Seven years ago when the civil war erupted in Syria, the Balkans considered itself far away from the war zone. However, when Daesh (ISIS) gained prominence in early 2014 and emerged as an influential non-state actor across eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq, the terror group began recruiting fighters quickly, and the Balkans became a region with some of the highest numbers of foreign fighters joining Daesh’s ranks.

Studies conducted at research centers based in western Balkan countries such as Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have shown that people, who joined the Daesh terror group often lack education, are members of marginalized groups with extremist ideologies, and experience poor emotional and economic situations. Most importantly is the lack of access to correct knowledge about their faith which causes vulnerable young people to be influenced by propaganda from various groups.

In the Balkans, the largest number of fighters joining Daesh came from Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent from Serbia, Montenegro and Northern Macedonia. According to the Extremism Research Forum-Albania Report, 144 people joined extremist groups in 2013. The Ministry of Interior and the Albanian National CVE Coordinator reported that the number of Daesh fighters from Albania dropped to 0 in 2015. This was the result of Albania’s 2014 Penal Code amendments criminalizing participation in, and recruitment of, citizens to engage in armed conflicts abroad.

According to a European Commission report on Albania, 45 individuals have returned from Syria while 26 are believed to have died, 73 individuals remain in Syria. Before Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, last month, around 50 children from Albania were living for months in Syrian camps. Turkey’s ambassador to Tirana, Murat Ahmet Yoruk, said last month in a press conference that the repatriation of Daesh fighters including children and women from Syria was a priority. Yoruk said that Turkey was exchanging information with the Albanian government but did not give any more details about when a repatriation effort might be expected.

The Extremism Research Forum– Kosovo report noted that 400 people have travelled from Kosovo to Syria or Iraq between 2012 and 2017. One third have already returned to Kosovo. Country Reports for terrorism by the U.S Department of State in 2018 shows that 74 of them are deceased. 133 of these individuals have returned while approximately 196 remain in conflict zone, which includes 40 children who were born in the conflict zone to Kosovo citizens. Generally, the age of fighters from Kosovo varies from 21 and 30.

Currently trials and investigations are continuing in Kosovo for 52 suspects and 21 cases. What is important to emphasize is that the prosecutors lack experience in these kinds of cases which Kosovo has never faced before. In April 2019 , according to the New York Times, the Justice Minister of Kosovo Ablerad Tahiri told journalist that “a planned operation to bring back some of our citizens from Syria ended successfully.” Among the group were four men suspected of being Daesh fighters who were arrested, 32 women and 74 children. Nine of these children had lost parents during the fighting in Syria. The justice minister claimed that these women and children are victims and deserve to reintegrate in the society. Meanwhile the number of Kosovo fighters that remain in Syria is around 90, and it is still not clear if any operation will be organized for their return.

Citizens of North Macedonia have also been included in Daesh recruitments, too. According to the Extremism Research Forum Report (2017) in early 2018 the number of Daesh fighters from North Macedonia reached 140 men, and 14 women. North Macedonia has the second highest number of returnees in the Western Balkans which is 80.

As a country with different ethnic groups – Macedonians, Albanians, Turks and Albanians from North Macedonia were the largest group to join Daesh. Taking in consideration the political situation between Albanians and Macedonians, often threats of violent extremism is misused by political elites. According to a research report by Regional Cooperation Group (RCG) a good example is the “Montra Case” where in 2012, “five ethnic North Macedonians were killed under (still) unclear circumstances”. The Interior Minister of North Macedonia said at the time that it was a ‘horrific assassination that was perpetrated by followers of radical Islam’ however, no relevant evidence was provided to confirm this.

The RCG report also stated that there were two large law-enforcement operations known as “Cell 1” and “Cell 2” in August 2015 in which 14 individuals were arrested under suspicion of conducting recruitment, financing or facilitating the travels of foreign fighters from North Macedonia to Syria and Iraq. To prevent radicalization the new government of North Macedonia introduced two strategies in March 2018 – the “Prevention of Violent Extremism” and an updated “Strategy on Countering Terrorism”.

Bosnia and Herzegovina historically been known to be a magnet when it comes to attracting foreign fighters. Bosnia’s State Investigations and Protection Agency reports show that between 2012 and 2016 around 200 men and 70 Bosnian women and a total of around 60 children travelled to Syria and Iraq. As the country made an effort to enforce laws in order to prevent recruitment, the number of individuals going to Syria fell sharply in 2016. In March 2019, two people were supposed to be repatriated to Bosnia with one successfully returned. Currently, Bosnian authorities are expecting to repatriate nine people, while 120 are still imprisoned in Northern Syria with repatriation procedures in process. In 2017, 46 people were reported by the Ministry of Justice.

The biggest challenge facing Bosnia right now alongside other Western Balkans countries is the treatment of returnees. In an Interview with the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) The Bosnian Security Minister Dragan Mektic said that “they will be treated according to our laws and the evidence we have and which is given to us by our partner countries. We are part of the global coalition for the battle against ISIS since the very beginning, we have been part of that process for a long time and we will fulfil all our obligations from our participation in that coalition”.

While civil society groups argue that women and children are victims, academics argue that even women should be investigated and prosecuted on a case-by-case basis as was done in Kosovo. However, Bosnian officials argue that extremism will still continue to be a threat for the country. What has raised the issue even more is a statement by the French President Emmanuel Macron in an interview for The Economist calling Bosnia a “ticking time-bomb” claiming that the country contains a danger from returning jihadists. However, this declaration was criticized by Bosnian officials and Islamic Community in Bosnia since according to them they are doing the best to deal with this issue, albeit being a huge challenge.

Serbia has one of the smallest numbers of Daesh fighters from the Balkans. According to the Interior Ministry of Serbia, 49 individuals joined the so-called Islamic State and most of them were from Novi Pazar, a city with Muslim majority in Serbia. The BIRN investigations show that there are 20 Serbian women in Syrian camps and until now Serbian authorities have not taken any measures to bring them home. The only politician that has spoken out about this issue is Muamer Zukorlic, a leader of a small Bosniak party and an MP in the Serbian parliament. He stressed that the state must do more, especially when it comes to saving the children. However, according to the US State Department Report the level of Daesh recruitments activities in Serbia are low.

When the influx of Daesh recruits began in 2012 and in the following years, the situation in Montenegro caused this issue become highly politicized so that even though the number of fighters was small compared to other Western Balkan countries, in 2015 the state responded by developing a Countering Violent Extremism Strategy. Balkan Insight writes that according to the latest European Commission report on Montenegro, 23 individuals went to Syria among them five women and three children. Out of that number six have reportedly died, while 10 returned to Montenegro. The first case to be persecuted by High court of Podgorica was in 2015 with the trial still ongoing.

