The French are getting more used to far right by the day. The enemies and targets of the far right movements change, but their ideas are the same. It could be said that after a couple of decades of inactivity, they are full of life now. As they’re no longer contained in the far right parties but exist within both right-wing and left-wing party, this wasn’t a challenge. There are other variables, of course; during Edgar Morin’s childhood Jews were the target of the far right, now it’s Muslims. For instance, when Jean Marie Le Pen had overtaken Socialist Party Leader Lionel Jospin in the presidential elections and ascended to the second round with Chirac on April 21 2002, it took France by surprise.

At that time, Jean Marie Le Pen was the representative of Front National’s both anti-Semitic and xenophobic streaks, while the former was more dominant. On May 1 2002, the French public took to the streets to protest in masses; with the call of all unions in France, 1.5 million people went out to the streets, 400,000 of them being in Paris, and newspapers ran headlines like “No!” 15 years later, according to the French Ministry of the Interior, there were a little bit more than 140,000 people who went out on the streets to protest Le Pen on May 1.

In the first round of Presidential elections, Jean Marie Le Pen had garnered 16.86% of the votes, while Chirac took 19.88%. Receiving the lowest support of the Fifth Republic, Chirac received 82.21% of the votes as a result of the mobilization of all voters; therefore, he was elected president with an unprecedented percentage since the time of the Soviet Union need to oppose Le Pen. Today, his daughter Marine Le Pen made it to the second round of elections with 21.3% of the votes and, according to recent polls, there is around 40% support for her.

There are two important factors explaining this. Firstly, Marine Le Pen, unlike her father, didn’t say anything that might sound anti-Semitic; she targeted Muslims rather than the Jewish minority. Secondly, Islamophobic discourses, which used to be associated with the far right, were embraced by reputable figures in both the right and the left, who have started to utter them with impunity. As a matter of fact, it was normalized. We have to give Marine Le Pen her due; whatever discriminatory statements she made while campaigning were already surpassed by numerous figures of the right and the left a long time ago.

Muslims have been exposed to the foul statements of many: Alain Finkielkraut, Elizabeth Badinter, Plantu, former prime minister Manuel Valls, Sarkozy and so on. However, if Jewish lifestyle and belief was to be boycotted and protested today, all hell would break loose in France! Think about what would happen if the kippa, or Jewish clothing became an issue, or the long beards of Jewish men; or if Jewish children were forced to receive an extremely Orthodox education at kindergarten; or if Jean Pierre Chevenement’s “advice” to Muslims, to make themselves less apparent in the public, was intended for Jews… However, it’s not possible; you cannot replace Muslims with Jews in these kinds of situations. It’s not allowed, because anti-Semitism is a crime against humanity. For something to be a crime against humanity in France, it has to be tried at Nuremberg. What was tried there? Genocide. Therefore, without genocide and a trial on genocide, nothing is a crime against humanity, at least in the Old World. Returning back to Edgar Morin’s childhood, when Jews were being targeted but the Holocaust wasn’t committed yet, anti-Semitism wasn’t considered as a crime against humanity; therefore, by this logic, today Islamophobic statements and acts are not a crime against humanity.

We have seen the most recent instance in a statement by Phillippe Moreau Defarges, a professor of International Relations. On the show on BFM, Defarges, referring to the recent referendum on the change in system of government in Turkey and 51.41% yes vote, said “after this point, the only way to get rid of Erdoğan is either a civil war or an assassination.” The moderator didn’t signal to take the show off the air, nor did he say that Defarges was committing a crime and that they were becoming an accessory to it; the moderator only said “this is an illegitimate proposition.” Defarges even said more: “This is a method that has been discussed since Ancient Rome and religions have even discussed it.” There weren’t any reactions towards Defarges’ statement about a president who was elected in the first round with 51.79% of the total vote. Let me tell you why: Islamophobia.

Marine Le Pen has been updating the extreme right ideology since her father’s departure from the party, and she has been doing this in accordance with the “zeitgeist.” Therefore, in the context of “zeitgeist,” neither Marine Le Pen’s success in the first round, nor her projected score in the second round, nor the possibility of Front National having 50-60 seats in the parliament after June elections is creating the kind of ripples seen in the past. When talking about her Islamophobic and anti-immigrant statements, at least… Although her statements about Frexit, leaving NATO, having a Russia-friendly foreign policy and return to French franc concerns the majority. If you examine it, the understanding of the majority is also disputable; if you consider leftist presidential candidate Jean Luc Melenchon has a similar outlook on the same issues and he had 19% support in the first round, the concerned “majority” doesn’t surpass 50%.

On the other hand, now that the two largest political formations of the country, the Socialist Party and the Republicans, were eliminated in the first round, the race is not between the traditional left and right. French people will make their choice among two different world views rather than two candidates about whom they know nothing of. An economic, cultural and social liberalism, which is in favor of the EU and globalization, versus a hegemonic French nationalism that is against the EU and globalization – these are the choices. For some this is a cartoon, while for others a sci-fi film; however, it’s very real.

One of the candidates is a deputy of the European Parliament, a parliament of the very EU she is against; while the other served as the former minister of finance and economy under François Hollande and is competing for the first time in the elections. If we are to think that one of every two French votes was cast in protest, it could be seen that Macron’s vote in the first round was not that high. What’s worse is that Macron isn’t expected to garner around 80% of the votes against Le Pen; it will be considered a triumph if he can merely surpass 60%. Yet, this is problematic, as support to Madame Le Pen is around 40%.

Moreover, there isn’t any consensus between the right and left in terms of supporting Macron who is already being supported by big business. It’s not that easy anymore. There is an increasing indignation towards global capitalism and the cost of the 2008 financial crisis by the people of both the Old and New World. While more than 20 high schools in Paris marched against Marine Le Pen, there were as many high schools, which did the same against Macron. When CFDT, the most prominent union of the country, called people to vote for Macron, their headquarters were vandalized. “Collabo” (Collaborator) was written on the building. Another union, Force Ouvriere, on the other hand, didn’t make any statement about which candidate they support. Some called to “destroy” both of the candidates. Regardless of their political disposition, there are politicians and voters who won’t hesitate in voting for Le Pen. Furthermore, parliamentary elections are to follow the presidential elections. For this reason, Melenchon, who is aiming to form a powerful group in the parliament, didn’t call for support to any candidate; he just expressed that he wasn’t going to vote for Le Pen.

Despite all odds, if Macron is able to garner more than 60% of the vote on Sunday, he will be able to administer the country with a strong mandate. However, if the opposite happens, he might have to cohabitate as Mitterrand and Chirac have done. Either way, it seems that Macron will be the 7th president of France after De Gaulle, Giscard, d’Estaing, Mitterrand, Chirac, Sarkozy, and Hollande. On the other hand, there are no obstructions that can halt Marine Le Pen’s progress. Even if Le Pen loses the presidency, her ideology will prevail in both the right and left wing politics.

The discourses of Islamophobic parties and politicians whose influence has been increased throughout Europe are effecting all European institutions, including judiciary bodies.

Could you give some information about the European Court of Justice, which has taken the headscarf decision? What is its structure and task?

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the highest court in the European Union (EU). It is a three-tiered organization that consists of the Court of Justice, the General Court and courts of expertise. The main objective of the Court of Justice is to ensure the uniformity of the interpretation and implementation of the European Union law. The Court performs the functions of ensuring legal adherence to the interpretation and application of the Union law; harmonization of the national legal orders with the EU legal order; legal administration; commentary; conflict resolution; and legislation. The Court is also authorized to rule a few cases arising from the EU law. These are cases about lawsuits examining the member states and EU institutions’ compliance with the Union law; and interpretation of the EU law when it is necessary for the settlement of the cases in the national courts. The Court consists of one judge from each member state, the General Court consists of 28 judges, which comprises at least one judge from each member state. Judges hold office for a renewable term of six years with the consensus of the member state governments. The independence of the Judges of the Court is ensured by various provisions that regulate the status of the judges. The EU Court of Justice is seated in Luxembourg.

