The Incubus of the Past or the Burden of History

Such an attitude not only displays an academic frivolity not uncommonly found among some Iranian experts who know little about Turkey but also testifies an uncanny tendency among them, as among some of their Turkish counterparts, to exceed the limits of a scholarly comparison between Turkey and Iran. True, Iran and Turkey have, roughly from the early 19th century onwards, followed fascinatingly similar historical trajectories. But the underlying spirit in these trajectories has been noticeably different. Throughout their modernization processes from 19th century onwards although they converged in their struggle against the ever-increasing imperial pressures coming from the West, the struggle consolidated the extra-governmental elements in Iran while it was mainly organized around the state machine in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

Further, despite the major ups and downs, throughout the decades, popular elections played the determining role in Turkey, while Iran almost invariably appeased repression at home to remove foreign domination. It is quite problematic that, while some pro-regime figures in Iran tend to interpret every popular movement in the Middle East as inspired by the uprisings that brought about the Iranian Revolution of 1979, some of the anti-regime Iranians hasten to analyze almost every such movement, especially if it harbors an Islamic tone, as a prelude to an Islamic state.

Interestingly enough, however, these two opposite positions seem to agree on an unfavorable reading of the failed coup attempt in Turkey. Basically, the now well-known obsession against President Erdoğan and his policies constitute a common ground between the two opposite camps. It is no secret that the conservative circles inside Iran have long since turned against Erdoğan. They see him and the current regional policies of the Turkish government as an obstacle to taking full advantage of the ‘historical opportunity’ that has emerged for them from the widespread destabilization in the Middle East to realize their regional power aspirations. Many conservative figures in Iran condemned, inasmuch they did, the crushed coup attempt not on democratic grounds but for notably different motivations. The anti-regime Iranians, on the other hand, have mysteriously accused President Erdoğan of leaning towards authoritarianism and even totalitarianism, the two terms whimsically and irresponsibly used by Erdoğan’s opponents.

Diverse Political Readings

Also, reactions to the failed coup inside Iran have not only reflected the perceptions of Turkey by Iran’s political elite but have also reemphasized the political divides at home. Javad Zarif, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was among the first to condemn the coup attempt. Hours after the attempt, he emphasized the significance of popular will and sided with the Turkish people. For the Moderate-Reformist figures, the failed coup attempt attested to the significance of the unalienable popular will and the futility of any move to run against it. Unsurprisingly, with the presidential elections less than a year away in Iran and the risk of Rouhani’s disqualification from running for president by the Guardian Council becoming more pronounced, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his close circle have used the failed coup attempt to send a democratic message to the conservative establishment in Iran to respect the popular will.

For the Principalists, the failed coup has provided the best opportunity to disfavor the Rouhani government on one obvious point, to wit, its rapprochement with the US, especially following the nuclear deal reached in 2015. In a statement at a gathering in Tehran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei referred to the failed coup attempt in Turkey as a sign of the untrustworthiness of the US for its alleged involvement. Another conditional condemnation of the failed coup attempt came from Ali Akbar Valayeti, Khamenei’s aide in international affairs, who used it to criticize Turkey for its insistence on the removal of Asad in Syria. In an interview on 16 July 2016, only one day after the coup attempt, he expressed his hope that “a day would come when the Turkish administration would also respect the opinion and vote of the Syrian people” and claimed “Bashar al-Assad has also been elected through the ballot box.”

The crushing of the coup attempt marks a watershed, not only in Turkey but also in the entire region. As Javad Zarif put it, “Turkish people’s brave defense of democracy and their elected government proves that coups have no place in our region and are doomed to failure.” In order to secure a lasting solution to the regional crises, most significantly to the Syrian issue, both Turkey and Iran must cooperate as two governments with high popular support, as destabilization or unpopular rule in one inevitably affects the other. Based on the recent foreign policy moves, there is every reason to suggest that Turkey is determined to restore peace in the Middle East by maximizing regional cooperation.

The comments made by some Iranian scholars teaching at western universities not only demonstrate their misreading of the developments which recently took place in Turkey but also give insightful ideas about the limits of their objective thinking. Fortunately, many Iranians inside the country see any coup attempt as categorically damnable, as they welcome the popular resistance in Turkey that heroically crushed the putschists on July 15. They, as every people in the Middle East, appreciate the costs of ineffectual, unpopular and foreign-controlled governments for the region.

