It is not the first time that Germany’s social democrats suffered a heavy defeat during elections on the federal, state, or recently at European level. In the past couple of years, SPD votes have been gradually decreasing on nearly all platforms. This did not exclude the fact that the party was still determined to build so-called grand coalitions with the country’s main conservative party, the CDU, between 2005-2009, 2013-2017 and once again since March 2018. However, the current coalition once again faces a crisis.

The most striking reason for the current difficulties faced by both parties is the defeat they faced during the European elections on 26 May. Once again, the social-democrat SPD lost many votes. They received 11 percentage points below their previous score, similar to the losses made by the conservatives. The Green Party surprisingly increased its votes and passed the SPD, becoming the second strongest party. As a direct consequence, similar to former chairman Martin Schulz, the SPD’s current chairperson and parliamentary group leader, Andrea Nahles (who became the party’s leader just a year ago and supported a coalition with the CDU/CSU), resigned from all her offices. Thus, in the upcoming months, the party will once again select a new chairperson. Until then, the party will be leaded by a provisional trio.

The SPD received 11 percentage points below its previous score in the European elections, making the Greens the second strongest party. 

The current federal government is the third grand coalition under the leadership of Angela Merkel (CDU), who has been head of the federal republic since 2005, when she defeated the SPD-Greens coalition government (1998-2005) and became the country’s first female chancellor. It can be stated that since that day, the SPD gradually lost its electoral base and the broader center-left vote mainly due to its lack of long-term strategy. Another factor contributing to this loss has been Merkel’s surprisingly liberal and to some extent center-left resembling steps.

As a consequence, the SPD’s importance as a so-called major/center-left party symbolizing social rights and social equality has been reduced generally to the margins. Subsequent to the federal elections in 2017 and the party’s heavy defeat, the SPD initially announced that it will not join another coalition government in order to strengthen its own party position. This, however, did not become true and the SPD joined a new coalition government with the CDU due to pressure coming from both the party and from Merkel. As a consequence, the far-right AfD has become the country’s strongest opposition party.

In addition to its losses on the European level, the SPD lost elections in the state of Bremen too. Despite the defeat in Bremen, the SPD still insists on building a coalition government this time with the Greens and the Left Party – a first time constellation in one of the Western states of Germany, which is heavily criticized above all by the CDU and even non-left-wing voices within the SPD.

It’s interesting that Kevin Kühnert (29) is the name being discussed in both German media and leftist political circles as the SPD’s potential new federal chairperson. 

Additional reasons for the difficulties and disputes in the current coalition government are certain issues concerning the refugee problem in general, topics such as abortion and other contents of disputes distancing the coalition partners from each other. Besides the different stances between the CDU/CSU and the social-democrats, it’s also well-known that even the positions of Chancellor Merkel (CDU) and her conservative Federal Interior Minister Seehofer (CSU) are different from each other in regards to the government’s refugee policy.

Thus, under these fragile conditions, the SPD nowadays is discussing on the one hand ‘new names’ for the party’s chairmanship and on the other is discussing whether it should quit the coalition at all. In both cases, the party cannot circumvent the question – or even a question interesting both major German parties – by whom and how the SPD should be led. It’s interesting or even experimental that German leftist circles and even the German media stresses the SPD’s young politician, Kevin Kühnert (29), who is the party’s current chairman of its youth organization “Jusos,” as the party’s potential new federal chairperson.

The need for a stable future notion of a major/center-left party is indispensable. Otherwise, smaller parties will most likely reduce the SPD to an insignificant role which in the long-term may even cause difficulties in passing the 5 percent threshold. Thus, the urgent question to be addressed will most likely be how and by whom a modernized center-left party should be headed by. As good news- from the social-democrat point of view- the expectation is that the increase of the Greens is just a temporary trend and that its success will be limited. However, whether experiments regarding a very young potential party chairperson, even with a socialist bias, will be accepted by the electorate is unknown. The additional negative effects of such experiments should also not be underestimated.

In the past week, German political circles have been discussing whether a potential dispute will erupt between Angela Merkel and her party’s (CDU) chairperson, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK). While some media outlets argue that AKK has recently made a deal with the former chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group (2000-2002), Friedrich Merz, it is not clear whether such an alleged step will cause other complexities. According to the news, AKK promised Merz a federal ministry as soon as she becomes Germany’s next Chancellor. However, it seems that current Chancellor Angela Merkel and the conditions of the current German parliament will not enable such possibilities prior to the 2021 elections.

