Iran’s Confrontation Strategy through the Dichotomy of Geography and Time

I

n conflicts between states, the use of force is not the only factor shaping the course of a conflict. In fact, other strategic deterrent factors arise from the intersection of geography and politics, carrying significant weight in tipping the scales in favor of one side or the other. These factors include geographical location, time, planning mechanisms, decision-making processes, and implicit alliances. Non-military caveats mean that war is not merely a direct confrontation between military forces; rather, it is a challenge between political systems.

As the great German military theorist Clausewitz stated, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” In this context, Iran’s response to the joint U.S.-Israeli attack on February 28, 2026, is a prime example of a strategy that draws its strength from various factors, enabling it to withstand pressure. Additionally, Iranian decision-makers have a history of long-term resilience when dealing with adversaries, whether in times of peace or during disputes and conflicts. Tehran tends to employ a strategy of political and economic attrition against its opponents. Iran has responded to aggression with military action, targeting U.S. interests, Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ territory, and the Israeli heartland. This showcases the Iranian combat doctrine and conflict architecture, which focuses on strategies that confound adversaries and make prolonging the conflict costly and difficult. So, what has Iran done to withstand all this pressure?

The Iranian decision-making circle

Contrary to what some believe about Iran’s centralized decision-making process, Iran initially employs a strategic doctrine often referred to as “mosaic defense.” This doctrine involves distributing leadership roles to branches that can fight independently without central command and that have alternatives for every administrative position. Iran’s complex regime structure makes it impossible to cripple the regime by targeting the Supreme Leader or other prominent leaders, while maintaining communication networks between various commands and units. Second, since the revolution, Iran has proven that it is prepared for all scenarios, especially after the joint U.S.-Israeli attack in the twelve-day war in June 2025.

Iran has demonstrated its readiness for a prolonged war that does not necessitate a swift resolution. It can exhaust its adversaries and transform the war into a political and economic burden for the opposing side. Third, Iran has expanded the conflict regionally by launching simultaneous attacks on multiple fronts, including U.S. bases in the region, vital Arab Gulf facilities, and, crucially, threatening navigation by closing the Strait of Hormuz. The situation at the Strait has caused significant disruption to energy prices and the global economy, transforming the war into an international crisis.

Iran’s strategy of regionalizing the conflict stems from lessons learned from previous wars in the region, such as the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These wars provided Iran with insight into U.S. military strategies and their pitfalls. Iran has also learned from Israel’s ground war with Hezbollah in 2006, not to mention its involvement in Syria, the October 2023 war between Hamas and Israel, and the confrontation between the Houthis in Yemen and the U.S. and Israel. Iran focuses on an asymmetric warfare strategy given its military weakness compared to its adversaries. Iran utilizes its missile and drone capabilities to launch flexible and simultaneous attacks, thereby weakening the ability of opposing air defenses to respond. Iran continues to utilize its regional allies, including the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq.

Despite the complex constitution of these factions and their varied affiliation with Iran, they remain key allies. These Iranian allies surrounding Israel have opened multiple fronts, granting Iran greater resilience and reinforcing the belief that survival is more important than dominance. Therefore, Iranian military doctrine demonstrates an ability to endure rather than achieve a decisive victory by complicating conflicts and exhausting adversaries without necessarily achieving outright triumph.

From the preceding, we can see that the balance of power primarily favors Iran and, to a lesser extent, Israel while failing to serve U.S. interests for two main reasons. First, Iran’s difficult terrain and natural barriers make a possible land invasion extremely complex. The Zagros Mountains in the south and west and the Alborz Mountains in the north form natural barriers with narrow, easily defensible passes that give defenders a tactical advantage. In the center, the Dasht-e Kavir and Dasht-e Lut deserts are massive, extreme desert areas with high summer temperatures and challenging terrain that can hinder supply lines and the movement of heavy machinery.

In the event of a land invasion, the terrain allows Iran to concentrate its defenses on chokepoints, which would make the mobility of land forces slow, costly, risky, and perhaps impossible. Second, while Iran and Israel share combat experience, which is emphasized by advocates of the realist school of thought regarding the use of military force to achieve objectives, Iran appears capable of enduring and prolonging a war. Iran has the manpower and a vast geographical area for maneuvering. It also has allies that can bolster its military position by disrupting calculations and controlling strategic waterways, such as the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb at the southeastern entrance to the Red Sea. Therefore, Iran has succeeded in freezing the conflict, preventing its adversaries from fulfilling their political agendas or achieving any strategic goals.

Iranian superiority or weaknesses of the adversaries?

Israel has combat experience and a vast military arsenal, but lacks strategic depth. It is accustomed to operating in a volatile environment and sensing threats from its surroundings. The domestic and regional challenges it faces have been exacerbated by global resentment since its aggression in the October 2023 war, internal opposition to its far-right policies, demographic imbalances, and increasing reverse migration. Despite suffering blows, Iran has broken Israeli hegemony and penetrated the “Iron Dome” defense system by targeting vital strategic areas such as command and control centers, air defense systems, power stations, energy facilities, and ports.

Attacks by Iran on Israel have led to a decline in economic activity and investment and have disrupted such sectors as tourism, aviation, and trade, which are pillars of the Israeli economy. Furthermore, Iran has depleted Israeli air defense capabilities to a certain extent and weakened its military readiness. The ability to target Israeli depth has proven costly for Israel, resulting in economic pressure, disruption to daily life, and pressure on the civilian population due to frequent warnings and the need to remain in shelters, thus diminishing the sense of security.

Israel is under increased international pressure to stop escalating the conflict, which has complicated its relations with some countries and eroded the stereotype of its absolute military superiority. The outcome of the confrontation has significantly undermined Israel’s ability to sustain the conflict, leading it to accept a ceasefire, perhaps at the behest of the United States. Notably, Iran’s air defense umbrella is the weakest link in its ability to confront Israel. This is attributed to the numerous sanctions that restrict Iran’s ability to acquire advanced air defense systems and its vast territory. The same applies to Iran’s naval capabilities, which remain vulnerable compared to those of its adversaries, who have more advanced platforms and superior electronic warfare capabilities.

During a relatively calm period, the United States suffered the most losses for several reasons. First, it lacked a sound strategic objective when launching the war and found itself embroiled in a poorly conceived conflict for itself and its allies in the Arab Gulf region. The U.S. campaign has not resulted in a clear victory. Meanwhile, the debate within the U.S. regarding the war’s legitimacy and feasibility has intensified. The war has created political division and public pressure, making it difficult to achieve decisive results. The prolonged state of attrition and the U.S. administration’s inability to manage important issues in Asia and Europe have also contributed to this difficulty. Not to mention, relations with traditional allies in Europe are strained, and relations with the GCC states are uncertain. American taxpayers are also aware of the repercussions of the war’s high operating costs, including the possible deployment of troops and equipment over vast areas and the resulting impact on energy prices and the disruption and rise in the price of goods.

Although the U.S. has not suffered losses on its own soil, Iran’s targeting of its interests and those of its allies in the region pushed the U.S. to accept a ceasefire and return to the negotiating table, despite the collapse of the Pakistani-led negotiations. Additionally, there has been strong opposition to the war within Washington’s decision-making circle, perhaps explaining the dismissal of some senior officers with extensive combat experience. As Iran realizes the limits of U.S.-Israeli power, it has set conditions for accepting a ceasefire and returning to negotiations. These conditions include linking the negotiations to the Lebanese issue and stipulating the level of U.S. representation during the direct talks in Islamabad. The U.S. vice president, J.D. Vance, will lead the American negotiating delegation.