What made the issue of Daesh recruitments in the Balkans, especially in Kosovo and Albania, all the more sensitive was when in April 2019, The New York Times broadcast video footage showing camps in Syria holding relatives of Daesh fighters. In the video, viewers could clearly hear voices speaking in Albanian saying “Oj Sare!” (Hey Sara!) “Ku eshte Sara?” (Where is Sarah?) Public reaction was immediate, prompting both the Kosovo and Albanian governments to take steps to return their citizens. Kosovo has the highest number of returnees and it seems to be the most successful country in the Balkans in terms of repatriating its citizens, however this all happened with the help of the United States.

Currently, Balkans countries especially Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are facing major challenges on how to deal with returnees. National and international organizations are conducting different training programs for psychologists as well as sociologists. The Balkans as a poorer region of Europe lacks expertise and often seeks help from the EU on dealing with cases.

Other neighboring states of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, do not have a high number of individuals who have gone to fight in Syria. In Bulgaria, some members of the Roma community include a Muslim majority were accused of recruiting individuals to go to Syria but there is no exact number. Croatians were shocked when in 2015 a Croatian citizen who joined Daesh was said to have been killed in Syria. These countries are usually used as transit routes for terrorists from Europe to Syria and Iraq. As part of the EU, they enforced laws and strategies according to EU requests.

Unlike other Western states who have often publicly refused to accept the repatriation of their foreign fighters, Balkan states have shown leadership by taking responsibility for their citizens, especially women and children. However, despite statements by some Balkan representatives that returnees are unlikely to pose a public risk, the long term issues that may arise with the return of battle-hardened fighters still remains of utmost concern. For now, many Balkan states face the challenging process of integrating returnees, an unfamiliar situation which will require thoughtful responses.

Written by Antigona Imeri – ISTANBUL

During Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in the north of Syria, US President Donald Trump sent an unpleasant letter to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that was later returned to him during Erdoğan’s visit to the White House. But besides Trump’s undiplomatic language, he also made an offer to facilitate negotiations between Turkey and a so-called “General” on the Northern Syrian issue. However, there was a problem. The person Trump referred to as a “General”, was actually a wanted terrorist by Turkey on Interpol’s red notice list and the US relationship with Kobani has become a sore point Turkish-US relation

After Kobani’s name was mentioned alongside the other European politicians, Turkish President Erdoğan strongly took issue to the fact that Mazloum Kobani is terrorist wanted by Turkey. “Now we are at a point that some European countries such as France and Germany are negotiating with leaders of this terrorist organization. Again, some American authorities discuss with them. And in the face of these developments, we ask them ‘What is this situation?’ On the one hand, we talk about counter-terrorism, on the other, unfortunately, you open your doors to them and sit around the table with them. You even sent their letter as an addition to your letter” he told in a press interview.

Turkish President Erdoğan also said that Washington has to hand over Kobani to Turkey according to international law. “We have an extradition agreement. The USA has to give this man to us. Because this is the requirement of ‘wanted by the red notice’ he said.

Who is Mazloum Kobani?

Ferhat Abdi Şahin, who is better known by the adopted name of Mazloum Kobani and also as Mazloum Abdi, or by the nom de guerre Şahin Cilo, was born in Afrin, Syria in 1967. Despite a lack of information about his early life, sources say that he met with the so-called leader of the PKK Abdullah Ocalan when he was a child. It was during Ocalan’s years in Syria that the bond between them was said to have grown. Because of his close relationship with Ocalan, Kobani is considered to be Ocalan’s spiritual son.

According to sources, in 1990, when Kobani was 23 years old, he joined the PKK. From 1991-1996, he worked as a so-called Cilo Region Manager in Turkey’s Hakkari province. Kobani was responsible for the 22 August 1996 rocket attack that killed five people and wounded 11 others in Hakkari’s Şemdinli province. He was also responsible for the 8 November 1996 rocket attack that killed 17 people and wounded eight other at Hakkari’s Çukurca Province.

From 1997 to 2003, he was assigned as the PKK’s Europe Manager. In these years, he established the PKK’s Europe organizational scheme. He described this period as ‘political works’ during some interviews. Sources say that during this period he made a lot of connections with governmental institutions in the name of the PKK.

Besides his ‘political works’ in Europe, he also organized some activities such as festivals and camps mainly in the Netherlands to promote the PKK.

When Ocalan was captured at Kenya in 1999, Kobani was living in Europe. After 2003, he returned to Syria and according to Euronews he was imprisoned by the Syrian Government on five occasions and until 2009 he spent most of his time in prison.

In 2013, during the early years of the Syrian civil war, he began to work for the YPG as a so-called special forces manager and individual responsible for intelligence. It was during these years that Daesh began to strengthen in Syria and despite Turkey’s objections, the US decided to collaborate with the YPG with the purpose of defeating the Daesh.

In 2018, after Daesh was defeated, the US administration began to refer to Mazloum Kobani as ‘General Mazloum’. Particularly after the US Defense Ministry Spokesman Col. Robert Manning first referred to him as ‘General’ and argued that the US would continue to help the YPG as long as they fight against Daesh. The usage of the term ‘General’ was condemned by Turkey. After Manning’s statement, Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hami Soylu gave a press brief about the situation saying “the Pentagon Spokesman spoke nonsense on Afrin matter”.

When Turkish President Erdoğan met with US President Trump in the White House this November, a month after Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, the Turkish delegation showed a short documentary about Kobani to US officials. In the documentary Kobani was shown to have “cost of the life of 313 Turkish security forces, honourable men and women whose sole duty and purpose was to protect and serve their people. He also killed five civilians during attacks on 29 police stations between 1991 and 1995. His preferred modus operandi, a method all too familiar to our fellow audience: Suicide.”

Following this crucial meeting that some Republican Senators also attended, some specialists commented about Kobani’s possible Washington trip. Luke Coffey, a foreign policy expert at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative policy think tank, was one of them. “Ferhat Abdi Şahin (aka Mazloum Kobanê) should NEVER be allowed to step foot on American soil” he said on his verified twitter account. He also made a special statement on Turkey’s state television TRT at beginning of Operation Peace Spring. “To defeat a terrorist organization by collaborating with another terrorist organization is a great insincerity. Entirely meaningless… If the citizens of the USA knew that the taxes that they paid to the government transferred to the YPG, which is an arm of the Neo Marxist PKK in Syria, they would not like this” he said.

