On Thursday last week, the Pentagon dismissed claims of a U.S. exit from Syria as being “rumours,” conveying instead that the fight against Daesh in Syria was not over.

According to senior U.S. officials, President Donald Trump had instructed military leaders to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, suggesting that U.S. strategic goals in Syria do not include longer-term stability or reconstruction efforts. Trump had also previously suggested that the Syrian war was a mistake during his campaign period, as well as more recently indicating that a U.S. military exit will happen “very soon.”

Nonetheless, while Trump maintains Syria as being a financial drain on the U.S. economy and burden on interests not in line with his ‘America First’ policy, mostly blaming the previous administration for not having crossed the stated “Red Line In The Sand,” Pentagon spokesperson Dana White, on Wednesday the following day described a U.S. plan to withdraw troops from Syria as “rumours,” with the fight against Daesh not yet over.

Contrary to Donald Trump’s statements of a rapid U.S. military exit within six months, sources have cited an increase in military presence in northern Syria, reporting that two more military outposts have been set up in the Manbij region. It is estimated the U.S. now has up to 11 military bases in northern Syria.

While President Trump’s remarks have been contradictory, it seems the military leaders with experience in the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan hope to stay with suggestions of their being a ‘robust post-conflict’ agenda. Some high ranking U.S. military leaders have insisted that “once the small [Daesh] footholds have been cleared out in eastern Syria, the U.S. will require a footprint after the fighting stops to deter further attacks against the United States.”

The U.S. financial and military aid towards the PYD/YPG in northern Syria has caused much friction between Turkish-American relations. Being a Syrian offshoot of the PKK, an outlawed terrorist organization recognized by Turkey, the European Union and the United States, the U.S. have used the YPG in their ‘fight’ against Daesh, but more importantly to decrease Russian and Iranian influence in the region, at the expense of supporting an organization also linked to terrorism.

With recent Turkish counter-terrorism operations in Afrin, north-western Syria, clearing what had become a strategic location for YPG cross-border attacks on the provinces of Hatay and Kilis, Turkey has made it clear they will now be directing their efforts towards other YPG/PYD controlled areas, most specifically the U.S. held region of Manbij. Causing apprehension towards a possible confrontation between Ankara and Washington, a Turkey-U.S. working group was set up to alleviate concerns and cooperate on a peaceful solution. The first meeting was held on March 8, 2018.

However, diplomatic sources recently signified that the next Turkey-U.S. working group meeting on Manbij will be put on hold until May. Waiting until Mike Pompeo replaces former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the impromptu shift in the White House has dampened Turkish-American cooperative progress and caused speculation on whether Pompeo will continue, or even adhere to Tillerson’s ‘constructive’ steps in finding a solution between the two NATO members in Manbij.

Where an immediate U.S. military exit has been no more than rhetoric to appease domestic concerns, as well as provide ground for Trump to demand payment from those that wish for the U.S. to maintain presence in Syria, signalling out Saudi Arabia, French President Macron has kept close contact with the White House. After having welcomed the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to the Elysee Palace two weeks ago it was proposed Macron looks to send an unspecified number of troops to the French bases in Manbij and assist the PYD who make up an overwhelming percentage of the SDF.

External intervention becoming ever more likely after the Douma chemical attack on civilians, with Trump and Macron calling for a “strong, joint response” towards the Assad regime, British cooperation and involvement has also come to light, with Trump securing a $500 million deal in relation to the drone development and maintenance project entitled the ‘Falcon Project.’

Although it may appear Trump’s rhetoric sympathizes with U.S. military personnel, striving for their ‘return home,’ the Pentagon, alongside the high ranking military leaders intent on countering Russia and limiting Iran in the region will maintain their presence in Syria for the time to come. Alienating Turkey, U.S. insistence to further build a military presence while assisting the PYD has paved the way for Turkey to nurture stronger bi-lateral relations with Russia and build collaborative relations with Iran based on mutual concerns of terrorism.

While Trump personally may want a Syria exit soon, it is evident that his personal opinions bare no weight within the interests of the Pentagon. It is also debatable whether elected individuals in the U.S. actually have a say with regards to foreign policy interests.

