Last week was quite hot in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Asayish (security) forces closed multiple offices of Tavgari Azadi (Freedom Movement). Tavgari Azadi is a political party based in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and is affiliated with the PKK. The party was formed on October 17, 2014, and has been trying hard to carve its roots in regional politics so that the PKK could find a new route to spread its political influence. The party was formed in 2014 by leading members of the then dissolved Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PCDK), which was part of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), or with its more well-known label, the PKK. 

The events occurred rapidly have still not been settled. First, the PUK surrounded the offices of the Tavgari Azadi and gave 24 hours to the party and its affiliated media and civil society organizations to close their offices in Sulaymaniyah. Then, the PUK’s asayish forces initiated an operation to the un-evacuated offices and arrested people resisting the evacuation. The party has already been banned from opening offices in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-ruled Erbil and Dohuk. And now its offices in Sulaymaniyah, including the towns of Kelar, Kove, Ranya, Kıfri, Raperin, and Kaladize are closed. 

If the PKK is to be removed from the region some day, it must be removed with all its organizations under its umbrella. Thus, the closure of Tavgari Azadi, if sustained and moved forward, is a major step for such a removal.

Although the party is not as big as the KDP and the PUK, this event is not one that should be ignored. Tavgari Azadi is crucial for its capacity to mobilize people for pro-PKK protests under the disguise of legal activities. The party tries to legitimize the PKK and spreads the ideas of the terrorist organization’s cult leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who is currently serving his sentence in Turkey. Hence, if the PKK is to be removed from the region some day, it must be removed with all its organizations under its umbrella. This closure, if sustained and moved forward, is a major step for such a removal.

In his take on the closures, the party’s co-chairman Shilan Shakir spoke to the press and stated that they did not accept the closure decisions because they are a legal party registered in Iraq. The party really is registered in Iraq and even ran for the parliamentary elections on May 12, 2018, and won a seat in parliament. While the party is registered in Iraqi politics, it has faced problems in the Kurdistan Region. Shakir, in his statement, indirectly threatened the regional authorities by claiming that the decision to close their offices is harming Kurdish unity, and further, that this will weaken the PUK. While defending the position that his party is not the political wing of the PKK, Shakir did not feel any need to hide that they have relations with the PKK and that they perceive Ocalan’s ideas as a resolution.

If the PUK works with Turkey in the latter’s campaign to terminate the PKK in Iraq, in return, the PUK can unseal its relations with Turkey, which were initially fragmented due to the PKK’s activities in PUK-controlled areas. 

From the Turkish perspective, the step is a necessary one but it is meaningful if it is just the beginning of a consistent and persistent set of measures against the PKK’s existence in the region. The PKK has no single village under its control and has to hide in the caves in Turkey. Nevertheless, the organization controls vast amounts of territory in Iraq. It calls the places under its control Medya Defense Zones just across the Turkish border. Turkey has also started a quiet but persistent campaign last summer in Northern Iraq targeting the PKK controlled areas. Turkey’s campaigns against the PKK over the past decades show that Turkey needs international cooperation to finally terminate the PKK from where it is based. So far, Turkey and Iran seem to agree on this. The PUK’s recent move to close Tavgari Azadi offices in Sulaymaniyah can, for the first time, make the PUK a partner in Turkey’s counterterrorism campaign.

The Kurdish region of Iraq held elections on 30 September – a year after a troublesome period. The elections were planned to take place almost a year earlier on 30 November, 2017, but the troubles the region found itself in caused delays. The region had already been in turmoil, but what put it in the midst of fierce developments was the independence referendum held on 25 September, 2017.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-led regional government found itself weakened and isolated in the process as Baghdad, Tehran, and Ankara took a common position against the referendum. While Turkey’s position was quite expectable as it is against any kind of de facto secession in the region, Iran used its close ties with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and created a split in the pro-independence regional position of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Eventually, not only did they fail to put the referendum in action, but the KRG also had to leave the disputed territories to the control of Iraq’s central government. Amongst them, the most important and disputed one was Kirkuk, whose governor Najmaddin Kareem (from the PUK) had to flee the city.

After all this mess, the parliamentary elections were finally held on 30 September, but this time the vote count took too long – due to the allegations of fraud by multiple sides. Weeks after the elections, the election commission finally published the results. The KDP received 688 thousand votes and secured 45 seats in the 111-seated parliament. 11 of those seats were reserved for minorities. This is quite a strong presence in the parliament, especially given that the PUK, the second major party in parliament, only received 21.

