I
n the early hours of the morning of 28 February, the Middle East faced serious developments that would determine the region’s future following an attack by the US and Israel on the compound housing the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, known as ‘Beyt-i Rehberi’. It had long been suggested by Israelis that these attacks would be carried out as a final phase, particularly following the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025.
Regarding how and why the situation has reached this point, it can be argued that the harsh suppression of the protests that erupted in Iran in recent months, coupled with the significant backlash and pressure from the Iranian diaspora, presented an opportunity that Israel and the US could not afford to miss. At the outset of the events, protests by opposition groups—who initially took to the streets largely in response to the country’s economic crisis but subsequently demanded regime change and targeted the government directly—escalated and spiraled out of control, prompting the government to take harsh measures and resulting in the ‘bloodiest’ crackdown in the 47-year history of the Islamic Revolution. The events resulted in the deaths of thousands of regime opponents.
Opposition groups, which had previously experienced similar protests—such as the allegations of electoral fraud in the 2009 presidential elections, the November 2019 protests, and the Mahsa Amini incident in 2022—but failed to achieve their goals, have now launched a serious campaign, both domestically and internationally, calling for military intervention by the US and Israel in the wake of the latest events. In this context, footage of protests and the security forces’ harsh crackdown, which has spread globally across online platforms, has been frequently shared. Particularly in the US, under pressure from Reza Pahlavi—the son of the former Shah of Iran—and other Iranian lobbies, the narrative that the only way to combat the Iranian regime is now through military intervention and conflict has been presented in Washington and Tel Aviv as the will of the Iranian people.
For Israel, which for many years had characterized Tehran as the “head of the snake” in its opposition to Israel, the bloody protests and calls from Iranian dissidents provided an opportunity to add a humanitarian dimension to the rhetoric of military action against Iran. Trump and Netanyahu had repeatedly assured the Iranian people that the aid and support they sought on the path to “freedom” would come. Although the negotiations between Iran and the US throughout February raised the question in the minds of the opposition – “might a new agreement be reached that would keep the regime afloat?” – and triggered a brief wave of backlash against Trump, the messages delivered in the final week before the operation and the military build-up in the region demonstrated the inevitability of the operation for both the regime and the opposition.
Whilst the protests in Iran and the calls from the Iranian people may have served as a trigger for the US and Israel, the ongoing conflict has far more significant underlying causes. Having lost its influence and allies in the region following 7 October, the Iranian regime was experiencing one of its most vulnerable and fragile periods since its inception, facing threats and dangers. In this context, the weakening or neutralization of elements of the ‘Axis of Resistance’—such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Ansarullah and Bashar al-Assad—created the golden opportunity Israel had been waiting for, leading to the 12-day war.
Iran’s air defense systems, which had been weakened by repeated small-scale air strikes in the period from 7 October to the 12-day war, were almost completely destroyed during the June conflict, leaving Iran effectively exposed to subsequent operations. Perhaps the most critical aspect of all these operations for the Iranian regime was that, due to intelligence failures and the absence of effective air defence systems, senior officials became targets in air strikes and were eliminated by being killed.
In fact, the assassination of political, military and bureaucratic figures of vital importance to the regime—often attributed to Israel—is not a new phenomenon. Israel has been carrying out assassination operations against high-ranking figures, particularly scientists involved in Iran’s nuclear program, for many years. Mustafa Ahmedi Ruşen in 2012, Muhsin Fahrizade in 2020, Razi Musevi in 2023 and Muhammad Rıza Zahidi in 2024 were among the most prominent nuclear scientists and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps killed by Israel. In particular, the death of Fahrizade, known as the key figure in Iran’s nuclear programme, highlighted the extent of the intelligence gap in Iran and led to serious questioning and debate within the regime’s leadership.
Whilst these significant losses suffered by Iran over the years have caused disruptions to its nuclear and missile programs, it is fair to say that none have left as lasting a damage as the 12-day war. During the attacks on the first night of that war, almost the entire senior command was killed in the very first wave of attacks. Among those killed were Revolutionary Guards Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami, Air and Space Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh – the public face of Iran’s missile program – and Chief of the General Staff Mohammad Baqeri.
Iran’s firepower and response capabilities were adversely affected by the sudden attacks it faced in the first two days, as it was caught unprepared; however, after overcoming the initial two-day shock, it managed to launch a counter-offensive despite intense air strikes, thereby preventing the complete severing of the command chain that Israel had targeted.
Looking at the situation, it appears that the Iranian leadership, having learnt lessons from the June conflict and the losses incurred, is preparing for a second round of fighting that it is almost certain will take place. In interviews with the US media, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi stated that the Iranian regime is not dependent on individuals or specific names, and that in the event of the death of its leaders or key figures, the names of those to whom duties and responsibilities would be transferred have been determined up to three or four levels down the hierarchy.
Indeed, on the very first day of the war, one of Iran’s greatest red lines, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; the Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guards, Muhammad Pakpur, the Chairman of the Supreme Defence Council, Ali Shamkhani, and many other key figures were killed in an airstrike. New figures were appointed to fill all the vacant positions, including the post of Supreme Leader, and Iran was able to continue the war, achieving some surprising successes without appearing to be in disarray.