U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. will be “coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now.” However, Trump previously promised the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan that he will immediately stop arm deliveries to the YPG in Syria, which didn’t happen. As the Pentagon’s 2019 Budget projection illustrates, the Pentagon predicts that U.S. troops will not leave Syria at least until the end of 2019. Within the State Department there is an internal dispute about U.S. policy on Syria. However, it’s not the Trump administration who seek to leave Syria soon, but the military and Pentagon deciding on U.S. affairs in Syria. Pentagon, CENTCOM and SOCOM are prioritizing their partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces over U.S. long-term interests.

From fighting Daesh to becoming strategic partners

The Obama administration decided to work with the Syrian branch of the PKK in order to fight Daesh. The US-YPG cooperation to fight Daesh rapidly advanced to a strategic partnership in Syria. Pentagon and CENTCOM’s partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces expanded to more than just fighting Daesh as U.S. soldiers joined a demonstration against Turkey in Manbij where Abdullah Ocalan posters and pro-PKK banners were seen everywhere.

Over time, the U.S. Army established at least 18 military bases in Syria, except two in south Syria. All of them are located in areas controlled by the YPG. Two of the military bases in northern Syria are used as military airports where U.S. Apache helicopters are stationed.

In addition to the military bases in northern Syria, which indicates the U.S. projection to stay long, the Justification for Fiscal Year 2019 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) foresees the U.S.-YPG partnership in Syria at least until the end of 2019. The Pentagon’s budget projection for support to the YPG in 2019 doesn’t hint at big clashes and military operations against Daesh, but rather depicts a growing U.S.-YPG partnership.

300 million U.S.-dollars are planned as funds for the U.S.-YPG partnership in 2019. While half of the funds are reserved for weapons, ammunition and vehicles, 12% are planned to be invested in military bases costs and transportation costs. One third of the budget is expected to be spent in operational sustainability.

Weapons that are intended to be supplied to the YPG include AK-47 rifles, Machine Guns (PKM), Heavy Machine Guns (DShK), RPG-7 Launcher, Sniper Rifles, 60mm and 120mm Mortars.

The Pentagon’s budget projection also foresees around 30 thousand militants to be trained and to the frontlines in addition to another 35 thousand militants of the YPG as so-called Internal Security Forces. According to the budget projection, the Pentagon plans to pay each fighter a monthly stipend payment range from $200 to $400. As written in the budget projection, the Pentagon is currently paying 10 thousand militants a monthly stipend payment.

In contrast to Trump’s declaration to withdraw from Syria, policy makers in the U.S., the military and Pentagon reportedly have other plans.

While for now the requested budget for the “train & equip” program in Syria for 2019 has to be accepted, the budget program for 2018 is already ongoing. It is unclear if the budget projection for 2019 will be blocked by the Trump administration, but until the end of 2018 the program will continue.

The increase of directly paid militants to 65 thousand until the end of 2018, the maintenance of military bases and the continuing support for the YPG even long after the forecasted end of Daesh in Syria suggests that the U.S. will remain in Syria for a long time, with their new strategic partner: Marxist-Leninist YPG militants.

Inter U.S. state conflict about Syrian policy

President Donald Trump told his advisers he wants an early exit of U.S. troops from Syria and he publically announced, “We’ll be coming out of Syria, like, very soon.”

A short period after Trump’s announcement, Brett McGurk, U.S. Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS said at the U.S. Institute for Peace in Washington: “We are in Syria to defeat ISIS. That is our mission and our mission isn’t over and we are going to complete that mission.”

Brett McGurk’s statement that Turkey failed to advance along the Marea line, but that the SDF (YPG) have been very successful, especially in Manbij, shows how short-sighted and single-minded the perspective of U.S. cadres in charge of U.S. policies around Syria are. Much wrong his statement is in military terms, as Operation Olive Branch illustrated, both politically and logically it is not a smart idea to compare a NATO army with a militant organization.

Shortly after Trump declared his intention to leave Syria, the U.S. Army were busy in establishing new military bases around Manbij in order to protect a designated terrorist organization from its NATO ally Turkey and the Syrian Opposition factions who were supported by the U.S. as well. The establishment of two additional bases in the Manbij region should not only be seen as a message to Turkey and the Syrian Opposition, but also a message towards internal conflicts within the U.S. as the bases became public after the announcement of the President.