In many ways, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the drivers of the new cold war in the region.

In many ways, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the drivers of the new cold war in the region. They have confronted each other in Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, Yemen, and now in Syria where they have been engaged in proxy battles for many years. To reduce Iran’s influence, the Saudis are trying to bring Syria back to the Arab world, while the Iranians don’t want to retreat and continue to support Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. In Yemen, Iran has been involved in supporting Houthi rebels, destabilizing Saudi’s southern border. Though Iran’s influence is less obvious, uprisings in Bahrain follow the same pattern.

Tensions between Tehran and Riyadh flared when, in September’s 2015 annual haj pilgrimage, hundreds of Iranians died in a stampede. The tension turned to an intense crisis and confrontation when in January 2016 the Saudis executed a Shia cleric and political activist Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, which was seen by many observers as a sign that the Saudis are going to reject any conciliatory policy towards Iran.

Iranian hardliners responded by attacking the kingdom’s embassy in Tehran, leading the Saudis to cut all diplomatic ties. Since then talks between the two countries have been complicated to the extent that both countries have failed to reach an agreement on arrangements for the Iranian pilgrims to attend this year’s Haj in Mecca.

The Saudis have done their best to further deepen Iran’s political isolation. Since the easing of sanctions on Iran early this year as a result of the nuclear agreement (JCPOA), a key concern of the kingdom has been that Iran will use money from lifting sanctions to step up engagement in regional conflicts and funding terror groups. Known as “Plan B” to try to stop Iran’s economic rise in the region, Saudis are doing their bit to make sure the foreign investment will not arrive in Tehran. For instance, they banned Iran’s Mahan Airline from flying through Saudi airspace and shipping insurers have been advising clients that ships carrying Iranian crude will not be permitted to enter Saudi or Bahraini waters.

Most recently, conflict between the two countries entered a new stage of cyber war. The hacking of the website of the Statistical Center of Iran, rending it temporarily out of service, was attributed to Saudis. In a reciprocal action, two Saudi statistical websites were hacked, reportedly by an Iranian cyber army, just one day after Iran’s statistics center incident.

The leadership of both countries should know that they may never get to trust one another but they certainly can do business with each other.

In each country, elements of domestic politics work against the possibility of improving relations. In Tehran, it is the power of Sepāh e Pāsdārān, a parastatal organization with huge influence in Iran’s domestic political arena, also having organizational interests in pursuing aggressive policies in the region. In the Saudi Kingdom, the potential challenge comes from conservative elements hostile to Shia Iran. Hence, Riyadh’s decision to cut off diplomatic ties with Tehran shored up support for Saudi authorities from these Sunni conservatives. As one analyst noted, the perception by many in the Saudi Kingdom is that Iran is a bully, and that only a firm response can get it to back off.

What happens next is unclear, but the situation is extremely dangerous. The leadership of both countries should know that they may never get to trust one another but they certainly can do business with each other. They should also realize that this conflict has the potential to drag foreign military interventions into the region. Adding to these is the economic costs of the conflict. As was the case during the cold war, it will substantially increase the defense budgets of both countries, a factor that takes their national budget away from social welfare programs.

The administration of President Rouhani is seemingly pursuing a policy of constructive engagement with the world, including Saudi Arabia. Rouhani himself has always favored a rapprochement with Riyadh. The Saudi leaders might try to view him positively.

It is unclear where Khamenei and his office stand in a confrontation between Rouhani and hardliners on the issue of Iran’s Saudi policy, but the history of decision making in Iran shows that the Supreme Leader eventually sides with those who make rational policies.

Iran should leave the region militarily. In order to establish greater stability in war-torn Middle East, the Iranian leadership should understand that it would be beneficial to pursue pragmatic policies and concentrate on lessening political tensions -factors that would enable them to gain more than they would lose. In addition, Saudis should understand that they cannot exclude Iran from the region. In effect all both parties need to do is to change their paradigm and perception rather than playing the “blaming game”.

Turkey can attempt to create a system for cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia to facilitate dialogue over collective regional security interests.

