Beijing in the Strait of Hormuz: The Iran War, Energy Security and China’s Strategic Dilemma
China meets over 63 per cent of its oil requirements through maritime imports, with half of these imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
President of China Xi Jinping (R) shakes hands with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (L) as they meet within the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia on October 23, 2024. Photo by Anadolu Images.
O
ne of the most pronounced tensions in the current process of transformation within the international system stems from the ever-widening gap between the global responsibility claims of major powers and their actual behavior. Whilst these gaps may appear manageable at the level of rhetoric during ordinary times, they inevitably surface during crises, bringing the question of who is actually bearing the burden of the system back to the fore.
Underlying this analysis is the fact that the focus of this study lies not merely in China’s economic size or military capacity, but in its redefined great power identity over the past two decades. For whilst Beijing positions itself as an actor resolutely defending its ‘core interests’, it simultaneously claims to be a ‘responsible architect of the international order’. The tension between these two roles inevitably surfaces at times of deepening crisis, bringing the question of which order China truly belongs to back into the spotlight.
Indeed, with the launch of the joint US-Israeli air operation against Iran on 28 February, this question has taken the form of a concrete and challenging test for China. As the Middle East is dragged towards a new systemic breaking point, the crisis’s repercussions for energy security have been projected onto a global scale via the Strait of Hormuz, thereby exposing the fragilities of the global energy order once again through a regional conflict. Beijing, however, is not merely an external observer of this situation; it is portrayed as an actor compelled to confront the crisis as one of the parties directly affected.
The 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement
For China’s relationship with Iran is built upon a multi-layered structure of interdependence, ranging from oil purchases worth tens of billions of dollars and technology transfers to the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in 2021, and the parallel financial networks and shadow fleets that enable the circumvention of sanctions. The deeply intertwined nature of this structure leaves Beijing with neither the option of maintaining a complete distance nor the luxury of intervening openly on the ground during a crisis. Precisely for this reason, Beijing’s stance in the US/Israel-Iran conflict must be viewed not merely as a diplomatic reaction, but as a multi-layered strategic landscape that simultaneously tests China’s vision for the global order, the structural vulnerabilities arising from energy dependence, and its positioning reflexes within great power competition.
Spanning from the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz within the energy system to the asymmetrical depth of China-Iran relations, this landscape requires analysis along an axis extending from Beijing’s official statements to the ongoing practical facilitation measures on the ground. In this context, the Strait of Hormuz represents the pinnacle of the systemic tension China is currently experiencing. Following the launch of a coordinated air operation by the US and Israel against Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps issued explicit warnings via VHF radio channels to all foreign vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
These warnings quickly escalated into a de facto closure, with tanker traffic declining by approximately 70 per cent and hundreds of vessels forced to anchor outside the strait. This situation threatened the energy corridors that supply 20 per cent of global oil supply, significant volumes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, and a large portion of Asian economies, whilst leading to a rise in Brent crude oil prices. The head of the International Energy Agency described this situation as “the most severe global energy security crisis in history”, thereby concretely demonstrating how a regional war can transform into a structural global threat.
Comprehensive strategic partnership and energy
From China’s perspective, Beijing’s primary security concern in this process is of a directly economic nature and stems from the very structure of its energy supply. Seeking to maintain control over its own energy supply, China meets over 63 per cent of its oil requirements through maritime imports, with half of these imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, China is the primary buyer of Iranian oil, as Beijing’s purchases account for approximately 90 per cent of Iran’s oil exports, generating tens of billions of dollars in annual revenue that funds the Iranian government’s budget and military activities. Given this structural dependency, the strait’s paralysis ceases to be merely a foreign policy issue for Beijing and becomes a direct matter of economic governance.
Indeed, prior to the crisis, China turned a blind eye to the accumulation of oil tankers from both Iran and Venezuela in its coastal waters; this floating reserve of approximately forty million barrels served as an emergency buffer against a potential prolonged closure of the Strait. The pre-stockpiling of strategic reserves clearly demonstrates that Beijing had anticipated such scenarios and treated energy security as a matter of strategic preparedness; however, the protracted duration of the crisis and the concurrent depletion of stocks are rendering this preparedness increasingly inadequate.
On the other hand, the 25-year ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement’ signed in 2021 confirms that the relationship between China and Iran cannot be explained solely by market dynamics or energy considerations. Encompassing economic, security and technological cooperation, this agreement serves as a testament to the evolution of the relationship between the two countries from limited cooperation over the decades to a broad strategic depth; and a significant portion of this partnership directly conflicts with US foreign policy and national security interests.
