Washington’s Allies? Japan, Germany and South Korea
Japan, Germany and South Korea are strikingly similar in terms of their relations with the US hegemonic order.
Japanese Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi (L), and South Korea’s Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back review the troops during a ceremony at the headquarters of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Yokosuka District, south of Tokyo, on Friday, January 30, 2026. Photo by Anadolu Images.
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series of photographs recently circulated in the global public sphere once again laid bare a reality that is well-known but rarely spoken of. Japan Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to the US provided the backdrop for scenes that have sparked much debate in Japan. The fact that the images of Takaichi dancing at a dinner party were featured prominently on the White House’s official website caused a shockwave across the country.
However, the real issue was not the dancing footage, but the psychological subservience displayed by the Japanese delegation throughout the visit. Whilst defending his decision not to inform allies in advance of the Iran operation, Trump remarked, “Who knows better about surprise than Japan?”, alluding to the surprise air raid on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor during the Second World War. Takaichi’s silence in the face of this mocking attitude drew criticism.
Her description of the leader of a country that had dropped atomic bombs on their cities as the only person “who can achieve peace across the world” was viewed by the Japanese public as a humiliating situation. What has transpired is not merely the result of a single act of diplomatic discourtesy or individual lack of judgement. Rather, these events represent the manifestation of a dependency relationship, woven thread by thread since 1945, brought into the open by a current incident.
From defeat to ‘alliance’
With the end of the Second World War, the US, acting as a hegemonic power, initiated a profound process of restructuring in both Japan and Germany. This process was framed as support for democratization and economic development. In reality, however, a structural control mechanism was established over both countries that surpassed even the most refined forms of colonialism.
The picture is striking when looking at the Japanese example. The constitution drafted under US supervision in 1947 stripped Japan of its right to maintain armed forces and declare war. Theoretically, this was presented to the Japanese people as a peace-oriented arrangement. In practice, however, it transformed Japan into a state that had to hand over its defense entirely to the US and seek Washington’s approval in every political crisis. Today, there are over 50,000 US troops and approximately fifty bases on Japanese territory. This military presence resembles not forces deployed in an allied country for the sake of shared interests, but rather a guarantee force stationed by a hegemon to secure its own sphere of influence.
Germany’s situation is, in essence, no different. Divided by the four major powers following the Second World War, Germany was reorganized as West Germany under the NATO umbrella, with every step of this reorganization subject to Washington’s approval. Even today, there are approximately 35,000 American troops in Germany. In this respect, Germany is not much different from Japan. The fact that Germany’s efforts to construct a natural gas pipeline with Russia (the Nord Stream project) were derailed by US pressure has laid this reality bare. The sabotage and explosion of the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 have also starkly revealed just how harsh and ruthless this dynamic operates.
The illusion of sovereignty: From economic miracle to compliant growth
The post-war economic rise of both countries serves as a kind of veil for their relationship of dependency. Japan’s economic miracle and Germany’s ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ were achieved not in spite of the structural constraints these countries faced, but precisely because of the safeguards those constraints provided. The US’s open market provided a vast area for these countries’ exports; the security umbrella established against the Soviet threat, meanwhile, enabled these states to keep defense spending to a minimum, thereby allowing them to redirect resources towards industrial investment.
This was not a gift, but a transaction. In return, Japan and Germany relinquished their ability to make strategic decisions independently; they often had to subordinate their national interests to Washington’s global agenda, and at times were compelled to accept policies that entailed heavy economic costs. The Plaza Accord, which Japan signed under US pressure in the late 1980s, demonstrated just how heavy the price of this acquiescence could be. What befell the Japanese Prime Minister is also the result of this semi-colonial dependency, systematically cultivated over many years.
Window-dressing democracy: How was South Korea polished up?
