The Council of the European Union had decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova in December 2023. On June 25, 2024, the EU held the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference at ministerial level to officially open accession negotiations with both Ukraine and Moldova. In many ways, this accession negotiation process was different from others. A brief look at the EU’s previous enlargements is needed to understand this difference.

A Brief History of EU Enlargement

Enlargement policy is the EU’s most important foreign policy instrument. The reason for this is the transformative power of the EU, the power to transform the countries that will become members of the EU by means of conditionality. By spreading its values through enlargement, the EU is able to ensure its stability, security and prosperity. Moreover, by enlarging with new member states, the EU becomes a much stronger Union economically, politically and geopolitically, and increases its effectiveness in the international system.

Since its first enlargement in 1973, the EU has gone through several rounds of enlargement, bringing the number of member states up to 28. Following Brexit and the UK’s withdrawal from the Union, the EU now has 27 Member States. Each enlargement has been assessed in the context of the needs of the time and has taken place when the conditions have been met. For example, the UK, Ireland and Denmark applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961, but were rejected twice, first in 1963 and again in 1967, because of French President Charles De Gaulle’s concerns over Britain’s close ties with the United States that would be detrimental to the Union. The first wave of enlargement, which included the UK, did not take place until after De Gaulle’s resignation.

The second wave of enlargement was also dealt with assessing in the context of the needs of the time. The EEC had suspended the Association Agreement with Greece after the Greek junta seized power in 1967 and installed the regime of the colonels. After the military junta had handed over power to civilians and a democratic government had been restored, Greece applied for membership again. After six years of negotiations, the Member States, instead of excluding Greece, arguing that its democratization could be achieved more effectively within the EEC, acted with the idea that we would admit Greece as a member in 1981 and democratize it.

Under the regime of General Francisco Franco, Spain’s application to join the EEC in 1962 was rejected. Following political reforms and democratic elections, Spain submitted its formal application in 1977, which led to the EEC’s decision to open accession negotiations in 1978. Similarly, after the resignation of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in 1968 and the replacement of the regime established by the military coup of 1974 with a democratic regime following the 1975 elections, Portugal formally applied to the EEC in 1977 and began negotiations in 1978. The 1981 enlargement to include Greece and the 1986 southern enlargement to include Spain and Portugal changed the EU from a “club of democracies” into a “school of democracy”.

In addition to political issues, obstacles to Iberian enlargement included the fact that these two countries produced similar agricultural products to France. In addition, the fact that Spain and Portugal, which had been ruled by dictatorships for many years, were economically lagging the other members caused concern among other EEC member states because of the possible influx of workers from these two countries.

Although Bulgaria and Romania failed to meet the EU’s criteria on corruption and an impartial judiciary, they were granted membership in 2007, albeit belatedly. Rather than leaving Bulgaria and Romania outside the EU, as was the case with Greece, they were helped to continue their transformation and development within the EU.

The most recent enlargement of the EU was the accession of Croatia. Croatia, which gained independence after the break-up of Yugoslavia, was able to join the EU after resolving its border issue with Slovenia. The growing strategic importance of the Balkans for the EU paved the way for Croatia’s accession process and the prospect of future Balkan enlargement.

For Turkey, which started accession negotiations to the EU at the same year with Croatia in 2005, the EU negotiation process was de facto frozen. When Balkan enlargement on the agenda and accession negotiations officially opened with Ukraine and Moldova, the question arises as to what will happen to the accession negotiations with Turkey. Although Turkey has recently expressed its willingness to take steps to revive its EU membership process it has not been included in these new enlargement perspectives of the EU.

Ukraine and Moldova’s EU Accession Process

We are witnessing that the EU, long suffering from enlargement fatigue, has begun taking important steps in the enlargement process. In a changing world and in the new European security environment, the EU has put aside its longstanding anti-enlargement approach. The war in Ukraine and its aftermath, as well as the changing conjuncture, have given a new impetus to EU enlargement, with both Ukraine and Moldova and the Western Balkans on the EU agenda.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signaled this change in her State of the Union speech on 13 September. In her speech, von der Leyen said that a new group of states, including the Western Balkans, would be admitted as new member states of the EU. The date for this enlargement scheduled to 2030. On 7 May 2024, the EU member states took a decision to support the Western Balkan countries with 6 billion euros, 4 billion euros in loans and 2 billion euros in grants to make them economically ready to join the Union. The fulfillment of this support based on two conditions: achieving political reforms and foreign and security policy alignment with the EU against Russia.

Ukraine and Moldova, previously part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), began to be considered in new enlargement policy. The relationship between Ukraine and the EU evolved into a different process with the Association Agreement, negotiated between 2007 and 2011 and signed in 2014, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

The pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych’s reluctance to sign the DCFTA led to pro-EU protests in November 2013, the so-called Euromaidan uprisings, and Yanukovych’s removal from power, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which is called as “special military operation” by Russian government, became the factor that accelerated Ukraine’s accession process. On 28 February 2024, 4 days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine applied for EU membership and on 23 June Ukraine was granted candidate status by the EU.

