Turkey’s border security cannot be maintained only by the physical presence of border posts along the border of the country, but needs a holistic approach that requires an efficient border management system and intelligence capacity for pre-emptive measures on both sides of the border.

The Limits of Authority

Turkish law assigns three military forces to securing the borders. The Turkish Army is responsible for the protection of land borders while territory under water at the coasts is directed to Turkish Coast Guard Command and air space is under the coverage of the Turkish Air Force. But Turkish law flags the Ministry of Interior as the authorized body for the border affairs through provincial Governors. Customs, on the other hand, is under the Ministry of Customs and Trade. Hence the laws pertaining to border affairs involve three different ministries, which may make coordination more difficult, although their lines of authority are clearly demarcated. But the issues of centralization and the unity of command to cover all borders are concerns, especially if the Turkish General Staff is added to this list, since the law also gives it authority in some respects.

Border Security Architecture

Turkish borders are far longer than many European borders, and have a complicated terrain. Hence the usual approach by the European Union to secure borders does not meet the realities of the Turkish border coverage. For this reason, Turkey is confronted with numerous challenges to design a new sui generis architectural structure to secure her borders in accordance with new threats, security needs, and geographical positions and domestic/foreign policy choices. Turkey needs to tighten security measures and augment the current structure along the Syrian and Iraqi borders because of the demographic facts, contradictory political strategies of outer powers, and the presence of secessionist groups.

Initially, a promising border security architecture needs to be constructed upon the regional characteristics of Turkey’s borders and its neighbourhood. The issues include illegal immigration, human trafficking, goods and drug trafficking, infiltration by terror networks, communication between divided families and tribes, reconnaissance and surveillance activities of neighbouring states, potential conflicts over disputed islands and isles, and containing crises surrounding Turkey in their countries of origin.

Aside from static factors (like geography) and a global power struggle in the Middle East, there are also other dynamics or newly-emerging factors forcing Turkey to improve security at its borders. For instance, since the 1990s Turkey has long been faced with illegal immigration stemming from migrants and refugees fleeing from conflict zones such as Iraq, Syria, Iran and Afghanistan in order to reach Europe. These problems, which no state actors aside from Turkey face, require a determined stance at the borders with active and pre-emptive undertakings to respond to all the listed concerns.

Contrary to the security picture, the relevant Turkish law limits the border security units by having them stay in designated zones except in exceptional circumstances, meaning securing the area requires an active and flexible border security strategy. An active border security strategy should have a holistic and flexible nature based on a functional decision making process that addresses concerns far beyond the borders. Regarding these static and dynamic risk factors, Turkey should reconstruct the border architecture with more ‘preventive’ security measures which would go beyond the formal distance limits determined in the applicable law.

More precisely, Turkey needs to adopt and implement a much more ‘proactive border security strategy’ than ever before, in order to meet current and urgent needs for detecting and deterring security threats. The border units must have the capability of confronting threats, mainly emanating from international terror networks.

A “proactive border strategy”

Accordingly, national law as well as the implications of cross-border legislation should be reviewed and a “proactive border strategy” should be reformulated after determining and describing the focus and scope of the new border policy, instruments to be developed for tasks and tools to be used for control mechanisms. Likewise, this new architecture must allow dispatching through a central control center while possessing an enriched and authorized structure in terms of intelligence tools, technologically-oriented border control systems, deeply echeloned and retaliation capabilities. What is intended with the word ‘integrative’ when speaking of new border architecture is not to demarcate borders by land, sea or air but rather taking border incidents in all their three-dimensional aspects; hence using the accurate and efficient tools that are available to the state.

By adopting such a holistic approach, no matter what kind of challenges are being confronted, the crucial thing is determining the engagement rules which will be then comprehensively enforced by all government bodies, in the light of previously defined policies and strategies of the Turkish state. However along with the provincial governors who are the national authorities responsible for the administrative tasks in implementing border management policy, it is necessary to create a new organization that can coordinate the entire capabilities of the state. Hence a centralized border organization, like a Directorate of Border Security, is a vital need to track all reported events, create a rapid decision-making mechanism and guide the relevant border units in accordance with the policies and strategies of the Turkish Government. Thus, a management system for land, sea and air borders appears to be a pre-condition for efficient coordination and integration of efforts.

