On September 16, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Ankara in order to continue Astana trilateral peace talks on Syrian settlement and to meet face to face with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan separately.

On the eve of the meeting, many skeptics in Russia voiced that Turkey was not fulfilling its obligations under the Sochi agreement signed a year ago. According to them, Syria’s last de-escalation zone in Idlib had turned into a nest of terrorists (mostly from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) who regularly carry out attacks against Russian military bases in Syria in Tartus and Khmeimim.

Consequently, most Russian observers agreed that the hour for a full-scale operation in Idlib by Damascus backed by Iran on the ground and Russia from the air, was fast approaching. The Sochi agreement was not working, and, therefore, it was time for Russia to look for another way to resolve the issue, namely, through a large-scale military intervention. These Russian observers expected to get such a message from President Putin as the result of his trip to Ankara on September 16, 2019.

Three Assads

Bashar al-Assad has not been the same politician throughout the crisis. The Assads of 2011, 2015 and 2019 are considerably different. It is even possible to say that these are three different political figures with three different types of behavior.

In 2011, Middle Eastern autocracies fell like dominoes and it seemed that Syria would quickly follow behind Egypt and Libya, and that Bashar al Assad would follow Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi. The prospect of a rapid overthrow loomed in front of Damascus.

In 2015, Assad, who several years earlier managed to transfer the seemingly inevitable collapse into a protracted civil war, was completely exhausted and went to the last frontier. So, Russia decided to directly intervene into the Syrian civil war, which the Russian leadership avoided up to the last moment. The result we may see today.

In contrast to 2011 and 2015, in 2019, Assad feels like a winner in the Syrian civil war, after recapturing most of the lost territory. Of course, statements by some officials, including Russian ones, claiming that “the war in Syria is over” and “the country is returning to a peaceful life,” should be considered at least premature. However, it is clear that Assad today has the psychological state of a winner who has pulled back from the edge of the abyss. This radical change in the civil war has transformed the psychological state of Assad and may lead to a change in how he acts.

The first task of Syria in turning the tide of the civil war is a final restoration of control over the country’s territory. Here there are two geographies: Idlib, controlled by the Democratic Union Party; and the east of the Euphrates, by the People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the support of the U.S.

There is no one-step solution available to Damascus in the east of the Euphrates River. As long as the U.S supports the PYD and YPG, then Damascus can do nothing about the YPG enclave that was established with U.S.’ support and protection. Some hopes, although very uncertain, have been raised by the announcement made by President Trump at the end of last year to withdraw American soldiers from Syria. However, nothing indicates that this decision may, even theoretically, be implemented in the foreseeable future. Attempts to replace American troops with Europeans have still not led to a result.

Syrian Civil War Cannot Be Won Militarily

The task of Russia looks much more complex and goes beyond specific case of the Syrian civil war. As a global player, Russia takes into account much more factors than just supporting Damascus. Which, in fact, President Putin once again demonstrated during his visit to Ankara. 

Firstly, the civil war in Syria cannot be won with a mere military victory and it would not be enough for establishing peace and tranquility. At this stage what is required is the arrangement of political dialogue between all parties of the conflict. It is clear that an exclusively military solution of the Idlib problem will only contribute to solving the short-term task of establishing control over an important part of the country by Damascus. However, it will deepen the problem of the country’s division. Therefore, it will not solve the problem of ensuring sustainable peace in the country, about which, Russian President Putin constantly speaks.

Secondly, at this stage, Russia considers Bashar al Assad as the only political figure who can keep the country together. Therefore, Russia seeks to restore his legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, primarily in the West, including the European Union. Russian diplomats are nowadays making noticeable efforts to reopen international diplomatic missions in Damascus.

Thirdly, Russia wants to return as a full-fledged player in the Mediterranean basin through Syria. This task has two dimensions: one of them is military, and the other is political. The military dimension is already ensured by the presence of Russian military bases in Syria – both aviation (Khmeimim) and naval (Tartus). The political dimension is impossible without Russia itself being able to engage in dialogue with various forces in the region, which it trying to hold in Syria.

And finally, it is clear that Russia cannot be an equidistant player in the Middle East. However, the Russian Foreign Ministry is trying its best to be able to maintain a dialogue with all regional players. Even with those with whom there are serious disagreements. Therefore, interrupting dialogue is a bad option, which it is trying to avoid.

