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n a joint statement released on December 28, 2023, the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom expressed deep concern over Iran’s recent actions, condemning the country’s increased production of highly enriched uranium. The statement followed the release of a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on December 26, revealing that Iran had elevated its rate of uranium enrichment up to 60% at Natanz and Fordow.

The four nations characterized Iran’s move as a significant step backward, warning that it would lead to a tripling of Iran’s monthly production rate of highly enriched uranium. The joint statement emphasized the lack of credible civilian justification for Iran’s actions and underscored the proliferation-related risks associated with the production at Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant.

One of the key points of concern raised in the statement was Iran’s decision to revert to a cascade configuration previously discovered by the IAEA in Fordow earlier in the year. The countries expressed doubt about Iran’s willingness to cooperate transparently with the IAEA, highlighting delays in declaring changes as a cause for skepticism.

“Iran’s lack of goodwill”

The U.S., France, Germany, and the UK, condemned Iran’s actions, characterizing them as a demonstration of Iran’s lack of goodwill toward de-escalation. The statement noted the “reckless” behavior occurring in a tense regional context, raising concerns about the broader implications for regional stability.

The joint statement called on Iran to reverse its steps immediately and de-escalate its nuclear program. Additionally, the countries urged Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA to provide assurances of the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. The reinstatement of inspectors suspended in September 2023 was emphasized as crucial for maintaining transparency and adherence to international agreements.

Despite the condemnation, the joint statement reaffirmed the commitment of the U.S., France, Germany, and the UK to a diplomatic solution. The countries emphasized their determination to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, underscoring the importance of diplomatic efforts in addressing the escalating situation.

This development has raised concerns about the stability of the region and the potential consequences of Iran’s nuclear activities. As tensions escalate, diplomatic efforts will play a crucial role in navigating the complex geopolitical landscape and ensuring a peaceful resolution to the situation.

Iran responds to the statement

In response to recent claims regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, Mohammad Eslami, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), reaffirmed the country’s commitment to existing protocols and dismissed the allegations as media hype.

During a cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Eslami addressed the reports, emphasizing that the attention garnered by Iran’s enrichment program is not new and had already been addressed in the Director General’s report to the Board of Governors. He regarded the claims as sensationalized and serving a particular agenda.

Eslami clarified that the AEOI remains steadfast in its commitment to established protocols, denying any deviation from ongoing activities. He urged the public to discern attempts by certain parties, particularly Western powers, to divert attention from other geopolitical matters, such as the situation in Gaza, by focusing on Iran’s nuclear program.

Highlighting that Iran’s nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, Eslami reiterated the country’s adherence to international obligations and standards. The statement aimed to assure the international community that Iran’s nuclear program operates within the framework of established regulations and is not a cause for alarm.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and Tehran Times.

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hina and the United States are slated to hold discussions on nuclear arms control next week, marking the first such dialogue since the Obama administration, according to a report from the Wall Street Journal.

The announcement comes after Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to Washington. Officials from both nations have revealed that consultations on arms control and non-proliferation will be undertaken in the following days, with additional discussions on maritime affairs and other related topics.

Senior State Department official Mallory Stewart and Sun Xiaobo, head of the arms-control department at China’s foreign ministry, will spearhead the arms talks. As of now, neither the U.S. State Department nor China’s embassy in Washington has commented on the specifics regarding the format or timing of these discussions.

Strategic stability

In 2021, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted that both the Chinese and U.S. presidents had expressed their intent to continue discussions on “strategic stability”. This emphasis arose due to increasing concerns in Washington about Beijing’s expansion of its nuclear weapons capacity. However, the White House was prompt in clarifying that these conversations would not mimic the formal arms reduction talks previously held with Russia.

Interestingly, despite the collaborative tone, U.S. officials have, in the past, expressed their disappointment over China’s seeming disinterest in proactive discussions to mitigate nuclear weapons risks. As per Pentagon data from October, China is believed to have over 500 operational nuclear warheads and might possess over 1,000 warheads by 2030. This assertion has been countered by Beijing, stating that the U.S. already has a substantially larger arsenal.

In response to these figures, Beijing has countered by pointing out the extensive nuclear arsenal of the United States. Chinese officials have long maintained the stance that the U.S. holds a substantially larger and more formidable collection of nuclear weapons in comparison to China’s arsenal.

The implications of these revelations are substantial, further emphasizing the nuclear capabilities divide and the race for nuclear superiority between two of the world’s most influential powers. The disclosure comes amidst growing tensions and calls for arms control talks between the two nations.

Strained relations between the two global powers

The upcoming arms discussion is anticipated to precede a significant meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping in San Francisco later in November. While the overarching agenda is yet to be fully fleshed out, a representative from the Biden administration acknowledged that vital details are currently in the works.