The third biggest party, Gorran, only secured 12 seats. In other words, the seats of the second and third parties combined still fall short of the KDP seats. Hence, the KDP increased its seats in parliament from 38 to 45 between 2013 and 2018, while the PUK increase stayed marginal, and Gorran faced the hardest blow by losing more than half of its seats.

The September 25 independence referendum escalated the mistrust between the KDP and PUK as both sides blamed each other for betraying the interests of the Kurdistan region. The two established parties of the region also competed in the presidential elections in Iraq earlier this month. PUK’s candidate, Barham Salih, won the election – allegedly with Iran’s use of its influence in Iraqi politics – against his KDP rival, Fuad Hussein, with 219 votes to a mere 22.

The developments illustrate that the KDP and PUK will continue to dominate Iraqi politics. You can essentially read this as the Barzani and Talebani houses continuing their reign on this shaky settlement, a settlement found based on a delicate division of power in the region.

The PUK secured the presidency, with the outside support (of Iran), and the KDP increased its dominance in the regional parliament. This balance of power can still preserve the status quo in the region if Turkey does not change it in favor of the KDP or Iran in favor of the PUK, which is not likely at the moment.

The KDP tried hard to change the status quo with its referendum initiative and nomination of a presidential candidate, but both failed. In response, the PUK is now trying to maintain its position as the second and only other major party in the region, which it achieved with Iran’s support. What is missing in this picture is Turkey’s cross-border strategy of containing and then eliminating the PKK, which at the moment, is not changing the parameters of the KDP-PUK game.

The long delayed Iraqi Kurdistan Parliamentary elections were finally held on Sunday, September 30th. According to the preliminary results, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) seems to increase its seats in the 111 seated (11 reserved for minorities) parliament from 38 to 45 compared to the 2013 elections. While the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) also gained three more seats compared to the previous election, the New Generation Movement won seats in the regional parliament for the first time as it secured 8 spots. Interestingly, the total increase in the PUK and New Generation’s seats are equal to the number that the Gorran Movement lost.

The elections have not changed two simple facts regarding the political realities of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. According to the results, as usual, the KDP is the winner – this time with a greater margin. The party received over half a million votes and 43.6% of the votes in the entire region. Hence, the KDP votes more than doubled its closest follower, the PUK votes. Nevertheless, there is a caveat to these results. The KDP finished the race in first place but with fewer votes than it received in 2013. This is because the turnout was as low as 57.3%

Not only did the KDP come first once again, but the bipolar structure of the region has been protected once more as the KDP and PUK continue to dominate regional politics. This has further deepened after Gorran weakened due to the death of its founding leader Nawshirwan Mustafa in May 2017. It seems that the lastnames Barzani and Talebani will remain the strongest institutions in the region. Even the controversial independence referendum that took place last year in September, which resulted in a loss of territories, has not changed the bipolar structure in the region.

In sum, the KDP came out of the ballot box quite strong and seemed likely to win the Iraqi presidential elections, a position that was reserved for the PUK candidate for the past 13 years. For that reason, the KDP competed with the PUK for this spot for thinking that it no longer needed to leave this office to the PUK. And this is the part where Iran steps in. The PUK’s candidate Barham Salih was elected as the new president of Iraq on Tuesday, 2 October, in an easy win over the KDP’s candidate Fuad Hussein (219 votes vs only 22).

Many think this result became possible only after Iran cut a deal with the PUK. The terms of this deal, if there is one, is not known to political analysts yet. But if there is a deal, it will not surprise any analyst with some sort of interest on Iraqi politics. Iran seems to be committed to keep the Iraqi Kurdistan region in its current bipolar structure, and, further, it has no intention to give up its influence on Soleimani, the PUK’s traditional stronghold.

What about Turkey then? Where is Turkey in this equation? The simple answer is, Turkey is not in it. Turkey seems to avoid being directly involved in Kurdistan regional politics, let aside the politics of Baghdad. Ankara shows no enthusiasm to call the game whether it is regional parliamentary elections, national parliamentary elections, or presidential elections in Iraq. It seems that the government is pretty much focused on one single issue in Iraq: the PKK.