Turkey can play a significant role in this context. A reasonable and appropriate construct is that Turkey can attempt to create a system for cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia to facilitate dialogue over collective regional security interests. Although it is at odds over a number of issues, Turkey is an influential regional player and a trusty country for both parties due to its balanced relations with Tehran and Riyadh.  Therefore Turkey, because of the common interests with these two, can play a significant role in rapprochement between the rivals. Given its friendly ties with Iran and the Saudi Kingdom, Turkey can be a reliable mediator to reconcile these age old enemies.

Aware of the tense Saudi-Iran rivalry, Turkey has already been trying to maintain good relations with both countries. Within the new Turkish government’s framework, aimed at increasing the number of Turkey’s friends emphasized by the Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, Turkey is keen on following a balanced policy between the Gulf States and Tehran. Ankara has been developing a dual-track approach to the Middle East by simultaneously courting these two bitter rivals. A clear indication of Turkey’s willingness to do so is what former Turkish ambassador to Tehran, Ümit Yardım, said in an interview with Tasnim News Agency, “Turkey and Iran are two major players not only in the Middle East but also beyond this region that can put an end to the current situation.”

With Turkey’s involvement, it is not a remote prospect that Iran and Saudi Arabia will be inclined to cooperate to stabilize the Middle East. No doubt, it is a delicate balancing act that needs a lot of work to maintain given the current regional tensions, but it is doable.

During the Iran-Iraq war, as Sunni Arab states and Western powers united behind the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Turkey maintained a neutral position.

However, disregarding such differences, during the Iran-Iraq war, as Sunni Arab states and Western powers united behind the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Turkey maintained a neutral position and Ankara viewed the Saddam Regime as a more ominous threat. Consequently, Iran did not pursue a confrontational policy toward Turkey, which enabled both countries to preserve the status quo between one another. Relations between the two countries began to improve following the Gulf War as they pursued cooperative measures to address issues that threatened the territorial integrity of both states, particularly the ‘Kurdish question’.

Following the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Turkey in November 2002, Ankara-Tehran bilateral relations blossomed. Although the leading figures in the AK Party called their political vision ‘conservative democracy’, the Iranians perceived the new government as being formed of those with an Islamic agenda and welcomed this government in their immediate neighboring country, which stressed the importance of improving relations with regional countries in almost all aspects.

During the past decade, a number of factors have motivated the two states to enhance their bilateral economic relations: Tehran’s desire for a reliable trading partner; Iran’s struggle under the crippling economic sanctions imposed by Western countries; and Ankara’s demand for Iran’s energy resources. Within the period of 2000 to 2011, reportedly, bilateral trade between the two partners increased from $1 billion to $16 billion, and the number of Turkey-based Iranian companies increased from 300 to more than 2,000 firms. Within Turkey’s framework of ‘zero problems’, ongoing relations between both countries have been based on ‘mutual pragmatism’, rather than competition, due to the mutual understanding that both parties will benefit more and preserve their interests by doing so.

Following the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Turkey in November 2002, Ankara-Tehran bilateral relations blossomed.

Against the background of such friendly exchanges between the two neighbors, however, relations have been strained due to the fact that both countries have been at odds on a number of issues in the Middle East, namely Iran’s support for the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s only ally in the Middle East, who could seriously endanger Turkey’s influence in the region. Iraq has also been a field of growing competition between Turkey and Iran, as Iran has been trying to fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.

Additionally, the Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflict fuelled by Iran has drawn both countries into the conflict in Iraq on opposing sides. Turkish leaders always warned of such a threat and sought to reduce sectarian tensions; in view of this, Turkey’s diplomatic missions to Iraq have always included visits not only to the Sunni but also to the Shiite leading figures of the country. In contrast, Shiite Iran, which competes (with Saudi Arabia) for the leadership of Islam, has used the sectarian divide to further its ambitions.

Other sources of tension between Iran and Turkey have been the Kurdish and the Palestinian issues. Iran’s attempt to support Palestine (and oppose Israel) has been used as a way to enhance its popularity in the Arab world, while Turkey’s assertive support for Palestinians has been an important factor contributing to the deterioration of Iran’s popularity in the Arab world. This particular policy of Turkey has been translated by Tehran as a threat to Iran’s role as the main state sponsor of anti-Israel movements.