The second issue appears to be the intelligence organizations and assets possessed by border units. Within the overall framework of border security management, deploying the assigned (frontier) personnel in watchtowers or on monitoring/surveillance activities run by these personnel at the borders is not merely inadequate but also potentially risky. On the other hand, considering the wide terrain which a border battalion is in charge of, technology-focused solutions must be taken into account with a broader perspective of border security.

Turkey has modernized the equipment used by its border units/troops, and also has procured and deployed armored vehicles equipped with long-range detection and tracking systems in recent years. Furthermore, Turkey has developed various projects related to the procurement and use of unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) on the borders as well as accelerated procurement of foreign and domestically produced surveillance balloons. As a result of these developments, many positive steps have been taken towards implementing a comprehensive border security strategy. These efforts have without doubt contributed to securing the border and augmenting force protection of Turkish border units.

Technology-focused solutions

As for intelligence-driven border security, it is an undeniable fact that technology-focused solutions are crucial in intelligence-related systems. Due to the high insecurity level in risk-based environments, border guards/units on all levels should be legally authorized and equipped with high-tech intelligence systems in order to detect, deter and prevent threats effectively. In particular, the threat of infiltration or attempted attacks on Turkish troops by terrorist organizations harboring separatist tendencies deployed across the Iraq and Syria borders can be diminished by establishing an integrated and effective working intelligence mechanism.

Ground radars and thermal cameras, for instance, can be used for short range surveillance tasks. Mini-UAVs can fly up to 15 km while tactical and operative level UAVs are allotted for strategic collation tasks. But border units should see far beyond these limits to identify threats by exploiting high-tech intelligence assets of various intelligence disciplines to verify or falsify suspected border threats long before they are close to Turkish borders. The integration and coordination of border units’ intelligence gathering will provide early warnings to all positioned border units before any potential attack occurs.

The threat of terror emanating from Syria and Iraq especially calls for Turkey to prevent infiltration and attacks by these networks using effective intelligence systems. To construct such an intelligence system, Turkish border units need to extend their surveillance capacities 50-100 km at both sides of the border at battalion level for tactical purposes. Furthermore, strategic intelligence systems need to be procured that can be directed to 200 km at least. These assets are not only ground radars, but all sorts of intelligence assets. An integrated all source intelligence system; say combining assets of imagery, open source, human, measurement and signature, signal intelligence at tactical and operative level appears to be the essential system needed for border security.

In order to secure the homeland, it is key to ensure border security, to prevent the illegal crossing of humans and goods. Hence current border security needs to be bolstered with a new security architecture. The current border security of Turkey is functional and adequate, but needs to be improved by, first, an efficient management system that coordinates the involved institutions of four ministries. Secondly, high-tech products rather than human-based solutions, mainly intelligence capabilities, appear to be an urgent field requirement to detect border threats before they are too close to combat. A multi-disciplinary intelligence perception is needed to build such a system.

Turkey has long been in search of strengthening its border security and protecting its military bases, and for sure high value facilities, scattered in the mountains of south eastern Anatolia. Terrorist organizations based in Iraq and Syria, including the PKK/KONGRA-GEL/PYD/YPG/DEASH, frequently attempted to infiltrate Turkish territory either for attacking Turkish citizens or in a quest for gaining local support in the region. Turkey deployed its military and security forces along the border to prevent such undertakings while equipping troops with high-tech surveillance systems.

However, Turkey failed to enrich its UAV inventory via foreign procurement through Western, in particular Israeli, aviation firms as the primary suppliers, at the beginning of the 2000s. This era was a disappointing period for Turkey as the country had to confront a highly politicised Western defence industry. Without doubt, the invasion of Iraq, by US-led coalition forces, was a clear challenge for Turkey’s quest to procure intelligence and security assets. Turkey’s democratic choice not to participate to the invasion of Iraq hampered its desire to acquire these assets to counter terror threats. Persistent Threat Detection Systems (PTDS), or in Turkish military literature “surveillance balloons,” were one of these kinds of assets.