The discussion become public subsequent to a piece published in Der Spiegel, according to which AKK and Merz made a deal for the time period after Merkel. Merz is a former conservative CDU politician, who challenged both Merkel and AKK in the race to leadership. However, lost the race against both. He quit politics in 2009 and changed to rather lucrative sectors such as consultancy and began lobbying for different companies. When in late 2018 it became clear that Merkel would leave as chair, Merz announced his ambitions to comeback, although he lost against the party’s former secretary-general and Merkel’s close ally, AKK.

But now there are interesting issues being discussed in the media and political circles as to whether AKK will push Merkel in order to become Chancellor at an early date, or whether AKK will continue to work closely with Merkel until 2021, respect her as the country’s Chancellor together with all her preferences – to which Merz definitely does not belong.

By this, it has to be stressed that there is no option that Merz might become a minister under the ongoing leadership of Merkel, while Merz excludes this option as well. Merz is making efforts to reinforce his dialogue with the country’s potential and future Chancellor, AKK. But one has to also keep in mind that Merz does not only want to become a minister (at the best the federal economy minister). He is also closely following both the EU elections and federal elections, which will determine the German federal government’s near future – consisting of a fragile coalition between the CDU, CSU, and SPD.

We will see how German politics and leadership struggles will be shaped in the upcoming months, in particular following the EU Parliament elections in May.

Although the coalition has been maintained for 15 months now and is likely to continue until the next federal elections in 2021, there are certain dynamics of potential importance. One of the most stressed points is the worsening economic conditions and the forecasts for a slowdown in the short term, which is most likely to begin next year. The other point that may trigger heavy discussions within all three coalition parties is the upcoming elections in the federal states of Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia. Therefore, the potential fields of dispute and the results of the CDU might have either a positive or negative effect on the remaining two years left of the Merkel tenure.

Finally, one has to also keep in mind that the current two major parties in Germany continue to lose votes according to the regularly conducted election polls. While the CDU/CSU parties still have difficulties in persuading their voters not to turn to the far-right AfD, the Social Democrats (SPD) are also facing similar difficulties in losing their voter base to the Green Party. In this sense, it is an interesting phenomenon that the co-leader of the Green Party, Robert Habeck, has become one of Germany’s most popular politicians. In addition to the Green Party becoming Germany’s second biggest party, thus overtaking the SPD, scenarios regarding a future CDU/CSU/Greens coalition is also on the table. This will lead to political deadlock due to the serious disagreements among the parties.

We will see how German politics and leadership struggles will be shaped in the upcoming months, in particular following the EU Parliament elections in May.

Germany is accepted as a successful case of a functioning parliamentary system of government. According to this, the main executive organ of the country’s system of government is dominated by a chancellor and his/her government, which is responsible to the parliamentary majority (Bundestag).

Germany is also a country that has lived through many years of coalition, with either conservative-led or social-democratic-led governments with an additional junior coalition partner. “Grand coalitions” have also been established in the past, in 2005, and this year in March 2018, when Germany’s two largest parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD came together.

My main emphasis in this piece is that Chancellor Merkel’s recent decision to leave her party’s leadership will affect the country’s ever more complicating parliamentary structure in the long run.

Merkel became her party’s chairperson in 2000 right after her era as the party’s secretary general, during which she challenged the former German Chancellor and her mentor, Helmut Kohl (CDU). In 2005, Merkel defeated the social-democratic Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder while Schröder himself underestimated Merkel during that federal election – consequently it was the end of Schröder’s active political career.

Since then, Merkel has been ruling the country as Chancellor and has simultaneously transformed the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) into a more centrist, European-oriented, and a modern one. In the last 18 years as chair and 13 years as Chancellor, there have been many changes that may be addressed in the upcoming months, and years, following Merkel’s depart from the CDU in early December.

Even though Merkel always stressed the importance of combining the office of the Chancellor with the party’s leadership as a necessary act, she announced her decision to step down from being chair of the CDU. In addition, she added that she will not be a candidate (for the fifth time) during the federal elections in 2021.

