Turkey's Greece Policy: Impact on the Balance of Power in the Aegean
The deterioration of relations between Turkey and Greece, especially since 2016, has led to serious tensions over existing core issues in the Aegean.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan meets with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Photo by Anadolu Images.
D
evelopments in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, which surround Turkey’s 4,000-kilometer coastline and over which Turkey has sovereign rights, are of great importance to Turkey. In light of recent developments in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, predictions of possible developments in 2024 are also important in this regard. In the recent past, Turkey has shown a determined attitude in defending its sovereign rights in the seas and airspace of these two important regions.
In the Aegean Sea, Turkey has maintained its stance against Greece’s expansion of its territorial waters and the arming of the Eastern Aegean islands, as well as its legal position on the delimitation of the continental shelf. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey has continued its actions to protect its continental shelf rights and to protect the rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). At the same time, Turkey has sought to improve its bilateral relations with Greece, Egypt, and Israel. As a result, local tensions stemming from fundamental problems in both the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean have decreased significantly.
This analysis will focus on whether there are threats to this positive trend in 2024, especially after Israel’s ongoing attacks on Gaza that began in early October 2023 and possible Turkish positions vis-à-vis such threats.
Turkey’s Approach to the Aegean Problems in the Recent Past
The deterioration of relations between Turkey and Greece, especially since 2016, has led to serious tensions over existing core issues in the Aegean. Issues such as the arming of the Eastern Aegean islands and Greece’s national airspace have led to concrete frictions. In early 2021, consultative talks between the two countries resumed, but they were broken off after only three rounds. Greece’s efforts to persuade the U.S. to take a position against Turkey led to the suspension of all talks, including high-level ones.
However, both countries are aware of the fact that even if bilateral problems cannot be solved, as neighbors, it is necessary to ensure that bilateral relations remain good. Even at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11-12, 2023, President Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis met and agreed to activate several channels of communication between the two countries and to initiate a High-Level Cooperation Council at the level of heads of state or ministers.
Another positive development is the economic diplomacy initiatives, or “Positive Agenda” meetings, which started in April 2021 with an agreement between Foreign Ministers Çavuşoğlu and Dendias in Ankara. These initiatives made progress after the disasters experienced by both countries and paved the way for new areas of cooperation in the economic context. An important step in this positive process was the visit of Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis to Turkey on September 5, 2023. During the visit, a meeting was held with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara.
Turkey’s strong will to continue the dialogue process is as important as the concrete steps envisaged for the dialogue process. Minister Fidan stated that Turkey is ready to continue the dialogue without preconditions and to develop relations in all fields on the basis of common interests. He went on to say that the revival of the dialogue channels and high-level contacts is a positive development, and that there is a will to continue it.
The talks continued and on September 20, President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Mitsotakis met at the Turkevi Center in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. In an official statement, the two leaders reaffirmed the current positive climate in Turkey-Greece relations and their determination to maintain it. As part of the Positive Agenda dialogue between Turkey and Greece, delegations led by Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Ambassador Burak Akçapar and Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantinos Fragogiannis met in Athens on October 16. This was the fifth meeting on the Joint Action Plan under the Positive Agenda between the two countries.
Another important development was the first Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) meeting between the armed forces, which was hosted by the Ministry of National Defense in Ankara on November 13, 2023. During the meeting, both sides agreed to resume and implement the previously agreed CBMs throughout 2024.
Finally, President Erdoğan’s visit to Athens on December 7, 2023 marked the first meeting of the Turkey-Greece High-Level Cooperation Council in almost seven years since its inception in 2010. The fourth meeting of the Turkey-Greece High-Level Cooperation Council was last held in Izmir on March 8, 2016.
During his visit to Athens, President Erdoğan met with Greek President Sakelaropoulou and Prime Minister Mitsotakis. The official statements following the talks indicate that, as expected, mainly Positive Agenda items were discussed and progress was made. At the end of the talks, the “Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good Neighborliness between Turkey and Greece” was issued. Some concrete decisions were also announced within the framework of the understanding stated in the Athens Declaration. Accordingly, the parties agreed to hold “continuous, constructive and meaningful” consultations on the basis of the specified “pillars.”
Another important stated intention was to continue “confidence-building measures,” including military measures, which would contribute to the elimination of unwarranted sources of tension and related risks. The parties undertook to refrain from any declaration, initiative, or action that would undermine this declaration or jeopardize the maintenance of peace and stability in their region.