Is there a relationship between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights in terms of their duties and decisions?

First of all, it must be noted that the Court of Justice is not a human rights court and it should not be confused with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR is the international Court of courts established by the European Convention of Human Rights of which Turkey is a member whereas the ECHR is not a member of the EU. The Court, as mentioned above, is the highest court of the EU and its duty is not to safeguard human rights, but the interpretation and implementation of the EU law. For this reason, it should be mentioned that the decision that we will discuss was not a lawsuit directly related to and aiming to reverse a human rights violation, but it was related to the violation of the EU legislation that directly affects the right to freedom of religion. Therefore, we may argue that similar cases on this subject are likely to go to the ECHR in the future.

Earlier rulings on the banning of the headscarf by the ECHR were based on the reasoning that it could be prohibited for reasons, for example, when it is considered “a threat to public order”. However, we can say that recent political developments and the current political climate which has influenced the Court’s leanings on this issue are also valid for the ECHR, and that negative decisions giving way to the prohibition are likely to arise as a consequence of this disposition.

Can you summarize the controversial headscarf decision of the European Court of Justice? What is the content of the case? How did it come to this stage? What is the grounds for the decision of the court?

The complaint regarding the headscarf ruling was initially made by a Muslim woman named Samira Achbita, who resides in Belgium. Since 2003, Achbita had been working for the security firm G4S as a receptionist. She had been there for three years when she informed her employee that she would begin wearing the headscarf. Her employer has rejected the request by reasoning that wearing signs that symbolize and visualize political, philosophical, or religious views would be contrary to the principle of neutrality towards customers, and this is among the internal, unwritten rules of the company. Despite this ruling, Achbita informed her workplace that she intended to­ wear her headscarf to work. On the day following Achbita’s decision, a written prohibition on religious and philosophical symbols in the work place was added to the employee code of conduct. Achbita insisted on wearing her headscarf and consequently was dismissed from her position as she was acting in violation of the workplace regulation.

Samira Achbita initially filed a lawsuit in the Belgian courts, which reached the Belgian Court of Appeals. The Belgian Court of Cassation then applied to the European Court of Justice to see whether the ban on headscarves at work is in line with the EU’s 2000 Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation. The case file and the dispute came before the Court. In other words, the Court review was not in regards of whether the prohibition was a violation of human rights and freedom of religion, but rather if it was in compliance with the EU Directive on equal treatment.

The Court ruled that the G4S security firm implemented a regulation of the workplace that did not discriminate based on religion or belief and that there was evidence to suggest that no specific discrimination was directed towards the person who filed the case and therefore it could not be ruled as a discrimination case under the EU Directive. In this particular case it was argued that there was no discrimination against a specific religion or worldview within the regulation which warranted an “indirect discrimination” case. In addition, it has been noted that it is legitimate for an employer to seek the protection of political, religious, and philosophical neutrality towards their employees and clients. It is emphasized that this rule is of particular importance for people who are in direct contact with customers.

As a result, the Court ruled that the prohibition of the wearing of visible signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs by companies would not constitute discrimination and the prohibition with the aim of “dress neutrality” was not contrary to the EU Directive regarding the direct and indirect. Finally, the Court abstained from making a decision in a similar case in which a woman in France was also dismissed from her workplace, because in that particular case, the dismissal was due to a complaint of a customer.

What is your view on the basis of the religious symbols and the justifications of neutrality that the decision is based on?

First of all, this decision is based on the claim that the prohibition was not targeted towards a certain religious or belief group and was a general rearrangement. In the justification of the decision, there were the employer’s defense and general expressions such as religious, political and philosophical symbols. However, it is commonly known that this specifically targets Muslim women and affects those that wear the headscarf and that they are the target of these decisions. As a matter of fact, it’s not all people who wear religious symbols that are affected by this decision but mostly those who are of the Muslim faith. The decision disregards the fact that headscarf was wore with the belief that it is a mandatory requirement of Islam. Furthermore headscarf is regarded as an instrument people use to reflect their faith.

Additionally, the Court ruling regards not wearing a headscarf as “normal/essential/actual”, implies that wearing a head covering is not and that represents impartiality. Thus, the court acted with the prejudice that wearing a headscarf symbolizes a religious affiliation and automatically is contrary to any type of neutrality. This recalls the headscarf discussion that takes place in Turkey time to time, in which the headscarf has been a contested symbol in the public workplace and that this symbol gives the impression that they are in opposition to those they serve.

It must be mentioned here that the headscarf decision is not based solely on legal grounds but has been influenced by the rising overall political atmosphere in Europe. The increased influence of the far right, the Islamophobic and anti-Turkish parties and politicians did not only affect other politicians and governments but also took hold of all of Europe’s institutions as well as its judiciary. This is a political decision that has technical legal aspects.

What are the consequences for European Muslims and Turks in the future?

As I mentioned previously, this decision is not a unique one but a part of politics that began to dominate Europe in a number of areas. Indeed, the Vienna based European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), welcomed the Court’s decision by stating that it was in line with the principles of equal treatment. It certainly would not be at all surprising if we see similar decisions made by various different courts and institutions and that this practice becomes widespread across Europe. We see the statements from different countries supporting the decision. Needless to say, contrary to values such as multiculturalism, human rights, and democracy that Europe has demanded for years and is still demanding from candidate countries such as Turkey, it is very likely that Islamophobia and anti-Turkish sentiment will continue in Europe and make living conditions for Muslims much more difficult.

In the 1990s, Schirmbeck was a journalist in Algiers and worked for Germany’s public broadcasting channel ARD, which seems to give him the authority, or ijaza, as he likes to use Arabic vocabulary in his book, to speak as an expert on Islam. With this use of specific vocabulary he tries to legitimize his arguments about Islam from a sociological, historical, philosophical, or even a hermeneutical Quranic perspective. According to his reference point– liberal and secular Muslims from Morocco and Algeria, who according to him seem to be the only decent Muslims existing – he offers his readers categorical solutions to deal with the problem of Islam and Muslims in the West. The answer is difficult and simple at the same time: reforming Islam (or “a superior humanistic principle”, as he calls it) and allowing criticism of Islam. In the spirit of Ayan Hirsi Ali, he addresses his recommendations or demands towards Muslims and their misguided liberal leftist allies.According to the author, there is a major threat looming for Europe and the ideas of liberalism, freedom and the public space. But what exactly is it and what should be targeted? A faith or an ideology? Believers or terrorists? Islam or terror? Typically for Schirmbeck, the answers are vague, especially for someone who studied Critical Theory at the Frankfurt School, which produced pioneers of Critical Theory such as Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer. The list of problematic imprecise characterizations of the key issue in Schirmbeck’s book includes “today’s Islam” (p. 10), “Islamic terrorism” (p. 13), “fundamentalism” (p. 15), “the regular Islam” (p. 24) or simply “Islam” (p. 48). The Islamic Crusade suddenly becomes a “Wahhabi Crusade” (p. 28) so that the author undermines the principle of Deutsche Gründlichkeit (German thoroughness), as well as philosophical accuracy. If one wants to continue without losing the author, he or she should accept that there is a problem with Islam, bottom line. So what is to be done about it? (1) Hermeneutics instead of literal understanding, (2) the abandonment of a distinction between believers and non-believers according to the Quran, and (3) the acceptance of the idea that Islam and Islamism are undoubtedly connected with each other.