In the context of Russian-Turkish relations, this means that for now in the eyes of Russia, the continuation of dialogue between Moscow and Ankara and the joint large strategic projects (such as the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, Akkuyu NPP, the supply of S-400), outweigh both the failure in the implementation of the Sochi agreement signed a year ago, as well as Turkey’s pursuit of its own policy in Syria, which differs markedly from Russia.

In its dialogue with Turkey, the Russian side still hopes that Turkey will gradually increase the level of its dialogue with Damascus, anticipating that, in the end, Turkey will finally abandon the expectation that “Assad must leave,” as a condition for beginning an active political dialogue in Syria.

Taking into account the motivation of the Russian leadership disclosed above, it becomes clear why at the final press conference of the trilateral meetings not a single word was said either about the Sochi Agreement or about the situation in Idlib.

Although, Russia is extremely concerned that Turkey’s fulfillment of its obligations under the Sochi Agreement is being delayed, this didn’t prevent the leaders of the three countries, including President Putin, from demonstrating a good mood, and together with the Presidents Erdogan and Rouhani, from making jokes with the audience during the final press-conference after the Summit on September 16, 2016.

Astana bigger than Astana

In its regional affairs Russia is guided by the position of strategic patience, obviously not wanting to risk its relations with Turkey – both existing and promising (including cooperation and contracts in the defense industry). Hence, it is ready to move towards the formation of the Constitutional Committee and the adoption of a new constitution for the country as per the Astana Peace Plan despite the unresolved case of Idlib.

There is one more circumstance that can be discerned from the results of President Putin’s trip to Ankara, it is the desire to make “Astana bigger than Astana”. That is to turn the Astana format of the Syrian settlement into a permanent Astana platform to solve regional issues in the Middle East. It creates a precedent for resolving difficult regional problems exclusively by regional powers in a “micro format” without resorting to large, slow, and inefficient instruments like the UN, and is a breakthrough towards a new world order. It is in this context, that the statements made by the three presidents in Ankara towards Yemen, and their willingness to contribute to the settlement of the crisis should be understood. No doubt, the existence of such a strategic goal outweighs the difficulties faced on the road towards peaceful settlement in Syria or the existence of disagreements between Russia, Turkey and Iran. Moreover, all three countries are united by a commitment to the territorial integrity of Syria.

Following the last meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, they announced that there was a list of constitutional committee members agreed to by both the Syrian government and the opposition. They also confirmed that efforts to form the committee and kick off its work were a priority and developments were expected soon.

Talk of the creation of a Syrian constitutional committee is the result of Turkish, Russian and Iranian efforts via the Astana process to help move the conflict towards a political solution. Leaders of these countries act as guarantors for Astana decisions and insist that the process aims to reinforce UNSC resolution 2254 (2013) which, calls for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The constitutional committee is to be formed with 150 members: 50 regime representatives, 50 opposition representatives and 50 civil society representatives chosen by the UN.

However, it is unlikely that progress will be made on the constitutional committee with the situation as it is in Syria. Both the conditions on the ground and the political atmosphere are not conducive for a diplomatically negotiated solution. Without disregarding the efforts of regional and international actors at reducing the violence and moving the conflict towards a negotiated solution, it’s not enough to achieve the conditions needed for the formation of a constitutional committee. This is because the demilitarized zone agreed to by Russia and Turkey are not going to keep the regime at bay, the fight east of the Euphrates is still up in the air, and the political consensus needed to make basic decisions regarding the constitution are nonexistent. These obstacles are the main reasons why a political solution to the Syrian conflict and efforts to do so through the formation of a constitutional committee are doomed for failure.

Operational obstacles to a negotiated solution

Even though many claim that the military situation on the ground is wrapping up, this is an incorrect assessment. Unfortunately, the many efforts to bring violent attacks to a halt in Syria have failed to do so and the largely defenseless civilian population is usually at the receiving end of such attacks. Military operations are ongoing in eastern Syria, chasing down the remnants of Daesh fighters that were not in Baghouz when the U.S.-led coalition attacked that territory. Furthermore, in the north east, the so called Syrian Democratic Forces – of which the PKK’s Syrian wing, the YPG, make up the bulk of the force, are on a crash course with the locals, Arab tribes, and Daesh sleeper cells. The situation in eastern Syria is further complicated following a recently released statement from Hayat Tahrir al Shaam, the Jabhat al Nusra Al Qaeda affiliate that is the dominant force in Idlib and northern Hama, which claims that sleeper cells of its own, living in regime controlled parts of Deir Ezzor, attacked and killed a number of regime soldiers. This came just days after the YPG-dominated SDF announced the defeat of Daesh in its last enclave, Baghouz. 