This move towards dialogue is seen as a part of the broader effort to restore strained diplomatic relations between the two global powers, especially in light of incidents such as the U.S. downing of a suspected Chinese spy balloon earlier this year.

Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association, opined that the discussions would potentially center on promoting a more transparent understanding of each nation’s nuclear doctrines and bolstering effective crisis communication channels. Kimball, however, cautioned against expecting immediate significant outcomes, emphasizing that real progress would necessitate mutual compromise and patience.

Sources: South China Morning Post and Reuters

Q.What is the New START treaty and why is it important?

The New START Treaty is the last remaining arms control agreement between the United States and Russia that puts limits on their strategic nuclear weapons and provides transparency between the two countries regarding their nuclear arsenals. Under the New START Treaty, both sides are allowed to have 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, which means that the nuclear warheads are on launchers either missiles or bombers. Each side can also have 800 total launchers – missiles or the aircraft-, 700 of which can be deployed.

The reality, however, is that there are other weapons that are not deployed and not counted under this treaty. So, the warheads awaiting dismantlement are not included in this Treaty.

And also, for the transparency measures, both the U.S. and the Russian sides can conduct 18 onsite inspections per year in nuclear facilities in the other country, and there is also information about the nuclear arsenals that is exchanged every six months, which helps both sides have some kind of confidence in their knowledge of how many weapons there are, and where they are located. That is important for stability and predictability in planning and why people are so worried about this treaty going away.

Q. What should we expect if the treaty is renewed -or not-?

First of all, I assume that the New START treaty will be extended, but if it were not, it would be the first time in 50 years without such limits on the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. And it feels that we would be losing that era of working together for our mutual security.

The U.S. plan for modernization accounts for having these weapons for the next 80 years, and thus it is hard to credibly say we are going to disarm when we have this plan for 80 years. On the other hand, you have the non-nuclear-weapon states in the world that are pushing for disarmament through the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was negotiated in the summer of 2017. 50 countries ratified the Treaty, and it entered into force very recently on January 22, 2021. And so, you have this trend on one side with these non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) urging for disarmament  rather than modernization. Those two trends make this whole nuclear order very challenging right now.

Q. Are there any sign of a rather multi-lateral nuclear treaty that could replace the New START? Are there any official talk with other nuclear-weapon countries such as India, Israel, Iran, North Korea, etc.?

I think a lot of people would say, we hope eventually we get to a multilateral limit. But again, there is that pressure that the U.S. and Russia still have to come down in their arsenal numbers. In the absence of a formal treaty, there is still a lot of opportunities for countries to talk in  multilateral fora  about their nuclear doctrine and ways to reduce the risk of a potential detonation, whether accidental or on purpose.

I do think it would be good for P5 countries, China, France, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S. to work on that. They already have P5 meetings within the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970, and it is still the cornerstone of the whole non-proliferation order.

But some of the other states you mentioned are not in the NPT; India, Pakistan and Israel for example never joined, and North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003. It is also true that South Sudan is not in the treaty, but I assume that at some point in the future, they will join.

Still, it is a very long long-term vision to think all of these nuclear weapons states, whether they are in the NPT or not, coming together and thinking about how to pursue nuclear reductions or how to improve their security relationships. That is very difficult to imagine, but even having talks would be useful.

Q. What about the Biden era? Which developments do you expect under the Biden administration?

This past year, President Biden wrote a piece in Foreign Policy, saying that he would consider a sole-use doctrine, which is based on the idea that nuclear weapons are only useful for deterring other nuclear weapons, and so that they are not used for any other kind of military contingency. We can say that Biden is trying to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and limit the scope of where nuclear weapons are appropriately employed.

I assume the Biden administration will quickly try to extend New START. There are a lot of people in the arms control and disarmament non-proliferation community that hope that the administration will extend for the full five years, which is allowed under the treaty. But there is also the pressure to develop the next treaty. There have also been some talks about whether to extend it, but for just one or two years. Five years is a long time, but it takes a lot of time to negotiate, so an extension of two years would put a lot of pressure to start negotiating the next Treaty.

Q. What would be different in this new Treaty that shall come to the table, an updated version of the New START?

I think the U.S. would like to see a treaty that is broader in terms of the types of nuclear weapons that it includes. The New START puts a limitation on deployed strategic weapons, but there is another category of nuclear weapons, called either “non-strategic” or “tactical weapons”, and these are not included in any treaties and have not ever been.

And so, the U.S. would like to capture these, because the Russians have more of these so-called “tactical weapons” than the U.S. does. And I think that at this point, many of us presume that any use of nuclear weapons is going to have a strategic effect. Even if it were a non-strategic weapon, it would still have huge consequences. Therefore this division between strategic and tactical is less meaningful.

The big security challenge in this realm from now on is going to be figuring out whether it is possible to bring different military technologies and capabilities to bear into one agreement because arms control is not just to limit weapons, it is to increase everyone’s security.