The instruments for accomplishing these goals are clear as well: taking the Mutazila – a speculative school of thought in early Islam – as the model as well as the preference of ijtihad instead of jihad. For attaining these goals, Islamic associations in Germany and liberal leftists or the 1968’ generation seem to be the biggest obstacles. Accusations of Islamophobic rhetoric are to be dismissed as simply a clever strategy to undermine, or hide, Islam’s true nature: a source for violence against women, homosexuals, and members of other faiths and non-believers.

His request that Muslim organizations should distance themselves from violence and terror, and should reform mosques, as well as the position of women within the religious tradition is also not very innovative. Just as radical Muslim voices purport to know what the “only one, true Islam” in reality is, so does Schirmbeck. Secular, enlightened and protestantized Muslims, or activists like Tunisian Amina Tyler – who exposed her body in 2013 with the slogan “This body is mine. It is no one’s honor” – correspond with the ideal Muslim prototype in Schirmbeck’s mind.

Or take the ones in chapter nine, in which Moroccans publicly state their un-Islamic lifestyle. Ironically, the German social scientist Necla Kelek is listed as one of the precious critical Muslims, though she has publicly declared she has no bond with Islam, but rather feels peace when she is at a church. When it comes to his authenticity and significance for matters on Islam, his descriptive experiences in Algeria, friendship with people from Muslim-dominated countries, as well as his interpretation of several verses from the Quran seem to legitimize and declare him as an authority, a common delusion found in biased interpretations.

There are several problems with this book, besides the ones already mentioned. Tone, methods, premises and conclusions seem to have no objective observation in the first place. One example would be his claim that the media and political parties in Germany do not discuss the problems around Islam and rather rely on topics like Islamophobia. Even if he has sincere advice for Muslims, which is hard to believe, Schirmbeck’s book is not helpful in any way, shape or form to lead to a constructive debate about faith, identity, immigration, violence etc.

When Al Qaida, Boko Haram, or Daesh are mentioned in the same line with all (conservative) Muslim associations in Germany, the ground for a rational debate is lost completely. For Schirmbeck, the link between Islam, backwardness and terror is obvious. Claims for the right to wear headscarves for teachers, or praying rooms at universities for students, are in the same category as the brutal beheadings of Daesh, all part of this “Islamic Crusade”. This type of declaration would be considered as hate speech in many modern legal interpretations. There are several anti-Islamic and xenophobic books in Germany in the spirit of Pamela Geller or Robert Spencer, which are distributed commonly by alternative publishing houses. But this book, unfortunately, finds its place in mainstream book stores, as did Thilo Sarazzin’s bestseller Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany is abolishing itself) in 2010. The book is also featured on mainstream websites such as Deutschlandfunk, where it is described as being an “exciting book”.

But maybe one has to be fair and say Schirmbeck has just caught the Zeitgeist of a growing, presentable racist and Islamophobic attitude in the West. Islam is probably the only world religion which constantly faces accusations (like the ones presented in the book) which is considered part of free, and even progressive speech. To be specific, as Schirmbeck is in terms of Islam, it is not an exaggeration to say that produced a poorly-written book in the spirit of Eurocentrism and racist orientalism.

Faruk Yaslıçimen interviewed Belkıs Kılıçkaya, a distinguished Turkish journalist, about DAESH, on which she made a three-part documentary for a TV channel in Turkey. Since its initial broadcast, the documentary was repeatedly shown on TV and has reached thousands of people via internet. Kılıçkaya’s critical perspective, multi-dimensional approach, use of different source material, and in-depth analyses clarify and illuminate many points about DAESH and the ambivalent international politics against this terror group that have so far remained in the dark.

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I would like to begin with asking when and how this work began.

Habertürk asked me to make a documentary on foreign fighters in August 2015. While studying foreign fighters’ portraits, I found myself focusing on Afghanistan: from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to the Taliban and to the US invasion in the aftermath of 9/11. The invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq are recent history, but we forget them quickly. I can tell that the bad experience of invasions continues to shape these countries and the region today.

At the beginning, I remember that I was depressed while researching the daily lives of people during the invasions. I was struck by a visual. It was a holiday. I was watching a French-made documentary, showing Afghan people living in denlike houses and villages. Like a hole in the wall … The interview was about the US soldiers’ Taliban hunting methods. A man in his fifties was telling his story. He said that the US troops came at night. His father was elderly and wasn’t able wake up right away. When his father barely got up and started to ask a question, the soldiers fired at him. The man, with tears in his eyes, said that his son, who was 12 to 13 years old, yelled at the soldiers, saying “you’ll pay for what you’ve done,” and they shot him too. Then the soldiers left, saying “sorry,” this was the wrong house. After watching this, I stood silent for a long time, not being able to utter a word.

How did you feel?

Numbness … I was still for some time, as if paralyzed. And this was just one of several examples of cruelty during the years of invasion.

After my research on Afghanistan, I started working on the portraits of foreign fighters originating from Europe. These are also depressing, reflecting their sorrowful lives. Take the Kouachi brothers, for instance; they didn’t have a father. Their mother was a prostitute, who committed suicide while bearing her sixth child. The brothers, who were only children then, came to their home and saw their hanged mother. It’s not a surprise that they joined DAESH later.

Joining DAESH grants them a comfortable, safe environment. They feel they’ve become somebody from being just nothing. Even their dead bodies would become precious; they were told that they would become martyrs. While nobody acknowledged their presence before, by joining DAESH, they became like brothers to people from numerous countries. I observed this while watching an interview, which was conducted by the French with hidden cameras. A boy was passionately saying “I have brothers from countries all across the world, can you believe it?” These portraits sadden you; this gets worse when you start researching Iraq.

You believe that these people are joining DAESH due to individual or social sufferings?

Yes, sure. There are individual and social traumas at play. Invasions have severely disrupted the traditional and social fabrics of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, where different segments of society have clashed with each other. Such organizations are nurtured by chaos and instability. Additionally, violence has a market in today’s world and it’s possible that there are also nihilist tendencies in some of those who joined DAESH, as Olivier Roy has argued. And finally prisons … We know from the PKK example that this terror organization emerged from Diyarbakır Prison. The politicians of the movement, academic studies, even Abdullah Öcalan himself have stated this. What else could emerge from prisons in Afghanistan where hundreds and thousands of people were imprisoned? Or from Abu Ghraib Prison and others in Iraq? Speaking from a sociological viewpoint, DAESH is not a surprise.

What kind of sources did you use while making the documentary?

I read many books. For instance, I read books on the Salafi-Wahhabi movements, along with the books by the founders of Al-Qaeda. I watched numerous documentaries, mostly French. I have also watched some US-made documentaries, as well. Slowly, I began to reach some conclusions and my further research, particularly my interviews conducted with various academicians and people who conducted field research, have all confirmed my foresight.

What did you foresee?

Looking at the patterns, academic works on the subject and the information gathered from the field, they were all leading to the same conclusion. I had foreseen that there would be DAESH attacks not only in the Middle East but also in Europe. I had forecast more precisely that there would be terror attacks in France, where I lived for 17 years. People coming from French colonies, jobless for three generations, and bearing neither Muslim nor French identity had formed a potential human resource for DAESH. Some had already revolted in 2004 by burning cars in the streets. It was no surprise that the largest participation in DAESH in Europe was from France.