The initial efforts to acquire PTDS for the Turkish Army’s inventory were based on importing these systems from foreign suppliers, mainly US-based manufacturers. But the project could not be finalized until because of bureaucratic challenges stemming both from the US and Turkish decision-making mechanisms. A security expert claims that, in order to defend against casualty risks, there was an increasing demand on military intelligence assets to provide security for outposts facing imminent terror threats. This concern encouraged young and talented officers as well as non-commissioned officers of Turkish Armed Forces Intelligence School to build their own surveillance balloons by recycling scrapped equipment with a budget of just 1,100 TL (about $450 at the time). They had aimed to construct a cost-efficient system with simplified operating procedures that could be operated by regular soldiers with basic training.

Initially, dedicated Army soldiers conducted an experiment with a weather (meteorology) balloon on which they mounted re-purposed camera parts. They attached the balloon to a simple ground station with a cable that was bought in a local market. Although this first try was a failure, it was a big step. They replaced the balloon with the one made of a stronger fabric and upgraded the equipment with something more functional. The aim was simple: to have the altitude of the balloon be fixed at maximum of 500 meters and monitor any individual within a distance of 6 km. After unofficial consultations with the young soldiers, the Turkish technology giant ASELSAN agreed to sponsor the local amateur project.

ASELSAN provided old domestically manufactured equipment such as video cameras at no expense. With the aid from ASELSAN, a more sophisticated surveillance balloon could now be designed with a higher altitude and increased payload capacity. One problem left to be solved was having the balloon continue its surveillance task even if it was shot by light rifles. The shooting test was very successful after a private Turkish company in Ankara, OTONOM, manufactured a persistent and long lasting balloon. The balloon, which stayed aloft despite seven bullet holes in it, was also stabilized against harsh weather conditions by integrating additional fixing materials and software. Actually, the adventure of Turkish soldiers in building a surveillance balloon has pushed domestic private companies to start partnerships and pool their manufacturing capabilities to meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. Hence, the project was in the hands of these companies afterwards.

The ASELSAN and OTONOM partnership produced surveillance balloons named “Global” (Küresel), a small balloon with 500 meters altitude, and the “Water Drop” (Su Damlası) with a maximum altitude of 1,000 meters. Apart from the ASELSAN-OTONOM partnership, Turkish satellite and cable network firm TURKSAT also developed another surveillance balloon with 800 meters altitude, which might be described as a medium-size PTDS in the defence market. TURKSAT, making deals with the foreign firms, enriched the competition in the emerging balloon sector.

The payloads of these Turkish surveillance balloons can be enhanced depending what the surveillance mission requires. Standard payloads include day and night cameras, laser pointers and radio relay systems. It is possible to integrate them to early warning systems used by ground troops in order to compliment, in other words “cueing,” other information collection efforts by integrated software. Furthermore, acoustic radar can also be mounted to detect explosions and movements of any sorts of vehicles. ASELSAN offers a great inventory of surveillance systems that can be integrated to any sort of these balloons.

Another option for the Turkish Army is the procurement of the PTDS from the Western defence market. In this context, Turkey is about to acquire two PTDS assets from the U.S. Army as a pledge. The U.S. Government granted two PTDSs from Lockheed Martin to the Turkish Army for countering illegal border crossing, especially by DEASH terrorists. The deal entails U.S. donation of the two PTDS assets at no expense for Turkey, but leaves maintenance responsibilities to Turkey. These PTDSs, most probably, will be have been used previously in Iraq or Afghanistan, and can be described as old and worn out. In order to maintain these systems, Turkey will need to meet their costs, and will be dependent on importing spare parts from abroad for them. Besides, the huge size of the balloon requires a huge amount of helium gas to run it, which reveals another challenging problem for the Turkish Army. However, this dependency creates an unwillingness within the circles of the Turkish Army to include these systems into its inventory or at least accept using them for urgent short-term needs until they are no longer functional.

The exploitation of the U.S. PTDS in Afghanistan is an indicator for whether it will meet the needs of the TAF and to see its efficiency. The PTDS was a distinguished intelligence asset for monitoring urban areas with its sensitive payload.  On the other hand, similar to small surveillance balloons, the PTDS of Lockheed Martin was strictly limited by harsh weather conditions; mainly wind, humidity, atmospheric pressure, cloud, and atmospheric electrical charge (including thunderstorms). Due to these shortcomings, the balloons were often grounded and fixed to command trailers. As in Afghanistan, harsh weather conditions along the border of Iraq and to some extent Syria, will hinder the effective exploitation of the U.S. PTDS.