Aegean Forecasts for 2024
Turkey’s position on sovereignty issues in the Aegean Sea will continue with the same determination. Indicative of this was Foreign Minister Fidan’s statement that Turkey’s rights in the Aegean Sea and the rights of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace and the Dodecanese Islands will be protected. It is clear from the official statements made before President Erdoğan’s visit to Athens that there was a “sovereignty issues are not up for discussion” approach on the Greek side. This essentially meant that the core issues could not be the subject of negotiations.
However, the main objective at this stage will be to maintain the moderate atmosphere in relations and strengthen the positive agenda. As President Erdoğan has stated, Turkey wants to conduct a process in which both sides will win. Although it was stated that the Athens Declaration would not be a binding international agreement for the parties in accordance with international law, the commitment to continue dialogue, good relations, and cooperation was expressed by stating that the letter of the document should not be violated.
There are some important expectations for the next period. The first is that the good atmosphere created between the two countries at the beginning of 2023 will now be transformed into a system of bilateral cooperation, and that the political dialogue and cooperation mechanisms will continue. As stated in the Athens Declaration, the parties are expected to avoid statements and attitudes that would complicate this process, and, even beyond that, to take steps to strengthen the process. The most important aspect of this process is that third parties, such as the U.S. and the EU, should not be allowed to undermine it.
The second expectation is to resume the process of consultative talks in order to resolve the main issues that cause tension between the two countries. The question of when it would be appropriate to start this process can be evaluated separately; however, in order to achieve results, it is important that the process start at a stage that is free from elements that could disrupt or stop it again.
President Erdoğan’s proposal, just before his visit to Athens, that “not only the delimitation of the continental shelf, but all Aegean problems should be taken to the International Court of Justice” is of great importance. This proposal both negates Turkey’s allegations that it “does not abide by the law” and forces Greece to change its “single problem” approach that blocks the solution of the problems. President Erdoğan’s approach is expected to have important repercussions in the context of the solution of fundamental problems in the future.
Recently, Turkey has taken a harsh stance against Israel’s attacks on Gaza, which have been ongoing for the past two months. On the other hand, most EU countries, including Greece, and the U.S. have taken almost the opposite stance and supported Israel, creating an anti-Turkey atmosphere which has the potential to have an impact on Turkey-Greece relations as well.
Meanwhile, Greece’s skeptical and exaggerated “fear of Turkey” persists. Even a routine statement by Foreign Minister Fidan that Turkey’s rights in the Aegean Sea and the rights of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace and the Dodecanese Islands will be protected was presented as a matter of concern in the Greek press. In the coming period, such situations threaten to have a negative impact on bilateral relations, which have been progressing with a positive agenda.
Recent Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean
There are a significant number of countries that border the Eastern Mediterranean and are, therefore, parties to delimitation disputes. These are Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, Greece (because of some of its islands), and the Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC).
A number of bilateral maritime delimitation agreements have been concluded in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first step in the process of bilateral agreements was taken by the SCGA and Egypt with their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) delimitation agreement on February 17, 2003. This was followed by the Lebanon-GCASC EEZ delimitation treaty on January 17, 2007; the Israel-GCASC EEZ delimitation treaty on December 17, 2010; the Turkey-TRNC Continental Shelf delimitation treaty on September 21, 2011; and the Turkey-Libya EEZ delimitation treaty on November 27, 2019. The most recent addition was the Delimitation Treaty between Greece and Egypt signed on August 6, 2020.
The year 2022-2023 saw a number of new gas discoveries in Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt. Although the discoveries are not at the level of the largest discoveries in the region, such as Egypt’s Zohr field or Israel’s Leviathan field, new reserves close to existing production infrastructure could boost natural gas exports from the Eastern Mediterranean. In particular, this increases the chances that Greek Cyprus will be able to export gas.
On the other hand, a consortium led by TotalEnergies plans to drill in the first quarter of this year, paving the way for the resumption of offshore exploration in Lebanon. Companies in the region plan to continue drilling in 2024. The agreement reached in late October 2022 to resolve the maritime dispute between Israel and Lebanon opened the possibility for Israel to begin production at the Karish field, located on Israel’s northern maritime border with Lebanon.