In northwestern Syria, the Syrian regime – backed by Russian air power – continues to conduct air strikes in northern Hama and Idlib province – especially along the M5 highway. These strikes are causing serious damage to civilian infrastructure and also killing civilians, including children. A successful regime operation would result in a further consolidated regime victory over the opposition and an unprecedented displacement of civilians and opposition members who would be forced to leave Idlib towards northern Aleppo or into Turkey. This would surely destabilize the Turkey backed Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield territories and put added pressure on Turkey to ensure security and stability in these territories. Just a few days ago a Turkish soldier was killed in an exchange of mortar fire between Turkey-backed forces in northern Aleppo and YPG elements in Tel Rifaat. With the Turkish Minister of Defense Hulusi Akar opening a new operations command center in Akcakale, Turkey is surely motivated to keep military operations in high gear. Especially against groups like the PKK affiliate, the YPG, who pose a direct threat to Turkey’s national security. Likewise, Russia and the regime backed by Iran are not taking off the table the option of an offensive in Idlib any time soon.

Understanding what the future holds for Syria is aided by the case of the southern Syrian province of Daraa. There the Syrian opposition was forced to concede their weapons and sign Russian facilitated reconciliation agreements with the regime because the United States told opposition forces there that they could no longer protect them from Russian and regime attacks. Now, the frustrated public, and select opposition forces, have formed what is being called a “popular resistance.” They have claimed several attacks that have targeted Syrian regime officials, including an Air Force Intelligence officer and Hezbollah operatives operating between Damascus and Daraa.

In northwestern Syria, the Syrian regime – backed by Russian air power – continues to conduct air strikes in northern Hama and Idlib province – especially along the M5 highway. These strikes are causing serious damage to civilian infrastructure and also killing civilians, including children

And east of the Euphrates, the PKK is further entrenching it’s forces into public life. PKK founder Ocalan is venerated by militant ideologues who plaster his face all across northeastern Syria from Deir Ez-zor, to Raqqa, and Qamishli. With U.S. forces on the retreat, Arab tribal forces are expected to counterbalance the influence of Leninist Marxist ideologies. However, the tribal forces’ loyalties are misplaced, working with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in an attempt to take measures steps to prevent further Iranian expansion in Syria. Their fear is that when the U.S. retreats, the regime, backed by Iranian funded militias, will move in to take valuable Syrian territory. The land east of the Euphrates is where most of Syria’s oil fields and natural resources are found- including fresh water and are able land that produces much of Syria’s grains.

With so much at stake, a political solution may not be the most feasible means for reaching an end to the conflict. The regime is still hopeful to retake the entire country by force, further legitimizing Assad’s rule. And Russia is stuck between propping up a government that has destroyed its own country for the sake of survival, and working with Turkey, hoping to bring it further away from NATOs sphere of influence.

Diplomatic obstacles to a negotiated solution

With the situation on the ground so complicated, the diplomatic efforts are a reflection of those intricacies. Both Turkey and Russia are insistent on achieving progress through the Astana process because it will secure their voices at future negotiations and ensure their participation in a rebuilding process, worth hundreds of billions by some estimates, that Russia and the regime insist have already begun. However, ensuring the necessary progress is proving more difficult than desired.

There are three groups that are to make up the proposed constitutional committee. If Russia and Turkey have reached consensus on the regime and opposition lists, there remains the question of approving the list of 50 Syrian civil society members. Those are to be chosen by the new UN Special Envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen. He adopted from his predecessor a Syrian Civil Society Support Group that is sanctioned by the UN. They sponsor and facilitate meetings with Syrian civil society organizations that operate inside Syria and outside as well. The issue with those civil society members is that they may not have approvals from other members of the constitutional committee, from both the regime and opposition sides. Some observers familiar with Syrian politics note that the Syrian civil society inside regime controlled areas is generally pro regime and do not represent the Syrian public at large. The second group of Syrian civil society adopts the opposition’s approach to the conflict and operate in opposition controlled areas and in Turkey. The third portion of Syria’s civil society organizations operate in YPG controlled areas east of the Euphrates River and are directly affiliated with the Marxist Leninist PYD political wing of the YPG. The division of Syrian civil society will make it very difficult for the incoming UN Special Envoy’s job of finalizing a Syrian civil society list that much more difficult.