After these developments Turkey’s Communications Director İbrahim Kalın wrote an article about the attitude of American politicians towards Kobani’s possible Washington visit. “Why would U.S. lawmakers roll out the red carpet for the top commander of a terrorist group, who is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice? The senators are extending an invitation to Şahin due to his role as the head of the YPG, which the U.S. has chosen to support as part of its counterterrorism strategy in Syria. This decision is riddled with too many contradictions to list. This invitation not only damages Turkish-American relations, but also constitutes a potential crime under U.S. law, given the YPG’s ties with the PKK.” he stressed.

“The Turkish public will not forget or forgive those who invited Şahin to the U.S. in order to legitimize him. Our NATO ally’s efforts to glorify a terror organization’s leader will be etched in our memory for many years. Şahin’s invitation to the U.S. will create a lasting wound in the hearts and minds of thousands of innocent Turkish families that have lost their loved ones” Kalın also emphasized.

Ahmet Hakan, a Turkish Journalist from Hurriyet Daily commented on the Kobani’s situation after the Trump- Erdoğan meeting. In his opinion the Kobani video that was shown to the US officials ended Kobani’s positive reputation. He also noted that Turkish journalists President Erdoğan watched the Kobani video together with President Erdoğan after the significant meeting. He noted that “having watched the video, we turned our sight to President Erdoğan, who told us: ‘I got Trump and the senators to watch this. I saw that Trump was influenced by the video’”.

After this diplomatic movement, there is still no clear consensus between Ankara and Washington on the issue of Mazloum Kobani. Following the meeting in the White House, international media has stressed that Erdoğan strengthened his hand against Trump. In particular, CNN International’s White House correspondent Kevin Liptak wrote an Opinion piece about the meeting entitled “Trump declares himself a ‘big fan’ of Turkey’s strongman leader Erdoğan,” and writing that “Erdoğan isn’t the only global strongman to have caught Trump’s attention. But no leader has appeared to get what he wants from Trump quite like Erdoğan.”

Written by Yeter Ada Şeko – ISTANBUL

The recent change in Ankara’s strategy towards certain terrorist organizations has been a game changer. Since 2016, Turkey has been rapidly eliminating FETO and Daesh threats. However, the policy shift and the effectiveness of the fight given against the PKK threat has been incredible so far.

The numbers regarding the counter-terrorism performance shared by Turkey’s Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu last week demonstrated how Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy has been functional in the fight against the PKK, particularly following the attempted military coup. Since the July 15 failed military coup attempt, Turkey has been revolutionizing its counter-terrorism strategy, especially in containing the PKK threat not only in Turkey but also in Syria and Iraq.

Ankara has made a drastic adjustment in its strategy towards the PKK. Before July 15, the PKK had found great opportunity to consolidate its military and political capacity to transform itself from a terrorist organization to an acceptable armed and political actor in Syria and Iraq. While the PKK has been enjoying the strategic advantages of the “reconciliation process” by reformulating its long-term strategy in Turkey, it has been repossessing its entire political and military organization and geopolitical agenda with the increasing international status notably gained following Daesh’s offense in Kobane (also known as Ayn al-Arab) in Syria and Iraq. The first attempt to achieve a territorial autonomy (known as democratic autonomy) in Turkey has failed due to Turkey’s active counter-terrorism strategy and has been territorially contained by Turkey’s military offensive in Syria and Iraq later on.

The success of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy was shaped by three revolutionary steps; the paradigm shifts in counter-terrorism strategy, security sector reform following the failed military coup, and the changing military strategy in tactical and operational level on the ground against the PKK. Besides these steps, one of the most important driving factors behind this success is the political decisiveness in sustaining a counter-terrorism campaign against the PKK. Undoubtedly, President Erdogan’s leadership role has been playing a vital role in consolidating the political determination of Turkey.

The success of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy was shaped by three revolutionary steps; the paradigm shifts in counter-terrorism strategy, security sector reform following the failed military coup, and the changing military strategy in tactical and operational level on the ground against the PKK.

Firstly, Turkey’s new counter-terrorism strategy integrates and synchronizes political, security, economic, and the technological components that reinforce the state as the ultimate legitimate authority over the population while reducing PKK influence over the Kurdish population, particularly. This was primarily the case following the collapse of the peace process in 2015. The counter-terrorism strategy was designed to simultaneously protect the population from PKK violence in city centers and strengthened the capacity of the state institutions to marginalize the PKK’s perception in the eyes of the local people. Especially the process of de-PKKization of the municipalities was one of the most important strategic decisions taken by the government to undermine the PKK’s mobilization activities, particularly in the economic, political and military domains.     

The changing understanding regarding the reformulation of the military operation modality is another revolutionary step in containing the PKK threat. Until recently, Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy had been based on one-dimensional strategic calculation aimed to prevent the terrorist attacks conducted by the PKK against the military and security units, especially in the South-eastern part of Turkey where the PKK’s main terrorist campaign takes place. This one-dimensional counter-terrorism strategy is based on the action-reaction operational model in which security forces usually carry a reactionary military operation following the terrorist attack against any target in a specific geographical zone.

The new counter-terrorism strategy, however, is based on non-stop anti-terrorist security and military operations not only in city centers where the PKK-affiliated persons might live but also in rural areas. More importantly, the preemptive operational model that aims to neutralize the PKK threat in its base has become the central operational mentality for Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy.

Turkey’s new counter-terrorism strategy is based on non-stop anti-terrorist security and military operations not only in city centers where PKK-affiliated persons might live but also in rural areas. 

According to figures shared by Minister Soylu, Turkish Security Forces carried out 87,838 operations against the PKK in 2018. As a result of the anti-terrorism operations in 2018, Turkish security forces have neutralized 1,289 terrorists. The percentage of the operations carried by Turkish security forces is also remarkable compared to previous years. Turkish security forces have increased counter-terrorism operations in rural areas by 173 percent over the last two years.

Turkey’s superiority in terms of surveillance technology and advanced intelligence capacity also facilitated the effectiveness of its counter-terrorism strategy and helped to prevent potential PKK attacks. Thanks to the strong intelligence network among the state security institutions and efficiency of the intelligence information shared in the operational domain, 100 senior terrorists were neutralized in 2018, including those who were listed under the red, blue, and grey categories of the most wanted terrorist list. In 2017, for instance, the PKK planned 965 armed attacks. However, this figure dropped to 677 in 2018 demonstrating the impact of Turkey’s effectiveness in military intelligence. More importantly, while the PKK conducted 250 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in 2017, the number of IED attacks in rural areas decreased to 148 in 2018.