Although the same weather conditions will certainly effect the functionality level of the Turkish surveillance balloons, their loss would be much more tolerable because they are domestically manufactured and cheap. The affordable cost of Turkish systems makes them more attractive than other PTDS products in the Western market. For instance, the cost of a PTDS manufactured by Lockheed Martin is around $15 to $20 million, which is prohibitive when it comes to usage in the rugged terrain conditions of Turkey. Thus, in order to cover the harsh terrain, security forces would probably demand additional PTDS assets over time. A comparison of terrain features of the U.S.-Mexican border and the Turkish-Iraq border illustrates this dilemma. The U.S. border is rather flat, so PTDS can serve for detecting illegal border crossings. On the contrary, the Turkish border with Iraq is full of rugged creeks, therefore several PTDS assets cannot provide either physical or border security since imagery intelligence (IMINT) assets require line of sight. Hence Turkey needs cost-efficient of surveillance balloons that could cover wide ranges that excludes the expensive PTDS.

As the Turkish Army’s priority is not solely based on border security, but also the force protection of ground troops, the needed surveillance balloons should be positioned for monitoring roads, neighbouring villages, and key terrain in the vicinity of military bases. For this purpose, the Turkish Army needs to procure small, mobile, easy to use surveillance balloons in large numbers. Basic military tasks such as target acquisition, directing fires, and location capturing ought to be the main capabilities of the surveillance system. The Turkish surveillance balloons offer such functions using simplified software. Software can be enhanced depending on the regional needs of Turkish Army in comparison to complicated and fixed software. Another advantage of the Turkish PTDS is the small number of operating personnel it requires. Just three personnel for each shift can run the system, which makes the entire 24 hour crew just nine personnel. On the other hand, the U.S. PTDS needs at least 10-12 personnel for each shift to run properly, corresponding to 30-36 operators over a 24-hour period, excluding team leaders.

Consequently, the indigenously developed surveillance balloons by ASELSAN-OTONOM, and to some extent TURKSAT, seem appropriate for the operational needs of the Turkish Army in comparison to the ones of outer market. They are mobile, small and simple systems to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance tasks in potential combat zones. Turkey’s technology is respondent to develop surveillance balloons and export to the other countries in need. Additionally, coast guard, police and gendarmerie forces, can also acquire these Turkish surveillance systems to complement existing threat detection systems, in order to monitor critical urban areas while countering crime.

Turkey’s fight against PKK terrorism dates back to early 1980s, and since that time, despite suffering from various unpleasant experiences, the Turkish military has made considerable progress towards enhancing skills, knowledge and expertise in many areas in dealing with counter-terrorism operations. On the other hand, despite all the advanced conventional war-fighting capabilities or highly sophisticated weapons systems acquired, none of these favorable conditions should be taken for granted, for it would mean neglecting needs and capacity assessments for the success of future military operations in both rural and urban terrains.

These assessments are critical to preparing and supporting the armed forces for the challenges of changing operational situations that will likely occur under any scenario in future conflicts.

Identifying and meeting the perceived and actual needs of the military remains as crucial as ever for establishing a much more comprehensive, timely, and effective response to prevent terrorist attacks.

In particular, the military’s technology readiness for implementing countermeasures to protect its aircraft is a key issue, especially considering the most recent Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) attack by the PKK.

On 13 May 2016, PKK militants dressed in camouflage fatigues shot down an armed AH-1W Super Cobra helicopter capable of close air support using what appears to be either a SA-16 or SA-18 MANPADS missile.  The helicopter had been dispatched to provide support to soldiers at the Çığlı base, in the Çukurca district of Hakkari province, near the Iraqi border.  PKK militants had killed six soldiers at the base, and the helicopter’s downing martyred the two pilots on board.

