Back to Future in the Eastern Mediterranean: Polarization Once Again?

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here was an expectation- and still there is- about possible coordination and dialogue among regional actors of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) especially after the Trump Administration announced Gaza Peace Deal. This expectation is relying on probability of rise of a new balance of power-based order in the region. The regional states have had hopes to take some concrete steps related to functional, normative and institutional sides of this newly establishing order.  Ankara may be one of the most eager regional actors in this regard. Türkiye wants to institutionalize its bargaining power and influence in this new regional diplomacy-first atmosphere. That is not surprising if one reminds that Ankara prioritized normalization and improvement in bilateral relations in MENA – especially within the period 2021-2023, till October 7 attacks and Gaze War.

Back to Polarization?

However, these expectations have not fully realized so far. There are still many unresolved conflicts and uncertainties in the MENA region. Meanwhile Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics is giving signals of back to the future, back to the atmosphere of polarization that was dominant feature of the region in the period of 2017-2021. Recently there are many minor and major developments strengthening this tension. Some of these developments may not have the objective of fueling polarization in the region, but consequently they contribute to increase strategic competition in the Eastern Mediterranean. Two examples easily come to mind: The first one is signing of an agreement, that limits Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the Greek Cypriot Administration and Lebanon in November 2025.

The second example is Israeli’s approval of Egypt export gas deal in December 2025. While these agreements may seem like functional collaborations for Lebanon and Egypt, which are currently experiencing political uncertainty and economic vulnerabilities, these deals also strengthen the positions of the Greek Cypriot Administration and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating that South Nicosia and Tel Aviv have a kind of actorness in the region. These deals were used by Tel Aviv and South Nicosia to give certain messages to the other regional players, including Ankara. On the one hand South Nicosia wants to show that it may continue to ignore rights of Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

On the other hand, Israel wants to prove that Tel Aviv can find partners in the region even if the Palestinian issue remained unresolved. However, these messages might have been weakly voiced if not for another obvious development: the triparty strategic rapprochement among Israel, the Greek Cypriots and Greece. At the end of 2025 Athens, Tel Aviv and South Nicosia not only deepened their defense and security ties but also did everything to make it visible for other regional actors including Ankara.

What does the trio want to achieve?

The rapprochement between South Nicosia, Tel Aviv, and Athens in the Eastern Mediterranean is not new. In the early 2000s, the discovery of natural gas in the region brought the three capitals into dialogue about potential East-West gas trade. However, this dialogue was never confined to the intended functional framework and failed to trigger regional stability and cooperation. Therefore, the Obama administration’s attempts to promote intercommunity reconciliation and cooperation in Cyprus issue through “imaginary pipelines” became unsuccessful. While the dream of Eastern Mediterranean gas bonanza returned to be a fantasy rather than a reality, the triparty ties have evolved into strategic partnership aims to constrain and marginalize Türkiye — albeit not explicitly — by exploiting existing fault lines and disagreements in the MENA region following the Arab Spring.

After 2015 the U.S. was uneasy with Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and hence Washington was also partially drawn into this three-party re-alignment to constrain Russian posture in the region. Greece and the Greek Cypriots are the member of the EU. Between 2017 and 2021 some of the EU members wanted to increase their influence in the Eastern Mediterranean by supporting Athens’ and South Nicosia’s posture there. These European actors also misinterpreted what is happening in Libya, Lebanon and Syria. As a result, Türkiye felt that Ankara was facing with multiple challenges and the trio- supported by Washington and by some European capitals- tried to restrain Ankara’s hand in the region.

However, this regional context has gradually changed after 2021. Washington also revised its priorities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the U.S. concluded that exclusionary, polarizing alignments were unsuccessful in limiting Türkiye’s influence. Besides, Washington did not want to lose Ankara as a potential partner in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Between 2017-2021, Ankara succeeded to strengthen its strategic and diplomatic presence in Syria, Libya, and the TRNC by increasing its civil-military maritime assets in the neighboring seas. Observing the realities on the ground Biden Administration decided to withdraw its support from the East-Med natural gas pipeline project. That means the East-West natural gas trade through this tripartite alignment failed as well by 2021.