According to figures shared by Minister Soylu, Turkish Security Forces carried out 87,838 operations against the PKK in 2018. As a result of the anti-terrorism operations in 2018, Turkish security forces have neutralized 1,289 terrorists.

Recruitment is also vital to the PKK’s survival to sustain its terrorist campaign and propaganda. However, the numbers show that the PKK has not been effective in recruiting new fighters because of the counter-narrative program of Turkey. This is the new face of the Turkish counter-terrorism strategy in containing PKK influence over the Kurdish population. Turkey’s effective control of public space and improved population-centric counter-terrorism understanding, the PKK lost its efficiency in delivering its propaganda. The number of terrorists recruited to compensate for others killed during the counter-terrorism operations is in decline. Participation in PKK events has reached its lowest level in the last 30 years. In 2016, while the total number of terrorist recruitment was 3,881, only 95 joined to the ranks of PKK in 2018.

The security sector reform process adopted following the July 15 failed military coup attempt is another driving factor that positively shaped Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy. While the relocation of the Gendarmerie under the Ministry of the Interior was an act strengthening the effectiveness of the internal counter-terrorism operations, the Turkish Armed Forces found a great opportunity to focus on extra-territorial counter-terrorism operations against the PKK, particularly in Iraq, which operationally prevented the terrorist organization to find extra space for maneuver to infiltrate into Turkey.

More importantly, the institutional reformulation of the Village Guards (VG) in counter-terrorism operations facilitated the effectiveness of internal operations in rural areas. The numbers show the increasing effectiveness of the Village Guards in fighting against the PKK. While the number of Village Guards reached 52,395 (plus 19912 volunteers) in 2018, the average age among the village guards decreased to 32. This is not limited to the increasing number of the VG; their technological capacity and training programs were also reformulated and improved following the new requirements of the PKK’s threat.

The harmonization of the technological capacities of different state/security institutions is also a critical infrastructure investment that Turkey has been doing since 2015. The reformulation of intelligence sharing, improvement of joint operation room and joint operational information mechanism facilitated the joint counter-terrorism operations. The number of professionals in Gendarmerie is 65 %, which is incredibly high as compared to previous years. To detect and end terrorist mobilization, especially in special counter-terrorism operations, drone technology provided Turkey another great opportunity in containing the PKK threat. Except for the TAF’s drone capacity, the drone capacity of the Ministry of Interior has increased 50 percent over the last two years. This is especially vital in creating a joint security umbrella to sustain active intelligence and rapid reaction against the PKK.

Turkey is revolutionizing its counter-terrorism strategy not only against the PKK in Turkey but also against other terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq. The new face of terrorism and changing dynamics in the Middle East are likely to push Turkey to revolutionize its military engagements in the near future.  

Turkey is in the midst of a ground operation in Iraq. The operation aims to clear the entire area under PKK control in Iraq and remove the PKK headquarters from the Qandil region, which is about 100 km away from the Turkish border. There were already limited operations and ongoing air bombardments of the PKK targets taking place after the PKK ended the ceasefire in the summer of 2015. Nevertheless, according to local sources, the operations took a new phase on March 11th of this year.

Accordingly, Turkish forces landed on the top of the mountains (i.e., Şapan, Dilan, Kewet, Bene, Çiyasor, Alekan ve Çiyaneya) in Sidekan/Bradost in Soran district of North Erbil. Then, eleven military bases were installed in the area. Next, the installed bases were connected to each other with the clean & sweep operations of Turkish ground forces and newly built roads between the bases. We see a close synchronization of the Turkish air and ground forces in time, space and purpose for the clean & sweep operations.

As a result of this joint operation, 155 PKK members were neutralized in the region since March 11. The 23 km long border was cleaned of the PKK threat and a total 400 km square is cleaned of the PKK. As a result of this operation, Turkey formed two pockets of PKK-free areas in Iraq across its border, one across Çukurca in the west and one across Şemdinli in the east. The eastern pocked has become a corridor heading towards Qandil and is currently as close as 24 km to the PKK headquarters.

Since March of this year 155 PKK members were neutralized in the region. The 23 km long border was cleaned of the PKK threat and a total 400 km square is cleaned of the PKK.

Turkey seems to be committed to end PKK terrorism for once and for all. After the PKK ended the ceasefire by murdering four Turkish security personnel in three different occasions from July 20 to 23, 2015, Turkey started its counter-terrorism operations. In response, the PKK increased its terror attacks including suicide bombers in bus stops, stadiums, etc. and started its so-called “rural-based urban war” in 22 centers across six cities in southeastern Turkey.

Once Turkey cleaned these residential areas from the PKK, the country seems to be committed to end the PKK in its strongholds outside Turkey. The PKK has no safe havens in Turkey, not a single “liberated” village, but is freely recruiting, training, sheltering, and even ruling vast areas in Syria and Iraq. Afrin was the first place where the PKK/PYD was cleaned off, the PKK leader Ocalan’s posters were taken down from Afrin city, and school textbooks with references to Ocalan are no longer being taught to school kids in Afrin.

Given that Qandil is 100 km away from the Turkish border, it required diplomatic negotiations with the Iraqi central government.

Following Afrin, Turkey also pressured for Sinjar in Iraq and Manbij in Syria to be cleared of the PKK. Sinjar and Manbij are still matters of diplomatic encounters between Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq. Nevertheless, unlike Manbij in Syria, the PKK is not under the security umbrella of patron states in northeast Iraq. In fact, the organization does not even allow the Kurdistan Regional Government forces to the areas under its control. Yet, given that Qandil is 100 km away from the Turkish border, it required diplomatic negotiations with the Iraqi central government.

If Iraq will be cleared of the PKK altogether, it will have to receive the support of Iraq or even Iran, which otherwise might be a retreat or even a logistical support zone. Hence, Turkey’s offensive in Iraq will require its neighbors’ cooperation. And only after such a tripartite cooperation of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, can the PKK finally be cleaned off from Qandil. As for defeating the PKK in Syria, Turkey will have to work with the U.S. and will have to find a way to persuade the U.S. to stop its support to the PKK’s consolidation in Syria.

The Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) which was launched on August 24, 2016 in order to clear the presence of terrorist organizations along Turkey’s southern border and to prevent the illegitimate PKK entity in Syria, seems to have reached its major objectives. While Turkey has carried out an intense counter-terrorism campaign at home in recent years, she has also adopted a strategy of eliminating terrorist threats at their roots by increasing military activism abroad. Along with the waves of frequent terrorist attacks in the country, the rapid proliferation of terrorist groups with the exploitation of the civil war in Syria made this strategy shift imperative.