Following Japan and Germany, another country we must address here is South Korea. Frankly, South Korea is in no way inferior to these nations. The 1950–53 Korean War was the first major proxy war of the Cold War. In the North, there was a communist regime backed by the Soviet Union and China; in the South, an authoritarian government supported by the US. With the end of the war, South Korea was transformed into the Western bloc’s most advanced outpost in the region. The buffer role of preventing communism from spreading south resulted in South Korea being presented on the international stage as a representative of the democratic and free world, regardless of what transpired in its domestic politics.
Yet South Korea’s recent political history stands in stark contrast to this portrayal. From 1961 to 1979, the country was ruled by Park Chung-hee’s military junta, which systematically suppressed left-wing tendencies, trade unions and the opposition. Following his assassination in 1979, another military coup took place, and Chun Doo-hwan carried out the Gwangju massacre in 1980. This massacre was largely ignored in the West, with the US administration playing a decisive role in covering up the events.
Despite this sordid past, South Korea continues to be presented by the West as a success story of Asian democracy.
Just how unfounded this privileged international perception of South Korea is has become even more apparent in recent years with a succession of scandals. In 2016, the then-President Park Geun-hye was removed from office and put on trial on charges of accepting millions of dollars in bribes from major corporations to influence state decisions. While this scandal laid bare the corruption of business world-political relations, the arrest of the Samsung Group chairman also exposed the intertwined nature of business and politics. Yet, these scandals have been presented to Western public opinion as examples proving the strength of South Korea’s democracy and commitment to the rule of law, simply because they were brought to light. The President’s trial has been cited as proof that accountability mechanisms are functioning.
In December 2024, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared a state of emergency, characterizing opposition parties as representatives of anti-state forces. This move was declared invalid by parliament within hours, and the President was removed from office. These developments inevitably raise the question of how a leader in a country presented as a consolidated democracy could attempt such autocratic measures. On the other hand, despite all this, it is puzzling that South Korea’s position in the upper echelons of international organizations’ democracy indices remains unchanged. For the existential contrast with North Korea renders South Korea indispensable to the West. This indispensability, in turn, brings with it a systematic display designed to mask its weaknesses.
Allied burden-sharing
In summary, Japan, Germany and South Korea are strikingly similar in terms of their relations with the US hegemonic order. All three countries are governed not by their own state rationality, but by a conception of sovereignty shaped around US-originated external security guarantees. In all three countries, political elites who legitimise and perpetuate this dependency have been supported; those who challenge this structure have been marginalised or rendered ineffective by being co-opted into the system itself.
The recent increase in defence spending by these countries also signals a new phase in this relationship of dependency. The US National Defence Strategy, published in early 2026 and based on the ‘Burden Sharing’ doctrine, has declared that Washington will no longer cover the full cost of its allies’ security. Under this doctrine, allies are required to aim for a new and significantly higher threshold of 5 per cent of GDP for defence spending. This pressure to share the burden has led to the approval of record defence budgets in Japan, Germany and South Korea. These budget increases have aimed to reinforce these countries’ roles as subcontractors, thereby alleviating the US’s military burden in the region. On the other hand, the US has remained the primary supplier of these increased defence expenditures. The record allocation of 9 trillion yen (58 billion dollars) in Japan’s 2026 budget has been earmarked for American Tomahawk missiles, hypersonic missiles and unmanned defence systems.
The cost of significant democratic and economic gains
Ultimately, one must not overlook the fact that these countries have achieved significant democratic and economic gains through their own internal dynamics. However, it is a misconception to believe that these countries’ international statuses are solely the result of these achievements. Germany’s inability to independently determine its own energy policy, Japan’s having very limited authority over forces stationed on its own territory, and South Korea being presented as a shining example of democracy despite the political crises it faces. All of these are different outcomes of the same relationship. The most entrenched illusion of sovereignty today is that the line between being an ally and being a dependent or semi-colonial state is an ambiguous boundary that the hegemonic power can draw as it pleases, in accordance with its own interests.