Turkey shows willingness to cooperate with any actor in Iraq, whether domestic players or influential outsiders, such as Iran. What drives Turkey’s attention in Iraq the most is not who will be elected the next president, as this is more or less a symbolic spot anyway. However, it is whether Turkey will be able to continue its counterterrorism campaign effectively within the borders of Iraq, where PKK camps are located. Once again, Turkey is playing its cards open and is not after any twisted plot to call the game of politics in Baghdad or Erbil.

As a result of the Peshmerga failing to resist operations initiated by the Iraqi Army on October 16, most parts of Kirkuk are now controlled by the Baghdad administration.

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Peshmergas’ withdrawal with the premise of “not being as powerful as the Iraqi Army” allowed the army to march into Kirkuk with ease. While the Peshmerga Command in Erbil accuses PUK Peshmergas, it could be asserted that these events are the reflection of a political will. While certain PUK factions aligned themselves with Erbil, the Talabani family distanced themselves from the Erbil administration after the division within the party following Jalal Talabani’s sickness. It was known that the PUK was improving relations with Baghdad and Iran while criticizing the Erbil administration for monopolizing the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) revenues, administration and justice system. As the Masoud Barzani administration intended to expand its authority to Sulaymaniyah following the referendum results, the PUK, led by the Talabani family, wanted to benefit from the crisis between Baghdad and Erbil. Withdrawal of Peshmerga units from Kirkuk without resistance could be assessed as a reflection of the political power struggle within KRG. Despite statements made by some Peshmerga forces and the PKK elements in line of defense, the Iraqi Army has captured most of Kirkuk. Baghdad replaced Najmiddin Karim, who played a prominent role in escalating tensions in Kirkuk, with Rakan Saeed Ali Juburi, who is of Arabic descent. The Kirkuk Police Department announced that they are on duty, while underlining their allegiance to Baghdad. Arabs and Turkmens, who were discomforted by the KRG, welcomed the Iraqi Army’s initiative. Baghdad regained control in Kirkuk.

It should be underlined that even though Kirkuk was a “disputed territory” according to the Iraqi constitution, Erbil seized the control of the city by abusing the conjectural opportunities after 2003.

In other words, the KRG administration’s presence in Kirkuk is what is “disputed.” Despite this fact, Barzani’s emphasis on Kirkuk being a “Kurdish city” and the realization of the referendum in the city, with the support of former Governor Najmiddin Karim, clearly indicated that the KRG wanted to establish an “independent Kurdish state,” which included disputed territories, such as Kirkuk. In fact, Iraqi Kurds have shown time and time again that they were seeking for a dominance surpassing their own influence and they have clearly indicated their geographical dominance aims with the 2006 constitution prepared for the KRG.

For this reason, current events transpiring in Kirkuk and north of Nineveh region are the culmination of the power struggle between Baghdad and Erbil for the “disputed territories.”

According to the KRG and the Iraqi administrative provisions, there are 13 cities and 3 towns which are deemed as disputed territories. Some of these territories are mentioned in the 2006 Constitution prepared by the KRG. Thus, the KRG perceives certain cities and towns that are outside of its jurisdiction and under Baghdad’s control as its own. According to the 8^th Article of the 2006 constitution, the following cities and towns are asserted to be within the KRG’s jurisdiction: Dohuk region; Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah regions; Akre, al-Shikhan, Sinjar, Tal Afar, Tall Kayf, Karkush, Zummar and the vicinity in Nineveh region; towns of Bashiqa and Aski Kalak; towns of Khanakin and Mandali in Diyala region; towns of Ba’adra and Jesan in Wasit region.

Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah are regions with a Kurdish majority. Evaluating the disputed regions in the south of Dohuk, it could be seen that the town of Zummar in Tal Afar is under KRG control. Gaining control of Zummar after Daesh’s withdrawal, the KRG administration revealed its intention to govern Tal Afar in 2006. However, as the city mostly consists of Turkmens, the KRG was unable to do so. Moreover, the line between Dohuk and Mosul up until Tall Kayf is also under the control of Peshmerga. The destruction caused by the fight with Daesh on the line between Tall Kayf to Zummar, going around the Mosul Lake is clear, as there are ghost towns and towns lying in ruins. The KRG was also unable to gain control of Sinjar, which lies on the west of Tal Afar, towards the Syrian border. The population of Sinjar is 40% Arab, 40% Yazidi and 20% Kurdish. While the PKK, Peshmerga, and Hashd al-Shaabi control certain zones of the city, in parallel with the Iraqi Army’s operation in Kirkuk, it has been stated that Hashd al-Shaabi has gained control of Sinjar.