Although it is often claimed that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) would face capability problems in case of a military operation in foreign lands due to the discharges after the July 15 coup attempt, the OES was successfully completed on March 30, 2017. The OES, planned and implemented with the concept of Joint Operations, has demonstrated that the TAF has the level of capacity and readiness, capable of dealing with hybrid terrorist threats in foreign lands as well as in urban environments. The fact that the operation was carried out with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), is an experience that further raises the value of the success and makes the OES an exemplifying campaign. However, it is understood that hybrid warfare practices and innovative terrorist tactics encountered in the theatre of war have created some problems for the course of the OES.

Military and Tactical Experiences

During the operation, the biggest threats faced by OES elements were Suicide Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). A significant number of the martyrs given during the operation was the result of SVBIEDs, and many of the destroyed armored vehicles are of those ATGMs. Particularly in the western and northern parts of al-Bab, the tanks were repeatedly exposed to ATGMs allowing SVBIED attackers to become more able to reach the OES base areas. The fact that suicide attackers instantly had car bombs ready in their present location at the time increased the shocking effect of the threat, exacerbating  the obstruction of the attack.

Smashing the enemy defense lines with the maneuverability and the fire power of the armors and mechanized units was a vital component of the OES. However, the high level of armor losses calls attention to the necessity of a number of regulations and developments in the tactical deployment, use, and handling of tanks in the hybrid warfare environment. On the other hand, due to limited TAF personnel at the beginning of the operation, the armor advances that were heavily dependent on the FSA infantry capacity, has come to a standstill due to the problems originated from the FSA components in adapting to the rapidly developing battle environment. This situation was only improved after the deployment of the Turkish Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Commando Teams to the battlefield at increasing rates. Furthermore, the lack of close air support was felt in many cases, in particular when the armored units were in vulnerable positions against the sudden attacks.

It was observed during the OES that DAESH evaluated the timing factor in the theatre of war. The time slot in question is the period of temporary fragility of the OES elements during deployments in liberated areas immediately after it was captured. In that time slot, which generally came across the early hours of the morning, DAESH resorted to its traditional counter-attacks with raids and hit and runs. SVBIED, guided missile and mortar attacks were followed by the close engagement of small DAESH teams into OES elements. During these raids, it was observed that DAESH provided effective cover for its attacking militants as well as putting pressure on the OES elements by suppressive fire via ZSU-23 Shilka anti-aircraft weapons. DAESH militants also harassed positioned tanks through these weapon systems, aiming tanks to leave their positions and to turn them into open targets for guided missiles. Another significant factor that created difficulties in DAESH counter-attacks was the weather conditions. Particularly the serious fall of visual range due to the dense fog made it inevitably difficult to counter asymmetrical and sudden threats.

The Necessity of Stable Diplomatic Relations

It should be noted that the inability to overcome some diplomatic problems is another critical factor that slowed down the operation. After rapid acquisitions in the early days of the OES, the Manbij became a target of the operation. However, it was forced to halt by the US’s manipulation and intimidation strategy. Afterwards, the OES continued towards the western direction. Another development was that in the time period between the capture of Dabık and the preparation stage for the al-Bab operation, both Syria and Russia created various problems with military threats by means of air forces, which caused the operation tempo to be adversely affected. In the same period, the US-backed YPG/PKK attacked elements of the OES in the vicinity of Mare, rapidly multiplying and complicating instant security threats. The fact that the Russian Air Forces hit Turkish soldiers on the 9th of February shows the seriousness of the whole complexity. Therefore, stable dialogue between interstate relations is a necessity for the military initiatives carried out on thin diplomatic lines.

Population Centric Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence

Through the OES experience, it became clear that counter-terrorism strategies must be population-centric. The reason for this is due to the fact that public acceptance of the OES components was not only essential for the successful completion of the operation but also for its long-term returns. In respect to counter-terrorism, it can be suggested that Turkey has succeeded in the activities of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) during the operation. The most crucial factor that contributed to this success was the support of the local people. While the evaluation of HUMINT during the OES highlights its success, it can be stated that technical intelligence activities should be intensified and surveillance in general should be upgraded to a stronger technological infrastructure.

Military Operation with a Local Partner

By allying with the local opposition groups, Turkey initiated the OES as an alternative model of Joint Operations. Conducting a military operation in a different geography, operating in an environment in which the dominant language is different and variations in socio-cultural dynamics in the region made Turkey more reliant on FSA forces during the operation. While combating hybrid threats, operations with local partners require a number of improvements in terms of motivation and battle performance.

On the tactical and organizational level, an ideal military cooperation that overcomes the principal-agent problem can be achieved through an integrated approach to the concepts of initiative, intelligence, and integration between units and services, leadership, motivated soldiers and learning. However, in these phases, it is inevitable not to encounter structural problems. First of all, local partners participating in the operation may need to conduct patrol and ambush operations outside the garrison and at night, so that an operation against irregular/terrorist elements can be successfully carried out. Disruptions in the implementation of these tasks may slow down the operational tempo and may even cause retreatment of the forces. At this stage, taking into account the components of the FSA forces, it should be noted that the traditional warfare culture of FSA is different from the TAF. In the light of this information, it may be necessary for the FSA forces to be trained at a tactical level regarding the necessities of the battlefield.

Secondly, in areas of complex conflicts like the Syrian Civil War, the advantage of local opposition groups is to have a deep and strategic knowledge of the population and local conditions. However, being deprived of this advantage or reducing it to a minimum can have vital consequences. In order for intelligence regarding the  population and local conditions to be beneficial for the operation, it is important to integrate intelligence gathering as well as analyzing and spreading capabilities and general knowledge of acquired knowledge. However, most of the time, information may not be shared among armed actors formed by the integration of several different groups such as the FSA, and informational disparities between the units may have negative consequences on the scene. In this context, it is necessary to establish a common ground between the commanders and the units to provide trust and information sharing.

Thirdly, in order to ensure complete control and security of an area in the operation, it is necessary for the forces participating in the operation to have the ability to work together. Besides, when unexpected resistance by terrorist elements are detected, reinforcement of forces may turn out to be a necessity. In the case of OES, the FSA forces formed an important part of the offensive force, while the armored units supported the FSA forces. This situation increased the role and significance of the FSA in the operation, as the main offensive force in the elimination of potential anti-tank units targeting armored troops.

Establishing Dynamic Coordination

On the other hand, the collaboration of commanders with leadership qualities among local partners constitutes a more dynamic coordination of the co-operative forces. From time to time disagreements among the commanders of the components of the FSA, and the suicide attacks of DAESH on these commanders have been one of the major problems affecting the course of the operation during the OES.