I do not want to address in depth the apparent reasons as to why Merkel made such a decision to leave  the party leadership. As is addressed by several authors (I>;II), the decision is mostly based on the party cadres’ continuing pressure against Merkel and her both refugee-friendly policies and the high losses during the recent elections in Bavaria and Hesse. Furthermore, the disappearance of actual conservative politics in Germany and the CDU’s increasing resemblance with left-liberal parties caused an increase of far-right parties, which are ultimately seen as an “alternative” to the conservative and center-right parties such as the CDU/CSU.

However, in my opinion, the main interesting point in the recent developments is the party’s instruments that put pressure on the party leader and Chancellor Merkel. This mechanism is quite normal for a parliamentary system, which is the case in Germany. However, there has not been a broad discussion with regard to Germany’s system of government and the question regarding the election of the executive, there are some contemporary key points that need to be addressed.

Above all, during a time where presidents and certain prime ministers (or Chancellors as in Germany or Austria) are becoming more popular and becoming the main focus of the electorate, the question arises as to whether a German executive might be elected by popular vote as well. For instance, one might ask what would be the outcome if the executive organ would be directly elected by a popular vote, as in the United States, or a closer example, like in the case of France?

While Macron as the head of the executive has a direct connection to French citizens, Merkel has to struggle within her party and make several concessions to achieve a limited goal.

Similarly, Bünyamin Bezci rightly stressed that President Emmanuel Macron, who is also the key actor in France’s pro-European political perspective, has a broader field of executive action in contrast to Chancellor Merkel. While Macron as the head of the executive has a direct connection to French citizens through his popular election legitimacy, Merkel has to struggle within her party and try to make several and sometimes contradictory concessions in order to achieve a certain limited goal.

Furthermore, while according to polls most of Germany’s citizens still support Merkel as the country’s most popular political leader, the party structures are the main decision bodies. One of the striking points here is the fact that Merkel is elected by the German parliament while the French executive has a direct legitimacy based on the decision of its electorate. Thus, the image of a constitutionally strong and powerful Chancellor occurs, who is actually able to quasi-dominate the entire EU in general while she is, though, not able to stand against the own party’s complicated structures.

What would be the result in German politics if the head of the executive would be elected with a popular vote?

What would be the result in German politics if the head of the executive would be elected with a popular vote? Perhaps this question might be on Germany’s future political agenda. There are currently too many parties in the German party system, which might hinder the establishment of well-functioning coalition governments. Thus, alternative possibilities will be most likely considered.

It is time for change in German political system in an era in which “presidentialization and personalization of politics” is taking place globally.

In this sense, it might be interesting to mention that in the near past there have been some discussions in the context of the election of the federal president of Germany. While some voices and nearly 70 percent of the population supported political reform for popularly electing the president, some have opposed this idea due to difficulties and bad experiences in reference to Germany’s political history. But time is changing and Germany might need optimizing its own political system during an era when “presidentialization and personalization of politics” are globally and increasingly becoming obvious and common. We will try to continue and address similar questions and discussions in the upcoming weeks in a more theoretical point of view.

171 days after the federal elections when main parties such as the Christian and Social Democrats had suffered damaging losses, on March 12 the German parliament finally re-elected Angela Merkel as the head of her new-old federal government.

It is the fourth term of the CDU leader and Chancellor Merkel who was initially unable to arrange a coalition government with the environmentalist-leftist Green Party and the pro-business/liberal FDP. In the second attempt, subsequent to Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s appeal to the leaders of all parties to “not entirely preclude the possibility of forming a government,” the Christian Union parties (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) finally agreed to negotiate for a new-old “grand coalition.” Otherwise, new elections would have mean new losses for both parties. The SPD’s initial unwillingness to talk with the CDU/CSU has been based on the fact that the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) would then be the main opposition party in the federal parliament. Unfortunately, having gained 12,6% of the vote in September 2017, the right-wing populists are currently represented as the strongest opposition party.

Nevertheless, subsequent to President Steinmeier’s appeal, the SPD had agreed to start negotiations with the CDU/CSU. These negotiations launched at the end of January and were completed successfully two weeks later. Finally, and despite a complicated inner-party struggle and a kind of splitting process among the Social Democrats, the three parties were able to sign the new coalition agreement on March 12, 2018.