40 kilometers northeast of Mosul, most of the population of al-Shikhan is constituted by Yazidis and was under the control of the Peshmerga while this article was being written. Kirkuk, on the other hand, could be deemed as the most glaring disputed territory among them all, which is also the most discussed city by the Turkish public. The KRG had enjoyed an increased control over Kirkuk especially after Daesh’s withdrawal. However, Turkmen and Arab populations in the city were discomforted by the KRG administration embodied by the former governor Najmiddin Karim. For this reason, Kurds and Turkmens in the city preferred to boycott the September 25 referendum. Having the most oil and natural gas reserves among the regions desired by the KRG, Kirkuk became the very apparent fault line of the crisis between Baghdad and Erbil on October 16.

By deploying military (Peshmerga) and police (Asayish) forces to the territories it controls, the KRG has chosen to consolidate its power.

While northern regions of Mosul were captured by KDP Peshmergas, certain parts of Kirkuk, Saladin and Diyala regions were captured by PUK Peshmergas. While the KRG was initially aligned with the Iraq central government in terms of security, it has increased its autonomy throughout the process. The emergence of Daesh in Sunni-majority regions, which include certain disputed territories, enabled a new process. When Iraqi security forces withdrew from the region, including Kirkuk, in June 2014, the KRG was able to seize control of various disputed territories.

Uncertainties about the disputed territories in the constitution resulted in a fight for geographical dominance since 2005, in which power was the main determinant, rendering the disputed territories increasingly disputed.

While KRG leader Barzani desired to resolve the disputed territories issue in his favor with the September 25 referendum, now he has started to lose previous gains. Entering a new era beginning with the Iraqi Army’s operation in Kirkuk, the crisis between Baghdad and Erbil indicates that further operations to other disputed territories will take place – as was suggested by the mobility in Sinjar. Being successful against Daesh, capturing Kirkuk within a day and being supported by regional and international actors, the Iraqi central government could be expected to launch new operations in the short and mid-term in order to gain control over the disputed territories. Considering that the division between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and PUK also caused a division in the military force, the KRG will have a hard time in responding to Baghdad. Meanwhile, the schism between the KDP and PUK, which became apparent over Kirkuk might result in changes that could upset the political, administrative, social and economic balances of the KRG. Lead by the Talabani family, the PUK administration will seek to re-balance the KRG administration which is dominated by Erbil.

As the referendum day is coming closer, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) shows no sign of stepping back despite disputes within the region and a number of calls from the central government of Iraq as well as the major regional and global actors. From the perspective of the KRG, a delay is still possible if the West, particularly the US, guarantees recognition after a delayed referendum, but this still has not happened as the referendum day is approaching fast. As for the objections from the global powers, the United States, through the Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, has recently repeated its stance on the issue by calling the KRG President Masoud Barzani to postpone the planned referendum on September 25th.

Likewise, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov has also emphasized Russia’s stance on the issue by expressing Moscow’s support for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. While the two global powers are disunited on the politics of the Middle East, their concerns seem to be similar in respect to the planned referendum. Both sides show their worries for the possible negative repercussions of the planned referendum regarding the stability of Iraq and the ongoing war against DAESH.

In response to the arguments made concerning unity and the fight against DAESH, Regional President Barzani has retained a constant stance arguing that DAESH is a product of a unified Iraq and that the current state of the Middle East is far from unity and stability anyway. The picture for the position of the global powers does not change when we add Germany and China to the equation as well. They all seem to acknowledge the Iraqi Kurds’ right for self-determination but express their concern with the timing (aka “it is too soon”) and style (aka “talk to Baghdad one more time”) of it. While Germany seems to have had this opinion for quite a while, China seems to have shifted away from a fixed anti-separatism position to a more neutral one with the help of its developing economic ties with the KRG.

As we downsize the scale from global to regional actors, Israel and Iran seem to be the opposite poles of this issue. While Israel supports the KDP’s quest for independence, the toughest objection comes from Iran. Israel seems to view the KRG’s independence call as an opportunity, as it is eager to develop cooperation with an independent Kurdistan, particularly in order to end its own isolation in the region and further to contain Iran and limit its access to Syria. Furthermore, an independent Kurdistan would be a good distraction for Arab states by turning many hostile faces away from Israel.