An important recent development for Turkey has been the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt, and Turkey and Israel, up until the October 2023 flare-up in Gaza. Although Egypt has not yet signed a maritime border treaty with Turkey, the maritime jurisdiction agreement signed between Greece and Egypt in August 2020 was the first indication of the search for rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo. The fact that Egypt’s agreement with Athens takes into account the southern border of Turkey’s continental shelf to a certain extent satisfied the Turkish side.
This development was followed by meetings between the intelligence services of the two countries, meetings between foreign ministry officials in Ankara and Cairo, a phone call between the foreign ministers of the two countries, and finally the handshake between President Erdoğan and Egyptian President Sisi at the opening match of the 2022 World Cup in Qatar.
Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited Egypt on April 13, 2023 and met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, who stated that the momentum of the relations continues and that they want to write success stories in the new page opened. Finally, the two countries appointed ambassadors in July 2023.
After the Israeli attacks on Gaza, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Cairo. He stated that the two countries share a common history and deep-rooted ties, and that efforts would be made to improve relations further.
Over the past two years, Turkey and Israel have made efforts to repair their relations. Israeli President Isaac Herzog paid an official visit to Turkey on March 9-10, 2023 at the invitation of President Erdoğan. The visit was the first by a head of state from Israel since 2007. Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu then visited Israel on May 25, 2022, marking the first official visit from Turkey to Israel at the foreign minister level in 15 years. Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid visited Turkey on June 23, 2022. Israeli Minister of Economy and Industry Orna Barbivay visited Turkey on October 18-19, 2022, and Israeli Defense Minister Benjamin (Benny) Gantz visited Turkey on October 26-27, 2022, at the invitation of Defense Minister Hulusi Akar. Israeli Tourism Minister Yoel Razvozov visited Turkey on November 7-9, 2022 to participate in the “WOCE22: IATA Wings of Change” event.
In late September 2023, President Erdoğan received Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in New York for the UN General Assembly. Erdoğan later told the press that Netanyahu may visit Turkey in October or November, which would be followed by a return visit.
Emphasizing that Turkey and Israel cooperate in many fields, President Erdoğan said, “It is a fact that there are new areas of cooperation… It is also known that Israel is trying to transport its resources to Europe. The most rational way is to transport these resources to Europe through Turkey.” Erdoğan emphasized that there is an opportunity for cooperation between the two countries in terms of drilling activities, and that the parties are negotiating details such as the route, schedule, and drilling areas.
However, Turkey has naturally reacted and continues to react strongly to Israel’s attacks on Gaza following October 7, 2023, which have caused unprecedented humanitarian devastation. President Erdoğan has frequently stated that Netanyahu’s government is acting like a terrorist state, and is committing serious war crimes and even genocide in Gaza.
Assessments for the Eastern Mediterranean in 2024
In terms of interstate problems, the Eastern Mediterranean has some important differences from the Aegean. First, there is only one fundamental problem in the Eastern Mediterranean: unlike the Aegean Sea, in the Eastern Mediterranean, there are no problems such as the arming of islands or the national airspace problem, but only the continental shelf-EEZ delimitation problem. The second difference is the multiplicity of parties to the delimitation problems in the Eastern Mediterranean as the parties to the problem are not only Greece and Turkey, but also Egypt, Israel, Libya, the TRNC, and the Greek Cypriot administration. Third, while the delimitation issue in the Aegean is somewhat frozen, continental shelf activities are ongoing in the Eastern Mediterranean, which continues to cause some tension on the ground.
While in the Aegean Sea there is a process of negotiation and dialogue between Greece and Turkey, albeit interrupted from time to time, in the Eastern Mediterranean there is no process of dialogue between the parties on relations or problem solving. The abovementioned delimitation agreements in the Eastern Mediterranean have not been accepted by all parties. On the other hand, there are agreements such as those between Turkey-Greece, Turkey-Egypt, and Turkey-Syria, which have not yet been concluded and require conclusion.
One of the most important issues is how to build gas transportation facilities. In recent years, the conventional wisdom on LNG exports from the region has been that Egypt’s liquefaction capacity is the most viable route. However, in the longer term, new export routes are likely to emerge, and the most important consideration is whether this will be through a route involving Turkey. Following the Israeli attacks on Gaza and the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, new approaches that exclude Turkey, such as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, can also be expected.
Although it is not clear how Israel’s attacks on Gaza and Turkey’s harsh reaction will affect relations between the two countries, it is certain that Turkey will take a firm stance in the face of attempts to marginalize it, as it has done in previous periods.