It’s interesting that in Chancellor Merkel’s new cabinet, except from Merkel herself and her Minister of Defence, Mrs. Ursula von der Leyen, the entire cabinet has been changed. Some new people have occupied ministerial positions. These include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by former Minister of Justice, Heiko Maas (SPD) and the Ministry of Finance by Olaf Scholz (SPD), who is also the Vice-Chancellor. Politicians known for their loyalty to Mrs. Merkel, such as the former Federal Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maiziere (CDU), had to be replaced with a CSU politician, Horst Seehofer. Reasons for these kinds of maneuvers are based on the fact that Merkel had to make concessions to the CSU and SPD by aiming to build a coalition government. Consequently, even so-called traditional CDU ministries such as the Federal Ministry of the Interior were handed over to the Bavarian partner CSU, and the Federal Ministry of Finance to the SPD.

After 12 years as Chancellor, the popularity of Mrs. Merkel is shrinking. The electorate has increasingly become dissatisfied with her personality and particularly with her “liberal” decisions for instance regarding the refugee crisis – which is also the main reason for the right-wing AfD’s success. On the other hand, Merkel is still resisting against calls from her own party’s conservative wing to establish a new and more ‘conservative’ path.

Consequently, due to such a decrease in popularity, both within the electorate and within conservative voices of her own party, there is a concise belief that Chancellor Merkel may only have about two years left in office. Due to these ‘domestic’ conditions, it is assumed that Merkel will prepare her party for an era without herself – unless she does not exclude a fifth term. By this, a possible new future Chancellor candidate, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, might be the new general secretary of CDU, who was until February prime minister in one of the smaller German federal states. Even though she represents a more conservative orientation of the CDU compared to Merkel, she would be a more moderate person in contrast to the younger and right-wing biased conservative circles gathering around Jens Spahn (37). Spahn, who publicly criticizes Merkel’s decisions regarding her refugee policy, represents a more ‘conservative’ generation. However, as a strategic move, Merkel appointed him as Minister of Health in her new cabinet in order to diminish his oppositional tendencies and possible future ambitions. While time will show whether Merkel will be successful, it is worth to note that she is known for previous similar kinds of strategic maneuvers utilized in order to terminate the political ambitions of potential opponents.

Thus, alongside global and regional challenges, during her fourth term, Merkel has to face serious domestic issues and in particular challenges within her own party. By this, she most probably will have to manage her succession against potential “conservative” and –unfortunately AfD alike – populist young circles. However, if Chancellor Merkel survives her new four year term, she will be catch up to the 16-year-era of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU, 1982-1998).

With no surprise German Chancellor Angela Merkel won the federal elections on 24^th September while major parties, including her own, suffered the worst-ever losses in German political history since 1949. In her early statements subsequent to the initial projections of the election results last Sunday, Merkel commented on the results with the words “we reached the strategic goals of our election campaign.” During a time period where Europe and so-called “Western values” are facing populist and right-wing challenges, Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) will once again become the only group able to build a coalition government in order to rule Europe’s most ‘powerful’ country for an additional four years.

Due to the deficit of the German parliamentary system, the building of a coalition including the negotiation process can last until Christmas of this year, or even longer. Merkel, who just started a new election campaign on the state level in Lower Saxony with regard to the elections on 25 October, will once again arrange a new coalition government. On the federal level, it is currently impossible to build a coalition government against the Christian Democratic parties by all the other five parliamentary groups. By gaining only 32,9% of the votes, Merkel’s Union will have 246 seats while the Social Democratic SPD (20,5%) 153 seats, the right-wing populist AfD (Alternative for Germany) party (12,6%) 94 seats (92 without Frauke Petry and Mario Mieruch who recently quitted their party), Free Democratic FDP (10,7%) 80 seats, the left-wing Linke (9,2%) 69 seats and the Greens (8,9%) 67 seats in Germany’s Federal Parliament, the 19^th German Bundestag.

With regard to the current number (709) of deputies in the parliament, the support of at least 355 MPs is required in order to elect the Chancellor of the new federal government. Another important result of the recent election is the fact that the two major parties reached just 53 percent of the total vote, which is the lowest combined share ever in German political history (for instance in 1987: 81,3%; 1998: 76%; 2013: 67,2%). The rationale behind this can be elaborated as a new trend according to which the German electorate diminish their traditional party allegiance and vote for other, small and even extremist parties.