The U.S. military deciding on the country’s foreign policies and its relations with other allied states is a story we’ve seen before in Syria. Shortly before the visit of former U.S. Foreign Minister Rex Tillerson, Maj. Gen. Jamie Jarrard, the Special Operations commander said: “We’re very proud of our positions here, and we want to make sure everybody knows it.” Lt. Gen. Paul Funk who accompanied Jamie Jarrard on his visit to Manbij went further and said: “You hit us, we will respond aggressively. We will defend ourselves.”

The U.S. Foreign Department under Rex Tillerson tried to find another policy for the Syrian crisis, especially regarding NATO ally Turkey. His dismissal is also a de-facto end to his efforts to de-escalate tension between Turkey and the U.S. over U.S. support for YPG militants. As Anadolu Agency reports, the U.S.-Turkey working group meeting has been delayed until the new U.S. Secretary of State takes office.

U.S. SOCOM commanders are growingly frustrated at policymakers in Washington for a lack of strategic guidance to further the counter-Daesh mission according to a report by NBCNews. The limited military view of SOCOM commanders backs their partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces more than U.S. strategic long-term interests.

Trump agreed in a National Security Council meeting this week to keep U.S. troops in Syria a little longer in order to defeat Daesh but wants them out relatively soon, a senior administration official said on Wednesday.

However, it seems that it is the Pentagon and CENTCOM who decide over when to finish Daesh entirely in Syria. As known for followers of the Syrian war, the International Coalition stopped fighting Daesh and months before the start of the Operation Olive Branch.

Later, Pentagon and CENTCOM blamed Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch for their pause in fighting Daesh, merely because YPG militants left the frontlines in order to fight against the Turkish military and Free Syrian Army. In reality, this development made clear that the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces are dominated by the YPG, disabling any military operation if the YPG militants refuse to fight.

While once the International Coalition conducted up to 1500 airstrikes per month in summer last year, the number of airstrikes against Daesh have been reduced to below 150 per month this year according to Press Releases by Centcom.

On the other side, according to Associated Press during the National Security council meeting, Trump insisted for a rapid withdrawal from Syria. As has been reported, the President was presented with several consequences that would occur if the U.S. were to remain in Syria, and only one if they were to withdraw – which was that with full withdrawal, Russia and Iran would take advantage.

The Trump administration has not the political vision and capacity for a genuine Syria policy. The weakened administration has effectively empowered the military over deciding on issues relating to foreign policy and issues that will have long-term impacts on U.S. relations with regional actors. The Pentagon’s agenda for Syria lacks strategic guidance and it is short-sighted and single-minded as it prioritizes the U.S. partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces over U.S. long-term interests in the Middle East. However, the internal U.S. wrangle over their policy will most likely continue.

Over the past years, the U.S. military involvement in the Syrian crisis has become a widely discussed topic across the globe. The recent announcement of President Trump to withdraw American troops from Syria has not only further complicated the situation for the international actors involved in the crisis but also enabled speculations about the future of the Turkish-American confrontation in Syria. In fact, such a decision can bear either dire consequences, or yield positive outcomes for Turkey. It is important to investigate the implications of Trump’s unsettled withdrawal decision for Turkey, and evaluate this new development in relation to the Ankara-Washington disagreement over the issue of American support for the YPG. Unfortunately, it is still unclear whether Trump’s unexpected decision will facilitate Ankara’s strategy in Northern Syria or not.

Despite the fact that Ankara has not made an explicit announcement on this issue, Turkey is likely to appreciate the American act of pulling out of Syria, if the timing and methodology simultaneously correspond with Turkey’s strategy against the PKK in the country. If so, one might question what the Turkish strategy towards the PKK-YPG in Syria is. Turkey’s strategy is first and foremost to minimize the territorial control of the PKK-YPG in the country and restore U.S.-Turkey relations. The acceptable end scenario for Ankara is to create a new “territorial space,” in which the PKK-YPG cannot obtain any sort of military force that can politically or militarily influence the northeastern part of the country. This ‘space’ can only be achieved if the U.S. stops backing the PKK-YPG. Otherwise, the Turkish-American relations may enter an irreversible direction since Turkey seems to be willing to carry out its military action against PKK’s region under U.S. protection. At this stage, the latter is not what Turkey wants to do in the near feature. In that case, the recent statement of President Trump to withdraw American troops from Syria is a crucial move that can influence Turkey’s short-term game plan in Northern Syria. There are two important but interrelated scenarios about Trump’s post-American Syrian strategy that can destabilize Turkey’s strategic concerns and more importantly create more chaos in Northern Syria. The irony here is that Trump himself is faithfully echoing Obama’s hands-off policy in Syria which is the main driving factor behind Turkish-American confrontation.