Moreover, the disagreement between the local partner and the protecting power may lead to motivation problems. For a long time, Turkey tried to persuade the opposition forces, who perceive the Syrian regime as the primary threat, to fight against DAESH instead of the regime. With the change of this threat perception of the FSA towards DAESH, the integration of the groups with low motivation to the operation posed a trouble in the conduct of the OES.

There is no doubt that tactical training is intended for conventional military operations. However, operations such as the OES, which are conducted with a local partner against irregular/terrorist elements, will require continual learning for conventional and hybrid threat operations, moving beyond high-level skills and standard procedures.

Turkey marks significant developments in the defense industry. Undoubtedly, the project of developing indigenously-developed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is among the country’s leading innovations. Manufacturing and using indigenously produced drones contributed to Turkey’s counter-terror fight to a great extent in recent months. Therefore, the developments in UAV technologies and their place in the defense industry constitute a considerable object of interest. SETA Foundation’s Strategy Program Director Hasan Basri Yalçın and researcher Abdullah Erboğa conducted an interview with Haluk Bayraktar, the General Manager of Baykar Makina, which presents important information regarding Turkey’s position in the field.

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The requirement of building a national and domestic defense industry has been highlighted in Turkey for a long time and we have lately observed that Turkey has achieved rapid progress in terms of developing UAVs. What kind of a transformation has Turkey experienced in the defense industry? Was there any critical turning point?

In Turkey, major steps were taken in the defense industry during the early Republican period. A number of national entrepreneurs and businessmen such as Nuri Demirağ, Vecihi Hürkuş, Şakir Zümre and Nuri Kılligil formed a convention in this respect. These names used to embrace their jobs as a mission. During the late 1940s, their initiatives were interrupted with the Marshall Plan aid that was introduced after Turkey’s strategic decision was shaped by the U.S. during World War II. Instead of the national entrepreneur/businessman model, the businessman model based on distributing important foreign brands was preferred. The question as to why Turkey does not yet have a domestic automobile partially stems from such choices made at the time. With the Marshall Plan aid, our military was equipped with donated foreign armored vehicles, tanks and weapons instead of domestic weapons.

The interrupted phase resumed with the Cyprus incidents in 1974, as during this period Turkey was subject to an arms embargo. It was during this era that the “make your own plane” campaign was re-initiated. Turkish Aerospace Industries Inc. (TAI) and Turkey’s leading defense systems producer ASELSAN were among the facilities established during this period. The period from the 1970s to early 2000s can be defined as the period of direct procurement and utilization from abroad. Meanwhile, joint production and montage activities were seen in certain projects.

In addition to manufacturing plants being found, a joint montage line of F-16 jets were also established with TAI in 1984. ASELSAN was established in 1974 as a consequence of the embargo imposed following the Cyprus Operation. Following ASELSAN’s establishment, while the U.S. continued to donate radios to Turkey, these were not used solely in order to encourage the operations of ASELSAN. There was another turning point as of 2004. It is argued that the hood event was the main factor triggering this since the turning point did not occur solely with the effect of a civilian initiative. Some military factors were also in play and we were direct witnesses of this period.  From the 1990s onward, the “network centric warfare” strategy gained prominence across the world and software and electronic components came into prominence in platforms. This reflected the possibility that those weapons might be used against us unless an investment was made within our own means. With advancing technologies, this situation became even more clear. Everything was mechanic a century ago, and electronic software dramatically changed the modes in the industry.

The turning point occurred in 2004 due to the fact that major bids corresponding to several billion dollars were on the agenda during the previous five years, such as bids on UAVs, tanks and helicopters. All of these were canceled and a domestic and original development model began to be implemented in 2004. The model was implemented in the field of UAVs in the most outstanding way. So, Turkey’s current position in the field of UAV technologies is the result of gradual process. Although it was really interrupted – for instance we confronted numerous obstacles as Baykar – a will was certainly displayed in this respect and we are now living the outcomes of this will.

UAVs in Counter-Terrorism

UAV technologies have developed at a rapid pace – is this because they are more producible or did the field emerge as a strategic necessity in the context of counter-terrorism?

Both factors have been effective. UAV technologies do really create the effect of force multiplier in operations as combatant force cannot properly be employed unless the targets are pinpointed. In addition, the conditions stemming from asymmetrical warfare environments increase the need for UAVs. It also presents a couple of advantages in terms of production and technological improvement. Each move made in this scope can take you to the cutting edge since UAV technologies experience a paradigm shift in aviation industry. While the previous century was based on a platform-focused aviation, the current focal points of the sector include themes like electronics, software and artificial intelligence.

Military systems are the top platforms. Below them are main subsystems, material technologies and their components. This field is required to encompass both military qualifications and military standards. For instance, if you are developing tanks, an enterprise cannot randomly step up to develop tanks. It is not easy to compete in a field that has remained steady since the Second World War. But an enterprise can develop domestic and independent UAVs, as we did, and can yield successful results. Thanks to the initiatives we made around a decade ago, we can develop and manufacture our local UAVs in our country and put them into the service of our military.

Is this because tanks are more complicated?

Rather than being complicated, it is a system that was developed a long time ago and so therefore it is not very easy to make groundbreaking moves in this field. As UAV technologies are newly developing, no specific standards or qualifications are requested for it. No one puts emphasis on certain qualifications in this field across the world as technology is always ahead of legal regulations. Besides being a newly-developing technology, UAVs do not have established main sub-industries when their subsystems and components are viewed. For example, in the automotive sector, all components can be found in the market from alternators to the most basic ones. It is a stable sector unlike the newly-developing UAV industry and for this very reason, it enables a great deal of flexibility. So many components from civilian sectors can be incorporated into the UAV industry. We call this “off-the-shelf material.” For example, suppose that you are developing the flight control system of an UAV.  It is a computer system that stabilizes the aircraft and enables it to automatically follow the routes identified and uploaded by you. You develop a software to create this system. Also, you need to work on the computer’s electronic equipment design and architecture. You create this design and architecture, and gather the components forming the computer such as its processor, diode and transistor. While you devise an authentic board design, you can purchase the components off-the-shelf since you have access to them for civilian and commercial purposes. This thus allows for the rapid improvement of the UAV industry.

Do you think there has been a critical point in the international arena where the need for UAVs has increased? Such as the Gulf War and the Second Iraq War to give examples from the past. Do you think the progress of UAV technologies accelerated at a certain point?