Since its establishment in 1949, Germany has been governed by Christian Democrat Chancellors for approximately 48 years. For instance CDU leader Merkel has been governing the country for twelve years – and will most probably l continue her job as Chancellor for an additional four years. On the other hand, the Social Democrats have only occupied the powerful Chancellor position for 20 years in total. Generally the federal governments in Germany consisted of two party coalitions with a major and junior partner; or, as was recently the case, between 2005-2009 and 2013-2017, of a so called “grand coalition,” which is a constellation of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.

With the disastrous election results for both major parties, a new debate started whether a grand coalition undermines the efficient political culture in Germany. Even though Merkel still considers a potential grand coalition, the Social Democrats do not share the same feelings towards Merkel’s such ambition. According to the current election result, the SPD ruled out joining any grand coalition due to the fact that the AfD –as the third largest parliamentary group– will become the main opposition party. A no-go in post-war Germany? According to the SPD the answer to this question is yes. However, Angela Merkel did not speak against this possibility. Actually, it is too early to predict a concrete government constellation. An additional reason for the harsh position of the SPD is most likely the fact that the Social Democrats’ two worst election results since WWII have come directly on the heels of playing the role of CDU/CSU’s junior coalition partner (2009 & 2017). Consequently the SPD, still led by Martin Schulz and who took the responsibility for the worst election of the party after WWII, does not prefer to join Merkel’s government once again.

Although the SPD is tendentious to become the main opposition in the Bundestag, Angela Merkel called the Social Democrats to rethink their decision. However, Schulz rejected this offer by elaborating it as ‘waste of time.’ It is interesting to observe that mainstream media, in particular left-wing voices, also insist on preventing such a ‘grand possibility.’ The German political elite, German mainstream media, business circles and big companies call for a so-called “Jamaica Coalition” – despite its difficultness and differences with regard to the involved parties’ programs. A ‘Jamaica Coalition’ – so called because of the three parties’ colors black-yellow-green – seems to be the only likely government constellation consisting of the CDU/CSU, Liberals/FDP and the Greens. This will be a first in German history as there has never been a three-party coalition forming government on the federal level. This option is also problematic as was reflected in the recently established Jamaica coalition in Schleswig-Holstein, where the parties needed several months to reach a coalition agreement.

While the German political system does not provide a deadline for a coalition to be set,  the new 19^th Bundestag must come together by 24^th October. Within this instability, Merkel is ruling out the option of holding a second election by emphasizing respect for “the German voters’ decision.” With regard to a Jamaica coalition, it is likely that the first negotiations with party representatives of the CDU/CSU, FDP and the Greens will be postponed until the end of the state elections in Lower Saxony on 15 October.

The 24 September federal election also revealed some interesting issues with regard to the German political environment and particularly concerning some leaders’ approaches.

For instance, while not resigning from the party leadership position, SPD’s Schulz took responsibility for the party’s defeat and made it clear that he will not act as the party’s parliamentary group leader. If one examines his statements, it becomes apparent that Schulz still appears very aggressive for instance by addressing Chancellor Merkel. For instance, during the “elephant round” which generally takes place right after the election, Schulz was actually in a fighting mood against the Chancellor. For some minutes Schulz harshly attacked Merkel by literally calling her as “the biggest loser.” Furthermore, Schulz charged Merkel with being responsible for the AfD’s strong result by stating “Ms. Merkel has led a scandalous election campaign.”

The same can be said for the newly elected SPD parliamentary group leader Nahles who attacked her former Cabinet colleagues from the CDU/CSU by stating “Starting tomorrow, we’ll be right in their face.” It also seems that members in the SPD do not have courage to criticize and speak up against Schulz’ over-confident decisions and sharp statements. Nevertheless, the current situation of the SPD suggests that the party will become a platform of competition between Nahles and Schulz in the course of the upcoming party congress in December this year, where Schulz, once again, will aim to run for party leadership.

As a result, it can openly be stated that the entering of AfD into the Bundestag is a federal reflection of the German political reality, which is currently the case in 13 of 16 German federated state parliaments. With the federal election on 24 September, the contemporary reality ultimately reached the federal capital of Germany. Thus, despite the disappointment and frustrated statements on media outlets and in political circles, it is not true that this result caused an actual shock wave in German society. Moreover, instead of being surprised the mainstream parties have to reorganize and create efficient approaches and alternatives.

