New Architecture of Regionalization in the International System?
The U.S.'s new selective and cost-transfer-based security approach has affected security dynamics in the Caucasus in three ways.
Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov arrives to attend the Meeting of the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of SCO Member States at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, July 15, 2025.
Photo by Anadolu Images.
T
he normative and institutional fractures that have emerged in the international system alongside the United States’ neo-hegemonic orientation have significantly increased the capacity of regional powers to develop autonomous strategies. This trend is not based solely on the search for a balance of power; it also paves the way for the redefinition of soft power elements such as historical ties, shared identities and cultural norms. In the coming period, regionalization is expected to take on a multi-layered character along the security-economy-norm axis.
This article examines how the United States’ neo-hegemonic foreign policy has triggered unique regionalization dynamics in different sub-regions of the global system. In the past, we identified that the transition from the role of “founding hegemon” to the model of “selective hegemon” in U.S. foreign policy after 2025 is characterized by the financialization of alliances, selective disengagement, conditional or unconditional proxy relationships, and a leadership vacuum in global public goods.
This transition process has transformed the international system into a form of ‘order within disorder,’ both accelerating and diversifying regionalization trends. However, these trends cannot be explained solely by the logic of power balance; historical memory, cultural identity, and normative values are decisive factors shaping the strategic choices of regional powers.
Economic and security interests, ideological and cultural factors
Therefore, in the post-neo-hegemonic era, regionalization emerges as a multi-layered process intertwining economic and security interests with ideological and cultural factors. The U.S. now appears to be inclined to conduct political processes with powerful states in its region rather than dealing with non-state and/or state-forming subgroups. However, the reliability of this political course and, consequently, its sustainability are, of course, open to debate.
In this context, the article examines the regions of Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia (Turkistan) separately, analyzing the context of neo-hegemony, normative (cultural-historical) elements, current regional power behaviors, and possible short-, medium-, and long-term developments.
The goal is to comprehensively reveal the regional reflections of the ‘disorder within order’ period from both a comparative and region-specific perspective. Since our next article will directly address Turkey, the contexts have been determined with brief transitions in specific places in the current article, and the expanded strategic context has been left for later.
Europe: Strategic autonomy, two-track security and normative leadership
The neo-sovereigntist U.S. approach has produced three results in Europe in the name of regionalization, the first of which is the financialization of alliances. The linking of NATO burden-sharing to financial targets has brought the U.S. security umbrella closer to a ‘security rent’ (pay-as-you-go) logic. The second is the institutionalization of the economy-security nexus. The intertwining of commercial/technological issues with defense in transatlantic relations has opened the door to the equation of ‘security in exchange for market access/preferential tariffs.’ Thirdly, there is the selective disengagement in Europe. The discourse on supply security and digital sovereignty in critical technologies (semiconductors, EDA software, rare earths) has directly linked the EU’s internal market regulations and industrial policies to the security agenda.
Regional states have continued to develop separate policies, influenced by normative factors. France has developed policies based on strategic autonomy and independent nuclear deterrence against the United States, following in the footsteps of de Gaulle, while Germany has acted in accordance with the logic of post-World War II passivity and limited power, but has undergone a gradual transformation (especially after 2022) with the Zeitenwende, a speech addressed to Olaf Scholz by the Bundestag. At the same time, France and Germany continue their initiatives within the framework of European defense industry consolidation through PESCO, EDF and joint platforms (land systems, air/missile defense), while managing crises at certain levels in Africa and the Mediterranean region.
Poland and the Baltic states, on the other hand, wish to maintain their security dependence on the United States due to their sensitivity to sovereignty and the perceived threat from Russia. In this context, bilateral defense agreements with the United States have been deepened, and investments have been made in high-readiness land and air assets. The EU, on the other hand, is losing its political common voice on a daily basis and is being negatively affected by this new wave of regionalization. The fragmentation that began with the Brexit process appears likely to continue due to the misguided and ineffective policies pursued during the Russia-Ukraine War.
The reflections of this ongoing wave of regionalization for Europe may be expected to develop the autonomous capacity (industrial/operational) of Western Europe in the short term and strengthen the ties of Eastern Europe with the United States. In the medium term, bilateral security clubs (e.g., air-missile defense, UAV/anti-UAV, maritime security) may progress more permanently, and in the long term, if the EU’s institutional continuity is maintained, it may transform into functional institutionalization according to crises and regions (e.g., one member country being responsible/relevant for the EU’s Middle East policies).