When you consider the literature, an example of this are the target drones used by the U.S. in Bosnia. There are also reconnaissance drones. Prior to that, drones were used in the Beqaa Valley by Israel. Israel is intensively employing such technologies in wars. We know that they were used in the most intensive way in the aftermath of 9/11. In a sense, this is due to the fact that the opportunities offered by technology make it possible to utilize UAVs in such operations.

While not that common in the Gulf War, AWACS (the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System) was used in Kosovo.

During the Gulf War, the U.S. did not have an established UAV technology yet. Especially following the results obtained through GNAT UAV in Kosovo, its upgraded version Predator was predominantly used in that area. Meanwhile, Turkey was among the first countries importing GNAT UAVs. We purchased ten of them in 1994 but did not use GNAT or I-GNAT systems in the following years. Their average duration of flight is around 100 hours, which is incredibly low. They were not used then possibly due to the fact that our military structure and outlook on this technology was different.

New Generation Wars and UAVs

There was the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) issue during the 1990s. From now on, military conflicts will arise not because of the problems caused by the industrial revolution but of the problems arising from information revolution. The network centric warfare will be out in the open and all systems will operate interdependently, which is called “system of systems.” Such a state was commonly seen during the 1990s and early 2000s, but there is a claim suggesting that firepower is still effective especially with the start of proxy wars. Which period do you think UAVs belong to?

Considering the phenomenon of network centric warfare, UAV systems encompass many different technologies including communication, sensor, processor, command and control technologies. As a matter of fact, the progress made in these technologies make us effective. For example, sorting out some communication systems allows one to develop satellite communication and a broadband communication system that is higher than the line of sight. This makes you acquire the ability to transmit images with very high resolutions. Or, the sensor you develop becomes portable in drones. In other words, UAVs will have the same function with AWACS. Consequently, technology and practice are parallel to each other. This is the point where network centric warfare comes into play. It enables regarding each component in the battlefield as a communication instrument or a sensor while enabling the reciprocal transmission of data at certain hierarchic layers.

UAV technologies are the direct outcome of network centric warfare as UAVs do not mean anything alone. For example, the aircrafts developed by Bayraktar are flying day and night, both inside and outside the country borders. From the moment, they take off, all the data is gradually transmitted to all centers and monitored by the top level. When an engagement decision is issued, it is conveyed to the base that flies the relevant jet. So, the system operates within a hierarchy of network centric warfare. Imagine a ground control station that flies a drone by itself. It has a pilot and a payload operator. It flies the drone, and while monitoring it, the image is simultaneously conveyed to various centers including brigade command and general staff, and each of them issue a decision on their own level. Then these decisions are transmitted to the system from a certain base.

The practices in the concept of network centric warfare depend on how far the developed technologies comply with this structure. Currently, our UAVs use a home-grown virtual globe, namely the Geographical Analysis System (CAS) developed by Piri Reis company. This is a software-based mapping technology. About a decade ago, the country did not have such a chance: Let’s say you are launching operations in a certain region. As teams change, you did not have a chance to analyze and filter the data of the previous team, which impedes the formation of strong ties. Now we have a software system operating above servers. All data is live. Everyone involved in the process enters their data and each one has the opportunity to see everything live. This is actually a component of the network centric warfare.

Turkey’s UAV capacity

How would you assess Turkey’s position in UAV technologies from a global perspective?

From 2004 onwards, Turkey displayed a will in this field that was reflected to the specifications of the Undersecretary of Defense Industries (SSM), which is the procurement authority. The necessity of being home-grown and authentic is asked in all the critical components as part of the specifications. Some criteria were adopted and implemented in this respect. For example, purchasing a component from a local supplier who buys it from abroad is not considered national. We started with micro UAVs and thought that starting from such a point was the most crucial factor.

As a matter of fact, this is another dimension represented by UAVs. In the previous century, aviation was completely based on aircrafts, air vehicles and platforms, but this has changed with the advent of UAVs. It has evolved into a technology solely focusing on electronic software and guidance and control systems. To give an example, we are currently developing all the components of UAVs including their flight control systems, frames, server systems that operate ailerons, batteries, power systems and ground command and control. Aeronautics and aircraft engineering constitute only 10 percent of this. In other words, designing the airframe is 10 percent of the overall job.

To explain our position, I can say that Turkey is among the countries that use UAVs intensively. Also, aircrafts keep developing as long as they fly. You can develop them. But an aircraft waiting in hangar cannot take you anywhere. It causes you trouble. In this sense, Turkey has significant experiences.

I think Turkey is among the top five or six countries that can use UAVs effectively in operational terms. Thanks to the contribution of the companies that have developed this technology in an authentic way like we have done, this experience has come to the fore. We started from the bottom of the ladder, and have come to our current position by gradually growing. Of course, we will keep our progress. Technology is a race. But one of the most important factors that will contribute to this progress is the experience of using them in the field. This factor will take us even further. Experience, identification of necessities, and additions on the system based on the feedback we have: These are the factors that improve us. No improvement can be achieved without practice.

What is the exact process? Does the military request a specific technology from you or do you develop and serve the technology to the army? Can the political and bureaucratic bodies rapidly respond to the technological improvements?

Bayraktar Mini UAV is the first system we developed. The SSM was the first one demanding Bayraktar Mini UAV. They invited us and other companies according to an invitation method based on competition and everyone developed and presented an aircraft model through their own means without any research and development support. We ranked first and the grounds of Bayraktar Mini was thus laid. For example, Malazgirt rotating-wing UAV is a project we kicked off with our own initiative. We also took initiative in many other things such as Bayraktar Tactical Bloc 2 without any demand from the procurement authority. We call it embracing duty as a mission. It happens very often. The structure in Turkey needs to change, and it is gradually changing. Currently, the military is the consuming body while the the SSM is the procurement authority. And the industry is the producer. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) has ten years procurement plans. Strategic plans and project necessities are determined based on these plans. The military reveals project needs by working within the structure and conveys the Project Definition Documents to the SSM. The documents state the needs and the SSM endeavors to meet the needs by means of the defense industry.

But to what extent is this technologically effective? How far are the country’s industrial infrastructure activities and competence concerned while determining the needs? This has many restrictions in terms of technology. Which feature is on which level? Which one needs more focus? To which one is our industry more inclined? As a matter of fact, various spheres across the country including industry and academia are required to take part in the process. In the U.S., there are test centers called battle space. Students, academics and entrepreneurs are invited to take part in exercises with the military. While we were testing Bayraktar Mini ten years ago in southeastern Turkey, military officers told us: “No one interacted with us like you did.” However, engineers must cooperate with the military as they need to see and feel the military’s necessities. If the military and engineers remain detached from each other, the process would not work out. We actually need a transformation in this structure. Currently, there is an array of procedures implemented in Turkey that begin with the manufacturing of the product after the needs are identified. They are currently more flexible and dynamic than a decade ago. As far as I see, the SSM can take on much more initiative. Such factors are also important in advancing the projects.