This is not the first time that PKK militants have successfully used such portable and shoulder-fired systems to hit military helicopters. Over the decades-long war between Turkey and the PKK, the PKK has downed one AH-1W Super Cobra, one AS-532 Cougar, as well as an S-70A Black Hawk.  On May 18, 1997, the AH-1W Super Cobra and AS-532 Cougar were shot down on 18 May, 1997, in the very same Çukurca district as the most recent attack, using a SA-7B (9K32M Strela-2M). The S-70A Black Hawk, meanwhile, was downed by an RPG-7 (rocket-propelled grenade) in Northern Iraq, on February 24, 2008.

A Highly-Effective, Cheap, and Easy to Use System to Bring Down Aircraft

The SA-7/14/16/18 – like their US-manufactured Stinger counterparts, which were used highly effectively in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan – is designed to meet the low altitude air defense needs of ground units.

Armies have always wanted an air defense system with a low cost, that can easily be used and requires minimal training, and is maintenance free for use on the battlefield. Two generations of MANPADS have been manufactured, and both can be used by a single soldier alone, but need two soldiers to carry them.

A basic MANPADS consists of the launch tube, the missile, and battery.  Several generations of the weapons exist, with the earliest types being guided by the user simply firing toward the target, and later ones, including the SA-7/14/16/18 and Stinger series, using the heat signature left by aircraft engines to hone in on their targets. Other, more sophisticated MANPADS are also used, some requiring aircraft to “paint” a target so the missiles can close in on them, and others guided during flight by an operator on the ground, yet these require extensive training and additional resources to be present on the battlefield.

The 13 May PKK attack likely used a heat-seeking SA-16 or SA-18 MANPADS.

The “kill box” – the cylindrical area it can hit a target with the shooter at the center – for the most advanced MANPADS is approximately 10,000 meters in diameter and 5,000 meters high.

They are highly effective weapons: with well-trained personnel shooting a target within the kill box, the systems have a 95% kill ratio against fixed wing aircrafts, and a 98% kill ratio for rotary wing aircrafts like helicopters.  Even older generations, like the Stingers used against Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan in the 1980s, had high kill-ratios: according to US military assessments, of 340 missiles fired, 269 hit their targets.

An SA-18 MANPADS takes just 5 or 10 seconds after being activated to fire, and can fly for the next 17 seconds at speeds more than three times the speed of sound  approximately 1,200 km/h at sea level).

The target’s only option after the missile is fired to try and evade it as quickly as possible.  Countermeasures like firing flares to confuse the missiles’ heat seeking systems have become increasingly ineffective, especially since the 3rd generation of MANPADS, because of the speed of the missile itself and the short amount of time it takes to reach the target.

Missiles also tend to have proximity fuse mechanisms, so that if the target take evasive action and change its flying direction, the missile’s on-board computer will decide not to wait for a collision before detonating, exploding the warhead as near as possible to the target. The missile’s warheads are thus designed to explode in fragments, to create as wide a zone of destruction as possible in cast the target is not actually hit directly.

The weapons systems are also quite cheap, with some costing less that $10,000 to manufacture, making it a good choice for bringing down a $2 million MI-17 helicopter.

Easily Proliferated and A Natural Choice for Non-State Actors

The Russian-made SA series MANPADS are especially selling to many countries, and easy to find in the open weapon market. There are some training simulators for western products, but a typical MANPADS is very easy to use after one real try.

So we have a weapon system that is cheap, easy to use, easy to find, maintenance free, and can be used against all aircraft for low altitude air defense purposes. MANPADS weapons are combat-proven systems, especially since the Afghanistan and Kosovo Wars. With these qualities, non-state actors like the PKK will prefer MANPADS for their arsenal for future needs.

The only military option against this threat is to eliminate its supply routes, and develop some supporting technology against MANPADS.

Within this context, a critical discussion needs to be had on the possibility of using unmanned aircraft, UAVs, to enhance low-altitude air defense capabilities. With MANPADS so easily available, and so often being used by the PKK, a greater shift needs to be made towards UAVs, which will not have the same human cost as a conventional aircraft if shot down, and can be used to monitor and counter militants on the ground more effectively.

The Turkish Army’s bitter experiences, such as the PKK’s recent attack near the Çığlı military zone, highlights the unanticipated consequences of shortfalls and limitations in countermeasure abilities against MANPADS, and draws attention to the need to strengthen capabilities for detecting, locating, identifying, and defeating targets through UAVs.