Caucasus: Geopolitical crossroads and energy corridor
The U.S.’s new selective and cost-transfer-based security approach has affected security dynamics in the Caucasus in three ways; the first is conditional support. Since it has become clear that Georgia’s goal of NATO membership will not be realized and that conflicts will continue, the U.S. has linked its security assistance to regional stability. The recent agreement signed between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the United States regarding the Zangezur Corridor is the most recent example of this.
The second aspect is the energy-security nexus. Europe’s policy of reducing its dependence on Russian gas has strengthened Azerbaijan’s role as an energy corridor, while the United States’ economic incentives have begun to be directly linked to security agreements. The third issue is the transformation of the regional power balance. Turkey’s unconditional support during the 44-day war, which ended in Azerbaijan’s victory, has called into question Russia’s role as a guarantor in the region.
While developing policies in this new order, the countries of the region have sought to transform the norms they have brought from the past and develop new forms of relations. In the post-independence period, Azerbaijan has made the emphasis on ‘territorial integrity’ in Karabakh a fundamental state policy within a normative framework that integrates energy diplomacy with the identity of the ‘Turkic world.’
Through defense industry integration with Turkey, energy trade, and ongoing joint projects in many areas, it has solidified its undisputed position in the South Caucasus. Thanks to the Zangezur Corridor, it has developed trade routes around the Caspian Sea while also occupying a central position in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Armenia turning to the West
Armenia, on the other hand, has accelerated its efforts to turn to the West due to its weakening security ties with Russia, while also seeking to strengthen its relations with the U.S. and the E.U., particularly Turkey. Georgia appears to have shelved its goal of NATO membership, but it has entered into efforts centered on Black Sea security while developing its trade relations with the E.U. Although Russia appears to be losing its influence in the Caucasus, which it traditionally considers its immediate neighborhood, it still maintains its sphere of influence in certain areas through local partnerships and ownership of mining companies.
In the Caucasus, Azerbaijan’s role in energy supply security is expected to strengthen in the short term, while defense industry partnerships may develop alongside energy agreements with the U.S. At the same time, in the medium term, strengthening land connections with Turkey within the framework of the Zangezur Corridor could enhance the geopolitical importance of the Turkic States Organization (TSO) as an effective transit route for China’s middle corridor and its logistics chain. In the long term, functional regionalization could take place through regional organizations (TDT, GUAM), and multi-layered structures could emerge in the fields of trade and technology as well as military cooperation.
Middle East: Regime security and identity-based regionalization
The U.S.’s unconditional support for Israel and its conditional/paid security approach to the region has produced three results, the first of which is the search for multiple guarantors in the Gulf. Gulf countries have developed multi-vector relationships with the United Kingdom/France in defense, with China in economy and technology, and with Russia in nuclear and energy fields, in addition to the United States.
The second is the creation of security mechanisms in small clubs. These include air defense networks, protection of maritime routes (Red Sea-Hormuz), and UAV/anti-UAV cooperation. The third is issue-based relationship modelling. This situation can be exemplified by Turkey, Egypt and Gulf countries moving closer to common policies on energy, the Eastern Mediterranean, humanitarian aid for Gaza and Syria.
While the region generally shows that normative elements are reflected in the policies of states, serious survival problems arise when actions are taken ‘outside these norms.’ Regime security is ensured by the legitimacy of family ties such as royalty/dynasty/tribe/clan, and foreign policy moves are advanced with this legitimacy. The Sunni-Shia rivalry and the Palestinian issue have become the most important lines of division in the Islamic world, and sectarian and identity-based divisions have deepened. The historical responsibility of the Ottoman Empire seems to have been taken on by Turkey today in the form of crisis management and mediation, carrying on the legacy of peace in the region.
A multi-alliance policy
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing a multi-alliance policy, developing relations with the U.S./U.K./France in the defense sector and with China in the technology and energy finance sectors, while striving to stabilize prices through OPEC+. At the same time, joint UAV and air defense system production is being carried out through defense industry funds. Iran, on the other hand, is accelerating its missile/UAV production to ensure deterrence, while seeking to establish areas of influence through Shiism and secure economic gains through Asia.
Israel, with the political, economic and military support of the United States, has bloodied the region and embarked on an effort to achieve its so-called national security through qualitative military superiority and pre-emptive intervention.
Egypt and Qatar, meanwhile, are developing policies in the areas of maritime security, mediation, and finance. Turkey has strengthened its influence in the region as a balancing factor, both through its historical legacy of peace and its status as a NATO member. At the same time, Turkey is implementing developments such as border security around Syria and Iraq, exports in the defense industry with the Gulf and Africa, and humanitarian aid, prisoner exchanges in Gaza, and a grain corridor between Russia and Ukraine through its mediation role.
