The Fragmentation of Europe: How Washington and Moscow Empower the Populist Right
The United States and Russia are the only remaining powers in a depleted Europe.
Supporters of the far right political group, Confederation, take part in an anti-immigration protest in Krakow, Poland on July 17, 2025. More than 70 anti-immigration protests take place all over the country, as Poland locked the border with Germany and Lithuania to control the illegal immigration. Photo by Anadolu Images.
T
he European populist right is distancing itself from its origins as it searches for its identity. In a sense, Europe is abandoning itself. Faced with mounting migratory pressure, Europeans are attempting to create a divide between themselves and the newcomers. Yet the Enlightenment established civilized relations between individuals, not societies. The European value system claimed universality.
The phenomenon that legitimized colonialism in continental Europe was this claim of universality. In response, European thought sought ways to live in a multicultural, post-secular society. However, the popular response of European peoples manifested itself in the abandonment of this claim. They will need more time to realize that abandoning the claim to universality also means abandoning the hierarchy of civilizations.
Recognizing the decline
The European value system, based on the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, claimed universality and established a hierarchy among civilizations, while also creating a world system. Although not everyone believed in the system, it was important to be seen as part of it and to participate in its rituals, since the system operated in a Eurocentric manner. For around sixty years, dozens of institutions formed around the United Nations were revered as churches, determining the rituals of the new world order. These institutions collaborated with complementary elements of American capitalism, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.
First, Europe abandoned the claims of its own value system. Then, the rest of the world lost faith in these values. Finally, the organizations that regulated the capitalist market lost their meaning. Furthermore, it has only recently become apparent that these developments signify a collapse rather than a transition. Those who argue that it is a transition claim that the world system is now dominated by five major powers, and that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have lost their significance. They expect another country to join the US, China, the EU and Russia as the fifth member. Those who speak of the collapse of the system argue that the world is bigger than five.
Europe was not as accustomed to living with different cultures as it claimed to be. The Catholic and Protestant worlds of Europe had always demonstrated their quest for homogeneity through historical massacres. When the Enlightenment replaced religion, this quest for homogeneity became secularized within the context of nationalism. The Holocaust emerged as the catastrophe of modernity’s divisive quest for homogeneity.
After the Second World War, the economy took precedence over politics and the global market necessitated the legitimization of multicultural societies. However, the balance of the world system was disrupted by Turkey’s application for EU membership, the political crisis that began with Islamophobic attacks and the 2008 economic crisis. The influx of refugees, which peaked in 2015, and the shock of the pandemic after 2019 further intensified these crises. The Gaza massacre marked the point at which universal values were exhausted. By the beginning of the 21st century, Europe had lost its economic, political and human credibility.
Europe benefiting
The United States and Russia are the only remaining powers in a depleted Europe. The United States is anxious to protect its economic interests, while Russia is striving to preserve its political presence. Both powers seek to control the continent’s remaining countries, as if to demonstrate that they are not part of Europe. Each power engages with Europe’s populist right and supports nationalist and separatist political movements for different reasons. What they have in common is that neither wants a strong EU.
A fragmented Europe, akin to the Middle Ages, would retain its economic production and market power, but lose its political significance. Unable to produce even a common foreign policy, let alone the planned common army, Europe is doomed to remain an economic community without political will. The protectionist and passive stance of European nationalists coincides with the interests of non-European powers. This is why the populist right in Europe is simultaneously supported by both the US and Russia.
The US, keen to exert influence over the court ruling on Le Pen, is using Greenland as a pretext to crush Europe’s political power. By frightening markets with customs duties, the US is taking advantage of European peoples’ inability to protect their welfare. Meanwhile, Russia was aware that Europe could not fight back when it attacked Ukraine, which is under EU protection both politically and economically. Driven by a desire to preserve welfare without military engagement, Europe is facing significant challenges in both the economic and security spheres. With its market under threat from the US and its security architecture under threat from Russia, it seems unlikely that Europe will be able to preserve its political unity. The likelihood of Europe becoming more fragmented is quite high. Concerned about preserving their own identities, European populations are also being drawn towards federalism and ‘direct democracy’.
The main issue for those who support the European populist right is freedom of expression. However, what is actually meant by freedom of expression, as reflected in the names of Dutch and Austrian European populist right parties, is the ability to espouse views that do not align with democratic values. As provocations and rhetoric designed to attract media attention are increasingly framed in terms of freedom of expression, the fight against disinformation is becoming increasingly important in European countries. Legal regulations legitimized through disinformation originating particularly from Russia are also affecting the European populist right.
Independence
Another facet of freedom is independence. Russia views the European populist right as representing the people against the elites. Therefore, it supports the independence of European peoples in their opposition to their own elites. In European populist literature, politics against the elites is politics against the ‘established parties’. Europe’s established system also tries to prevent populists from participating in decision-making processes by drawing political boundaries.
In every European country, from Austria and the Netherlands to Italy and Hungary and the Czech Republic, politics now revolves around those in favor of and those opposed to integration with the EU. However, from the perspective of the European populist right, the sides in the political struggle are not pro-EU and anti-EU, but real people and Europeanized elites. It is hardly surprising that US populists also claim to support the ‘real people’. In this context, Musk’s speech of support at the AfD congress could be seen as an attempt to free the ‘real people’ from elite domination.
Another favorite topic of the populist right is ‘direct democracy’. The Swiss model of direct Democracy and confederalism are presented as a formula to save the EU’s political existence, but they actually conceal a Europe that has lost its political unity and declined in power. Paradoxically, therefore, the proponents of plebiscitary democracy, supported by both the US and Russia, are the European peoples themselves, who are concerned about preserving their identities. Those who advocate federal ideas based on the romantic notion that a unified political structure will emerge from a world of satisfied social interests also belong to the European populist right.