A similar coincidence happened when I was meeting with academics from Turkey, Europe, and the US. For instance, what Prof. Burhanettin Duran said about the US invasion of Afghanistan was unknowingly confirmed by Alberto Munoz, who was one of the high-ranking administrators of the CIA during the invasion. Similarly, an Australian security expert’s observations in Iraq and Syria during the invasion coincided with Cole Bunzel’s findings, who is an academic at Princeton working on DAESH. Listening to all of them, I understood that none of these events were unexpected. On the other hand, Michael Nagata of US Special Operations said to the New York Times in 2014, “We do not understand the movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it”. This can only be an irony! Shane Bell, a former Australian soldier and a senior security consultant for Iraq, Syria, and Libya, notes that “people from military-origin, like me, and intelligence agencies were aware of DAESH for a long time. Recently, a picture [was] released showing that a US commander posing for the camera with a black DAESH flag in his hand. This picture belongs to 2008 and if you look at the souvenirs that soldiers brought along having served there in this period of time, you can undoubtedly find traces of DAESH.” Although Turkish media, along with the whole world, was surprised when DAESH first emerged in 2014, the emergence of DAESH was hardly a surprise for people working in the field.

Could you say briefly who or what caused the emergence of DAESH? Was it international interventions or regional dynamics? What does your documentary tell us about this?

Invasions, dictatorial regimes, and finally terror regimes… Firstly, there is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When the Soviets left the country 10 years later, it had become a completely different Afghanistan. It is a country where 20 different dialects are spoken; a country with a population of 30 million, consisting of diverse ethnic groups. Although the Soviets have left the country, the communistic ideology remains, as many bureaucrats and civil servants were raised by the Soviets. During the Soviet invasion, new sectarian dynamics entered Afghanistan that had not existed before. For instance, with the support of the US, Pakistani jihadists entered the fray. Similarly, a Salafi-Wahhabi understanding of Islam also started to appear in Afghanistan, where the Sunni-Sufi understanding of Islam had actually been predominant throughout history. Suddenly, there was a new movement, which forbid music, girls’ education, or even flying a kite. And the Taliban emerged.

The social fabric of the region started to unravel and it became unpredictable. Then, the US invasion ensued after 9/11. Something really surprised me about this invasion. As you know, the Afghan Northern Alliance supported the international forces against the Taliban. There was a tradition between the clans of Afghanistan; the Northern Alliance, being victorious, demanded that the Taliban, the defeated side in the war, should submit, and the Taliban agreed. However, Donald Rumsfeld disagreed with the decision. As a result, prisons were built and more than 100,000 people were imprisoned. Moreover, many people were sent to the notorious “black sites”, secret prisons run by CIA and constructed generally outside of the US territory, and these are places, where human rights do not matter.

So, now we can expect that some of these inmates were probably tortured to become radicals.

Of course; people imprisoned during the Iraqi invasion turned from typical insurgents into militants with a clear agenda when they got out. The first pictures of the ruling cadre of DAESH released to the world media were all taken in the Iraqi prisons. The conditions there apparently paved the way for radicalization.

But the invasion of Afghanistan is not the whole story. After Afghanistan, Iraq was invaded. Before the Iraqi invasion, there was the Iran-Iraq War between 1980-88 that caused the deaths of almost a million people. We had Saddam Hussein, who was backed by the West. We also had the Iranian Revolution in 1979, with serious regional effects when Humeyni tried to spread it. We are basically talking about a turbulent region. Moreover, as Iraq invaded Kuwait, there was a 13-year-long embargo on Iraq by the international community, which left the country in a shambles. To top all of this, Iraq was invaded after 9/11 and it became a failed state with no authority! Prisoners who committed either felonies or petty offences were all released. Looking at the dispositions of the groups in Iraq, you can see Sunnis and Shiites who were in favor of the invasion and who were against it. Some of these groups had enmity against each other. While some elements formed an alliance between themselves in the first year, they became enemies in the second and allies once again in the third year. There were many different organizations emerging during these turbulent times.

The war in Iraq also had a psychological component. The US forces were playing Metallica on the streets of Fallujah. A whole administration was overthrown, from its fire department to basic state institutions. It became a country without any authority after the 13-year-long embargo; a country that suffered too much violence as a consequence of Saddam and the Iran-Iraq War. On the other hand, the country had the potential for wealth, as it has bountiful oil and mineral reserves. It could have become as wealthy as France, but the country is continuously ravaged by invasion.

You said that it was a transformation from dictatorial regimes to terror regimes: a title that you gave to the second part of your documentary.

DAESH emerged in Iraq and flourished in Syria. If you notice, these two countries were ruled by the Ba’ath regimes, which were actually the remnants of the Soviet ideology, while also having components of the Nazi Stasi. Moreover, both of the regimes represented the minorities in their respective countries: one represented the Nusayri minority, while the other the Sunni. It is not simply that DAESH emerged due to existing catastrophic conditions, but I want to underline that DAESH means Ba’ath. It’s not coincidental that, among all of the organizations in the region, only DAESH emerged and established a state. They got their know-how from Saddam’s men. Looking at the important figures of DAESH reveals this. Izzat al-Douri, for instance, was the right-hand man of Saddam. Abu Bakr Naji’s notes were published by Der Spiegel. Examining his networks within prisons led to the same conclusion. Olivier Roy defined it perfectly: “Secular men with mustaches grew Islamic beard[s] within a couple of months.” They also transferred their military skills to DAESH.

You’re speaking about DAESH’s organizational structure now …

After he was killed, Abu Bakr Naji’s notes were published by Der Spiegel. In those notes, it said that they were forming religious schools named Da’wah and were selecting the most talented participants. Then, they cooperated with these people from whom they received intelligence about the people in their villages or towns. They learned who had a weakness for what, who was wealthy, who would resist etc. By this method, they were able to establish a small but effective intelligence network. Abu Bakr Naji was known to be responsible for the air force and intelligence during Saddam’s reign. All of the names were somehow related to Saddam.

Do you believe that each and every member of DAESH was related to Saddam’s regime?

No, there are still many questions about the nature of this issue. Zarqawi, for instance, is still a mystery for me, even after all of the reading. You know everything about him, but you cannot make any sense of him. Cole Bunzel studied his portrait very well and read all of his works. I should state that I’m commenting on existing works. He is from Jordan and he was an alcoholic and a drug addict. Zarqawi met with Maqdisi, his Salafi teacher, in a prison; however, their relations turned sour. It is said that he is charismatic and is able to mesmerize people.

Zarqawi left the prison with a seemingly inimical attitude towards the countries in the Middle East and the Shiites. Let’s assume that he met with Salafist imams and started to hate Shiites to the extent that he came to believe that every Shiite has to be annihilated. He doesn’t even care about the invasion forces. Moreover, the American academics who examined the notes of Zarqawi state that he isn’t inimical to Jewish people.

That’s peculiar. How can we explain it?

Depending on the information provided by our interviewees and on the news appearing in the world media, Zarqawi first went to Afghanistan to meet Osama bin Laden; however, they had a disagreement. Later, someone acted as an intermediary between them and, ultimately, bin Laden funded him. Anyway, Zarqawi was wounded during the US siege of Herat and left Afghanistan. Do you know where he went? Tehran! We know that Zarqawi saw Shiites as his enemies during that time. So, how was he able to go to Tehran and conduct his business there? This is an important question. We asked this to Cole Bunzel and he said “this is a very hypocritical behavior; he didn’t attack Shiites during his stay. Moreover, the Shiite administration offered him support and he accepted it.”

Let’s stay there for a minute. A man who is inimical towards Shiites goes to Tehran, conducts certain businesses, and receives support from Iran. What does this mean?