As for Iran, the primary motivation seems to be its fear of being contained and losing its upper hand in Iraq and Syria. Iran has also reasons to worry from a diffusion effect of the independence seeking Kurdish nationalism, on top of the long legacy of violent separatism in the country, as it is currently facing serious protests in its heavily Kurdish populated cities.

What about Turkey? What is the driving force for Turkish politicians’ calls for caution and wariness to the KRG President Masoud Barzani? For one, Turkey, as expected, also feels threatened by a possible diffusion effect from the independence aspirations of Iraqi Kurds. While this is true, what drives the paramount Turkish approach is not a possible or even probable future scenario regarding popular aspirations, expectations or perceptions. Turkey’s understandable concern is real, tangible and current: the presence of the PKK camps and headquarters in Northern Iraq. The question I believe best summarizes Turkey’s primary concern is “what if the PKK hijacks the planned Kurdish state?” Turkey’s concern is far from a paranoia given the fact that the PKK currently de facto rules certain areas in Northern Iraq, has certain ties with the local actors such as the PUK and Gorran and even with the US through its Syrian branch, PYD. So therefore, Turkey’s concern is not a minor one, nor unsound. While this concern is significant, Turkey’s closest associate in its fight against the PKK at present and in the foreseeable future, is another Kurdish organization, the KDP.

Turkey has long suffered from PKK terrorism and has lost thousands of security personnel, hundreds of teachers and civil servants, politicians and random civilians at the hands of the PKK over the 33 years long history of the conflict. Turkey at times benefited from its Western partners in its struggle with PKK terrorism as in the case of Öcalan’s capture in Kenya in 1999. However, not only are Turkey’s longtime allies now officially providing weapons to the PKK’s Syrian branch, PYD, the PKK’s enlisted members can freely travel in Europe and the PKK are freely publishing death orders in its newspapers printed in Europe.

While Turkey is being left alone by its Western partners, Masoud Barzani’s KDP seems to be the closest ally for Turkey’s fight against the PKK. On top of the violent past of the KDP and PKK in Iraq, the PKK has also accused the KDP for providing ground intelligence to Turkey for its recent military operations and blockage of the passage used by PKK members between Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, the KDP has also condemned the PKK attacks on the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS, the KDP affiliate organization in Syria) offices in Syria amidst the rivalry in Sinjar, Iraq.

Given that the PKK is a destabilizing actor not only in Turkey but also in the KRG-ruled areas, the Turkish government and the KRG have mutual interests in the fight against the PKK. Moreover, Turkey and the KRG’s trade deals are now well-known and ever growing as Turkey is the top investor and trading partner in the region, a situation that has been preserved despite the PKK’s efforts to spoil it. This is why the Turkish official reaction to the planned referendum is not as loud as Iran’s.

It appears clear that any actor wanting to cooperate with Turkey in the region needs to show its commitment to Turkey’s fight with PKK terrorism. Turkey has no means to tolerate neighbors who host, or “partners” who arm its number one security threat, the PKK. Hence, in reference to the referendum, Turkey’s choice seems to be of a conditional one – neither categorically fixed in favor or against the emergence of a Kurdish state. For Turkish interests, what matters most is not the name of the country across its southern borders, but its position vis-a-vis the PKK. Turkey seems to follow one single, straightforward goal: the termination of the PKK headquarters and camps in Iraq (and anywhere else across the region), for once and for all. Thus, Turkey’s choice is the option that enables this end.

The densely Kurdish populated areas of Iraq obtained political recognition and autonomy from the central government of Iraq with the 2005 Iraqi constitution. This is how the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), originally established in 1992, and Kurdistan Region Presidency, formed in 2005, came to this day. Since then, Masoud Barzani, the president of the KRG, along with many other local political actors, has occasionally stressed the need for the region’s independence. Hence, independence calls are not new for the KRG. They have been made before, but never this loud, never this close. On June 7 Masoud Barzani, after a meeting with the major political parties of the region –with the exception of Gorran (Change Movement) – set the date for the referendum as September 25.

The referendum is planned to be held not only in KRG provinces such as Erbil (Hawler), Duhok, Suleimani, and Halabja but also in areas still claimed by the central government such as the oil-rich province of Kirkuk. The planned referendum will be a cornerstone not only for the KRG but also for the broader region. Nevertheless, there are pressing concerns and conflicts of interests on the referendum, its aftermath and political consequences at the local (KRG), national, and international levels. Here, concerns of the local actors in the KRG-ruled areas are of vital importance.