The most significant factor in Iran’s unexpected successful resistance against the US-Israel coalition and its ability to sustain the war was the assassination of the Supreme Leader on the very first day of the conflict. Ali Khamenei, in his capacity as the Wali al-Faqih and Supreme Commander, was regarded as a figure of such unique and distinguished standing that even his opponents would not have considered subjecting him to a direct attack. Although, due to changing circumstances, many senior officials now considered it possible that anyone—even themselves—could be targeted, no one had anticipated the possibility that the Supreme Leader could be killed on the first day of the war. It was assumed that lessons had been learnt from the 12-day war and security/intelligence failures, and that at the very least, the regime’s most important figure would be protected at the highest level.
Before the war began, it had been calculated among Iranian opposition circles—and even in Washington and Tel Aviv—that Khamenei’s death would rapidly bring the regime to the brink of collapse. However, whilst his death caused a major shock among the regime and its supporters and deeply affected the morale of the military forces, it did not lead to a major fracture within the system. On the contrary, as Ali Larijani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council—who was later killed in subsequent attacks—stated, it provided them with a strong motivation for resistance, making them even more determined to seek revenge.
In Iran, the position of Supreme Leader is not merely a religious office; it is an authority and institution that commands all armed forces, including the army, police and Revolutionary Guards; it directly or indirectly shapes presidential, parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections; and its approval is required for everything from the country’s long-term strategic plans down to minor decisions. No politician or bureaucrat who is not loyal to him or who acts outside the framework he has drawn can survive within the system.
Ali Khamenei, having held all these powers for decades, has succeeded in shaping Iran’s structure and institutions to his own liking. For example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), one of the forces absolutely loyal to him, is no longer merely an armed force; it has transformed into an economic giant overseeing the country’s largest projects, possessing an intelligence network in numerous countries abroad, and acting as a colossal entity that directs wars—a structure of unprecedented scale.
However, upon examining the religious and political structures in Iran, it is possible to observe that these structures have been shaped in such a way as to be able to operate independently of, and without dependence on, individual figures. The system of governance in Iran functions as an interconnected, multi-layered network rather than relying on individual figures. In this context, the regime’s continuity in recent years has been linked not directly to the consent of the majority of the population, but to control over the country’s critical sectors.
The fact that areas such as energy resources, the banking system, major economic structures, the security bureaucracy, the intelligence network, the judicial mechanism and the media are almost entirely controlled by the same power centre makes it difficult for the system to be destabilised from the outside. The fact that institutions in Iran adhere to the same ideological line ensures that, in times of crisis, the system consolidates more tightly rather than disintegrating from within. Over time, this structure has evolved beyond being merely a model of governance; it has transformed into a multi-layered power network where military, economic and ideological elements are intertwined.
From a sectarian perspective, the behaviour exhibited by Imam Hussein at Karbala—the greatest example for Shia believers—is prioritised as a guiding principle. Mottos such as ‘fearing not death’, ‘fighting until the very end’, and ‘never bowing to humiliation’ have traditionally been central tenets in the history of the Shia sect; since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, they have been the most emphasised aspects in the education system, cultural activities, the media, and even political discourse. It is extremely difficult to dissuade the generations who have been raised with this mindset—and who serve as the regime’s supporters and defenders—from fighting, or to make them accept defeat, even if their leaders were to die. During this war, the emphasis placed by clerics and orators on this very subject—namely resistance and martyrdom—in the commemorative programmes and ceremonies held in the main squares of Tehran and other cities is particularly striking.
When considering the military/strategic dimension—another key factor sustaining the system—it is necessary to highlight the importance of the ‘mosaic system’ mentioned by Abbas Arakchi in an interview with American news channels during the early days of the war. What Iran means by this system is, as mentioned above, the resolve of the highest-ranking military officer responsible for missile and UAV strikes in a region or at each base to take the initiative and continue the operation in accordance with the pre-established plan, should the chain of command be severed.
Although it is not known how and to what extent this strategy has been implemented in practice, it is clear that the Tehran regime has demonstrated greater success than anticipated compared to the 12-day war. The political structure, which was thought to be on the verge of collapse, and the ranks of the Revolutionary Guards, who were expected to lay down their arms and surrender, are still able to continue targeting many regional countries despite the heavy blows they have suffered.
The regime in Iran is struggling to compensate for the successive losses of the religious leader and figures possessing decades of military and political experience, and will struggle even more. However, it is certain that overthrowing a seasoned regime—one that has taken root in a country which, for 47 years, has played a significant and decisive role not only militarily and politically but also ideologically and intellectually—is not an easy task merely by eliminating its key figures.
The ideology of the Revolution and the conviction, determination and courage required to uphold it are among the most important factors sustaining Iran’s armed forces and political will. It is clearly evident that, despite the extremely difficult conditions following the assassination of the revolutionary leader and the suffering of serious losses, preserving the ideology of the Shi’a Islamic Revolution and upholding the regime built upon it is regarded as the most noble and sacred of duties.
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