I leave this to our readers. I’m just providing the information.

When I talked to the people of the region, they were telling me that the probability of DAESH being an instrument of Iran was high.

We know that Iran wouldn’t miss any chances. Petraeus says that Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian senior military officer, is “a wonderful spy and he established a contact with the Iraqi al-Qaeda.” The interesting thing is that Iraqi al-Qaeda is against Shiites.  According to German intelligence reports, Zarqawi started to travel frequently to Syria from Jordan. Syria isn’t an ordinary country in which to travel. It is hardly believable that someone like Zarqawi would travel to Syria frequently without any knowledge of the Assad regime. Then, in 2005, Zarqawi’s men were captured in Iraq. One of the captured men was from Syrian Intelligence, while the other was a colonel in the Syrian Army. I watched the record of this news broadcast on Iraqi TV at that time.

Let’s assume that Al-Assad was afraid of a US invasion and sent his men to infiltrate the insurgents. However, Zarqawi worked together with these men and, if the news was accurate, Iraqi Al-Qaeda started to attack Shiite mosques. It’s not improbable that they coordinated and carried out these attacks together. We also know that they appeared anti-Shiite, but they killed thousands of Sunnis too.

According to the writings of Zarqawi found by the US military, the chief purpose of Zarqawi was to sparkle a civil war with sectarian conflicts at its core. For this reason, Zarqawi called the people to protest the elections. As a result, the Sunni population protested the elections; the Shiites gained more power, while this clever act by Zarqawi pushed the Sunnis out of politics and led them to become increasingly marginalized.

At the same period of time, a book named The Management of Savagery was published. Its author was Abu Bakr Naji. The book employs a complex academic discourse. A year after its publication, it was translated by a think-tank in the US. For instance, the book interestingly distinguishes between Jihad and Islam and suggests employing violence and savagery to manage perceptions. It states “One who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening (others), and massacring—I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam and one should not confuse them. (Moreover, he knows) that he cannot continue to fight and move from one stage to another unless the beginning stage contains a stage of massacring the enemy and making him homeless (or ‘frightened’).”*

The claim for a state appeared first with Zarqawi and it was before DEASH, right?

Yes, Zarqawi first established the Mujahideen Shura Council. Then, they found two men, one from Baghdad (Abu Omar al-Baghdadi) and one from Egypt (Abu Hamza). They established a so-called state and announced it on the internet. But none cared about the claim. After Zarqawi was killed, Omar al-Baghdadi became the leader. The actual ruler of the organization was Abu Hamza; however, al-Baghdadi was preferred as he was a local man. The US put a $5-million bounty on these two men. Two years later, this amount decreased to $100,000, as they had suspicions about these two men’s existence. After they were killed, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the new leader. We did not hear his name between the years 2006 and 2011. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began to emerge as a powerful figure when Maliki took the government in Iraq, the Sunnis came under pressure, and the Sahwa forces comprised of Sunni fighters were destroyed by Petreaus. Some of these fighters joined the Iraqi al-Qaeda later.

You have said that there were many documentaries on this subject; how does your documentary compare with those?

I’m a journalist who loves to deal with the human element. I prefer to examine subjects with a sociological perspective. This is also true for the DAESH documentary. There are very good books and documentaries on Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, and DAESH. But there are also documentaries that can turn their viewers into Islamophobics. Unfortunately, the second is widespread in Europe and the US, portraying Muslims as a savage horde targeting Western civilization; however, this is not the case. DAESH is actually targeting us rather than the rest of the world. Look at, for instance, the number of people they killed in the Middle East and the cultural heritage they destroyed. Olivier Roy rightly defines the Salafi-Wahhabi movement as “Holy Ignorance” in one of his books. In my view, DAESH is an attempt to de-Islamize Islam, targeting not only Muslims but also Islamic civilization as a whole.

Do you think that modernism and DAESH are in contradiction with each other?

I think DAESH is a very modern organization, as they effectively employ every privilege granted by modern life. Their propaganda videos don’t only consist of violence. For instance, a journalist at the BBC examined their tweets posted during a three months period. The visuals are exceptionally well done. The foreign fighters originating from Europe are especially good at this. The saying of Andy Warhol, “In the future, everyone will be world-famous for 15 minutes,” applies to DAESH as well. DAESH militants become famous with their YouTube videos on the internet.

How about DAESH’s periodicals?

If you examine their periodicals, you can see that they’re all well prepared. They refer to events from the historical and sociological memory of their respective countries. For instance, their first periodical in Turkey referred to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The British and French made a secret agreement and divided the territories among themselves. We understand that the Ottoman Caliphate was no more, right? The peculiar part is that DAESH regards neither the Ottomans nor Turkish as Muslims. That’s why they talk about conquering Istanbul, and it is no coincidence that on the cover page you see the picture of the Maiden’s Tower, not the Sultanahmet (Blue) Mosque.

So, DAESH’s media tools follow certain tactics for winning people over.

Let me tell you something more interesting. As I was exposed too much to their materials, I wasn’t able to distinguish interesting or peculiar parts of their publications. So, I gave one of their periodicals to my brother, so that he could examine it. He said, “They’re [DAESH] calling people to not vote.” I knew that they were doing this, but I thought it was only in Europe. If the Muslims in Europe don’t vote, they will become marginalized, as was the case in Iraq. Think of people in Turkey who identify themselves as Muslim not casting their vote; the people who they want to exclude from the system will become excluded, marginalized, and will form a human resource for DAESH-like organizations to be recruited.

And the image of the sword … You examine it in your documentary as well. DAESH is not killing people with the sword. But they use weapons of modern technology that were left behind by the Americans and captured by DAESH in Iraq.

These are pornographic visuals. They terrify people, while becoming a center of attraction. On the other hand, I know from France that mainstream Islamophobic periodicals sometimes used the image of the sword. Can you imagine, there was a weekly periodical published in France that had such a cover, named “Prophet of the Sword”? DAESH serves this perception and markets this image deliberately.

Interestingly, ten months after the formation of their so-called state, one of al-Baghdadi’s statements was revealed. He said “Islam is a religion of war, not peace.” This wasn’t said by Trump, Sarkozy, or any Islamophobic academics, but by al-Baghdadi himself. They first categorize the world as Muslims and non-Muslims. Then, they distinguish Muslims on the basis of their pledge of allegiance to them and they excommunicate whoever does not obey them. This excommunicative behavior is such that, if two people were left, one would excommunicate the other.

Then, what purpose does excommunication serve? Which strategy is it a part of? A rational person would expect the organization to negotiate more in order to recruit more people, especially if they are claiming to found a state. Am I wrong?

Palestine is a fundamental issue for Muslims all over the world, right? You can even find a Palestine motive, being a symbol of resistance, in very secular and leftist movements. In theory, you expect DAESH to have such a motive too. But DAESH attacked the Yarmouk Camp where Palestinians were residing. Why? I think there are some peculiarities waiting to be answered. We should try to understand DAESH by following not what they are saying but what they are doing.

There are Eurofighters in DAESH as well. What do their profiles tell us?

There is an identity crisis in Europe. Looking at the lives of those who joined DAESH, you will see intriguing facts. For instance, Salim Benghalem, one of the ten most wanted DAESH militants in the US. He has a criminal record for being a gang member, being connected with the mafia, drug dealing, and thievery. His lawyer is Léon-Lef Forster, who caught my attention when I was a journalist in France, for also being the lawyer of Alaattin Çakıcı. Forster is an expert in gang lawsuits. He said that he was very surprised when he heard about Benghalem joining DAESH. “Putting religion aside, I haven’t even seen this man being either a part of a civilization or the enemy of it,” he said. Benghalem became a DAESH member in a very short period of time.

