle of “a strong Hungary, a strong Europe” as a European nation. This approach largely stems from the perspective that Europe’s strategic autonomy is achievable through strong nation-states, which is somewhat anti-Russian and anti-American. Consequently, while Magyar’s ideology is similar to Orbán’s, his practical policies diverge.
The picture that emerges within this framework clearly demonstrates the following: Magyar embraces post-liberalism and promises to rescue it from Orbán’s grasp, purify it, and rebuild it through discipline. While preserving the mobilization generated by populism, Magyar aims to rebuild the institutional and economic foundations eroded by Orbán. In this respect, Magyar represents a more refined, accountable, and enduring version of post-liberalism. He seeks to reinforce this by upholding the same social sensitivities through the rule of law, institutional balance, and economic rationality.
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Lessons from Hungarian elections
The assessment that the Hungarian elections carry significance far beyond a mere change in national-level government is valid. The results clearly highlight the limitations of current analytical frameworks that attempt to interpret today’s political trends. The long-dominant dichotomies of “liberalism versus authoritarianism” or “democracy versus populism” are clearly losing their explanatory power. They are giving way to a far more complex and layered division.
The true axis of this division can be defined as follows: post-liberals who maintain their credibility and moral standing, and those who have turned into their own enemies and are beginning to rot from within. Hungary’s example clearly demonstrates that societies are not backing down from criticizing liberal values and the liberal order. On the contrary, the post-liberal demand centered on meaning, security, and identity—in short, self-valorization—continues to thrive. However, this demand cannot be satisfied by powerful rhetoric or cultural mobilization alone.
In this context, the Hungarian elections demonstrate that the sustainability of post-liberal politics in the new era hinges on three fundamental, interlinked conditions. First, moral consistency is paramount. Actors must not reproduce the forms of corruption they criticize or transform into them. Second, the problem of institutional balance must be resolved. The concentration of power necessary for strong governance must be anchored in a manageable and accountable framework, which is essential for fair sustainability. Third, the expansion of economic performance capacity and its institutionalization are of vital importance. Economic stability, the ability to produce tangible outcomes, and the capacity to disseminate them to the grassroots are indispensable for garnering popular support. Any erosion in these three areas can rapidly undermine the social foundation upon which post-liberal governments rely. The Hungarian elections have demonstrated just how crucial these dynamics are in a post-liberal context.
Contrary to popular belief, however, the Hungarian elections do not represent a victory for liberal democracy or a retreat of authoritarianism. What has transpired signals the beginning of a new, more mature phase of post-liberal politics. Orbán’s defeat reveals that the post-liberal ground he represented has become unsustainable under his leadership and will be replaced by a more reliable and untarnished actor. From this perspective, in countries where post-liberalism prevails—including Turkey—traditional political alignments are losing their meaning. Political competition is beginning to take shape around which actor can best represent post-liberal expectations and the politics of self-valorization in a credible, balanced, and sustainable manner.