 Turkish leaders always warned of and sought to reduce sectarian tensions; in view of this, Turkey’s diplomatic missions to Iraq have always included visits not only to the Sunni but also to the Shia leading figures of the country.

Turkey and Iran have clashed over other issues as well. Turkey views itself as a regional leading power. Many Arab countries also regard Turkey, with its relatively democratic political system and high economic growth rate, as a model for their own political development.

Although these are major divergences and challenges, Ankara and Iran have more shared objectives, which could push them closer rather than break them apart. Both countries have many common interests that could enable them to overcome their differences. After the comprehensive nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), between Iran and world powers was reached, Turkey could once more play a major role as a gateway between Iran and the West. This is particularly important as Western countries try to find ways to reach Iran and tap into its $500 billion economy.

Furthermore, Iran is still an important partner for Turkey in other areas. For example, tourism has intensified as a trade activity between both countries in recent years, which could bring vitality to commercial activities in Turkey if given the chance to increase. According to reports from Turkey’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1.7 million Iranians visited Turkey in 2015, ranking Iran as the sixth leading source of visitors to Turkey from among 90 countries.

The foreign policy agenda of the Rouhani administration known as ‘prudence and moderation’ aims at ending Iran’s isolation on the global stage. Since Turkey is a NATO member, Iran needs Turkey’s cooperation to send constructive signals when approaching the West. From the perspective of geopolitics and the regional balance of power, Iranian leaders should view their Turkish counterparts as key regional geopolitical, strategic and economic partners due to the fact that the Arab Gulf countries have been Iran’s competitors and rivals rather that its natural allies.

Even after the JCPOA was reached, Turkey was among the nations that welcomed the deal and lifted sanctions on Iran regardless of the fact that some of its allies had opposed the plan.

Due to all of these landscapes as well as common interests and objectives, the leaderships of both Iran and Turkey must come to realize that they need each other’s cooperation now more than at any other time in the past. Iranian policy makers should understand that Turkey can play an important role in building bridges between the West and Tehran. It has been proven to Iran that Turkey is a reliable and trusted partner. Turkey faithfully sided with Iran, supporting its neighbor at a most vulnerable time, when tensions reached their height over Iran’s controversial nuclear program.

President Erdoğan repeatedly vouched for Iran’s compliance and peaceful intentions with its nuclear program at a time when there was growing alarm regarding the threat of Iran developing a nuclear arsenal. This was a significant psychological boost for the Iranians as the key question was Iran’s lack of compliance with IAEA safeguards. Even after the JCPOA was reached, Turkey was among the nations that welcomed the deal and lifted sanctions on Iran regardless of the fact that some of its allies had opposed the plan.

Strengthening the economic partnership between the two countries may reduce the sense of vulnerability each has toward the other. Both partners should increase the level of bilateral direct investment as an option to soften the impact of possible tensions emanating from political differences in the future. The leaderships of the two countries are well aware that having a strong economy and forming mutual dependencies through establishing economic partnerships with neighbors are prerequisites of achieving the status of a strong regional power. In this context, it would be beneficial for both nations to pursue pragmatic bilateral trade policies and concentrate on lessening political tensions, factors that would enable them to gain more than they would lose.

Considering the advanced age, 76 years, and the poor health of Khamenei, there is a possibility that the newly elected Assembly will be charged with electing Iran’s third Supreme Leader.

With a slightly over 60 percent voter turnout, 68 of the 290 seats in parliament had remained empty on February 26 when no clear winner emerged; according to the Iranian laws, a candidate must win at least 25 percent of votes cast in an electoral district to qualify as a deputy. These 69 deputies have been elected in the runoff election held on April 29, 2016. A number of distinctively Iranian features – some essential, others conjectural- make a comprehensive appraisal of the election results challenging. For instance, no political parties as such exist in Iran and the seats of the deputies are determined by drawing lots every six months. Besides, only about half of those who registered to run for parliament, 6,229 out of 12,000, were approved by the Council of Guardians. So, many notable reformists were disqualified by the Council and Iran experienced yet another conservatively well-engineered pre-election process. Further, the right–left political spectrum as it exists in Iran hardly makes any sense in other contexts. Therefore, one should not overstate the results in favor of the vaguely defined reformists.