Although relations between Moldova and the EU began in 1994, when Moldova signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, the main obstacle to Moldova’s membership in the EaP under the ENP was the fact that the country’s economy did not meet EU standards and, most importantly, the situation in the Russian-backed Transnistria region.

Moldova, like Ukraine, applied for EU membership on 3 March following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Together with Ukraine, it was granted candidate status on 23 June 2022. Ukraine is currently at war with Russia, while Moldova is concerned about a possible war situation due to Russia’s support for the Transnistria region.

The start of negotiations with Ukraine on 25 June was only possible after convincing Hungary, which was opposed both because of the war in Ukraine and because of the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. Negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova were officially launched before Hungary took over the rotating EU presidency on 1 July, thus avoiding a potential stumbling block. But there are many other features of this wave of enlargement that make it different from the others.

The Russia-Ukraine war marked a watershed moment in relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia, which had previously been strained by the Georgian war and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Post-Cold War efforts to improve EU-Russia relations through trade and dialogue have not succeeded in transforming Russia politically into the democratic regime the EU desired. On the contrary, the Russian political regime has embarked on an expansionist policy of violating the independence and sovereignty of countries in the former Soviet geography and sphere of influence by military force. This has led key EU countries such as Germany and France to reassess their approach to Russia.

The EU countries, which somehow maintained relations with Russia after the war in Georgia (2008) and the annexation of Crimea (2014), realized that Russia’s expansionist policy would not stop with the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which Russia announced as a “special military operation”. We have begun to observe that a new approach to the EU’s relations with Russia has been adopted in this process.

The swift imposition of EU sanctions against Russia was the first step in this new approach. Against the possibility that this coercive measure would fail to convince Russia to make peace and that this war would spread to other parts of Europe, Germany’s decision to increase its military capacity with a fund of 100 billion euros, announced by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on February 27, 2022 as a turning point (Zeitenwende), signaled a serious transformation.

The EU’s strategic autonomy in the field of defense, which gained momentum with the adoption of the Strategic Compass in March 2022 when France held the rotating presidency of the European Union, was accelerated by the two-year Russia-Ukraine war and the growing needs in the field of defense. Steps have been taken to support this with new policies, programs, and funding.

Another step in this direction was the decision to establish the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), led by Germany and including Turkey, to create a defense shield with missile defense systems against Russian aggression from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The reasons behind this move are the increased importance of missile defense systems based on the lessons learned from Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure and Russia’s deployment of Russian hypersonic missiles in Kaliningrad, between Lithuania and Poland, in August 2022.

However, this law does not change the fact that the European defense industry does not have sufficient stocks to meet Ukraine’s demand for ammunition in a short period of time. In other words, the Russia-Ukraine war has left EU defense production unable to replenish depleted military stocks and meet the pace needed to support Ukraine. The main reason for this ammunition problem is that EU defense industry production is based on a peacetime economy, not a wartime economy. Shifting to a wartime economy means shifting a significant portion of the budget from other areas to defense.

At this point, the EU adopted the European Defense Industry Strategy (EDIS) to address these concerns. Based on the results of the defense investment gap analysis and an extensive consultation process, the first European Defense Industrial Strategy, entitled “First ever Defense Industrial Strategy and a New Defense Industry Program to Enhance Europe’s Readiness and Security”, was presented by the European Commission and the EU’s High Representative on March 5, 2024.

Keeping production going and building industrial confidence through ambitious targets is an important part of this strategy. The strategy also calls for EU countries to work together to purchase at least 40 percent of defense equipment by 2030, to spend at least half of their defense procurement budgets on products made in Europe, and to trade at least 35 percent of defense goods between EU countries instead of with other countries. The strategy is intended to help make the EU more secure and resilient and would also benefit key allies such as Ukraine.

The Cost of Energy Security

Besides providing ammunition to Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron recently mentioned direct military support and readiness for a major war in Europe. All these discourses should also be read in the context of Russia’s moves in Africa and the price it is paying for France’s energy security. France, which gets a significant part of its energy from nuclear power, also gets a significant part of its uranium, the fuel for nuclear power, from Africa. After the coup in Niger, pro-Russian Niger’s decision to suspend uranium exports to France increased France’s discomfort with growing Russian influence in the region.

Moreover, the search for an alternative natural gas supplier to Russian gas and to reduce energy dependence on Russia was further intensified by the Russia-Ukraine war. As a result, the search for natural gas from Africa gained momentum. The planned Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, which would transport Nigerian natural gas through Niger and Algeria to Europe, appears to have been blocked by Russia. As France is squeezed by Russia’s strategic moves in Africa, we observe President Macron’s assertive statements, the steps taken to strengthen the defense industry, and finally, as an alternative to endangered energy supplies in Africa, France is turning to one of the world’s largest uranium producers such as Kazakhstan.