UAVs and the Regional Balance of Power

Among the regional rivals of Turkey such as Iran, Israel, Egypt and Russia, who are the actors we can compete with in the region?

Iran and Israel started their UAV works before us. They have been making a great deal of investment in the field. In some technological aspects such as guide control algorithms and navigation systems, we are more advanced than these countries. The triple-redundant flight control system we developed and the results we obtained clearly demonstrate that.

For instance, a triple-redundant flight control system has been used in a tactical UAV for the first time in the world. This is such a flight control system that the drone can manage its own taxiing, departure and navigation from the moment it departs hangar. It also has various automatic modes. The landing process is completely automatic and takes place with a triple-mode redundancy. The system automatically determines which landing mode is to be used according to the degree of the wind-force. It applies the brakes after it lands and then returns to hangar. This kind of automation is not available even in airliners yet. Bayraktar is the one who firstly employed this system in the UAVs of such size.

What about Israel’s Heron drones?

Turkey ordered 10 Herons from Israel in 2005. Some delays occurred in their delivery and the first delivery was made in 2010. But many malfunctions were subsequently encountered in the logistic process. Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs, on the other hand, have been in inventory since 2014 and they are currently much more advanced than Heron drones, which are procured for operational activities. This is due to the fact that it is an authentic system developed in line with latest technological advancements.

The U.S. provides a great deal of technological support to Israel. But we have observed that we are far more advanced especially in flight control algorithms and systems. To express more tangibly, Bayraktar TB2 has been in the air for 15.000 hours and it has been operating only for two years. Despite that, many results have been obtained. It is a fully automated system that manages all the phases of the flight on its own. Even the first prototype we developed in 2009 had automatic taxiing, departure and landing modes, while none of them was available in Heron. Heron drones were hired during these years, which were remotely controlled by Israeli pilots. The problems grew after those pilots left the country following the Gaza flotilla raid. In this sense, I can safely express that Turkey is far more advanced than these countries particularly in flight control systems.

Is there a distinction between the vehicles designed to be combatants and the ones that were subsequently used as combatants? For instance, do Bayraktar and other Turkish companies directly plan the vehicles as combatants?

As a matter of fact, Bayraktar TB2 was designed as a reconnaissance aircraft. What they demanded from us was an aircraft that reaches an altitude of 18.000 feet, carries 35 kg weight and flies for 10 hours. We developed an aircraft with further technical features and came up with a system that can reach an altitude of 27.000 feet, carry 100 kg, and fly for 24 hours so that it can carry ammunitions. But of course, it was not developed within the concept of offensive combat. Its airframe can make long-time flights. It also collects and transmits real time data and makes engagements in certain cases. When the types developed for offensive combat are considered, we need air vehicles that are much quicker, a little more maneuverable and with far more carrying capacity.

Does this transition require a qualitative or a quantitative distinction? Or is the distinction much sharper than this?

It is a very smooth and natural transition. There is no difference in terms of technology. It is actually a normal progress. So, what I said is aerodynamically true. There is no radical difference when you look at the subject through the lens of electronics or software.

Does this new platform require a new structuring?

It required a new hull. Also, we need to take certain steps regarding the turbine engine technology as a country. Our target is to become independent especially in critical components.

Domestic Engine Production

How can we solve the engine issue?

We do not have any problem with that since Bayraktar TB2 has a piston engine that can be procured from everywhere. But this is not the case for turbine engines, which have some constraints. Turkey is already investing in turbine technology with the support of the SSM. Also, it must be noted that the aim of developing home-grown and authentic drones is motivated by the will of improvement without depending on external sources. The whole system of Bayraktar TB2 was developed by Turkish engineers. As for the airframes, electronic systems, guidance and ground control systems, we can produce them as many as we desire whenever we wish. This is why they are national – 93 percent of it is home-grown. The average rate of this in the defense industry is currently around 50 percent. It is noteworthy that such an important technology is around 90 percent domestic while the average domesticity rate in the defense industry is around 50 percent. This is due to the fact that a considerably high added value can be provided when its electronics and software are developed.

Being domestic is crucial for the defense industry. This aspect is not so important for other civilian sectors such as the automotive sector. But in the defense industry, being domestic is really of critical importance since foreign producers can deny anything to you when defense is in question. There are many instances to that. Therefore, Turkey has taken certain platform-based steps with regard to critical components and now we are advancing in the field of main subcomponents and subsystems as well as the field of material technologies. We will keep our progress and hopefully reach the point we aim.

But still Turkey cannot procure combatant UAVs.

Piston engine, or internal combustion engine, is not a critical component for Bayraktar TB2. This product is manufactured in many places of the world since the technology for it has been in the market for a hundred years. Although being domestic is significant, there are some priorities for that. For instance, as Baykar, electronic software was a pivotal priority for us. Consequently, we endeavored to develop all the critical electronic and software components as completely home-grown in the first phase and now we are yielding the outcomes of this endeavor. In terms of engine, there is a serious need for tribune engines in the country. The SSM has been initiating and supporting programs in this respect. We are trying to come up with solutions that would consolidate our independence.

Suppose that you decide to make a combatant UAV, but it is not certain how long it will take for the tribune developing company, which was awarded the contract by the SSM to develop this. Do such situations affect your projects?

Sure, they do. But they have certain road maps. The SSM released the roadmap for UAVs for the first time. Maybe you have read about this. There is a road map encompassing the period until 2035 which also touches upon the engine issue. They are also engaging in activities of coordination regarding this. So, the SSM is trying to make a coordination, exerting efforts to prevent programs from conflicting each other.

What kind of advantages do the combatant UAVs offer in the concept of asymmetrical war?

They offer very important advantages. Above all, they can stay in the air for a long time. They can exercise assignments in dangerous spots for long durations without being located. In this sense, they bring a great advantage.

What if satellite technology would be more advanced? Do you have any plans regarding the use of satellite technology?

We are not using satellite in our current communications system as we are communicating in the line of sight by installing antenna systems in certain centers. You can think of it as a base station. Satellite communication is not so necessary for the vehicle we developed.

What kind of experiences have you gained from the Operation Euphrates Shield? Is there any point you find important in this context?

Over the course of the Operation Euphrates Shield, Bayraktar TB2 vehicles offered support to our troops from the air as far as the weather conditions allowed. Of course, we have gained some important experiences. For example, the project of central command and control system emerged as a result of this.