The upcoming independence referendum seems far from uniting the local actors in the KRG controlled areas. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has come first in all the parliamentary elections up to now and is the party of both the regional president Masoud Barzani (since 2005) and the regional prime minister Nechirvan Barzani (since 2012 and previously from 2006 to 2009). While the party is the leading Kurdish political actor of Iraq, it is not uncontested. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran, disappointed with the KDP’s governance in the KRG and Masoud Barzani’s ruling beyond his legally constrained presidential term, made an agreement in May 2016 to join forces for a number of causes, but most importantly for the reactivation of the regional parliament and counterbalancing the KDP. The two parties have more or less stuck to this deal so far despite occasional dissent from within the parties.

The PUK and Gorran, combined, make up 42 seats in the deactivated regional parliament, outnumbering the 38 seats held by the KDP. While the PUK and Gorran seem to embrace the idea of Kurdish independence from Iraq, the two also declared that “complete preparations” for a referendum on independence should be made after the normalization of the parliament, which has not sat since October 2015. Although the PUK and Gorran are concerned about the KDP’s hijacking of an independent Kurdistan, they are also not without problems given that Gorran split from the PUK as a result of internal rifts and has long charged both the KDP and PUK with corruption, on top of its tough rivalry with the PUK, particularly in Suleimani, which both see as their stronghold.

The PUK and Gorran’s deal to act as a bloc is not without problems. Moreover, both of the parties are going through a succession crisis to replace former Iraq president and PUK leader Jalal Talebani, who is in the midst of severe health problems, and the recent death of Gorran leader Nawshirwan Mustafa. Suffering from the absence of such charismatic and experienced leaders, the two parties seem to be far behind Masoud Barzani’s influence over the people of Iraq Kurdistan, the official name of the region according to the 2005 constitution. That’s also the primary reason why the tougher of the two, Gorran prefers a parliamentary system over the KDP’s presidential system proposal. And that is just part of a long list of disputes between the major political parties in the region.

While the three major parties in the Kurdistan Region have serious trust issues and problems on the table, the politics of the region is further troubled with the longstanding existence of the PKK in the region. The PKK has long struggled against the KDP’s authority across the Turkish border and could maintain its own areas up to this day. Yet now it is on the move again to expand at the cost of the KRG’s, particularly, the KDP’s interests.

Since breaking an over two-year long ceasefire with Turkey in July 2015, the PKK has also become more aggressive in Northern Iraq. The PKK could exploit DAESH’s presence to the best of its interests both in Syria and Iraq and now will likely destabilize the region further as the deadly clashes between the PKK affiliated forces and KRG Peshmerga in Sinjar in March 2017 showed. While the KDP and Turkey have had ups and downs in the course of their relationship since the Gulf War of 1991, the KDP, compared to other local actors, has remained the closest entity to an ally for Turkey. Once again Turkey and the KRG under the rule of the KDP are in a win-win game, deepening their commercial ties to an unprecedented degree while cooperating against the PKK. The two governments on the two sides of the border have allied against the PKK’s terror activities against Turkey and ambitions of expansion in the Iraq side of the border.

With its terror camps in Northern Iraq scattered from Metina to Qandil and its relentless use of violence against any adversary, the PKK is a real threat for the KRG’s move towards independence and what comes after. Any definition of statehood makes reference to Max Weber’s classical definition with its emphasis on the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and the PKK has repeatedly shown that it has no intention to stop challenging the KRG or any other government’s claim on this.

Given the parameters, President Barzani’s call for independence will not be a smooth path. The upcoming referendum on September 25 is likely to exacerbate the existing tensions amongst the Kurdish actors settled in Northern Iraq. Of course, no local actor could directly object to Masoud Barzani’s referendum call, which would threaten the mass support they have. Nevertheless, all the relevant actors in the region, with the natural exception of the KDP, question the timing and aftermath of the expected referendum and express their concern that the referendum is not genuine but a political card being used by the KDP to extend and expand its rule of the KRG.

On the other hand, Masoud Barzani seems to be aware of the risks and opportunities that the post-DAESH Iraq will pose and he is eager not to leave the ground to the endless claims of the PKK while the PUK and Gorran are also trying to counterbalance his de facto supremacy. The referendum and possible independence process gets even more complicated when the non-Kurdish actors –both within and out of Iraq- are taken into account but Masoud Barzani is not naive enough to start a game that he has no chance of winning. Either way, the referendum is a fair game that Barzani dares to play.