Another argument of the European populist right is that they alone can internalize the system of democratic values. This tendency makes the European populist right defensive and passive. The exclusionary tendencies of European peoples now stem not from a claim to greatness, but from a claim to authenticity. However, this claim to authenticity is increasingly diminishing amid new divisions. For example, this tendency towards division is evident among Germans, Bavarians and Munich residents. In the French populist right, the shift from Jean-Marie Le Pen’s view of French superiority to Marine Le Pen’s view of protecting ‘Frenchness’ represents an intellectual contraction. Such tendencies towards contraction and isolation are naturally supported by both the US and Russia.
European reality
From another perspective, European governments, most of which subscribe to globalism, are in fact isolating themselves from world politics by excluding those who do not adhere to democratic values. Having lost its discursive and productive dominance in world politics and global markets respectively, Europe is losing its centrality. Examples of this include the Gaza conflict, the end of the discourse on human rights and democratic values, the war in Ukraine, the issue of Greenland, the collapse of the security architecture, and the fragility of markets, as demonstrated by US tariff threats. What remains of what Europe has built over many years is unlikely to be sufficient to maintain prosperity, and there is no desire to share this with migrants.
Although immigrants bring more benefits in the long term than losses in the short term, welcoming them no longer seems possible. For this reason, anti-immigrant sentiment is at its peak among the populist right in Europe. However, this protectionist approach is also diminishing European politics and the economy. A shrinking Europe would be a loss for neither the US nor Russia.
Another issue frequently emphasized by European populist movements is the loss of sovereignty. They therefore feel that they are being overwhelmed by EU bureaucracy and its system of rules. For those who believe that they have suffered losses as a result of the EU’s free trade agreements, which prioritize industrial production while disregarding local issues such as the interests of farmers, sovereignty has become an indispensable concept. Swiss populists, for example, may believe that their sovereignty is undermined by decisions taken by ‘foreign judges’.
Digital infrastructure
For this reason, they are delaying their participation in the European Court of Justice and EU law. The EU’s difficulty in pursuing a common foreign policy, coupled with its gradual distancing from the goal of a common army, demonstrates that resolving the sovereignty issue will be challenging. The intensity of the debates surrounding sovereignty is delaying EU integration. Each delay benefits both the US and Russia. Each populist victory causes the EU to become more indecisive and distances Europe from becoming a political power.
Another aspect of sovereignty loss relates to digital infrastructure. Europe’s digital infrastructure, including its payment systems, was developed with US assistance. The removal of International Criminal Court members from the payment system should also serve as a warning to Europe. When Europeans saw Iran excluded from the international money transfer system, they never imagined that such sanctions could be imposed on them. Today, they are not so sure. Meanwhile, the European populist right is not particularly concerned about such institutional EU worries. They are not bothered by the US owning the digital infrastructure, nor are they particularly interested in Russia’s initiatives, despite Russia being the target of the most cyber-attacks on digital infrastructure.
Paradoxically, those who raise the issue of sovereignty in political debates remain silent when it comes to cyber sovereignty. Even the European populist right, which talks about a return to the nation state and wants to end the common market, can remain silent on issues such as dollarization. Anti-EU policies are not necessarily anti-US. While Western European populists lean towards the US, Eastern European populists, as in Romania, are happy to receive support from Russia. Central European countries such as Hungary and Austria try to maintain good relations with both powers.
The European far right between the US and Russia
While the European populist right makes different choices regarding the US and Russia, it converges on three points. The first is its liberal stance against the capitalist global economy. The second is its rejection of the anti-Semitic legacy of European nationalists, including that of its own party history, as in France. The third is its opposition to Muslim immigration. In this context, they receive support from their wealthy elite while avoiding the attention of the Israel lobby. Furthermore, they derive political power from popular opposition to Muslim immigrants.
Although they agree with democratic and left-wing political elements in Europe on rejecting the anti-Semitic legacy, they clash with the European left in particular due to their subordination to the capitalist economy and their opposition to immigration. The conflict between the European left, which currently advocates gender freedom, and the conservative populist right is supported by both the US and Russia. The fact that European peoples are in conflict with each other as well as with the EU weakens their social bonds. Acts of sabotage by the radical left, such as those that caused power cuts in Berlin, undermine the social contract of European peoples.
For those who interpret world politics through a geopolitical lens, the fact that the European populist right is also supported by the US and Russia is difficult to accept. After all, an interpretation of Europe caught between the Transatlantic and Eurasian spheres is impossible without sociology. Where sociology and space converge, a people’s nomos emerges. Nomos is both an ideological and spatial designation. From the perspective of the people’s nomos, there are more similarities than one might think between European populist movements, Trump’s supporters, and Putin’s backers. As long as they are not in the same place, populists are respectful and distant towards each other while also supporting each other.
Conversely, it is not really possible to see a similar level of cooperation between democratic and left-wing populists. Marxists were disappointed when workers failed to unite. However, international unity was always just a dream. Europe’s populist right, on the other hand, is not talking about uniting, but acting together. It is their differences, rather than their similarities, that bring them closer. In world politics, where global rules do not apply, those who base their politics on their own people show solidarity despite their differences. Conquest/occupation, production/market and distribution/deal are the new nomos of world politics and peoples. It is impossible to make sense of the new political order through geopolitical readings or democratic nostalgia.
(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter.)