Yet, certainly the results were utterly disheartening for the conservatives who lost all of the capital’s 30 parliamentary seats to the “List of Hope” of the reformist-moderate fronts. For instance, while Mohammad-Reza Aref, the former presidential candidate and a professed reformist, was among the thirty elected deputies from Tehran, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, the principal candidate of the conservative camp, was denied a seat in parliament. A similar result came out of the Assembly of Experts’ elections. While Rouhani and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani were elected to the Assembly such principle conservative figures as Muhammad Yazdi, the current ultraconservative Chairman of the Assembly, and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, one of the protagonists of conservative thinking, could not make their way to the new Assembly.

Elections and Domestic Politics

For a long time, Iran’s Middle East policies have turned attention away from its domestic developments and towards its foreign policies. The country seemed to many a monolithic body which, say, pursued harmonious policies to preserve its strongholds in Iraq or Syria or conducted painstaking talks over its nuclear question. Yet, major disagreements between conservatives and non-conservatives have existed throughout; disagreements which surfaced again during the last weeks. Now that the next presidential elections are only a year and a half away Iran has a lot to debate at home. Above all there are economic issues which are among the direst problems for most Iranians. Inflation is still high, the number of the unemployed is on the rise, income inequality is becoming greater and even the essentials are getting harder for low income groups to afford. The nuclear deal has not yet produced the expected outcomes for the Iranian economy. The economic problems are and will continue to be amongst the most challenging for the Rouhani government.

It is safe to suggest that the gap between the conservative and reformist policies will continue to widen in the newly elected 10th Parliament.

There is also the current government’s reformist agenda. Although Rouhani and other prominent moderates and reformists are among the outspoken supporters of the Revolution and the Islamic Republic regime they differ from the conservatives on some crucial points. They see the future of the regime in being willing and able to meet the plausible popular demands which can fill the growing gap between the state and society. Economically speaking, they favor, in the words of Rouhani, a ‘competitive economy’ which will attract foreign capital into the country, while the conservatives see, what Khamenei calls, a ‘defensive economy,’ which basically refers to the promotion of home industries that will remove the need for foreign imports, as the only viable policy.

The favorable election results will bring a challenge on a macro level since the frustrated conservatives will probably follow more aggressive policies against the government. Therefore, it is safe to suggest that the gap between the conservative and reformist policies will continue to widen in the newly elected 10th Parliament. Also, disheartened by the long list of disqualified candidates many pro-reform voters boycotted the elections. Rouhani needs to convince them to vote for the next presidential elections in 2017 for which his economy performance, but not only, will play the determining role. Yet, considering the many inexperienced deputies and the numerous moderates who have been elected from the ‘List of Hope’ and the approximately 80 independent deputies as potentially key groups in parliamentary politics, it is not clear to what extent they will be able to back the Rouhani government and act harmoniously. On his Labor Day speech, Rouhani commented on the results and said that, “people chose the best people in the elections, and we are happy that the next parliament will be more coordinated with the government.” This, more than anything else, remains to be seen.

Iran and its Neighbors

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a clear message to friends and foes alike that Turkey is strictly against sectarian policies and denounced any attempts at deepening the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.

Having lifted the Western-imposed isolation by the nuclear deal, Iran is on the edge of a new isolation, this time by its Sunni neighbors which have been disillusioned by the former’s regional policies, as reflected in the Final Communique of the 13th Session of the Islamic Summit Conference held in Istanbul in mid-May 2016. In that, Iran was deliberately criticized for supporting terrorism and interfering in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries including Syria and Yemen. Further, in his speech during the Summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a clear message to friends and foes alike that Turkey is strictly against sectarian policies and denounced any attempts at deepening the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.

It would be an overestimation to suppose that the Rouhani government is necessarily at odds with the conservative establishment on such critical foreign policy issues as Iraq, Syria and Yemen but it certainly supports more friendly relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors, primarily Turkey. Rouhani declared, in his visit to Ankara following the Summit, his intention to improve relations with Turkey and added that the post-sanctions era brought about a suitable environment for such a development. The new parliament provides a good opportunity for both Rouhani and Iran’s neighbors, primarily Turkey, to build mutually beneficial and reciprocal relationships. This can also help solve some of the region’s chronic problems.