Another example was a family in which the mother was Algerian and the father a Charlie Hebdo subscriber. The family defined itself as laical believers. Their child was against any religion. The child had two names: Yunes and Sebastian. He sometimes used one and then the other. It can be seen that he was in an identity crisis. Then, his parents joined DAESH. Interestingly, they wrote and sent a letter to their son. The mother said “don’t think that we affected the decision of each other, we made this decision by ourselves.” This indicates a hybrid form of culture. They stressed the equality between men and women. In the statements of such people, there are many indicators of a hybrid culture. For instance, some of them talk about “the right to behead people.” They say “I haven’t beheaded anyone until now, but I can. This is how I employ my freedom of expression.” Another one says, “You carry the flag of gay pride. It is my preference to carry the DAESH flag.” These kinds of rhetoric on freedoms and rights don’t appear in the profiles of fighters originating from the Middle East.

For instance, there is a family in France that produces flags. The woman there made an interesting statement. She said that she made a white DAESH flag as “many pacifists come and prefer the white DAESH flag.” This was an interesting detail.

In another instance, there was a man named Abdelhamid Abaaoud who was a Belgian of Moroccan descent. It was one of the first profiles I examined while studying DAESH. There was a visual of him, which was one of the most striking. He had attached a number of corpses to a rope and said “I used to ski, but now I’m jihading.” Then, he laughed and started to drag the corpses with the rope. It was one of the most terrifying visuals I have ever seen. A French TV station conducted an interview with this man and broadcast the footage. Abaaoud was somewhat popular in DAESH. If I had ever seen him, I would’ve been able to identify him easily. However, this terrorist entered and left France numerous times, as if there was no screening. Moreover, this man was one of the important figures of the Bataclan attack. Previously, he had prepared an attack on the opera house in Toulouse; however, it was prevented at the last minute. Abaaoud was one of the most important profiles in DAESH.

In addition, there are religious converts, all of whom don’t have any political background. They don’t have any connections with political movements, including extreme ones, in their own countries. There are very interesting portraits among these converts. There was one whose mother was an agnostic and father socialist. Then, the parents got divorced and the father married a Portuguese woman, who was a devoted Catholic. The mother raised both her child and the man’s together. However, both of the children joined DAESH. For example, Denis Cuspert’s mother was German, while his father was from Ghana. His father left the family and Cuspert was subjected to violence by his American step-father. Cuspert is an important recruiter in DAESH.

How much time does it take the new converts to join DAESH?

They join DAESH after almost a year of sharing the news of their conversion to Islam to their close friends and relatives. In his book, Robert Leiken has an important point. He says, “It’s 80 times easier for a German to become a jihadist than a Muslim.” Because, converts have no basic information about Islam at the beginning. There are elements of modernism, violence, and an identity crisis that contribute to this fact. This is also known by Al-Qaeda. In their guides on propaganda, it’s said, “stay away from the ones who know the religion well, focus on people who don’t know much about it.”

There are striking similarities between DAESH’s interpretation of Islam and evangelist’s interpretation of Christianity. I interviewed Esra Özyürek, who is an academic in the UK. Özyürek studied the Salafi mosques in Germany and published a book named Being German, Becoming Muslim. I told her an anecdote I had heard from a peshmerga who fought in Northern Iraq against DAESH. A DAESH militant and the said peshmerga somehow came side by side; the peshmerga asked the militant why he was fighting. The militant said, “Because, I’m going to have lunch together with the prophet.” After listening to this anecdote, Özyürek said that it was interesting and added, “Evangelists talk about having tea with God.”

Does this mean that DAESH is also using expressions borrowed from Christianity in its propaganda mechanisms?

No, they are not borrowing these expressions directly from Christianity. Such similarities demonstrate resembling reflections of modernism both in new Christian currents and DAESH-like organizations. It is also seen in the letters of the European Muslims who join DAESH: “If you become a Muslim, we’ll see each other [in] heaven.” They’re sure that they’ll all become martyrs. And there is also the Salafi-Wahhabi understanding, which is a modern interpretation of Islam representing not really returning to the authentic version of religion. It disregards fourteen centuries of memory of Islamic culture and civilization, severing all ties with tradition and local culture. Not all Salafis have jihadist or excommunicative attitudes, of course. But the Salafi-Wahhabi tradition turns against the Islamic culture. As you know, Salafis always have an issue with tombs. DAESH shouts “Allah-u Akbar” while destroying the tombs with explosives.

Is DAESH still a closed book?

Yes and no. In certain aspects, it’s a deciphered organization. There is a French expert on terrorism named Jean-Charles Brisard, who worked at the anti-terror department. In one of his statements, he said that the 24 banks captured by DAESH are still open for international transactions.

What does it mean if the banks are open to international transactions?

I don’t know. Banks in Greece were closed down in just a day. Then, it means that the international system allows them to stay open for transaction. When we asked this to Munoz, he said, “It is easy to close down the banks. If they are still open, someone wanted to keep them open.” He clearly wasn’t surprised.

It seems as if the international system doesn’t want to finish off DAESH quickly.

According to the 2015 report of the Louvre Museum, which was conveyed to the Élysée Palace, DAESH is smuggling artifacts. So, it is not dynamiting all historical artifacts.

Or, take the oil sales of DAESH.

We knew that the Western oil companies in the region were selling oil during the Iraqi embargo. These companies never asked the source when they found cheap oil. This was also stressed by the European Parliament. There also was a hearing in 2015 in the US. The Chief of General Staff and the Secretary of Defense were present. A senator was asking how the DAESH tankers travelled almost without any resistance. They replied that the drivers were civilians. When the senator emphasized that those drivers were working for DAESH, they said that they didn’t have any man in the field. The senator asked again, “where are these drivers? Have they retired after carrying all the oil and started to plow the fields somewhere?” The Chief of General Staff replied by saying, “I don’t understand your question.” It was just like a comedy show.

Would you like to add anything?

In Europe, one of the most brutal events in world history, the Holocaust happened. This was conducted by an organized large group, which was the product of the transitivity between the state and the people. WWII swept millions of lives away. In summary, 50 million people died and, since then, we haven’t seen a war of this scope. However, we know that in the region we’re living, WWI and WWII still continue.

Belkıs Kılıçkaya, I thank you for your time and we’re grateful that you allowed me to conduct such an extensive interview with you.

*The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass, translated by William McCants, Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, May 2006.

Constant change is one of the elementary factors of the nature of life and the world in which we live. In the last three centuries many important revolutions transformed almost every country on the planet. Great thinkers in history, such as Ibn Khaldun and Arnold J. Toynbee, saw civilizations in their historical processes as a sort of body that periodically undergo the segments of regular human organisms – from growth to death. In this line, German philosopher and historian Oswald Spengler published his influential book, Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West). Herein, Spengler presented an alternative model to the rational and enlightened idea of constant progress by pointing out that a decline of a civilization is a common, final, and natural result. But, more importantly, according to Spengler, the age of the decline of the West was already in progress at the beginning of the 20th century. Based on this, it may not be surprising that ideological terminologies such as “downfall” or “clash of cultures” have been used disproportionately in the political arena. A popular word in German political literature, for example, is the so-called clash of cultures, or Kulturkampf, which also belongs to the historic experience of Otto von Bismarck’s controversy with the Catholic Church. In the process of unifying German provinces into a single nation he saw the Catholic Church as a big threat, which led to an antagonism between the state and the church. These concepts matter for us as they are the ideological backbones of a neo-conservative worldview under construct today.Such cultural pessimism has been revived by the advocates of the new right wing in Europe. For more than a decade they have created hysterical or malevolent concepts such as “Eurabia,” “Londonistan,” or “Dhimmitude.” They have taken to the streets with their activist allies, such as the EDL (English Defense League) or the far more effective PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of Europe), recently winning political influence in various parliaments with their political representatives, the FPÖ, Front National, or the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), or even creating their own terrorists such as Anders Breivik. With these activities, Islam is their main focus. To the right wing, Muslims are seen as the main threat to Judeo-Christian Western traditions, and their public symbols as objective proof of the Occident’s downfall. This fear can also be seen in various polls conducted in Germany between 2014 and 2015, in which 57% of Germans saw Islam as a threatening religion, 52% were worried about the increasing influence of Islam in Germany because of Muslim refugees, and 72% were afraid of terrorist attacks.