The first scenario is about timing. The preference to downgrade U.S. involvement in Syria in the fight against Daesh is problematic if the Trump administration really wants to restrain Iranian influence over Syria. The strategy of disengagement makes sense only if it is applied at the right time. The Obama administration made a similar mistake in Iraq in 2011, with a post-American Iraq easily slipping into Iran’s hands. The power vacuum that emerged after the U.S. retrenchment from Iraq was one of the driving factors behind the rise of Daesh. The timing of the U.S. withdrawal might also provide more space for the Assad regime to gain leverage, which is not an intention of the original U.S. strategy in Syria. It is needless to say that Russia will become a more significant actor in a post-American Syria. Overall, it is expected that an uncontrolled and untimely American withdrawal from Syria may bring extra costs for Turkey in Syria.

The second scenario relates to methodology. A critical assessment of such a striking development is essential for Turkey in assuring long-term military leverage against the PKK threat in the region. In this regard, the methodology that the U.S. pursues in pulling out its ground troops is really a matter of Turkey’s policy towards a post-American Syria. But, nobody thinks that the U.S. will completely remove itself from Syria, even Trump himself. Thus, many questions still remain regarding the direction of American military presence in the country.

If the U.S. maintains its military presence to protect the current structure of the SDF as it is now, for which the PKK-YPG is the primary military component, then Turkey’s ‘military deterrence’ oriented strategy vis-a-vis the PKK presence in Syria will remain. The main strategy for Turkey is only acceptable in the condition of the demobilization of the PKK. The latest attempt of the U.S. to transform the Syrian Democratic Forces into a political party to be named as Syria’s Future Party does not bring any solution to Turkey’s concerns for the future of Syria. Ankara sees the new party as an extension of the U.S. strategy to attribute another label to the PKK. Ankara, in fact, perceives this move as an attempt to cover up the PKK’s terrorist motivations. Turkey believes that a comprehensive strategy should consist of a broad communal consent, in which the PKK-centric political project cannot be sustainable.

The strategic value of the U.S. disengagement from Syria for Turkey is not apparent since Ankara did not expect that the U.S. would change its overall strategy. Ankara still thinks that Trump’s act is not realistic and applicable in the near future. It is also interesting to witness that President Trump’s military withdrawal incentive irrationally contradicts the claims put forth by CENTCOM in favor of furthering American military presence in Syria, especially in Manbij where Ankara and Washington are most likely to confront against each other in the near future.

Recently this week spokesman for the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Col. Ryan Dillon announced that the U.S.-led coalition was creating a 30,000-strong “Border Security Force” in northern Syria.

It was announced that the majority of these 30,000 fighters would be SDF veterans – otherwise known as YPG militants.

In stark comparison, on Thursday 18th January, the Pentagon dismissed the recently announced “Border Security Force” and announced that the U.S.-led coalition is training the PKK/PYD-led SDF as a “stabilization” and “hold force.”

Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon stated: “There was a mis-characterization of the training that we are providing to local security forces in Syria.”

“What we are doing is designed to enable our partner forces to maintain local security, as our statement said, for people who are returning to their homes.”

Pahon claimed that the training is “aimed also at preventing an outflow of fleeing Daesh terrorists as their presence comes to an end and they start trying to scatter.”

Asked whether this new force would be a policing force, Pahon said he would not describe it in that way, but rather call it a “kind of security or stabilization force,” or some sort of “hold force.”

Describing what a “hold force” meant, Pahon stated that it is designed to secure small areas where Daesh has been removed and to prevent the terror group’s resurgence.

Following the statements made earlier this week by Ryan Dillon, Turkey had criticized this decision on all fronts.

In regards to Turkey’s sensitivity over the issue, Pahon said: “We are aware of the security concerns that our NATO ally Turkey has presented. We have been in regular discussions with Turkey particularly since this issue cropped up. Our senior leaders have been talking. I am not going to get into the content of those discussions. Turkey is also a valuable member of the coalition.”