Another major issue of contention is the constitution itself. There are two approaches to dealing with the constitution. Unconfirmed reports to Arab news sources say the French are suggesting skipping writing a new constitution and making amendments to the 2012 constitution. These amendments would be reached through direct negotiations between the regime and the opposition facilitated by the international community. The regime accepted this proposal on the condition that future elections would only allow people in regime controlled areas to participate in the voting.  This option excludes the votes of the millions of Syrians that are displaced inside Syria, made refugees in surrounding countries, and those Syrians that are yet to be accounted for. The other option is for the constitutional committee form and engage in extensive negotiations to write a new constitution. Neither of these options are possible without first making progress on some core issues: release of prisoners, return of refugees, and holding those responsible for crimes against the Syrian people accountable. Insecurity and instability are a symptom of a larger condition in Syria. The cycle of violence Syrians are living in is a result of the Assad regime’s security apparatus and violent attacks against defenseless civilians. If this is not stopped, then any efforts towards a political solution will be in vain.

Finally, there are erroneous calls for changing the name of the Syrian Arab Republic so that it does not have any ethnic identifier. PKK ideologues representing the so-called Autonomous Administration in eastern Syria are calling for a complete autonomy and are engaged with negotiations with the Assad regime to achieve this status. It’s not clear if they have made much progress, but what is clear is that they expect to play a significant role in any of the future scenarios regarding forming a constitutional committee and moving the country out of a cycle of violence and into a political transition. Ironically, all of their efforts are quite deceptive since they have been partners with the regime in suppressing legitimate opposition against Assad, they have coordinated business transactions between Assad and Daesh, and have contributed to the destruction of major Syrian cities including Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, and helped U.S. forces kill scores of civilians in the name of fighting terror.

The PKK’s efforts are deceptive since they have been partners with the Syrian regime in suppressing legitimate opposition. The PKK has also coordinated business transactions between Assad and Daesh, and contributed to the destruction of major Syrian cities. 

Constitutional committee woes

Forming a constitutional committee requires that the participants have consensus and approval from all sides. The cycle of violence on the ground must come to an end and civilians must be able to reunite with their families and return to their homes. But as UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen clearly saw when he visited Home recently, regime efforts are more focused on rebuilding and renovating destroyed markets than rebuilding civilian homes and letting people come back home. Unfortunately, the international community may be sabotaging efforts to form a constitutional committee because they see little potential in the Syrian opposition and do not want Turkey and Russia to succeed in creating the political momentum needed to push the political solution forward and give reverence to the UN Geneva resolution 2254. For these reasons the military option is still very much on the table for the Assad regime and its Iranian allies. Russian pressure may not be enough to stop an Iranian backed Assad regime from trying to retake Idlib province.

Engaging in talks preceded by confidence building measures including the release of prisoners and excluding those responsible for committing gross human rights violations from the political process are critical to ensuring the success of any political efforts towards peace. For the Astana guarantors, cooperation and coordination with the UN, is critical to keep the momentum of their diplomatic efforts alive. But before any of this can move forward, there needs to be real grass roots support from the Syrian public in regime controlled areas, opposition controlled areas, and the Syrians spread around the region and the world. Furthermore, regardless of developments on the ground, without the participation of the Syrian public, both inside and outside Syria, a constitution written in Geneva or Astana, or even Paris, may not have the legitimacy required to mobilize the Syrian public to participate in a transitional political process. This is even more unlikely if Bashar al Assad remains the figurehead of the Syrian regime and is not held accountable for the crimes he, and those who fought with him, committed against the Syrian people.

Yesterday in Geneva, Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Russia and Iran – Mevlut Cavusoglu, Sergey Lavrov, Muhammad Javad Zarif – agreed upon the establishment of a constitutional commission of which the composition is yet to be set.  

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov read the joint statement after the three ministers met UN Syria peace envoy Staffan de Mistura yesterday in Geneva, Switzerland. The statement emphasized that the agreement will be oriented “by a sense of compromise and constructive engagement.” 

Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu said that the three countries have reached an important phase in the establishment of the commission, which will write the future constitution of Syria, speaking to the press after the meeting.

Cavusoglu stated that there is no disagreement on the names proposed by both the Syrian regime and the opposition; he added “However, there are some differences of opinion on the list of non-governmental actors. In this matter, as the guarantor states we are working with the United Nations.”

Cavusoglu added that the three ministers also discussed the rules of procedure of the constitutional commission and said “In what percentage the commission has to take decisions, two-third or more, will there be a president or will he have deputies, will there be a co-president. We have discussed these kind of issues. So, we are coming towards an end gradually.”

Highlighting the intensifying efforts of the three countries in order to establish the commission as soon as possible, Cavusoglu said, “We anticipate that the first meeting of this commission will take place in the first month of next year. As the Astana guarantors of the process, we will continue the process by intensifying our efforts. In this regard, today’s meeting has been very productive. We hope that these meetings will bear best results for the political solution and the future of Syria. As an important actor, we (Turkey) will continue to retain our contribution to the process.”

On the other hand, according to Sputnik News, spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry – Bahram Qasimi – told Tasmin news agency that if the military operation, which Turkey wants to initiate towards the YPG/PYD in north of Syria, starts without the consent of the Syrian regime, the application of the agreements that have been agreed upon in Astana process will be difficult. 

Meanwhile, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, Siban Hamo – the leader of YPG in northern Syria – said that Russian officials are pleased with Turkish threats to the U.S.-backed YPG in northern Syria and complained that the Syrian regime is not doing anything to defend its northern border. Hamo added “Turkey is seeking through all means to eliminate the gains made by the YPG and has mobilized its troops on the border and bombed terrorists inside Syria. We are ready for a joint action (with Syria) to deter Turkey.”

While Turkey is waiting for the ‘moment’ to start its military operation against the YPG controlled areas in Northeast Syria, Sputnik News reported that the one of the commanders of the Syrian Peshmerga under the autonomous Kurdistan administration in north of Iraq – Badal Bandi – stated that their forces will move to Syria soon.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

On September 7, the leaders of Turkey, Russia, and Iran met in Tehran to discuss the Syrian issue with Idlib being the most important topic on the agenda. The organizers broadcasted the whole summit, which allowed us to witness a kind of a televised argument in which Erdogan ceased the moment to ask Putin and Rouhani for a ceasefire in Idlib. Basically, what the Turkish side was trying to achieve is to spare lives of more than 3.5 million civilians in the province from the Assad regime’s aggression, and buy some time to solve the problem.

During the summit, Turkey’s President highlighted his country’s grave concerns and sensitivities towards the issue. If a major assault is to be launched against the Syrian province, the humanitarian catastrophe will be big and Turkey, with its maximum capacity being utilized to support refugees, will not have more room to deal with it. Stressing the importance of Idlib, the Turkish side clearly said that it is a matter of national security and will not leave the city.

President Erdogan may not have fully succeeded in convincing both leaders to halt the military operation; however, the political showdown uncovered in the summit shed light on the different agendas, interests, and priorities of Turkey, Russia and Iran. If we add the U.S. to the mix, then it would be safe to assume that the way the Idlib dilemma is going to be handled will have a profound impact on the power game evolving in Syria and on its future.

Despite the unlimited support the Syrian regime is getting from Moscow and Tehran, Assad is still less than a decision maker in his country’s affairs. By defeating the opposition and taking over their last stronghold Idlib, Assad’s allies want to guarantee his regime a better position in the political process, boost the efforts to extend its control over Syria, and expedite the ongoing proceeding to re-legitimatize it as a de-facto ruler for the whole country.

Although in a very unfavorable position vis-à-vis the Russia-Iran-Assad axis from one side, the U.S.- SDF/ PYD /YPG axis from another, Turkey –as clearly reflected by the Tehran summit– is the only country which is still actively defying Assad in public and behind closed doors. In this sense, Ankara is seen as an obstacle that needs to be neutralized if not completely removed from Idlib.

Unlike other times where Russia conceded for Turkey, things seem to be a little bit different now. Aware of Ankara’s critical position, Putin insisted on his stance, refused to include “ceasefire” in the text and showed support for the assault against the province with the pretext of the presence of terrorist organizations. After the summit, Assad and Russia intensified their aerial bombardment giving a clear sign that a land assault is near.