These results can be seen as typical manifestations of the German Angst. However, a view of Europe’s current political landscape proves the opposite. Fear seems to be a regional, or even continental, attitude towards the now-visible Muslim community. But this concept of fear is not a mere expression of an uncomfortable emotion. It has become a major social challenge and even a research field in various academic disciplines: Islamophobia and xenophobia represent the irrational fear of “the other” by having prejudices and creating a discriminatory image of Muslims or other minorities. So, it is not surprising that some European states have revived the “mission to civilize” by banning the burqa and burkini (as in France), or even forcing Muslim students to eat pork (as in Austria). Society and demographics are changing as new types of people are appearing today, such as the German with a migration background or the “New Germans” (Prof. Herfried Münkler). What many populists or plain racists conceal is that change is not a synonym for downfall. As mentioned earlier, the concept of change has its own and sometimes unpredictable logic. It would be naive to believe that a country such as Germany still has the same homogenous populus it had in the 1920s. In places such as Berlin’s Kreuzberg, multi-culturalism is the norm, as it is in many world capitals and in other cities such as Offenbach, where 60% of the inhabitants have a non-German background.

Finally, it should be pointed out that fear can block rational thinking and thereby question ideas that have been fundamentally protected in legal documents for many centuries. As an example, the AfD’s questioning of whether or not Islam belongs to Germany is an irrelevant question in terms of the German Constitution. But the presence of fear, human rights, and constitutional guarantee create an oxymoron such that, for example, if religious freedom is a right provided by the constitution, then it is an essential element of the social contract between the people and the state according to social contract theory. One can add vague legal concepts such as living together (vivre ensemble) to this. But the burqa case in France provides a flexible tool for conservative approaches to limit the freedom of Muslims and move closer to the concept of assimilation. The president of the German Constitutional Court, Prof. Andreas Voßkuhle, referred to the German Constitution as the “constitution of the middle.” This seems to be a wise approach and should be a plea to lead discussions and debates regarding refugees, Islam, and demographic changes; a path advisable for those who represent either of the two extremes: Thomas More’s Utopia on the one hand or John Stuart Mill’s Dystopia on the other.

I would like to answer your question with offering a different perspective. I think that this is right for a segment of German mainstream media, for certain ideologically driven media outlets and for those who want urgently sell copies. Because presenting the Turkish government in a critical way is very easy and there are always customers for such an approach. But there are other serious publications, not just necessarily the daily press, but also radio and television as well as specialized press which try to maintain a more objective view and have at least a balanced view.Given the recent agreements between the European Union or – respectively – the German and Turkish governments, there is an understanding that Germany now, either voluntarily or reluctantly, needs Turkey and Turkey needs Germany. On the governmental level, there is a balanced situation now. Coming to the other part of your question as to why there is a more critical view on the Turkish government: simply, the reason is mainly that Turkey has become more independent, more powerful and more incisive.

Coming to the other part of your question as to why there is a more critical view on the Turkish government: simply, the reason is mainly that Turkey has become more independent, more powerful and more incisive.

With regard to the religious or conservative values of the Turkish people, I think, yes, this is very important: one should not forget that everything that president Erdoğan did when he was a prime minister was on the basis of the secular constitution from 1982. Even though, Erdoğan is very unfairly portrayed as a “Sultan” or an “Islamist,” he clearly followed secular politics. There is neither an Islamic constitution in Turkey nor even is it likely one will come soon. So the constant mentioning of Islam and of the Muslim identity of the Turkish people does not reflect the true course of things. Commentators and journalists in Germany should know this fact well but just prefer to ignore it. I definitely agree with you that for a section of our media landscape there is a radicalization and polarization.

So, do you think the reason behind negative attitude is bad journalism or deliberate manipulation? Are we talking about ideologically charged and detached quarters, commentators or journalists?

I think we have both. We have definitely a dissolving and a lowering of journalist professional standards and equally an economic pressure in the production of media. This is definitely one reason and I think this an important one. But not all media is under financial pressure. Money is not always the chief reason. It also has something to do with the domestic politics of Germany as well as with ideological motives. There are ideologically driven people who color or taint the coverage of Turkish issues in accordance with their ideology. That is definitely true.

I think when people write about Turkey, they are actually writing about themselves.

I might be wrong but I think that when people write about Turkey, they are actually writing about themselves. You know the famous legal axiom that “the enemy is one owns’ question as ‘Gestalt’”. That means, when we deal with issues regarding Turkish politics, we put Islam and Muslims into the same package. Of course, these questions are not irrelevant for European and German identity. Since German society is in an identity crisis, it is easier to deal with this crises by reflecting it on the other.

And yes, we have ideologically charged and entangled writers, commentators and journalists. I don’t want to list them one by one, but we certainly have them. They have been to Turkey, they wrote and commented about it. Reasons and intentions are mixed. Some of those people come from the former conservative right. Maybe the background of their negative handling of Turkey is also related to the issue pertaining to Islam, to Muslims, to immigration. So it is a kind of proxy war. You see? We have people, who come from a left wing background. For them it is easier to relate the issue to “international solidarity” and supposed “human rights.” We should also keep in mind that some people just report what you perceive negative or critical because that is the truth as they perceive it.

When it comes to making news about foreign countries, do you think German media prefers to act in unison with the German government? Or how frequently do they diverge? As far as I remember there were plenty of negative news and comments about the Iranian government when economic sanctions were applied to Iran just couple of years ago. It was a habit, in this regard, to lift up the voices of Iranian opposition vis-à-vis the Iranian government officials. But now Germany is trying to establish a good relationship with the Iranian government and German officials and private companies are signing economic agreements during their visits to Iran. Did the perspective of the German mainstream media changed accordingly with the change of the government policy towards Iran? And importantly, can you compare reflections of the former Iranian and current Turkish cases on German mainstream media?

That might have been the case in the fifties and sixties when we still had remnants of old German authoritarianism in the German society during the post war period. But nowadays, I don’t see it. I think it is rather the other way around. I think rather the politicians are interested in finding a public mood. To find it, they go to the media. And they diverge quite often. German media has its blind spots.

We all know the situation in Turkey over the past decade. I cannot remember in the nineties and eighties that the issue of human rights or even the issues of Kurdish minority was a big subject for the German policy, not at all. They didn’t care about it. Turkey was a NATO member, Turkey was a foreign state, Turkey was important for defense of the southern NATO front and we didn’t care about the rest. I find it quite hypocritical that suddenly they are interested in human rights in Turkey. It is very hypocritical.

Now suddenly the Saudis are becoming the bad guys. Two or three years ago, Saudi Arabia was the best friend but suddenly they’re vilified.