Polarization logic has slowly changed

Although the strategic environment based on polarization logic has slowly changed after 2021, this high-tension period between 2017 and 2021 revealed two facts related to the strategic game in the region. First, the Greek Cypriots and Greece can take, and indeed took, the advantage of the above-mentioned polarization to procure new weapon systems from various sources, primarily Israel and the United States. That has led revival of arm race/security dilemma logic in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea region. Washington was well aware of risks of security trap in the region among Athens, South Nicosia and Ankara but the U.S. also calculated the potential of constraining Russia.

It is a well-known fact that Washington can more easily support its Trans-Atlantic/European allies, like Greece and South Cyprus by arm procurement than others since the U.S. has upper-hand over NATO. As a result, the U.S. ignored Ankara’s and North Cyprus’ protests and decided to arm both Athens and South Nicosia – which endangers the delicate balance between Türkiye and Greece, as well as Turkish and Greek Cypriots on Cyprus. Meanwhile, Israel viewed Greece and Greek Cypriots as useful components of its revitalized Peripheral Doctrine. One of the major aims of this new Peripheral Doctrine is increasing Israel’s strategic depth without direct conventional deployment around Tel Aviv’s rivals, particularly Ankara. Therefore, Türkiye would face costs for its increasing presence in areas important to Israel.

Secondly, the 2017-2021 period proves that Western actors, both the U.S. and Europeans, prioritize area control within the framework of East-West connectivity – assumed to be provided by Greece-Greek Cypriot-Israel connection. However, it soon became clear that, to achieve full control or area denial capacity, all Western/U.S. allies (including those in the Gulf, Egypt, and Türkiye) needed to be part of the East-West connectivity, or at least they do not challenge the way of this connection. This explains why both the Biden and first Trump administrations worked on different formulas especially to attach the Gulf monarchies and Türkiye to the Europe-Israel/ West-East connection. The Biden Administration encouraged normalization agreements among the players, Trump Administrations suggested different versions of Abraham Accords.

What’s new in Greek-Greek Cypriot- Israeli quasi alliance in 2025?

Today’s three-party rapprochement can be seen as an extension of above-mentioned competitive logic. Therefore, it is also part of the process of creating perception that Ankara’s influence in the Eastern Mediterranean can be restrained by a rival bloc although the parties claim that this triparty cooperation is not against any other external actor. Accordingly, there are three elements in this renewed re-alignment: The first element is the deepening of security and defense cooperation between these three countries, though this cooperation does not include a joint defense guarantee or pledge. The second element is the establishment of mutual interoperability in the fields of defense and security. The third element is the rearmament of Greece and the Southern Cypriots by Israel that emerges as the main security provider. These three elements form the backbone of this renewed alignment among Athens, South Nicosia and Tel Aviv.

Within this context, recently, the South Cypriots acquired Barak air defense system from Israel. Meanwhile, Greek Foreign Minister Dendias claimed that Ankara’s progress, particularly in the field of UAVs/UCAVs, poses a threat to Greece. Dendias also stated that they would strengthen air defense in the Aegean Sea and deploy missile and anti-aircraft systems — some of which are expected to be procured from Israel— to the Aegean Islands. Leaders from three countries met in Jerusalem at the end of December, and they applauded Netanyahu’s words: “We will defend the area against those who want to rebuild their empire.” Considering that Athens and South Nicosia are part of Western institutions, this gathering, while not reflecting a common Western view, is a performance reflecting the desire of actors to use a hypothetical expansionism as a convenient excuse for Israel’s current expansionism.

Therefore, Jerusalem summit among Greek, Israeli and Greek Cypriot leaders was not just a realist act of balancing. It was a tacit support of two Western/European capitals to Israel’s policies in Gaza and West Bank- including war crimes. Hence, Athens, South Nicosia and Tel Aviv could find each other as available partners in micro-state strategy but because of shadow of war crimes and atrocities committed by Israel in Gaza, the cost of this reproachment for the Western actors will likely be greater than just triggering security dilemma between the trio and Ankara.

Without doubt, by this alignment Israel, Greece and Greek Cypriots attempt to provoke Ankara. By poking Türkiye unnecessarily, these three capitals, not only test the limits of Ankara’s reaction but also try to push Türkiye to make strategic mistakes. This strategy is an unreasonable strategy because it will not help western desire to have access and control on East-West as well as South-North (Eastern Mediterranean-Caspian) connectivity.

All in all, the atmosphere in the Eastern Mediterranean has turned from moderate hopes to polarization very quickly. This shift may be expected but the pace of this shift is still surprising. Therefore, one should ask, why this shift is happening now?