The situation will harshly test Ankara–Moscow relations in Syria and how both of them will cope with the coming developments and challenges there. A major assault on Idlib is expected to create a humanitarian catastrophe and trigger flows of refugees towards the Turkish borders. This will increase the political, economic, and security pressure on Ankara, but most importantly will hinder its credibility as a guarantor in the eyes of the Syrian opposition. The direct result will likely be the end of the Astana process and the breakdown of the trilateral mechanism with further implications to come.

Thus, by ignoring Turkey’s critical points and concerns, Moscow not only risks undermining its understandings with Ankara, but also endangers the fate of the political process in a way that will likely make a sustainable solution in Syria impossible. Taking into consideration that, without Turkey, there can be no serious progress on the coming non-military challenges (constitutional law, preparing for elections, construction….etc), Russia would be shooting itself in the foot if it insists on a full scale military assault on Idlib.

Moscow needs to understand very well the risks arising from such a scenario and that without taking Ankara’s concerns into account, it might win the war but it will never win peace. If decision makers in Russia are fully aware of this point, then there will be still a slim chance to halt the military operation or at least downsize it to a limited operation.

To be sure, everyone except Turkey, seems to be agreeing on the military operation in a way or another including the U.S. While Russia and Iran are in a rush to achieve the above-stated goals and consolidate Assad’s power, Washington made it clear that its only concern is the use of chemical weapons. Last week, U.S. ambassador to the UN said at a UN press conference, “If they – Assad and his allies- want to continue to go the route of taking over Syria, they can do that, but they cannot do it with chemical weapons.”

Just five months ago, U.S. President Trump stressed that he wanted to withdraw from Syria and bring his troops back home. Now Trump has agreed to a new strategy that indefinitely extends the military effort to ensure the departure of Iran and its proxy forces, the “enduring defeat” of Daesh (IS), the establishment of a stable, nonthreatening government acceptable to all Syrians and the international community.

Yet, allowing Assad to kill civilians, take over Idlib, and extend his control over more territories with the help of Iran and Russia will run against the freshly stated goals of Washington’s new policy in Syria. It will be hard to imagine that the U.S. will be able stay in Syria indefinitely, prevent the emergence of terrorists, and drive Iran out of the country if Assad is going to consolidate his powers. In this context, the U.S. has an interest in stopping the imminent military assault on Idlib and can work with Turkey on this issue for their mutual benefit.

Americans have always complained lately about the Turkish-Russian cooperation. It should be kept in mind that Ankara is working with Moscow in Syria after it was on the verge of war with it at the end of 2015 because the U.S. decided to downsize itself and make alliance with a franchise branch of the PKK in Syria, thus constantly working against Turkey’s national security.

Currently, disagreements with Russia and Iran on Idlib are visible. Turkey, a NATO ally, is saying it will stand its ground amid the imminent military assault of Assad and his allies on the city. However, since the balance of power is not in Turkey’s favor versus Assad, Iran and Russia, the U.S. can step in to defend Ankara, not only politically but militarily if needed. When they have the will, Americans proved that they can act. They defended the PYD against Assad, they defended themselves against Russian mercenaries without the pretext that such a lethal engagement will lead to a total war.

Another option on U.S.-Turkey cooperation in this matter can be explored too. U.S. officials can offer valuable intelligence information that might help Ankara convince Moscow that there is a more effective way to work on counterterrorism operation in Idlib rather than letting Assad and his allies take over the city with the pretext of fighting terrorism. This will not only raise Turkey’s chance to halt the operation but will serve Washington’s interest too.

If it were considered as a country, Idlib would have been the second country in hosting refugees. The Tehran summit proved that Ankara’s position to defend the civilians in Idlib against the Assad regime is not another PR strategy rather than an ethical position, which is constantly undermined by the imbalance of power. Defending civilians against the brutality of the Assad regime and his allies should not only be Turkey’s responsibility. The international community, including the U.S., has great responsibilities to carry in this particular matter as well.

Idlib, the last stronghold of the military and political opposition, is becoming a new episode for the seven-year-old Syrian Civil War. While the Syrian regime and Iran-backed Shia militias are planning a military offensive against the opposition in Idlib, where approximately 2,9 million people including internally displaced people live, Russia has puzzling hesitations whether the military option would bring a solution or produce more chaos for the Russian strategy in Syria.