To some extent, the result was predictable and now this has to be addressed seriously without an overestimation of the AfD. With no doubt the striking number of right-wing, extremist and populist AfD deputies in the federal parliament is perceived as a new challenge for the German political elite in Berlin. Thinking about the potential total number of MP assistants and other AfD-employees of each AfD deputy, who will also enter into the Bundestag,  it becomes clear that the political mood in Berlin will be tense when trying to communicate with far-right politicians and affiliated employees. Nevertheless, Berlin-based political scientist Oskar Niedermayer states that the AfD in parliament should not be overrated; above all due to the fact that no political group wants to build a coalition with the far-right populists. However, Niedermayer also emphasizes the possibility that the Bundestag’s debate culture could be worsened due to some racist-nationalist AfD deputies’ actions and behaviors. In the context of the AfD, some polls revealed that more than 60 percent of current AfD voters cast a protest vote. Thus, this vote should not be considered as an expression commitment to the AfD’s party program. In addition, 50 percent of AfD voters described themselves as critical of the party for not doing enough to distance itself from the far right.

That is to say; first of all, the AfD should not be overrated as previously stated. Secondly, the right-wing populists should be prevented from dominating the Bundestag by abusing several mechanisms. Whether this will be possible is one of the main challenges the main parties, above all the government parties, the main opposition party and some key figures have to think about. Under these circumstances, the wrong path for mainstream parties would be imitating AfD’s racist discourses and populist statements. Unfortunately this was the case when CSU leader Horst Seehofer blamed the CDU/CSU for having left “the right flank open,” which, according to him, made it possible for this gap to be exploited by the AfD. But seriously, what should have been done? Be more racist than a racist party? Or solve the problems of the electorate by accurate and reasonable solution approaches? Preferably, the latter. As it is rightly stated, if a country accepts that right-wing extremists entered the parliament due to 890.000 refugees who came to Germany, what will this country do if a real crisis arises? This question has to be taken into consideration by all; not just by political parties.

The September 24, 2017 parliamentary elections in Germany seem to have a striking result. For the first time since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 a party defined as neo-Nazi by most German politicians was able to surpass the 5% electoral threshold and hold seats in the parliament; this could be regarded as the most astounding feature of the elections. While perceiving itself as the insurance of the EU and successfully protecting itself from far-right movements, the victory of the xenophobic, anti-immigrant and Islamophobic Alternative for Germany (AfD- Alternative für Deutschland), which received 12.6% of the vote and obtained 94 seats in the Federal Parliament, marks a new era in Germany.

Besides being xenophobic, anti-immigrant and Islamophobic, AfD’s desire to revert Germany to its nation-state structure, thus standing against the EU, means that Berlin’s role within the union will be increasingly questioned. Seeing itself as the defender of European values and the leader of the EU, while being criticized by many European countries like Poland, Italy, Hungary and Greece for patronizing other countries, Germany will have a hard time maintaining its bid for EU leadership after AfD’s rise. Building extreme right pressure in Germany, similar to France, indicates that the worst is yet to come for the EU, which is already facing the risk of dissolution.

Another significant result of the election is that a three-way coalition government has become imperative for the first time since 1957. As it seems highly improbable that a coalition consisting a center-right, a liberal and a leftist party could be established, let alone stay intact for 4 years, it would not be unrealistic to suggest that serious instability awaits Germany. After 60 years, Germany is once again preparing for a three-way coalition government. While it may be asserted that the country already has a tradition of coalitions as it has constantly been governed by them since 1957, what is important to note is that they have always been two-party coalitions. Bringing business-minded FDP together with the leftist Greens and making them cooperate will be a challenging task to accomplish for the CDU/CSU – the greater partner of this coalition.

Moreover, CSU, the smaller partner of the Christian Union Parties, being in crisis and having issues in communicating with CDU are other factors that could cause instability. Lastly, having 6 parties in the parliament for the first time in 60 years could also cause instability resulting from the distribution of political power between these groups.