You’re giving the Iranian example. It is actually a very interesting one. I realize when I speak to people from the region that the change of the perception of Iran is not something exclusively German. This process is initiated by American foreign policy. The Obama government pushed the lifting of sanctions. They want to draw back from the Gulf. They want to engage now their limited forces in East Asia. The Americans accepted Iran as being a limited hegemon in the Persian Gulf region and this is an overall Western thing and nowadays I think with some unjustification, now suddenly the Saudis are becoming the bad guys. Two or three years ago, Saudi Arabia was the best friend but suddenly they’re vilified.

I think the case is more representative. Let’s say for modern media or western media, then of international media because that’s actually the position of the Russian and Chinese media too. That would be my comment of it. But also it does not necessarily mean that they embrace Iran or the Iranian policy. They just shift their positions in a way so Teheran could be a partner of interest because Iran is a big market. Some people say that it could become the biggest steel producer in the world. Everybody is waiting that the doors are opening so they can invest and make a lot of money while the Saudi market is saturated and also the Saudis now announce a reform program that they want to produce more and more of their own stuff.

After the nuclear deal, Germany was one of the first countries to sign economic agreements with Iran, which shows where their concerns lie. Right?

Ethical foreign policy only applies to weak governments. Our president, for example, was in Myanmar and didn’t mention the treatment of the Muslim minority in Myanmar with a single word.

It’s one of the arguments to show that the so called ethical foreign policy which was initiated by Joschka Fischer only applies to weak governments. You cannot or do not apply it to places like China, or to any country where you have strategic and economic interests. I mean for example the behavior of the German foreign policy towards Uzbekistan, which is a dreadful government. It is a case in point. Or Myanmar, our president was in Myanmar and didn’t mention the treatment of the Muslim minority in Myanmar with a single word. The German foreign, let’s say, the human rights oriented German foreign policy is quite selective.

There is a recent debate on the Böhmermann affair and this happened after you submitted your very article about the same subject for Insight Turkey. Would you like to comment on that? None talked about what he said. Do you think the press freedom can be debated separately from the content of the news itself?

This case needs a bit of clear thinking. Let’s take politics and diplomacy out and try to consider the issue only from a legal perspective. The offended party is the Turkish president Tayyip Erdoğan. According to law he has the right to go to trial himself. None can do it for him. I think the president has very good cause and reason to do it. And that’s it. I think that would have been the best situation. I don’t want to comment on the content of what he said. Because it leads to a kind of interpretation. Some people say no, it was just a media comment. Imagine what would happen, if the same thing would have happened with Benyamin Netanyahu!

Imagine what would happen, if the Böhmermann affair would have happened with Benyamin Netanyahu!

In Germany, normally – except some rare cases – politicians don’t go to trial with satirists. Helmut Kohl, for instance, had a lot of enemies and for sixteen years he was viciously attacked. But he never put someone to trial. Bringing the issue to the court was an option as much as keeping silent. Because what these satirists cannot stand is silence. You just don’t mention or comment on them. Just silence. Alternatively it would have also been an option to bring issue to the court and then remain silent. No statements to press, no comment, just say – this is a legal case. In German inner politics it would have functioned like this.

Do you think press freedom can be debated separately from the content of the news?

I am very much in favor of press freedom. But I like to see strong libel laws. It’s basically the old British model that they had for more than a century or two. They have total press freedom, but they also have libel laws, which means if a person was libeled s/he could go to court with quite tough sanctions like money and prison sentences. On the other hand, if we do not separate it, then the law could become subjective. Then one can make rules arbitrarily. This is a dangerous road. I am speaking as a German Muslim, because there are attempts to silence us and to limit our freedom of speech. And I don’t want my freedom of speech limited. So I have to give the same freedom to the opponent. In Germany, when Muslims speak freely, they are not put on to trial, but there is a media campaign against them. But there is nothing to do against such media campaigns. I think it is good as it is. One can and should stand it.

And how about the question from where one has to draw limit or how to limit power of journalist?

We really wish financially powerful Individuals or companies in the Muslim world like Turkey or Malaysia would invest in genuine European Muslim projects.

In Europe, there are certain tendencies in the legal system. For example, there were, as far as I know, between seventeen and twenty cases who went to the European court in Strasbourg concerning the competing rights of religious and press freedom. And in every case, press and media freedom won. This is almost a tradition. Even if the lower echelons of the law might give you positive decisions, the upper one will not. Because that is how it is. I think at the end, the only way to do it is by hard work – and by good PR work. Even by buying a newspaper. There are some newspapers on sale in Germany. Buy a newspaper and turn it slowly into the direction you want! That is a legitimate thing. There is nothing illegal. Just make your own media presence. We really wish financially powerful Individuals or companies in the Muslim world like Turkey or Malaysia would realize this and invest seriously in genuine European Muslim projects.

And coming to our last question, what is your prospect for future where the position of “oppositional” German media is in sharp contrast to Turkish government or critical and revisionist outlook is predominating?

It depends on certain issues like the outcome of the Syrian refugee crises or the handling of the EU-Turkish accord. How it is handled, how it is dealt with, how it is practiced. I think Turkey is successful. And success is itself always a good argument. If the economic policies continue and the numbers remain positive, the Turkish government can make the use of it.

When people speak about the government of president Erdogan, they never mention his quite successful fight against inflation, which is the biggest killer of the small people, of the poor.

Say whatever you think about us, in fourteen years Ankara created a far more adjusted society compared to the decades before of corruption and mistreatment of resources and politics, and inflation.

I mean one interesting thing is, when people speak about the government of president Erdogan, and then prime minister, they never mention his quite successful fight against inflation, which is the biggest killer of the small people, of the poor. Likewise, they won’t mention a large chunk of the foreign debts, which is in fact a huge success and should be promoted for a greater public. I mean look where Turkey is and where Greece is. You have to understand that media is not a global vending machine, where you go and want something. If you want something, you need to get it done yourself.

‘The two Muslim women who are closest to Kamala are her mother and her friend Nakia, who is Turkish-American. Both women wear the hijab. This is interesting because the story does not portray hijab as a tradition that cannot transcend generational boundaries. Nakia is shown as more mature and strong-headed than Kamala. She does not like people calling her by an Anglicised nickname and prefers if they called her by her real name; in contrast, Kamala tells her father she would rather have a ‘normal’ name like Jasmine or Layla. By making Nakia a more strong-headed woman than Kamala, Wilson and Amanat turn upside down the assumptions their non-Muslim readership might have.

Many popular culture stories that feature people of colour take an apologetic turn and become narratives of white redemption by focusing on the white allies. Makers of ‘Ms. Marvel’, however, do not shy away from portrayals of privileged, obnoxious white teenagers. Yet they also treat the white American teenage identity in an equally multi-layered way. Kamala’s other best friend, Bruno, is a young white man who upholds high moral standards, is praised by Kamala’s father and develops a crush on Kamala. The comic does not ignore the presence of white supremacy, which manifests itself in both physical and symbolic violence, while acknowledging that white Americans like Bruno are multifaceted as well.

‘Ms. Marvel’ is a step in the right direction. It is an important example of positive representation that has the potential to empower Muslim youth around the world as well as expose non-Muslims to a more accurate depiction of Muslim youth culture. Kamala Khan’s story is successful because it is able to respect cultural specificity while also creating a story that is universally relatable. This is due largely to the fact that it is a project co-led by two Muslim women. They do not accommodate the dominant narrative about their protagonist but rather ask the reader to tear this narrative down. They are able to do this because they create a character that is relatable. In this regard, Kamala functions much like one’s first Muslim friend. Structures of oppression take a long time to come crumbling down but to change one person’s perception all you need is another.