The Origins of Terrorism in Mali and the Role of International Actors

T

he developments in North Africa have had a decisive impact on the current climate of instability in Mali. In this context, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s and continues to operate in the Sahel. A group of Tuareg fighters received military training under Gaddafi’s ‘Islamic Legion’ project in Libya and came to northern Mali following NATO’s 2011 operation in Libya. These fighters established the Azavad Liberation Movement (MNLA) organisation and rebelled against the Malian state. These are the most fundamental examples of this claim.

The Tuaregs, constituting around 10 per cent of Mali’s population, organised under the MNLA and demanded an autonomous state. In order to repel state forces in the north, they formed alliances with various radical organisations, including AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine. In March 2012, Amadou Toumani Touré, Mali’s president at the time, was overthrown in a coup by the army, who claimed that the government was unable to quell the rebellion.

The collapse of state institutions in the north enabled the MNLA to seize strategic centres such as Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. However, a dominant group within the MNLA that embraced a secular-nationalist ideology caused a deep split within the organisation. The MNLA subsequently withdrew from the alliance because its secular-nationalist ideology was incompatible with that of the other radical groups, and the MNLA entered into armed conflict with them. Following clashes that began in Gao, the radical groups eliminated the MNLA.

Initially pursuing a secular goal of independence, the insurgency turned into a terrorist threat dominated by jihadist Salafi ideology when radical groups advanced southwards to capture cities in central Mali. Amid increasing instability, the Malian government accepted Algeria’s comprehensive peace plan and signed a peace agreement with a coalition of independence movements in the Azawad region, including the MNLA. However, excluding radical groups from this coalition has allowed them to expand their influence and spread their control towards central Mali and neighbouring countries, such as Burkina Faso and Niger.

In 2017, the Sahel branch of AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Katiba Macina Front and al-Mourabitoun merged to form Jemaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Led by the Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, JNIM pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada following its formation. Since 2017, the organisation has increased its activities in the Sahel region, centred in Mali.

JNIM’s new strategy: Economic warfare

In landlocked Mali, which has a population of around 25 million, terrorist and violent acts that have been ongoing for over a decade reached a critical threshold in 2025. In recent months, the country has faced an intensifying siege as JNIM has cut off vital supply routes to the capital, Bamako. Moving beyond classic guerrilla tactics, JNIM has begun to target transport convoys and logistical routes, exploiting the state’s economic vulnerabilities.

In September 2025, JNIM announced a ban on fuel imports into Mali from Senegal, Mauritania, the Ivory Coast and Guinea, effectively aiming to isolate Bamako from the outside world. This embargo has led to one of the most serious crises in Mali’s history. JNIM militants have targeted fuel tankers and transport companies in the Kayes-Nioro corridor in the west of the country, destroying hundreds of tankers and cutting off the main roads connecting Mali to Mauritania and Senegal. This has effectively besieged the capital, Bamako. As a result of this economic blockade, fuel supplies to Bamako came to a standstill.

Additionally, JNIM has targeted gold and lithium mines operated by foreign investors, kidnapping foreign engineers and demanding high ransoms in exchange. The fuel blockade is part of JNIM’s evolving operational strategy, which now encompasses economic warfare. Rather than seizing the capital Bamako directly, JNIM aims to weaken the government in the eyes of the people by tightening the circle around the regime using economic tools. As a result of these attacks, the country has experienced fuel shortages, price increases, power cuts, and supply chain disruptions. These issues are having a paralyzing effect on daily life, creating both psychological and political pressure on the regime.

The governance gaps within the Malian state, coupled with the socio-economic and cultural divisions in the north and centre, have played a decisive role in JNIM’s rapid rise. The central authority’s inability to respond to the demands of rural areas in particular, coupled with the economic and social neglect of the population, has facilitated the establishment of shadow governance structures by JNIM. These structures have fuelled JNIM’s growing support and influence by forging local agreements with different sub-communities in Mali. Mali’s political turmoil in recent years has also deepened the security vacuum. Military coups in August 2020 and May 2021 brought Colonel Assimi Goita to power. Although the Goita regime promised to address security issues in the north of the country, it has not yet achieved this.

The role of international actors and failed security models

Since 2012, security measures, military operations and regional and international cooperation have played an important role in countering ongoing terrorist and violent acts by radical groups in Mali. In 2013, Mali requested assistance from France to counter the terrorist threat spreading southwards. France responded with Operation Serval in 2013. This operation later evolved into Operation Barkhane, which is centred in Chad and targets radical groups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It involves 3,000 personnel. This operation helped the Malian forces to recapture key cities.

However, large areas of the countryside remained outside state control, enabling armed groups to proliferate. Not only did the presence of French forces on the ground fail to end terrorism, it also led to growing resentment among the local population. Anti-French sentiment, stemming from the colonial past, fuelled a series of military coups in the region, particularly in Mali. The Goita regime expelled French and UN troops from Mali, claiming that France was violating the country’s sovereignty.

Following France’s failed military missions in Mali and its subsequent withdrawal from the region, this has presented both an opportunity and a challenge for Russia. Since 2021, the Wagner Group, a private military company with links to the Kremlin, has been operating in Mali, supporting counter-terrorism operations and internal security missions. The recapture of the symbolically important city of Kidal was initially regarded as a triumph for the Mali-Russia alliance. However, in July 2024, around 80 Russian mercenaries and 50 Malian soldiers were killed in an ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM near the Algerian border.

These developments demonstrate that the Malian army is facing serious challenges on the ground, despite receiving external support. Furthermore, reports that Ukraine may have shared intelligence with Tuareg forces against the Wagner Group highlight the increasingly complex and internationalised nature of the conflict in Mali. Following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin in mid-2023, the Russian presence in Mali was reorganised as the ‘African Corps’. However, Russian forces have largely withdrawn to their bases and have not succeeded in stopping radical groups from advancing across the country.

The regional security environment has deteriorated further following the 2023 coup in Niger. This has led to fragmentation within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES): a military and political alliance between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The AES was formed on 16 September 2023 through the Liptako-Gourma Charter. It was designed as a response to the West’s withdrawal from the region and the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS against military regimes. The AES aims to establish an alternative security architecture that is independent of Western influence and asserts ‘regional strategic autonomy’.

Since 2012, the collapse of state authority in northern Mali and the rise of radical movements have created an environment of insecurity that threatens the entire country. The Russian mercenary model, introduced as a replacement for France’s failed counter-terrorism strategy, has resulted in greater instability and increased civilian casualties, with terrorism now reaching the capital. This situation demonstrates that security crises cannot be resolved solely by military means or by relying on external actors. In the short and medium term, the most serious threat to Mali is the erosion of the state’s legitimacy and the strengthening of JNIM as an alternative authority. Mali’s return to lasting stability will only be possible through local solutions centred on inclusive governance, socio-economic development and regional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)