Centrist parties are losing power in Europe

Another significant trend reflected by the election results is that the centrist political parties in Germany are continuing to lose votes, as is also the case in other European countries. Although they are still the most powerful parties, unlike those in France, the Netherlands and Austria, Germany’s two powerful centrist parties have lost around 13.8% of the vote in comparison to the previous election. Their combined vote, 53.4%, is the lowest in Germany’s history. This should be regarded as an indicator that confirms the worries of those that fear of Germany’s instability.

Social Democratic Party (SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) receiving 20.5% of the vote, thus the lowest in their history, is another astounding result of the election. SPD’s votes, declining since Gerhard Schröder’s resignation from the Chancellorship and party chairmanship in 2005, could partially be explained due to the party sharing its voter base with other leftist parties like The Left (Die Linke) and Greens. Left votes in Germany declining to 38.5% signifies that leftist parties, especially the SPD, are unsuccessful in persuading German voters. When considering that the left had received more than half of the total votes in the 2002 election, which carried Schröder to power, the dissolution of Germany’s left becomes evident. SPD’s votes being distributed between the extreme left Die Linke and the extreme right AfD indicates that this is not an issue only about the German left. On the contrary, it is an issue concerning the whole country and Europe.

Another reality marked by the results of the election is that competing with far-right AfD in xenophobia and Islamophobia, along with competing amongst themselves in anti-Turkey sentiments, did not yield any benefits for centrist parties. AfD, tripling its vote and becoming the third most successful of the election, has shown other parties that advocating their own policies and principles instead of imitating AfD’s xenophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments would have been more credible for their voter base. As a result of the media’s editorial policy, which pumps insecurity, fear and concern, voters who maintain negative views towards migration and foreigners have found AfD’s anti-immigrant discourse more realistic.

Similarly, following the trend of The Left and Greens in terms of anti-Turkey sentiments, centrist parties CDU/CSU and SPD were unable to wrest any benefits from their hostile discourse towards Ankara. The power struggle these parties entered into with Turkey displeased voters who believe Germany is a country of commerce that ought to stay out of any conflict. The antagonistic policies towards Turkey, developed especially by leftist parties, were also punished by conservative voters of Turkish origin. Meanwhile, the anti-Erdoğan and anti-AK Party perception created through the smear campaign carried out by the media served AfD.

Effects of the election results on Turkish-German relations

According to the results of the election, there were two possibilities regarding a coalition. The most probable was the continuation of the “Grand Coalition” (between CDU/CSU and SPD) which was preferred by Chancellor Merkel. However, after SPD Chairman Martin Schulz stated that his party is to become the opposition, the only alternative is the coalition between CDU/CSU-FDP-Greens, which is also known as the “Jamaica Coalition.” Considering that all parties oppose a coalition with AfD, that the leftist parties lack seats to form a “leftist coalition,” and that the CDU/CSU categorically reject a coalition with Die Linke, the Jamaica Coalition becomes the only available option.

Formation and maintenance of this coalition is indeed challenging. Yet, how would this coalition affect Turkish-German relations?

Firstly, the Greens, who alongside Die Linke, have led an ideological hostility towards Turkey claiming that if they were to become partners of the coalition they would issue travel warnings as to wreck Turkey’s tourism. In an attempt to increase economic and political pressure on Turkey by claiming that Ankara only understands from stern language, it should be underlined that a party who has maintained this negative discourse sharing political power in a coalition will have negative consequences for Turkish-German relations. Considering that the party consorts Turkey’s domestic affairs into Germany’s agenda through anti-Turkey diaspora members and negatively affects Berlin’s policies towards Ankara, the Greens might exacerbate existing issues between the two countries if they maintain these policies when part of the coalition government.

In such a scenario, potential coalition partner FDP’s intervention and assertion that Germany is a commerce country which should refrain from constructing foreign policy based on ideology gains importance. It is highly likely that the CDU/CSU’s ideological approach towards Turkey was influenced during the election campaign due to Die Linke and the Greens. Within this framework therefore, the FDP ought to take duty in pulling the government back onto a rationalist doctrine.

Future relations between Germany and Turkey will be shaped by a possible Jamaica Coalition, whose major political lines will be determined by either the Greens’ ideological foreign policy or FDP’s expected pragmatism along with Merkel’s CDU/CSU’s approach to these two options.

Ankara’s position is clear. Turkey expects Germany to accept it as a sovereign and equal partner and to halt support to PKK and FETO as a requirement of the NATO alliance.