Behind Beijing’s positioning of Iran as such a central partner lies not only energy but also a geopolitical need for Tehran, which is viewed as a strategic asset that could be used to counterbalance US influence and reshape the US-led global order. However, despite its comprehensive nature, the partnership also harbors a deep asymmetry. Whilst Iran is heavily dependent on China for energy export revenues and diplomatic support, Beijing continues to pursue a cautious balancing act to avoid jeopardizing its relations with other Gulf partners such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Risk-free pragmatism
The practical manifestation of this balance is clearly evident in the form of China’s support for Iran. By enabling Iran to effectively circumvent global sanctions through trade and financial networks, technology transfers and dual-use trade, China takes care to keep this support strictly separate from any official defense commitments. Beijing, which is alleged to have facilitated access to dual-use technology—including oil transactions, covert tanker fleets, and Iran’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle programs—through Chinese banks, front companies and intermediary firms, has refrained from making official commitments to Iran in the defense sector.
Although Tehran seeks a deeper strategic rapprochement, bilateral defense cooperation has remained limited in recent years, with both countries conducting their military coordination primarily through trilateral mechanisms with Russia and multilateral platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or BRICS. Reports that, following the outbreak of the crisis, two Iranian vessels in a Chinese port were allowed to be loaded with sodium perchlorate—a solid rocket propellant used in missiles—suggest that this balance of ‘official distance, practical facilitation’ persists. As of November 2025, there were 366 China- and Hong Kong-based entities on the SDN List due to sanctions programs related to Iran; when this figure is taken into account, it paints a picture that illustrates the depth and institutional reach of these networks.
When analyzed at the diplomatic level, it is evident that Beijing has adopted a carefully calibrated language in this crisis, as it has in many other global crises. At a press conference on 3 March, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson emphasized that “energy security is of great importance to the world economy, and all parties bear the responsibility to ensure an uninterrupted energy supply” and called on all relevant parties to take action to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s Permanent Representative to the UN have characterized the US and Israeli attacks as violations of international law, condemned the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and called for an immediate halt to military operations and the resumption of dialogue.
Beijing’s stance on Iran’s attacks against Gulf states
However, Beijing has not taken a clear stance on Iran’s attacks against Gulf states, limiting itself to condemning “indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians and non-military targets”. During Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s meeting with his Iranian counterpart, both the reiteration of China’s support for Iran’s sovereignty and the expression of confidence that Iran would “take into account the legitimate concerns of its neighbors” represent a clear manifestation of this delicate balancing act in diplomatic language. Although this rhetorical framework has taken on an institutional dimension through the six-point plan for resolving the issue presented by China’s Special Representative for the Middle East, Zhai Jun, to the Chinese press and his visit to the region, ultimately, Beijing has not provided the level of response that the international community expected from China.
Although developments on the ground are ongoing, the trajectory of the Iran crisis is taking shape around several key scenarios, each of which could lead to different outcomes. The first and most critical scenario is the permanent closure of the Strait of Hormuz. It is anticipated that should the closure of the Strait of Hormuz persist, the price of oil per barrel will rise rapidly, placing additional pressure on global inflation. In such a scenario, China would face the options of turning to alternative routes, increasing storage capacity, and building a closer partnership with Russia for energy supply; however, on the other hand, each of these temporary solutions would merely postpone its structural vulnerabilities to a limited extent. Although the introduction of alternative routes via Oman, the UAE and South Africa could be considered a high-cost temporary solution, their sustainability is limited.
The second scenario involves China increasing its diplomatic involvement to become a critical mediator, either by establishing a channel for communication between Iran and Washington or by facilitating partial negotiations regarding the use of the straits. Wang Yi’s call on 24 March to his Iranian counterparts to enter into negotiations with the US lends credibility to this scenario and appears to be laying the groundwork for a potential China-US leaders’ summit. Of course, it is important not to overlook the fact that Trump has postponed his summit with Xi Jinping in April.
The third scenario is one in which China quietly reaps benefits from the chaos. Whilst Beijing strengthens its normative narrative criticizing US unilateral interventionism, it is seizing the opportunity to capitalize on growing signals that European partners are beginning to view China not as a rival but as a global partner for stability. This situation enables Beijing to pursue a policy of strategic patience until the crisis touches upon its own interests, whilst simultaneously offering the opportunity to shift its relations with various European and Western countries—notably Germany, Canada and France—onto a more unconditional and US-independent footing.
Hormuz is not merely a strait
Consequently, it is possible to define the strategy China is pursuing in this crisis as a unique policy of strategic ambiguity. Beijing is focusing on a risk-free pragmatism strategy, maintaining a position close enough to stand by Iran, yet distant enough to avoid actually being on the scene. Beijing, acting as the de facto insurer of Tehran’s energy revenues, is simultaneously indirectly concerned about the military activities fueled by these revenues; this contradiction constitutes the most defining tension in China’s strategic positioning in the region.
For China, the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a strait, but the most vulnerable link in global economic interdependence. As long as this point remains under threat, the direction of the real strategic pressure will not change, regardless of Beijing’s rhetorical stance. And the international community is interpreting this pressure with increasing scrutiny. Indeed, what China does or does not do in this crisis serves not only as a test of expectations regarding the responsibilities of a major power, but also as a measure of the gap between the global role Beijing envisions for itself and its actual behavior.
(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)