Considering the region’s century-long environment of unrest and conflict, in the short term, Turkey’s cooperation with Gulf countries in particular will accelerate in the commercial and security fields; in the medium term, a multi-guarantor structure will be institutionalized within the framework of the U.S., China and Turkey; and in the long term, the regime security of certain states may strengthen on a more regional scale.
Central Asia (Turkistan): Logistical bridge and multi-balance
Turkistan is a geopolitical gateway that has had to strike a delicate balance between the sovereignty-building efforts of states that gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and competition among major powers. The security architecture that took shape in the early 1990s based on dependence on Moscow has taken on a multipolar appearance since the mid-2000s with China’s economic and infrastructure projects. Today, the neo-sovereigntist approach pursued by the United States at the global level is indirectly reflected in Turkistan, placing the region at the center of new bargaining areas based on both economic and security considerations.
Although the United States’ direct military presence is limited in the context of neo-hegemony, its influence in the region after its withdrawal from Afghanistan is particularly felt through security cooperation and energy equations. The United States’ priority is to break Russia and China’s absolute dominance in the region and turn Central Asia into a ‘strategic balancing belt.’ However, the countries in the region are not stuck in this three-way competition; they have also taken into account common language, religion and historical ties in their alliance choices, thus bringing the Organization of Turkic States (Turkish: TDT) and, of course, Turkey to the fore. Within the context of this normative bond, the national gains of the countries in the region cannot be ignored, because Turkey is at the center of every project that passes through Turkistan on its way to Europe.
While the countries of the region were cautious about external dependence in the past, they were unable to show sufficient resistance, but the networks of relations formed through language, religion and historical unity have institutionalized and transformed into the TDT, thus developing this resistance. Kazakhstan continues to pursue a multi-faceted foreign policy strategy, maintaining economic and security ties with Russia while signing major infrastructure projects with China through the Belt and Road Initiative.
The United States’ neo-hegemonic orientation
In conclusion, the normative and institutional fractures that have emerged in the international system alongside the United States’ neo-hegemonic orientation have significantly increased the capacity of regional powers to develop autonomous strategies. This trend is not based solely on the search for a balance of power; it also paves the way for the redefinition of soft power elements such as historical ties, shared identities and cultural norms. As exemplified by the Organization of Turkic States in Central Asia, norm-based regional alliances both strengthen integration within their own ranks and provide strategic flexibility in the face of global actors.
In the coming period, regionalization is expected to take on a multi-layered character along the security-economy-norm axis. In the short term, regional powers will focus on managing existing security threats and diversifying their economic corridors. In the medium term, infrastructure integration, the institutionalization of trade networks, and the integration of cultural ties into diplomacy will come to the fore.
In the long term, it is likely that regional orders will produce their own normative standards within the fragmented structure of the global system and legitimize them in the international arena. Thus, the form of ‘disorder within order’ may give way to a flexible but more complex world order based on the multiple interaction areas of different regional centers.
(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)
The energy sector
Cooperation with the West in the energy sector, particularly oil and gas transportation across the Caspian Sea, has made Kazakhstan an important player in the Eurasian energy network. By emphasizing cultural identity within the TDT, it has contributed to institutional integration while also implementing joint economic projects in the region. Uzbekistan, which has pursued a more open and regionally cooperative foreign policy under Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has developed its relations with both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the TDT simultaneously. The Tashkent administration, which promotes intra-Turkestan integration, views trade corridors extending to South Asia via Afghanistan as a strategic opportunity.
Turkmenistan, despite its permanent neutrality policy, actively uses energy diplomacy, particularly in its natural gas exports to China and its efforts to integrate with South Asia through the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline. While maintaining a distance from Russia, it has an economic relationship with China. Kyrgyzstan is one of the countries with the strongest security ties to Russia; its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the presence of military bases reinforce this position. However, it is open to Chinese investment and continues to pursue policies aimed at Western development aid.
With the increasing competition among the major powers in the region, Russia-China competition may become more visible in the short term in the areas of security and infrastructure, while the U.S.’s recent position on the Zangezur Corridor may trigger its return to the region. The economic and political ties of the TDT may strengthen during this period. In the medium term, the logistics capacity of the middle corridor may increase, thereby strengthening non-Russian routes in Europe-Asia trade. The economic integration functions of the TDT may expand, and joint investment funds and customs cooperation mechanisms may become institutionalized.
In the long term, the TDT may become a cultural-economic bloc in Eurasia; its bargaining power in energy diplomacy and transportation networks may increase on a global scale. Russia’s influence in the region may gradually decline due to demographic and economic challenges. China’s influence, meanwhile, may institutionalize through dominance of economic networks, while local cultural resistance elements may form a counterweight in the normative sphere.