“A military solution here would be a disaster, not just for the Idlib region, but a disaster regarding Syria’s future,” Mevlut Cavusoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, told a news conference in Moscow with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. However, Turkey’s priorities in reaching a peaceful solution for Idlib are becoming more difficult and complicated to achieve due to the nature of the conflict in the region.

The dynamics of geopolitical competition among the regional countries and Turkey’s self-capabilities are in test vis-a-vis overcoming Ankara’s strategic anxieties on the ground, mainly to achieve what Russia and other international actors are expecting from Turkey’s military presence there and political engagement with the opposition groups in the region.

The deterioration of Turkish-American relations, in which both countries have divergent policies towards Syria – particularly in the eastern part of the country – is also creating more complexities for the future of the Idlib region, as well as Turkey’s difficult role in it. At this stage, the actors involved in the new Idlib turmoil have competing strategies and divergence policy options.

Turkey’s priorities in Idlib

Turkey has twelve military observation points in the Idlib region to observe the de-escalation agreement in which Russia, Turkey, and Iran had agreed upon within the framework of the Astana summits. From the very beginning, Turkey started to establish military observation points in Idlib. Ankara safely delivered its security priorities in terms of increasing the number of military outposts across the Idlib region, preventing the radical groups, particularly Al-Qaeda affiliated ones, such as HTS, from getting more ground among the military opposition and remobilizing moderate armed groups under the framework of the National Army.

However, it is difficult to say that Turkey successfully de-integrated radical groups and eliminated their military capacity due to internal dynamics among the armed groups, the rigid ideological perception of the radical groups toward the peaceful solution in Syria and the military moves of the Syrian regime towards the opposition groups in the Idlib region. The HTS’s political and military mobilization in the area and its militant ideology was an extremely important obstacle in achieving Turkey’s original strategy.

At this stage, Turkey’s security priorities are shaped by many puzzling variables. As Ankara’s intensive diplomatic talks with Russia have demonstrated during the last two weeks, Turkey firstly aims to prevent the Syrian regime’s unilateral military intervention against the opposition groups. For Ankara, a large-scale military operation without distinguishing civilians from radical armed groups can create a new wave of instability in the region that would cause another conflict spill-over effect from Syria to Turkey.

The new mass refugee flow towards Turkey, together with the potential of an influx of radical fighters, can create another security threat for Turkey and can complicate the already existing massive refugee issue in the country. More importantly, there is a most-likely scenario that Turkish troops in the Idlib region intentionally or unintentionally can be targeted by any other third party and this might trigger the conflict between Turkey and other actors that are operationally involved in the Idlib war.

In addition to these security concerns for Turkey, strategically, the Idlib offensive apparently with the victory of the Syrian regime at the end of the day, can create real strategic pressure on Turkey’s military presence in the Afrin region where the Turkish forces defeated the PKK and ensured the Free Syrian Army’s military and political presence there.

The most important thing for Turkey’s strategic priorities is the continuation of its military presence in the region, especially within the western part of the Euphrates river. At this stage, it seems that Ankara and Moscow are continuing with their negotiations over the issue and that the Russian side is expecting for Turkey, before it’s too late, to achieve what they agreed upon in Astana.

The puzzle of the Turkish-Russian dialogue

While Turkey sees the potential Idlib conflict from the very center of its national and regional security priorities, Russia has a completely different agenda. The Russians see the military fall of Idlib by the Syrian regime as a tactical and operational issue, yet Moscow cannot be sure about the broader implications of the Idlib war across Syria -including the remobilization of militant groups, the continuation of the war, and destruction of the Astana agreement.

Ankara understands the Idlib war from the angel of a massive flow of refugees into Turkey, remobilization risk of radicals along its border, and the potential threat against its strategy of containing the PKK/YPG in the region. While Turkey can influence military oppositions, Russia is the only country that can contain the Syrian regime’s military operations against opposition groups in Idlib. From a realistic perspective, both countries are locked with a dilemma; the dilemma between choosing a strategy that relies on a war against the radical groups and maintaining peaceful negotiations with radical armed groups to dissolve their military structure.