Some EU members, led by France, want nuclear energy to be widely used in Europe to combat climate change, and nuclear energy is seen as the main alternative to eliminate energy dependence on Russia. Against this backdrop, the first Nuclear Energy Summit was held in Brussels on March 21, 2024, and proposals were made to promote the use of nuclear energy.

What did France’s President think he was doing by visiting Putin in Moscow? On the anniversary of the EU adopting the Maastricht Treaty – heavily backed by France – a lot has changed in the world. But Macron hasn’t changed his own vision of France and is still living in the 90s where the Republic had more clout on the world’s stage and Russia was just rebuilding itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The long table stunt was pure genius by Putin, who knows a good media opportunity when it walks in the room. The ruse, to make Macron look pathetic, servile and very much a servant at the master’s table paid off as Macron was blindsided by the media arrangements, too obsessed with his moment in the global media spotlight.

Compared to other world leaders who visited Putin – Merkel, Trump and just recently Erdogan – Macron was certainly treated with a certain contempt, which reflects exactly how the  Russian leader regards the EU project and Macron himself. Lightweights.

Macron paid a heavy price consequently to agree to the long table photo shoot which served as an example of how out of touch he is and how desperate he is to promote himself as a world leader, weeks ahead of the Presidential elections in France which will probably reinstall him as the country’s premier.

He believes in a European pillar within NATO and that France should lead such a farcical vanguard, which is really what the visit to Putin was about. He undermined NATO entirely and even went as far as to support Russia’s presence in Eastern Ukraine all in exchange for the meeting itself which he really believed would make him shine at home with the voters and embolden his banal ideas of an EU army, led by France which supposedly would deter Putin.

The Russian leader’s threats are very real and Macron’s visit and the hilarious memes which followed gave Putin even more kudos.

All nonsense and wildly deluded. In reality what we saw by the move was that it merely enshrined Putin even more and affirmed him as a powerful leader of a mighty super power which, unlike the West, does not have a reputation of talking big but then retreating when someone calls its bluff. Putin is not Obama. The Russian leader’s threats are very real and Macron’s visit and the hilarious memes which followed gave Putin even more kudos and placed Russia where it has wanted to be but failed for twenty years – in a superior position where the West is actually listening to its security concerns. Macron just walked straight into a media trap and gave Putin exactly what he wanted: a snapshot of the West on its knees with cavernous, weak, ambitious leaders begging for sympathy.

Macron is part of a political elite which since Maastricht has treated Russia with contempt. In particular, the EU’s role in pushing Kiev to mull NATO membership was foolish and has led to the present crisis. The photo itself of the long table will be logged in the annals of history as the key moment where Russia no longer takes the EU and the West seriously as the tipping point now is in Russia’s favor.

Putin will be delighted by how the meeting went. Macron really got nothing accept mockery on the internet, while the EU and NATO had to just look on as puerile spectators while he made everyone look like second rate players.

Aside from the memes on the internet which just made Macron look stupid, there are some important messages there which Putin’s media people manipulated. The main message is that Russia has the advantage however the Ukraine debacle turns out. It is the lion, surrounded by mice.

The winner takes it all. And Putin is winning even more now after Macron gave him this latest media coup.

Macron’s embarrassing charade merely supported this. A French president who has delusional views about his own status in the world organizing himself a personal visit to see the Russian president doesn’t make France look like the super power that it would like to project of itself, more like a corrupt, minor EU member state which allows its president to manipulate its own media, led by a man who clearly doesn’t have any respect for the fourth estate.

France today is struggling to come to terms with its new demise and Macron’s visit just underlined this as he walked away a loser. The winner takes it all. And Putin is winning even more now after Macron gave him this latest media coup.

Another message from Putin is that he is neither scared nor bothered by the threat of sanctions from the West, which is really what the whole row is about. Sanctions alone will be difficult on Putin and in particular his close circle of tycoons who have huge investments in London. But as Biden has proved, secondary sanctions imposed on a handful of countries which buy oil from Iran, are very hard these days to implement and Putin has made it clear that, if necessary, he will trade sanctions for an invasion of some sort, if the West doesn’t engineer a way of Ukraine talking down NATO membership.

Of course, if Putin sent his own troops into those regions, Macron may well be delighted as this would give even more gravitas to his idea of an EU army. The problem of course is that the French leader doesn’t want to send French troops to a war zone with Russia, as he has proved by speeding up his own withdrawal of troops in Mali, once the presence of Russian mercenaries just recently emerged. But it will be that iconic picture of the long table which will haunt Macron as the Russian media machine will be the victor. As Churchill once said, history is written by winners. And that snapshop of the long table makes it quite clear who the winners and losers are.