At this stage, Ankara’s expectation is for Russia not to easily open the gate for a full-scale military campaign for the Syrian regime forces.  As Lavrov stated in the press meeting in Moscow, Turkey and Russia will continue to bring a diplomatic solution as they had agreed to apply for opposition armed groups in Aleppo last year. What Turkey and Russia agreed in their meeting in Moscow remains unclear, yet Russia proposed to Turkey some options both to eliminate the HTS, which is the most influential armed group (approximately 13. 000 fighters) inside the Idlib region and to bring a peaceful diplomatic solution. However, the realities on the ground are more complex than Turkey’s and Russia’s desire to eliminate HTS presence in a minimal time.

As the leader of the HTS Abu Mohammad al-Golani declared many times in his statements that they would not allow the Syrian regime military assault and demobilize their fighters. Rather than dissolving the group, the HTS member declared that they are “working hard to arrive to a useful solution in the liberated north.” More importantly, the very nature of the groups is complex; they are not composed of indigenous fighters and their ideological commitment to “revolution” is hierarchical and radical.

If Russia and Turkey can agree over a haven option in which the members (it is not possible to know how many fighters would leave the HTS in this process) can survive, then the Syrian regime military campaign may be out of option. This narrative is not limited to the HTS. There are also other armed groups that have an entirely different view toward the ongoing uncertainties.

Therefore, it is not clear whether the diplomatic dialogue will necessarily bring about a peaceful solution to the Idlib region and whether it will determine the status of the opposition. However, Russia and Turkey are still key actors who will determine the future of Idlib.

The U.S. factor in Idlib

While Turkey and Russia are the main determinant powers for the future of Idlib, the U.S. administration has indirect concerns regarding the situation in Idlib. However, three interrelated dynamics shape the U.S. perception towards Idlib.

The first is the probability of a chemical attack by the Syrian regime against the civilian population in Idlib. The U.S, France, and Britain released a joint statement regarding the military offensive of the Syrian regime against civilian and civilians infrastructure in Idlib by using chemical weapons. U.S. officials are particularly worried that the regime would turn to chlorine-filled helicopter-launched barrel bombs as it has in the past.

The second one is the potential strategic re-consolidation of Iranian influence through the Idlib offensive. The Syrian regime’s military power is heavily dependent on Iranian proxies to fight against opposition groups in the region. It is a critical topic since the Russians are unwilling to support the regime’s military assault. The U.S. administration sees an Idlib offensive as an opportunity for Iran to reconsolidate its military influence in Syria. This is especially important following the announcement of Iranian officials that Tehran agreed to a deal deepen military cooperation with Syria despite moves by the U.S. to contain Iranian military reach in Syria. This move also undermines the U.S.’s attempt to convince Russia to get rid of Iranian capabilities and to get Iranian fighters out of the country.

The third factor that shapes the U.S. understanding of Idlib is the possibility of a dissemination of radical armed groups across Syria – which would escalate another violent moment in the Syrian crisis. At this stage, it is difficult to say that the U.S. administration has an obvious policy option towards the situation in Idlib except that the U.S. wants to remain in contact with Russia and Turkey.

Options and implications

The future of Idlib remains unknown, but which actors will be determinant in shaping the already fragmented issue on the ground depends on their capability either to convince the self-disbanding radical anti-regime forces or to fight against them. It seems that Turkey has limited influence over the Al-Qaida affiliated armed groups to transform them peacefully. Ankara also does not want to fight against the radical groups at this stage unless Turkey is targeted by any of them.

The only way for the solution and to prevent a new political and security turmoil in the region is the evacuation of the radical armed groups from Idlib. It is hard to guess at this stage who can determine who is who regarding their level of extremism, yet Turkey’s and Russia’s intensive diplomatic attempts can bring a new way out from the Idlib elusiveness.

If this option does not work on the ground, then a limited military campaign against particular armed groups and especially HTS-led places in the Idlib region will be conducted by Russia and Syrian regimes forces. If this becomes the case, a limited refugee flow towards Turkey should be expected.

If the regime and Russian military campaign goes beyond a limited military intervention and turns into a full-scale military assault, then two major developments should be expected. The first one is the radicalization of the moderate armed groups against Russia and the Syrian regime, and the second is the alienation of Turkey from the Astana process, which might bring more cost for Russia. At this point, the upcoming summit between Russia, Turkey, and Iran in Tehran on September 7 will be of critical importance as it will determine the decisiveness of the three actors to maintain their consensus on a ceasefire and de-escalation zone, or to shape the future of the Syrian crisis.